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Finally, there came a time when everything that men had considered as
inalienable became an object of exchange, of traffic and could be
alienated. This is the time when the very things which till then had been
communicated, but never exchanged; given, but never sold; acquired,
but never bought - virtue, love, conviction, knowledge, conscience, etc.
- when everything, in short, passed into commerce. It is the time of
general corruption, of universal venality, or, to speak in terms of
political economy, the time when everything, moral or physical, having





This thesis is concerned with the theory and practice ofplanning in Western capitalist
societies. Specifically, it examines the tradition of radical planning within the context of
conventional planning theory. Its objectives are to evaluate the historical influence of
radical planning thought on conventional planning theory and practice, and secondly to
assess the relevance of radical planning to contemporary (and future) capitalist societies.
This is accomplished firstly through an analysis of the history of radical planning thought,
particularly the theories of a small number of influential planning theorists from the turn
of the nineteenth century up until the present. The contemporary relevance of radical
planning is examined by critically evaluating Friedmann's theory of transformative
planning and by offering an alternative theory based upon a Marxist critique of capitalism
and Gramscian transition theory. The normative theory is presented as practice in the
form of a critique of the resource management legislation in New Zealand undertaken by
the author in the course of his Ph.D. studies. In this way theory is linked to practice and
the dialectic between theory and practice made explicit.
The thesis evaluates three propositions:
1. That radical planning thought, although often obscured, possesses a rich history and
has had a profound and lasting influence on modern planning theory and practice.
2. That radical planning theory has a positive role to play in contemporary (and future)
planning aimed at the transformation of the capitalist mode ofproduction.
3. That this theory can be applied to a practice of radical planning that can contribute to
a progressive challenge to the dominant capitalist hegemony.
It is concluded that all three propositions can be answered in the affirmative. Radical
planning thought does possess a fertile history and has had a significant influence on
modern planning theory and practice since its inception at the close of the nineteenth
century. Although its existence has gone largely unacknowledged by orthodox planning
its presence indicates that historically there has always been resistance to the exploitation
of capitalist class society and a search for a better, more sustainable mode of production.
Secondly, radical planning theory can have a positive role in contemporary and future
planning. There is a legitimate rationale, founded upon a Marxist critique of capitalism,
for adopting a radical approach to planning (a theory for planning). In addition,
Gramscian transition theory provides a strong conceptual basis for a theory ofradical
planning, a methodology of radical planning practice. Lastly, this theory can be applied to
a practice of radical planning that may contribute to a progressive challenge to capitalist
hegemony. Whether this challenge escalates into fundamental socio-economic change
remains to be seen. Radical planners can, however, continue the tradition of earlier
proponents of radical change and search for alternatives to the exploitation of human and
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This thesis grew out of an earlier work (Grundy, 1993). That essay (Sustainable
Development: A New Zealand Perspective) was the result of a two-pronged inquiry.
Firstly, from an environmental view point, it represented an attempt to evaluate the
potential of the concept of sustainable development (and its New Zealand counterpart,
sustainable management) to address, respectively, global and national environmental ills.
Secondly, from a planning perspective, it attempted to provide a rationale for planning as
an intervention in societal affairs by redefining the notion of the 'common good' through
an analysis of the concepts of sustainable development and sustainable management.
Those inquiries were undertaken at a time when New Zealand was undergoing
fundamental socio-economic, political, and institutional restructuring. The post-war social
democratic consensus was being tom asunder and subjected to thorough 'economic
rationalisation' by a rampant neoliberal ideology.
The study concluded that the environmental imperatives contained within the concepts of
sustainable development and sustainable management were incompatible, and indeed
contradictory, with those of neoliberal deregulated capitalism. It argued that
contemporary environmental ills would require more regulation not less. It postulated the
need for a return to social democracy and a regulated economy. In this sense, sustainable
development, in its conceptual form, provided a rationale for increased planning
intervention in socio-economic processes.
The present study was initially an attempt to formulate a planning theory and
methodology to enable sustainable development as earlier defined. This was envisaged to
be within the confines of a capitalist, albeit regulated, economic system. In that sense, it
was reformist. However, as the study progressed it became increasingly apparent that
purely reformist measures were inadequate to address the contradictions inherent to the
capitalist mode ofproduction. In short, it became obvious that the socio-economic system
itself required radical transformation to overcome these contradictions.
I was then faced with a problem that has long perplexed planners of a transformative or
radical persuasion. Namely, how to resolve the contradiction between the realisation that
capitalism is socially perverse, economically unjust, ecologically disruptive and, over the
long term, unsustainable whilst, at the same time, effectively perpetuating the system by
alleviating social, economic and ecological tensions over the short term through the
planning process (in other words, facilitating the reproduction of capitalism by attempting
to overcome its immediate social, economic and ecological dysfunctions).
In addition, a further paradox confronted me. According to traditional Marxist theory, the
transformation of capitalism would be brought about by a popular revolutionary uprising
led by a rapidly expanding industrial proletariat fully conscious of its historic task.
However, in contemporary capitalism there is no indication of this taking place. There is,
instead, an actual 'embourgeoisment' (ideologically, culturally and politically) of the
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proletariat, and little evidence of the development of a revolutionary class consciousness.
Moreover, since the collapse of Eastern bloc communism, global capitalism seems under
even less challenge. So much so, that the'end of history' and the' end of ideology' have
been triumphantly proclaimed as a contemporary and lasting reality. The capitalist mode
of production, it seems, reigns supreme.
Three things convinced me to pursue those riddles. The first was an analysis of Marx's
economic writings, particularly Capital, Theories ofSurplus-Value and Grundrisse.
Marx's emphatic demonstration that the capitalist economy must continuously expand,
that steady-state capitalism is an impossibility, suggested to me that this mode of
production is, in the final analysis, unsustainable. Despite its contemporary triumph over
'actually existing' communism, ultimately capitalism will be replaced, either through a
conscious transformative process or by its own demise brought about by increasing
ecological and social disruption.
The second factor was John Friedmann's book, Planning in the Public Domain. In it
Friedmann advocated a transformative theory and practice ofplanning. He argued that
reformist approaches were unable to address the growing contradictions of contemporary
capitalism. This reinforced my own view that reformism was inadequate to overcome the
present dysfunctions in the capitalist mode ofproduction and that a more radical approach
was called for.
The third, was my discovery of the writings of Antonio Gramsci, one of the founders of
the Italian Communist Party and imprisoned by the Fascists in 1926. In prison, Gramsci
addressed the problem of revolutionary change in advanced capitalist countries. His
writings give an insight into how contemporary (and future) capitalism can be
transformed, what the role of the modem proletariat is in this process, and, most
significantly, an indication of the role of activists and planners.
This encouraged me to formulate a role for planners and activists working in the public
domain, both in the community and in the apparatus of government. The intent was to
provide a theoretical legitimisation, a rationale, and a methodology for radical activism
and radical planning. By building upon Friedmann's earlier efforts, I was able to construct
a normative theory for, and of, radical planning. This thesis is the result of those efforts
and should be judged as such. It makes no pretense at being definitive. It is merely a
beginning. It has, however, served to provide me personally with a philosophical basis for
my own practical activity as a planner and activist. Hence its title - the 'philosophy of
praxis' - words borrowed from Gramsci who used them as a substitute term for Marxism
so as not to arouse the suspicions of his prison censors.
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Planning theory attempts to answer three questions: 'Why plan?' (theory for planning),
'how to plan?' (theory ofplanning), and 'what is a good plan?' (theory in planning).The
first is a philosophical/political question, the second a procedural one, and the third
substantive/spatial. Planning theory in Western capitalist societies has largely been
concerned with the latter two questions. The question 'why plan?' has been submerged by
the technicalities of 'how to plan', and 'what constitutes a good plan'. In this way, the
practice of planning has often been depoliticised and portrayed as an objective, value-free
technocratic process carried out by appropriately trained professional' experts' proficient
in planning technique (Kiernan, 1983; Reade, 1987).
Planning is, however, an inherently political activity. It is concerned with questions about
the allocation of resources and the distributional effects arising from such allocations,
including both socio-economic consequences and environmental costs and benefits.
These profoundly affect the distribution of wealth, and economic and political power in
society. They also profoundly affect ecological outcomes. Planning interventions rest
either explicitly or implicitly upon a political/philosophical rationale, which includes
specific views of the human-nature relationship. Substantive and procedural planning
theory is thus intimately linked, although that is often unstated or obscured, to political/
philosophical presuppositions about the role ofplanning in society (Beatley, 1987;
Beauregard, 1978; Harvey, 1973, 1996b; Low, 1991).
In his book, Planning in the Public Domain: From Knowledge to Action, Friedmann
(1987) outlined a comprehensive history ofplanning thought. Within this historical
analysis he linked the substantive and procedural theories ofplanning with their political/
philosophical sources and underlying rationales: what Reade, (1987: ix) has called 'the
fundamental socio-philosophical presuppositions of planning' . He distinguished two
broad types of planning action in modem times: 'societal guidance' and 'social
mobilisation'. Within the broad parameters of societal guidance he situated three
traditions: social reform, social learning, and policy analysis (the former being dominant).
Within social mobilisation he positioned the three major oppositional movements of
utopianism, social anarchism, and historical materialism, which he described as 'the great
counter-movements to social reform'.
Broadly speaking, societal guidance (or social reform) is concerned with maintaining the
existing capitalist mode of production and its associated relations ofproduction, and
conventional planning in Western capitalist countries is firmly positioned within this
tradition. On the other hand, social mobilisation seeks to transform the capitalist mode of
production. It views the existing socio-economic system, with its underlying property
relations, class divisions, and associated privileges, as socially oppressive, economically
exploitative, and ecologically unsustainable. It proposes radical change to future modes of
production capable of overcoming these fundamental dysfunctions.
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Friedmann, in his analysis, suggested where the future emphasis in planning theory and
practice ought to lie. Planning, he claimed, must aim not merely at the incremental reform
of industrial capitalism in response to its short-term contradictions, but at the actual
transformation of the capitalist mode ofproduction itself. It must be firmly positioned
within the tradition of social mobilisation. Friedmann (1987:9) explained his position as
follows: "As we approach the end of this century, the social mobilization tradition is
becoming ever more relevant to planning. For there are signs that the system of industrial
capitalism is so deeply mired in crisis that it may never fully recover."
Conventional planning aimed at reformist measures is, according to Friedmann, unable to
address these fundamental dysfunctions in the modem global industrial capitalist system.
He stated: "Because it is inevitably integrated into the state apparatus, planning for
societal guidance [reformism] is incapable of coping with the crisis of industrial
capitalism" (p.10). He concluded by outlining a theory and practice of radical planning
aimed at achieving socio-economic transformation through a process he called 'social
reconstruction' .
The advocacy of a radical transformative approach to the theory and practice ofplanning
may appear to orthodox planners as extraordinary, coming as it does from one of the
foremost American planning theorists and academics of the later part of the twentieth
century; particularly so at a time when public planning was generally in retreat, or had
been eo-opted to act as facilitator of development rather than the regulator - 'the
gamekeeper turned poacher', as Hall (1988) put it. However, Friedmann's position may
not be as incongruous as first appears. Planning has a rich heritage of radical thought.
Indeed, the founding fathers of modem planning at the turn of the last century advocated
the radical transformation of Victorian capitalism. There have been other influential
planning theorists since who have likewise advocated radical approaches to planning.
This rich history of radical planning thought has, however, largely been ignored by the
planning profession. Planning historians and planning theorists, together with planning
educators, have been concerned mainly with reformist approaches to planning. This is, of
course, understandable and, indeed, to be expected in a capitalist society. If, on the other
hand, as Friedmann argued, the theory and practice of planning are in crisis at the end of
the twentieth century then a reexamination of radical planning thought may offer insights
into this crisis along with its possible resolution. In addition, Friedmann's claim that
reformist approaches are no longer able to deal with the crises facing industrial
capitalism, and that a transformative approach to planning is urgently required, is worthy
of careful evaluation.
The thesis will address those issues. It does so by evaluating three propositions:
1. That radical planning thought, although often obscured, possesses a rich history and
has had a profound and lasting influence on modem planning theory and practice.
2. That radical planning theory has a positive role to play in contemporary (and future)
planning aimed at the transformation of the capitalist mode ofproduction.
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3. That this theory can be applied to a practice of radical planning that can contribute to
a progressive challenge to the dominant capitalist hegemony.
The methods used to evaluate these propositions are:
1. An historical analysis of radical planning thought and its influence on conventional
planning theory and practice.
2. A critical appraisal of Friedmann' s theory of social transformation and its relevance to
planning in contemporary society.
3. The formulation of a theory for, and of, radical planning applicable to advanced
capitalist societies.
4. The application of this theory to practice through a critique of the formulation,
interpretation and implementation of the resource management legislation in New
Zealand.
The first proposition will be examined through a study of the history of radical planning
thought, particularly the theories of a small number of influential planning theorists from
the turn of the nineteenth century until the present. This comprises Part One of the thesis.
Historical analysis will show that modem planning initially developed as a response to
the dysfunctions of nineteenth century industrial capitalism. However, its objectives were
not simply reformist. The founding fathers ofplanning sought not only to ameliorate the
adverse effects of industrial capitalism (particularly as manifested in rapidly growing
urban centres) but the actual transformation of the capitalist mode of production itself.
This transformative approach to the philosophy ofplanning was based upon utopian
socialist and utopian anarchist visions of society.
Later theorists likewise advocated a radical transformative approach to planning founded
upon utopian and anarchistic principles. These initiatives were responses to later crises
afflicting the capitalist mode ofproduction, particularly the 1929 stock market crash and
the Great Depression of the 1930s. We shall examine the theories of two of these radical
planners - Frank Lloyd Wright and Le Corbusier - who advanced opposing views of the
ideal society, one based upon extreme decentralisation and the other hierarchical
centralisation, both, however, designed to transform the capitalist mode of production
existing at the time.
Over time, those early radical visions ofurban and regional planning were subsumed
within a reformist approach that sought the containment of environmental externalities
resulting from economic development and the orderly provision of infrastructure and
institutional support to enable the reproduction of the capitalist mode ofproduction itself.
This approach to planning theory predominated in the literature from the Great
Depression onwards. Following the Second World War, rational comprehensive models
and systems analysis pervaded the theory ofplanning (Hall, 1992). Planning was
presented as a technical, rational, value-free process undertaken by 'experts' proficient in
planning technique. In this way, planning was both depoliticised and 'professionalised'
(Kiernan, 1983; McLoughlin, 1994; Reade, 1987).
3
In the 1970s planning theory was subjected to severe criticism from a radical leftist
perspective (Beauregard, 1978; Castells, 1976, 1977, 1978; Dear and Scott, 1981; Harvey,
1973, 1996b; Preteceille, 1982; Scott and Roweis, 1977), while in the 1980s the
neoliberal right launched a sustained attack on the legitimacy ofplanning (Anderson,
1982; Banergee, 1993; Klosterman, 1985; Richardson and Gordon, 1991; Sorenson and
Day, 1981). The outcome was a crisis in planning theory and a reorientation ofplanning
practice during the 1980s and 1990s, described by some commentators as a modern!
postmodem disjunction and realignment (Allmendinger, 2001, 2002; Allmendinger and
Tewdwr-Jones, 2002; Dear, 1986; Goodchild, 1990; Healey, 1996, 1997; Sandercock,
1998; Taylor, 1998).
The reorientation ofplanning theory over the last decade or so has resulted in a number of
theoretical approaches to development and land use planning. These include neoliberal
and public choice perspectives (Evans, 1991; Lewis, 1992; Pennington, 1999,2000), neo-
pragmatism (Hoch, 1995, 1996, 1997), political economy approaches (Ambrose, 1994;
Fainstein, 1997,2000; Feldman, 1995, 1997), new urbanism (Katz, 1994; Kuntsler,
1996), sustainable development initiatives (Blowers, 1993; Buckingham-Hatfield and
Evans, 1996; Common, 1995) and, perhaps the most influential, communicative or
collaborative planning (Forester, 1998, 1999; Healey, 1992, 1996, 1998; Sager, 1994).
Indeed collaborative planning has been hailed as planning theory's 'emerging paradigm'
(Innes, 1995) or the 'theoretical zeitgeist of the 1990s' (Allmendinger, 2001, 2002).
The radical critique ofplanning undertaken in the 1970s was, in the main, a negative
critique and offered little in the way ofprescription for a progressive role for radical
planning in capitalist societies (Cenzatti, 1987). Nor do the so-called postmodem
initiatives, or the application of Habermasian communicative rationality to planning
theory, offer much in a positive sense for a transformative theory and practice of
planning. Friedmann's theory of radical planning, being one of the few truly
transformative approaches to planning in recent years, thus warrants further investigation.
His theory of 'social reconstruction' will be critically examined to determine its
usefulness as a theory and practice of radical planning. His analysis of contemporary
capitalism will be evaluated along with his prescriptions for transformative action.
Although Friedmann makes a worthy attempt at advancing a theory and practice of radical
planning, it will be seen that his theory of social reconstruction has shortcomings.
Friedmann starts from an historical materialist position in his analysis of capitalist
society. However, his exposition lacks an adequate analysis of the underlying dynamics
inherent to the capitalist mode of production, and almost completely ignores the
relationship between the forces of production and the relations of production that is
essential to understanding the contradictions afflicting contemporary capitalism, together
with its historical trajectory and long term sustainability. This, it will be argued, leads
Friedmann to an inadequate interpretation of, and prescription for, the transformation
process.
4
However, it is proposed, following Friedmann, that there is a role for radical planning in
contemporary capitalist society and that this role will become increasingly important as
the contradictions of capitalism intensify. Just as the beginning of the twentieth century
witnessed the advancement of planning as a method for transforming capitalist society so,
it is argued, does the start of the twentieth-first century cry out for a progressive and
radical vision of planning. Whilst the concerns of the late nineteenth/early twentieth
century centred largely on the social and immediate environmental dysfunctions of
capitalism, the start of the twentieth-first century faces a crisis of a different nature and
magnitude - a global social and ecological crisis. Reformist approaches to planning, it is
argued (in agreement with Friedmann), are insufficient to address this crisis, and a radical
approach aimed once again at the transformation of the capitalist mode ofproduction is
required.
The second proposition of the thesis - that radical planning theory has a positive role to
play in contemporary (and future) planning aimed at the transformation of the capitalist
mode ofproduction - will be evaluated in Part Two of the thesis. In other words, an
attempt to provide a normative theory and practice of radical planning to contribute to this
transformation will be undertaken. Initially, a rationale is proposed for radical planning as
a practical activity in advanced Western capitalist society and, secondly, a methodology is
formulated to carry out these interventions. The theory is positioned within one of the
three great oppositional movements identified by Friedmann: historical materialism.
The theoretical rationale for adopting a radical approach to planning is founded on a
critique of capitalism based upon Marx's economic writings, particularly Capital,
Theories ofSurplus-Value and Grundrisse. This is explored in Chapter 4. Marx's
dialectical analysis of the capitalist mode ofproduction revealed its inner dynamics and
contradictions. These 'inner motions' are explained by his theories of value, surplus-
value, and capital accumulation. It will be demonstrated that the accumulation process,
resting as it does upon the inherent drive to expropriate surplus-value, manifests itself
concretely as the expansion of capital, a propensity to incessant economic growth in the
form of ever-increasing commodity production over the long term.
In addition, the accumulation process manifests itself concretely in yet another form - the
concentration and centralisation of capital. That is, the means ofproduction are
progressively confined to fewer and fewer owners of capital. Concurrently, the proletariat
(dependent wage and salary earners) increases in size along with the creation and
maintenance of a surplus population or pool ofunemployed and semi-employed people.
Associated with these movements is relative impoverishment of the proletariat as a
whole, and absolute impoverishment of sections of the surplus population. This results in
the polarisation of wealth as well as economic and political power intranationally and
internationally.
It will be argued that these dynamics result in two fundamental and, in the long term,
unsustainable contradictions inherent to the capitalist mode of production. Firstly, the
expansion of capital, the chronic quantitative increase in the production of commodities,
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is ecologically disruptive and ultimately unsustainable. It must meet its biophysical limits.
These are set by the laws of thermodynamics and the ecological realities ofbiological
reproduction. Stated simply, thermodynamics and ecology reveal finite limits to human-
induced transformation of nature. Infinite economic growth in the form of ever increasing
commodity production inherent to the capitalist mode of production is therefore
unsustainable. There is, in other words, a conflict between capitalism and its continued
biophysical reproduction. This is posited as the ecological, or external, contradiction of
capital.
Secondly, the concentration and centralisation of capital, with its associated polarisation
of wealth, along with economic and political power, is socially unsustainable. This trend
is seen as socially repressive in that it denies a greater portion of the global human
population its individual and social potential. It is seen as economically exploitative, in
that the surplus social product arising from the increased social productivity of labour
does not accrue to the producers of that surplus, the proletariat. And it is viewed in the
long term as socially and politically disruptive due to increasing social, economic and
political inequities, intranationally as well as internationally. There is, in other words, a
conflict between the capitalist mode of production and its social reproduction. This is
termed the social, or internal, contradiction of capital.
It will be demonstrated that these two contradictions contain a further contradiction.
Whilst the immense productive power of capitalism, founded upon its chronic
expansionary dynamic, is ecologically disruptive and ultimately unsustainable, the social
relations ofproduction, expressed as the concentration and centralisation of capital as
well as economic and political power (subjectively representing the expansionary dictates
of capital), are intrinsically incapable of addressing the mounting ecological crisis. There
is, in other words, a conflict between the forces of production (capital expansion) and the
relations ofproduction (capital concentration/centralisation).
In this way, it is argued, capitalism creates an impasse, a contradiction, that cannot be
resolved by its own logic. That is, it cannot be resolved by reformism. It is the inevitable
result of dynamics inherent to the mode of production. Capital must expand and it must
concentrate. It cannot do otherwise. To overcome this contradiction requires the
transformation of the capitalist mode of production to a post-capitalist socio-economic
system founded upon different economic, ecological and social rationalities.
Chapter 5 examines this transformation process. For insight, we again refer to Marx.
Marx not only investigated and explained the underlying dynamics and resultant
contradictions inherent to the capitalist mode ofproduction. His other great achievement
was to situate this mode ofproduction in its historical context; to show that the dynamics
he uncovered were not absolute economic laws applicable to all societies, as bourgeois
economists would have us believe, but are historically specific and applicable to a
particular period: one of relatively recent origin and one, according to Marx, facing its
eventual demise. Thus, Marx's theory of historical materialism posits that just as former
modes ofproduction have been replaced so too will the present system give birth to its
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successor. Moreover, this transition, although determined 'in the last instance' by
objective economic conditions, is realised by human praxis in the form of a proletarian
revolutionary movement.
For insight into the nature and role of the proletarian movement in contemporary
capitalist societies we will turn to the writings of Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist
theoretician and activist, who analysed the success and failures of the proletarian
revolutionary movements surrounding the war of 1914-1919. Gramsci concluded that
different revolutionary strategies were required by West and East, by advanced capitalist
nations and less developed countries. Those strategies are informed by Gramsci's concept
of hegemony, perhaps his single most important contribution to Marxist theory.
Gramsci adopted the notion of hegemony used by previous Marxists (i.e. a process by
which the proletariat extended its leadership over all the elements opposed to capital) and
applied it to the way capitalism reproduces itself, in effect, how the bourgeoisie
establishes and maintains its dominance over wider society. Gramsci argued that the
dominant class maintains its position not only through force and coercion but also by
'educating' the consent of the subordinate classes through 'moral and intellectual
leadership'. Economic, social, cultural, and ideological influences permeate the complex
superstructure of advanced capitalist countries to diffuse a 'common sense', a common
conception of the world based upon, and legitimising, the interests of the dominant class.
In light of those discoveries, Gramsci outlined a strategy he termed the 'war of
manoeuvre' (or 'war of movement'), an uprising culminating in a frontal assault on, and
overthrow of, the state. This strategy, according to Gramsci, was appropriate and
successful in the East (Russia) where the dominant class maintained its position mainly
through force. He then described an alternative 'war ofposition' , a protracted struggle
conducted largely in civil society (the private sphere) for hegemonic dominance, which
preceded, but did not supercede, the 'war ofmanoeuvre'. This, he postulated, was the
necessary strategy in the West, for advanced capitalist countries with well developed civil
societies.
Gramsci also re-theorised the role and relationship between the proletariat, its political
organisation and party structure, and its leadership. In doing so he re-examined the role of
intellectuals in maintaining the dominant class's hegemony and in challenging it as
'organic intellectuals' of the proletariat. It is his writings on the role of intellectuals in the
counter-hegemonic struggle that provide the conceptual basis for a practice of radical
planning. Public planning occupies a strategic nexus in the vast superstructural complex
of advanced capitalist countries. It is situated at a critical mediating position between
political society and civil society, between the state and the community. It is precisely this
position in the state apparatus and civil society, and in mediating the discourse between
the two spheres, that provides opportunity for a radical form ofplanning.
In Chapter 6 we examine the concrete task of radical planning. Using the theoretical basis
presented in Chapters 4 and 5, a normative practice of radical planning is outlined. First,
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the crucial nexus between theory and practice, a dialectical relationship essential to
understanding 'the philosophy of praxis' and operationalising a practice of radical
planning, is discussed. We then examine planning in the public domain and suggest
potential sites ofcounter-hegemonic activity that radical planners can occupy in the
superstructure of advanced capitalist societies. This is followed by analysis of the roles
that radical planners can play in their capacity as organic intellectuals of the proletarian
movement. Chapter 6 concludes with an exposition on radical planning, emphasising the
necessity of developing a 'popular front' consisting of a coalition of the disparate
elements opposed to capital: in the first instance, an alliance of traditional socialist groups
and emerging radical green movements.
It will be argued that there is, indeed, a role for radical planners in the public sphere of
modem capitalist societies and Marx's critique ofcapitalism provides the rationale.
Capitalism, it is maintained, is ultimately unsustainable, and its transformation is an
historical necessity. Reformist approaches to planning are thus inadequate. Marx's
writings on historical materialism and revolutionary class struggle provide the theoretical
basis for the necessary proletarian movement in opposition to capital. More specifically,
the writings of Gramsci provide the conceptual basis for a practice of radical planning.
His writings on hegemony, the 'war ofposition' , and the role of intellectuals in the
struggle for hegemony provide a strong theoretical base for radical planners operating in
the vast superstructural complexes of advanced capitalist countries.
To evaluate this theory through empirical analysis is difficult. The normative theory
outlined in the thesis is for an envisaged practice of radical activity. In this sense,
following Friedmann, it is 'both theoretical and visionary'. As Friedmann (1987:303)
stated: "Instead of generalising from empirical case studies, I have tried to construct a
normative model of what a radical form ofplanning might look like. It outlines the
dimensions of a possible practice". This has been precisely my task - to advance a
normative theory and practice ofplanning within the transformative, rather than the
reformist, tradition of planning. As with Friedmann's theory of radical planning, it is
firmly located within the social mobilisation tradition.
However, according to the canons of critical social science, knowledge is not simply
concerned with interpreting, explaining or predicting events. Knowledge, like theory, if it
is to remain relevant, must be directed to actively bringing about social change, i.e.
knowledge must be linked to action. Critical social science is an 'engaged' science, one
that demands involvement and activism on the part of the researcher or theoretician.
Thus, the theories for and ofradical planning formulated in Part Two of the thesis must
be applied to a concrete practice of radical planning, to inform specific actions aimed at
social change, if that knowledge is to remain relevant; active, rather than contemplative.
The dialectic between theory and practice can thus be realised.
In order to realise the dialectic between theory and practice, and based upon the
theoretical prescriptions outlined in Part Two of the thesis, the author, in his capacity as a
planning academic and environmental activist, has engaged in a form of counter-
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hegemonic activity that can be viewed as indicative of a role that a practice of radical
planning can undertake. This role is prescribed in the theory of radical planning presented
in Part Two as one ofpolitical, socio-economic and environmental critique (Gramsci's
'hostile criticism') within academia and the ranks of the planning profession. The
education system is a crucial site for hegemonic struggle. And just as the education
system acts as a coercive force and a centre for the reproduction of the dominant
hegemony, so can radical planning use it as a site for' anti-coercive' resistance and a
centre for counter-hegemonic activity.
This will be exemplified by a critique of resource management legislation in New
Zealand, in particular the interpretation of section 5 - the purpose and principles of the
Resource Management Act - undertaken by the author during the course of his Ph.D.
research. That critique, presented in Part Three of the thesis, takes the form of a series of
articles questioning the dominant ideology in relation to resource management and
environmental regulation. The counter-hegemonic arguments put forward in the articles,
following Gramsci, are challenges to the 'moral and intellectual leadership' of the leading
social group, the 'common sense' of the times, the dominant contemporary neoliberal
bourgeois ideology. They were written to raise critical awareness of the political-
economic dynamics underlying resource management and environmental planning in
New Zealand at the time. They represent, in this sense, an empirical study of counter-
hegemonic activity and provide a practical application of the theory presented in Part
Two. The essential connection between theory and practice is thus established.
In a conventional planning sense, the articles can also be looked upon as an empirical
study in policy analysis. Policy analysis is usually undertaken within the planning
tradition of societal guidance. It seeks to improve public policy within the confines of the
existing socio-economic structure. However, policy analysis can serve another purpose.
By critiquing public policy from a radical perspective - i.e. by critiquing the underlying
presuppositions ofpolicy rather than just the surface manifestations - policy analysis can
challenge the dominant assumptions about the socio-economic system, the 'common
sense' regarding the structure and functioning of society. In this way policy analysis can
be subverted to act in opposition to the prevailing hegemony and can contribute to the
construction of a counter-hegemony to challenge that of the dominant group. It can, in
short, serve a radical cause.
This is precisely the objective of the articles presented in Part Three of the thesis. By
critiquing the resource management legislation - its formulation, interpretation and
implementation - these articles attempt to shed new light on the policy process. By
challenging the prevailing ideology regarding resource management and environmental
policy, and arguing an alternative position, the author, through these articles, seeks to
raise broad critical awareness about the political economy of resource management in this
country. In addition, through such an approach, the political economy of capitalism
(particularly neoliberalism) in its wider aspects can be brought under scrutiny.
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Policy analysis can also be understood as a form of discourse analysis. Discourses are
frameworks which "embrace particular combinations of narratives, concepts, ideologies
and signifying practices, each relevant to a particular realm of social action" (Barnes and
Duncan, 1992:8). They are, in Foucault's (1972:31) words, "sets of regularities which
constrain and enable social action, individual expectations and the questions which can be
asked by people under a particular discourse". The debate over the Resource Management
Act can thus be viewed as a discourse concerned with resource management and
environmental regulation in New Zealand. This discourse encompasses differing
ideologies and 'signifying practices' relevant to specific social actions: in this case,
planning in the public domain. By deconstructing this discourse those ideologies and
signifying practices can be made explicit.
Analysis of the debate over the resource management legislation reveals two different
views of planning, each situated within the parameters of the two broad planning
traditions identified by Friedmann: societal guidance (reformism) and social mobilisation
(transformation). The New Zealand Government, in its interpretation of the Resource
Management Act, has advocated a 'narrowed' view ofplanning underpinned by
neoliberal ideology associated with deregulated capitalism. This view ofplanning is
firmly located within the tradition of societal guidance. It implicitly accepts the logic of
capitalism (in fact, serves to reinforce it) and merely attempts to resolve its short-term
environmental and socio-economic contradictions.
The alternate 'holistic' interpretation investigated in the articles is founded upon a
radically different vision of planning. This view ofplanning requires a critical re-
examination of the political and socio-economic presuppositions underpinning neoliberal
capitalism in light of the ecological and social contradictions that have developed within
the present mode ofproduction. The resolution of these contradictions, it is argued, will
necessitate a radical reorientation of the present political economy and the transformation
of the present mode ofproduction to a mode of production determined by the social and
ecological realities facing us in the twenty-first century. This view of planning is located
within the tradition of social mobilisation.
We can see from the outline above that the thesis has a tripartite structure based upon the
three propositions that are to be evaluated as part of the research project (see Figure 1).
Part One addresses the first proposition advanced in the thesis: that radical planning
thought, although often obscured, possesses a rich history and has had a profound and
lasting influence on modem planning theory and practice since its inception at the close
of the nineteenth century. This will be accomplished through an historical analysis of
radical planning thought, and its influence on conventional planning theory and practice,
together with a critical appraisal of Friedmann's theory of social transformation and its
relevance to contemporary planning. The objective of Part One is to make explicit the
influential role radical planning has played historically and to investigate the
philosophical roots of radical thought. In this way, Part One situates the research project





Part I - Past Radical Approaches to Planning
• Historical analysis ofradical approaches to planning and influence on
conventional planning theory and practice
• Critical appraisal of Friedmann's theory of social reconstruction
• Objective: to situate the research project in socio-historical context and
particular field of intellectual enquiry
D
Part 11- Future Directions: Eco-Radical Planning
• Future role for radical approach to planning theory and practice
• Formulation of theory for, and of, radical planning
0 Rationale for adopting radical approach
0 Conceptual basis for, and methodology of, radical practice
• Objective: to substantiate the need for a radical approach to planning and
to provide normative theory for such an approach
U
Part ill - Policy Analysis and Counter-Hegemonic Struggle
• Application of normative theory to practice ofradical planning
• Critique ofresource management legislation in New Zealand
• Objective: to present empirical study of radical planning and realise
dialectic between theory and practice
D
Conclusions
Figure 1: Thesis Structure
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Part Two focuses on the second proposition put forward in the thesis: that radical
planning theory has a positive role to play in contemporary (and future) planning aimed at
the transformation of the capitalist mode ofproduction. This will be accomplished, firstly,
by providing a rationale for adopting a radical approach to planning, in other words, a
theory for radical planning. This will be based upon a comprehensive critique of the
capitalist mode ofproduction founded on Marx's economic writings. Secondly, a theory
ofplanning will be outlined: the conceptual basis for such a theory together with a
methodology to inform a practice of radical planning. These will be founded upon an
analysis of Marx's and Engels' theory of historical materialism, together with an analysis,
and appropriation, of Gramscian transition theory. The objective of Part Two is to
substantiate the need for a radical approach to planning in contemporary (and future)
times and to provide a normative theory to inform such an approach.
Part Three addresses the third proposition advanced in the thesis: that the theory of radical
planning developed in Part Two can contribute to a progressive challenge to the dominant
capitalist hegemony. This will be attempted through the application of the theory
developed in Part Two of the thesis to a practice of radical planning undertaken by the
author during the course of his research for this thesis. It takes the form of a series of
articles critiquing the dominant ideology in relation to resource management and
environmental regulation in New Zealand. This enables at least a partial evaluation of the
proposition presented above in the sense that a role for radical planning in the public
domain can be established. Whether this role contributes to a progressive challenge to
contemporary (or future) capitalism remains to be seen. The objective of Part Three is
thus to present an empirical study of radical planning through the practical application of
the normative theory developed in the thesis and, in this way, realise the dialectic between
theory and practice.
There are strong links between the three parts of the thesis in that each part serves to
inform any following parts and to reflect upon those proceeding. For example, the
historical analysis undertaken in Part One sets the context for the contemporary analysis
that follows. It situates the research project undertaken in the thesis in a socio-historical
setting and particular field of intellectual enquiry. It also investigates and evaluates the
philosophical and conceptual foundations of radical thought. The research undertaken in
Part Two relies upon the philosophical and conceptual knowledge gained from the
historical analysis to help situate, and inform, a contemporary theory and practice of
radical planning whilst, at the same time, investigating further sources of knowledge. Part
Three applies the theory developed in Part Two to a practice of radical planning. It thus,
in accordance with critical social science, links the knowledge gained in Parts One and
Two to action; to practical activity designed to engender social change. This also enables
the experience gained through practice to inform further theoretical research.
The thesis thus represents a comprehensive and rigorous analysis of radical planning
within the context of conventional planning theory and practice. It is an area of
intellectual endevour that is, in the author's opinion, under-researched. It is hoped that
this project will at least partially address that deficiency.
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Chapter 2: Research Methods
In regard to the research methods employed in the thesis an important, indeed crucial,
distinction between critical (Marxist) social science and conventional (bourgeois) science
must be established. All science demands that the methods followed be defensible
according to certain canons ofprocedure. Marxism, along with other approaches to
knowledge, insists upon the' scientific' nature of its own procedures. However, as
Heilbroner (1980) pointed out, it differs from other approaches in the way it defines
'science', and thus how it views scientific enquiry.
According to Heilbroner (1980), the dominant notion of science today refers to a method
of obtaining information about the world, a method that can be broadly described as the
formulation of refutable hypotheses (he also observed that there is no doubt that
approaches to social science often fall well short of ideal specifications). However, the
conception of science broached by Marx is not defmed by devising testable hypotheses
(although these are not discounted). It is a differently conceived task that Marx insisted
upon, namely the dialectical analysis ofphenomena by piercing the screen of appearances
to arrive at the 'scientific' truth of a concealed essence. As Marx emphasised: "All
science would be superfluous if the outward appearance and the essence of things directly
coincided" (Capital 3:956).
Marx often used 'dialectical' as a synonym for 'scientific' method. In the Afterword to
the Second Edition of Capital] he quoted the St Petersburg reviewer's description of his
scientific approach, commenting "when the writer describes so aptly... the method 1have
actually used, what else is he describing but the dialectical method?" (in Bhaskar, 1983a:
125). In a letter to Schweitzer (24 January 1865), Marx observed that 'the secret of
scientific dialectics' depends upon comprehending 'economic categories as the theoretical
expression of historical relations of production, corresponding to a particular stage of
development ofmaterial production' (in Bhaskar, 1983a: 125). As Bhaskar (1983a: 125)
explained: "Marx's dialectic is scientific because it explains the contradictions in thought
and the crises of socio-economic life in terms of the particular contradictory essential
relations which generate them... And Marx's dialectic is historical because it is both
rooted in, and (conditionally) an agent of, the changes in the relations and circumstances
it describes."
When describing value, Marx provided the following insight into his procedure: "1 do not
proceed on the basis of 'concepts', hence also not from the 'value-concept' ... What 1
proceed from is the simplest social form in which the product of labour in contemporary
society manifests itself, and this as 'commodity'. That is what 1 analyse, and first of all to
be sure in the form in which it appears. Now 1 find at this point that it is, on the one hand,
in its natural form a thing of use-value, alias use-value, and on the other hand that it is
bearer of exchange-value, and is itself an exchange-value from this point of view.
Through further analysis of the latter 1discovered that exchange-value is only an
'appearance-form' , an independent mode of manifestation of the value which is contained
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in the commodity, and then I approach the analysis of value" (Notes on Adolph Wagner,
in Mohun, 1983:507).
According to Marx, it is through dialectical abstraction from concrete phenomena
revealed by empirical investigation that the concealed essences ofphenomena (the
underlying relations and contradictions) are revealed. Once accomplished, revealed
essence is used to explain the outward appearance of a phenomenon in all its
implications. As Mandel (1976a:21) explained, referring to Marx's approach to socio-
economic investigation: "Marx goes from the elements of the material concrete to go to
the theoretical abstract, which helps him then to reproduce the concrete totality in his
theoretical analysis". Thus, according to Bhaskar (1983a:125) one can distinguish in
Marx's dialectics an 'empirically-controlled mode of inquiry' and a 'quasi-deductive
method of exposition' .
Based upon this distinction, Bhaskar (1983a) described a 'critical' and a 'systematic'
dialectic employed by Marx in his scientific investigations. The former, which is also a
practical intervention in history, takes the form of a triple critique - of economic
doctrines, agents' conceptions, and the generative structures and essential relations which
underlie them. Bhaskar (1983a: 125) stated: "Marx' s critical dialectics may perhaps best
be regarded as an empirically open-ended, materially conditioned and historically
circumscribed, dialectical phenomenology". According to Bhaskar (1983a) Marx's
systematic dialectics begins in Capital], with the dialectic of the commodity and
culminates in Theories ofSurplus-Value with the critical history of political economy.
Bhaskar (1983a:125) stated:
"Ultimately, for Marx, all the contradictions of capitalism derive from the structurally
fundamental contradictions between the use-value and the value of the commodity, and
between the concrete useful and abstract social aspects of the labour it embodies ...
Marx conceives these fundamental structural contradictions as themselves a historical
legacy of the separation of the immediate producers from (a) the means and materials
ofproduction, (b) each other, and hence (c ) the nexus of social relations within which
their action on (and relation to) nature takes place".
According to dialectical analysis, it is at the theoretically abstract level that the
stratification, the internal complexity, and differentiation of reality becomes apparent.
Here the 'essential relations' between phenomena are exposed: the 'real' underlying
relations, causal structures and generative mechanisms that determine outward
appearance. Thus, as Bhaskar (1983c:407-408) pointed out "an abstraction can be faulted
if it fails to grasp either the stratification or the internal complexity of a domain of reality
(e.g., if it isolates a necessary connection or relation from others essential to its existence
or efficacy); and the differentiation of reality allows for the possibility of the multiple
determination of concrete historical events by agencies or mechanisms of (relatively or
absolutely) independent origins as well as for the coherence of the determining agencies
or mechanisms in a common causal condition of existence or a totality".
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The distinction between appearance and essence, which is fundamental to the dialectical
method of investigation, is but a conscious attempt to pierce through successive layers of
phenomena, towards their inner dynamics which explain why these phenomena evolve in a
certain direction and in certain ways (Mandel, 1976a). In this way the external appearance,
which Hegel described as the 'one-sided, immediate unity' of the opposites beneath its
surface, can be explained by the underlying essence. Without further analysis, the' one-
sided immediate unity' of appearances can lead to mystification and illusion (Nicolaus,
1973). As Marx himself stated: "Scientific truth is always paradox, ifjudged by everyday
experience, which catches only the delusive appearances of things" (Wages, Price and
Profit; in Bhaskar, 1983d:255). Thus, when Marx criticised 'vulgar' political economists
for merely reflecting 'the direct form of manifestations of essential relations' his concern
was precisely with the conceptualisation of an adequate representation or 'reflection' of
phenomena based upon their inner connections, a task which involves theoretical work and
conceptual transformation rather than a passive replication of reality (Bhaskar, 1983a).
This is fundamentally different from the approach of nondialectical social science, which is
not concerned with essence at all, indeed, does not recognise the word. A positivist science
limits itself to empirical problems which can be stated in testable form. Dialectics does not
deny the relevance or the validity of empirical investigation, but seeks to expand the
concept of science beyond the borders of a positivist approach. Marx himself never denied
the relevance, or value, of empirical research. Indeed, the massive empirical infrastructure
of Capital bears testimony to this. Marx' s position was anti-empiricist not anti-empirical.
According to Bhaskar (1983b:149-150), following Marx, "empiricism sees the world as a
collection of unconnected appearances, ignores the role of theory in actively organising and
critically reorganising the data provided by such appearances and fails to identify its
function as the attempt to re-present in thought the essential relations generating them".
The dialectical view of social science, as Heilbroner (1980) pointed out, therefore poses an
interpretative task quite different from that of modem 'positivism'. Positivist science
penetrates phenomena to arrive at truths in the form of 'laws' or patterns, but the task is
one of sifting through random disturbances to discover regularities (not essences)
concealed within phenomena. The dialectical approach, on the other hand, attempts to
discover underlying essences (in the form of internal relations and contradictions) and not
mere regularities, by penetrating the systematic disturbances imposed on phenomena.
These disturbances, as Heilbroner (1980) explained, be they ideological, political, social, or
economic, affect our vision in ways ofwhich we are mainly unaware. The task of
dialectical science, accordingly, is to make explicit the presence and nature of systematic
misconceptions so that we can discern essence where we might otherwise be deceived by
appearances.
What is specifically dialectical about this task is derived from a view of knowledge that
stresses the relational, contradictory aspect of social knowledge - a view that differs
markedly from the approach of non-Marxist social science with its emphasis on 'facts'
rather than contexts. According to Harvey (1996a:49): "This transforms the self-evident
world of things with which positivism and empiricism typically deals into a much more
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confusing world of relations and flows that are manifest as things" and, we might add, that
are internalised in things.
The Marxist approach to knowledge is both dialectical and materialist, hence the term
'dialectical materialism' is often used to denote this approach to social investigation. The
materialist dialectic that informs Marxist science arises from the union of two bourgeois
philosophies: the mechanistic materialism of the Scientific Revolution and Enlightenment,
and Hegel's idealistic dialectics. The mechanism of the former, which is incompatible with
dialectics, and the idealism of the later, which is incompatible with materialism, are
rejected and opposed as 'metaphysical' and 'idealistic' (Edgley, 1983). The combination of
materialism with dialectics transforms both. Materialism is not reductionist: it does not
reduce ideas to matter by asserting their ultimate identity. It holds dialectically that the
material and the ideal are, in fact, opposites but within a unity in which the material is basic
or primary. Mind was historically emergent from, and remains dependent upon, matter
(Edgley, 1983).
In addition, this materialism does not view entities in isolation but insists upon the primacy
of relations and connections between things (as between mind and matter). It is the
relations and processes connecting entities that constitute their actual being, their inner
essence. Things are thus understood to exist in a mutually interacting 'relational' context,
and it is this context that determines their being and not the attributes of things in
themselves. Moreover, according to dialectics, this relational context is not static - the
relations and processes interact and produce tensions or 'contradictions' that are resolved
by transformation to a new state. This emergent state then enters into new relational
contexts that produce further tensions and contradictions, both of which require resolution.
The fundamental concepts of dialectical materialism are motion and change arising out of
the (internal) tensions, and contradictions produced in an interacting relational context:
becoming, being, and passing away. As Engels put it, 'motion is the mode of existence of
matter' and immanent change is the fundamental nature of reality.
This is a powerful conception of science, at least within the realm of social science to
which Marx applied it. As Heilbroner (1980:49) stated: "Indeed, the entire contribution of
Marxism to social thought rests ultimately on its effort to penetrate the veil of appearances
to discover the hidden essences of things, the web of relations that is the 'real' ground of
reality and not just the surface manifestations that are its facade. The target ofa dialectical
methodology is therefore illusion or delusion, not simple ignorance" (original emphasis).
Marx's direct use of the term 'scientific' was aimed, more than anything, at what he called
'vulgar' conceptions of society - conceptions based purely on appearances that 'mystify' or
'distort' explanations of reality. This mystification may be deliberate or otherwise. More
commonly, it is a form of mystification or distortion that is not consciously imposed but
takes place through the mediations of a complex arrangement of institutional, ideological,
cultural, political and socio-economic processes that 'mystify the mystification itself'. This
is part of Gramsci's conception of hegemony, or 'common sense', which we will return to
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later, and also ofMarx's 'inverted reality'. In essence, the mystification process is largely
outside the realm ofbourgeois scrutiny and therefore outside widespread consciousness.
By exposing this mystification, dialectics exposes bourgeois social science as 'one-sided'
and 'uncritical', as part of the ideology of class dominated society. Hence, Marx described
dialectics as "a scandal and an abomination to the bourgeoisie... because it includes in its
positive understanding of what exists a simultaneous recognition of its negation, its
inevitable destruction; because it regards every historically developed form as being in a
fluid state, in motion, and therefore grasps its transient aspect as well; and because it does
not let itselfbe impressed by anything, being in its very essence critical and revolutionary"
(Capital 1, Postface to the Second Edition: 103).Through critical analysis, by delving below
the surface reality of appearances, it makes explicit the class nature of capitalist society, the
exploitative foundation (in surplus-value) of capitalist social relations, and the alienation of
human and other nature that is a consequence of this mode ofproduction.
Moreover, Marxist social science is not concerned solely with exposing illusion and
delusion about reality by revealing the essence underlying appearance. It is intimately
committed to changing reality. If its analytical power lies in revealing socio-economic and
ecological contradictions mystified by external appearances, its emancipatory potential
rests upon its commitment to radical social change. It insists upon a dialectical unity
between theory and practice, between knowledge and action. To the Marxist social scientist
the purpose of social research is not merely to explain the world but to change it.
As Marx stated in the famous XI Thesis on Feuerbach: "The philosophers have only
interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to change it".
Critical social science is, in the words of Sarantakos (1993), an 'engaged' science, one that
assumes involvement and activism on the part of the researcher and theoretician. He
explained: "Researchers don't only study reality; they act on it" (p.37). Further: "The
researcher experiences reality through interaction and interpretation. Our world is
something we make, not something we discover" (p.20). Thus: "critical research aims at
criticising social reality, emancipating people, empowering them to change social reality by
suggesting possible solutions and thus liberating them from oppressive and exploitative
social structures" (p.16). According to Fay (1987:85): "Besides being both scientific and
critical, critical social science seeks to be practical in the sense of being a catalyst for
fundamental social change".
As Sarantakos (1993:37) put it: "It enables the social scientist to get below the surface, to
expose real relations, to disclose myths and illusions, to show people how the world should
be and how to change the world". In Fay's (1987:27) words, a critical science "explains
social order so that it becomes the catalyst that leads to the transformation of the social
order", or "explains social reality, criticises it and empowers people to overthrow it". More
simply, critical social science aims at "understanding and changing social reality" (Lather,
1992:87). As Gramsci concluded, it is both 'science and action'.
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According to Fay (1987:7-8), the distinguishing features ofcritical social science are that it
is "scientific, critical and practical" and that it aims at "enlightenment, empowerment and
emancipation". He stated: "A critical theory is propounded with the specific end in mind of
providing people with a systematic critique of their own self-understanding and social
practices in order to provide them with the knowledge on the basis of which they can
change the way they live" (p.39). Thus, "Scientific knowledge (theory and practice) can be
useful to humans by providing them with the means necessary to alter their existence"
(p.85). Hence: "The purpose of scientific theory [apart from its instrumental value] is to
engender self-knowledge and so to liberate people from the oppressiveness of their social
arrangements" (p.89).
In this way, critical social science rejects the professed objectivity of bourgeois science.
Social science cannot be value free. It intrinsically relies upon a value system as a reference
point for conducting research. This, more often than not, goes unacknowledged in
bourgeois social science. Marxist sociology, on the other hand, is, unashamedly, a
normative science. Apart from studying what society is, it is intimately concerned with
what it could be and what it ought to be. Moreover, it is committed to realising this social
potential. As Harvey (1996a:56) explained: "Dialectical enquiry necessarily incorporates,
therefore, the building of ethical, moral, and political choices (values) into its own process
and sees the constructed knowledges that result as discourses situated in a play ofpower
directed towards some goal or other".
In accordance with the canons of critical social science, the thesis is thus not primarily
concerned with refuting testable hypotheses as positivist science demands. At the same
time, it does not deny the relevance of empirical research but posits it as a necessary, albeit
incomplete, contribution to social research. The thesis, following the dictates of critical
social science, is primarily concerned with the dialectical analysis of reality, with
discovering and exposing underlying relations and dynamics of capitalist society together
with their accompanying contradictions that determine external appearances. Having
revealed the dysfunctions arising from these inner dynamics and relations, the thesis is
intimately committed to changing reality to resolve these contradictions. It is committed to
social practice as well as social analysis.
Thus, whilst this thesis sets forth three propositions to be evaluated, these are to be
evaluated using a dialectical-materialist approach rather than a strict empirical or positivist
methodology. This is illustrated in the thesis, firstly, through the historical analysis of
radical planning. This analysis reveals that whilst the substantive and procedural aspects of
a number of celebrated contributions to planning theory and practice have been widely
appropriated to serve reformist purposes, the philosophical and political presuppositions
upon which these were founded have been, in the main, ignored or obscured. In this way,
the theory for these planning interventions has been 'mystified' or even deliberately
reconstituted. A deeper analysis, however, reveals the radical thought underlying the
practical prescriptions proposed by these earlier theorists and explicitly connects the
theories ofand in planning to the theory for planning, the socio-philosophical
presuppositions underlying these particular prescriptions for social change. In addition, the
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historical roots and continuity of this radical thought is revealed and the socio-historical
context in which it developed is established.
Secondly, the rationale for adopting a radical approach to planning is established primarily
through an exegesis and extension of Marx's dialectical analysis of capitalism as set out in
of the thesis. This theoretical analysis is supported by empirical data in Section 4.7 of
Chapter 4. The empirical data is included to provide support for the theoretical analysis
preceding rather than to enable the inference of causal mechanisms. The empirical data on
its own is open to various explanations as to its generative causes. Indeed, differing
(bourgeois) explanations are most often accepted for the existing global socio-economic
and ecological condition. The primary purpose of Chapter 4 is to delve below the obvious
surface appearances of socio-economic and ecological dysfunctions to reveal their
underlying causes and generative mechanisms, i.e. the dynamics and contradictions
inherent to the capitalist mode ofproduction that are revealed through dialectical enquiry.
By appropriating and applying Gramscian transition theory to a practice of radical
planning, the normative aspect of Marxist social science is made explicit. Having
established a rationale for adopting a radical approach to planning, a conceptual basis for,
and a practical methodology of, radical practice is outlined in Chapters 5 and 6 of the
thesis. This practice is undeniably influenced by values held and judgments made by the
researcher; but values and judgments not arbitrarily arrived at but determined
systematically and methodically by the historical, materialist and dialectical investigation
of socio-historical phenomena relevant to the research project. Thus, in accordance with
the tenets of critical social science, having made use of the analytical power of dialectical
materialist analysis an attempt is made to realise its emancipatory potential.
Finally, the commitment to activism demanded by critical social science and Marxist
sociology is presented in Part Three of the thesis. Here, the researcher applies the
theoretical knowledge formulated in the thesis to a concrete practice of radical planning
aimed at progressive social change. Although the subject matter comprising Part Three - a
substantial critique of the formulation, interpretation and administration of resource
management legislation in New Zealand - presents an empirical study of radical planning,
specifically radical policy analysis, its primary purpose is not to provide data from which
generalisations can be inferred according to the methodology ofpositivist science. Its main
purpose is to link knowledge with action, to connect social analysis to social change in line
with the canons of critical social science. In this way, the dialectic between theory and
practice is established in accordance with the theory of dialectical materialism and
knowledge becomes active, not merely contemplative.
Whilst the investigations undertaken in the thesis are somewhat different to the usual
approach encountered in conventional academic research, they are defensible according to
certain canons ofprocedure: those of Marxist critical social science. They comprise a
research project that, according to this methodology, can rightly claim to be 'scientific'.
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Part One - Past Radical Approaches to Planning
Chapter 3: Radical Planning Theory
3.1 Planning Theory
"Planning", according to Hall (1992:1), "is concerned with deliberately achieving some
objective, and it proceeds by assembling actions into some orderly sequence". As Camhis
(1979) pointed out, other theorists have defined planning in similar terms. For example,
according to various definitions, planning is: 'the laying out of a course of action that we
can follow and that will take us to our desired goals' (Churchman, 1968); 'a process of
strategic choice, requiring a capacity to anticipate the future and yet also adapt to the
unforeseen' (Friend and Jessop, 1969); 'a process ofhuman forethought and action based
upon that thought' (Chadwick, 1971); 'the process ofpreparing a set ofdecisions for action
in the future, directed at achieving goals by preferable means' (Dror, 1973); or, simply,
"the guidance of future action" (Forester, 1989:3).
Essentially, all such definitions view planning as a procedure - a deliberate course of action
aimed at achieving a predetermined outcome. Planning is thus more than an intuitive
activity. It presupposes deliberation, and, therefore, the application of knowledge to the
process ofplanning. Friedmann (1987), in this sense, defined planning at its most
fundamental level as 'an attempt to relate knowledge to action'. By drawing upon the view
of planning as a set of actions with a particular goal (or goals), together with the
application of knowledge to this process, we can formulate a working definition of
planning as 'the application of knowledge to a deliberate course of action aimed at
achieving a particular objective, or set of objectives'.
This is a relatively uncontroversial description of planning until we distinguish between the
application of knowledge to the determination of the goals ofplanning, and the application
of knowledge to determining the appropriate course of action to achieve those goals. The
former attempts to inform the question - why plan? What objectives we are trying to
achieve? What are the ends of our endeavours? The latter, on the other hand, addresses the
question of methodology. How can we best achieve the objectives decided upon? What are
the appropriate means to achieve the desired ends? Or, simply, how do we plan?
Planning theory attempts to provide answers to these questions, and the distinction between
the two sets of questions has led to a fundamental cleavage in planning theory. The
application of knowledge to the goals ofplanning has developed into a theory for planning.
This body of knowledge, in its widest sense, is concerned with what Reade (1987:ix) has
called 'the fundamental socio-philosophical presuppositions ofplanning' , or what Low
(1991) termed the 'political-philosophy ofplanning'. It is essentially the
political/philosophical rationale for adopting particular planning objectives. On the other
hand, the application of knowledge to achieve the objectives decided upon has evolved into
theory ofplanning. This body of knowledge is concerned with formulating methodology or
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procedures of planning. Such procedural theory may be positive or normative, i.e.
explanatory or prescriptive (Faludi, 1973a).
Other theorists (Camhis, 1979; Faludi, 1973a; Hall, 1992; Taylor, 1998; Yiftachel, 1989)
have distinguished a third category - 'theory in planning'. This is the substantive, as
opposed to the philosophical and procedural, component of planning theory. It is concerned
with the phenomena to which planning is addressed: for example, substantive issues such
as urban form, housing, land use, or transportation. In other words, it is concerned with
what is being planned and often, particularly when involving land use, has a spatial
orientation.
These three categories (along with their historical evolution) have been described by
Yiftachel (1989) respectively as 'analytical', or 'what is planning?'; 'procedural', or 'what
is a good planning process?'; and 'urban form', or 'what is a good urban plan?'. He stated:
"In short, the analytical debate examines the societal goals of urban planning, the
procedural debate studies how best to achieve these given goals, and the urban form debate
analyses the actual physical effects ofplanning goals and procedures" (p. 32). He described
the three categories as distinct but interrelated bodies ofplanning knowledge.
Yiftachel (1989) located the foundations of these three traditions or 'debates' at the
beginning of the nineteenth century and, like Taylor (1998), maintained that whilst all three
have coexisted historically, at any particular time one has predominated over the others in
influence. Thus, the urban form debate, which Taylor (1998) described as 'urban design',
(theory in planning) dominated modem planning theory from 1900 until the 1950s. This
tradition was concerned with physical design and spatial planning and was theorised and
practiced mainly by 'architect-planners'. It began with the 'garden city' concept,
encompassed the 'linear city', the 'city beautiful movement', and other permutations all
more or less involving a master plan, or blueprint, directing the design of built form and
spatial arrangement of land uses.
According to Yiftachel (1989) and Taylor (1998), after the Second World War the urban
design tradition was increasingly challenged by procedural and systems theory. In
particular, the rational comprehensive model, first proposed by Meyerson and Banfield in
1955, was promoted as providing an objective, scientific and empirical basis necessary for
planning complex and dynamic urban systems. Planning was to be the preserve of the
rational decision maker and technocrat rather than the architect-planner. Thus, theory of
planning replaced theory in planning as the predominant theoretical discourse. This does
not imply that the design-based tradition ofplanning was completely superceded by the
development ofprocedural theory. As Taylor (1998) pointed out, whilst questions of design
and physical form were marginalised in planning theory debates, in practice, particularly at
the level of local planning, physical planning and design remained a necessary and
significant consideration for town and country planners.
After the Second World War, planning came to be portrayed as an objective, universally
applicable, technocratic process carried out by appropriately trained professional 'experts'
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proficient in planning technique, particularly rational decision making. The view emerged
that if the appropriate process was theorised and practiced, the 'correct' result would
follow (Kiernan, 1983; Low, 1991; Reade, 1987). Programmes in planning schools
reinforced this view, with curricula focused on planning methodology to the neglect of
political and philosophical content and often divorced from substantive issues (Cuthbert,
1997; Kiernan, 1983; McLoughlin, 1994). In this way, planning became depoliticised and
professionalised and imbued with its own internal legitimisation and rationale.
According to both Yiftachel (1989) and Taylor (1998), the view ofplanning as a
universally applicable, apolitical, rational, and objective process came under increasing
criticism from the late 1960s onwards. In the 1970s planning theory was subjected to
severe criticism from a radical leftist perspective (Beauregard, 1978; Castells, 1976, 1977,
1978; Dear and Scott, 1981; Harvey, 1973, 1996b; Preteceille, 1982; Scott and Roweis,
1977) whilst in the 1980s the neoliberal right launched a sustained attack on the legitimacy
of planning (Anderson, 1982; Banergee, 1993; Klosterman, 1985; Richardson and Gordon,
1991; Sorenson and Day, 1981).
The idea ofplanning as an apolitical, objective, rational and technocratic process also came
under increasing challenge from within mainstream planning circles (Etzioni, 1973;
Forester, 1987; Hudson, 1979; Lindblom, 1959; Wildavski, 1973). The view of the planner
as a rational, objective, scientific 'expert' serving a discernible and accepted notion of the
'common good' or 'public interest' was challenged by an increasing awareness of the
political and value-laden nature ofplanning. Rather than a clear, unitary 'common good' or
'public interest' , interests in reality were viewed as pluralist with public groups, politicians
and administrators having differing and often conflicting values and objectives.
An alternative tradition ofplanning thought emerged which viewed the planner's role as
one of identifying and mediating between different interest groups involved in land use and
development. The planner was seen not so much as a technical 'expert' but more as a
'facilitator' and 'mediator' of other views on how development should be regulated. Public
participation in the planning process became an integral feature of this school of thought.
An early version of this theory was Davidoff's (1965) 'advocacy planning' . Davidoff
recognised that society was comprised of a plethora of values and interests and it was the
planner's role to identify with individuals or groups with similar values and to advance the
interests of such individuals and groups. He mentioned the disadvantaged in society as
particularly in need of such services.
Other theorists advocated various forms of 'positive discrimination' towards disadvantaged
groups as an essential part of the planning process. For example, Gans (1968) advanced a
'compensatory' form of planning. He stated: "When it comes to planning for heterogeneous
populations, however, and the public interest is difficult to determine, [the planner] has to
take a political stand, and propose the allocation of resources so that the maximal benefits
accrue to those people, interest groups and communities he feels are in the greatest need of
public benefits" (p.383).
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This approach was perhaps best exemplified in the work of the Cleveland City Planning
Commission (Krumholz et al., 1975; Krumholz, 1982) which attempted to discriminate
positively towards the urban poor in its development plans and policies during the 1970s.
Fainstein and Fainstein (1979) have similarly advocated 'positive discrimination' as a
necessary goal ofpublic planning and Kieman (1983) strongly argued for a form of 'equity
planning' which favoured the disadvantaged in society.
According to Allmendiger (2002), Fainstein (2000) and Healey (1999), the last decade or
so has witnessed a reinvigoration of theoretical discussion within the discipline of
planning. This discourse covers a range of different approaches, including neoliberal and
public choice perspectives (Ehrman, 1990; Evans, 1988; 1991; Lewis, 1992; Pennington,
1999,2000), neo-pragmatism (Hoch, 1984, 1995, 1996, 1997), political economy
approaches (Ambrose, 1994; Fainstein, 1997,2000; Feldman, 1995, 1997; Lauria and
Whelan, 1995), new urbanism (Katz, 1994; Kuntsler, 1996), sustainable development
(Blowers, 1993; Brehemy, 1992; Buckingham-Hatfield and Evans, 1996; Common, 1995;
Grundy, 1993; Healey and Shaw, 1993; Millichap, 1993; Rees, 1989), and, perhaps the
most influential, communicative or collaborative planning (Forester 1989, 1993, 1998,
1999; Healey, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999; Innes, 1995, 1996; Sager, 1994).
Indeed communicative/collaborative planning has been heralded as planning theory's
'emerging paradigm' (Innes, 1995) or the 'theoretical zeitgeist of the 1990s' (Allmendiger,
2001: 122) and has inspired substantial debate in the planning literature. 'Communicative
planning' (Forester, 1989), 'dialogical incrementalism' (Sager, 1994), 'argumentative
planning' (Forester, 1993), 'planning through debate' (Healey, 1992), 'inclusionary
discourse' (Healey, 1994), and 'collaborative planning' (Healey, 1997, 1998) are common
approaches that rely upon the application of Habermasian communicative rationality to
planning processes.
Habermas (1984) examined the concept of rationality and its relations to communication,
social action and socio-historical change. He argued that instrumental rationality has come
to dominate other ways of thinking and knowing and has increasingly distanced the
'lifeworld' of everyday life from the technical world of experts. Reason, understood as
logic coupled with scientifically constructed empirical knowledge, was alleged to have
acheived dominance over other ways of being and knowing, crowding out moral and
aesthetic discourses. In order to counter the invasion of the lifeworld by experts and the
instrumentality of the' system' , Habermas developed his 'communicative rationality' .
Central to communicative rationality, as in post-structuralism, is the role of language and
the search for undistorted communication as a basis for consensus and action. In
Habermas's 'ideal speech situation', communication will no longer be distorted by the
effects ofpower, self-interest, or ignorance. Agreement is reached instead on the basis of
reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust and accord. In this way,
knowledge for action, principles of action, and ways of acting are actively constituted by
the members of an inter-discursive community. Further, according to Allmendinger (2001),
the reasons employed can escape from the confines of rational-scientific principles to
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include varying systems of morality, and culturally-specific traditions of expressive
aesthetic experience.
Habermas (1984) offered four claims about the validity of our communication which are
necessary if agreement is to be reached:
1, Truth ofpropositions about our external reality,
2. Rightness of our interpersonal relations,
3. Truthfulness about our internal subjective state,
4. Comprehensibility of our language.
The employment of these four criteria will, in Forester's view, lead to "informed and
unmanipulated citizen action" (1989:36). Although we may fail to achieve these claims,
according to Dryzek (1990), communicative action requires us to attempt them through
discourse that is characterised by:
• Interaction free from domination (the exercise ofpower),
• Interaction free from strategising by the actors involved,
• Interaction free from (self) deception,
• All actors being equally and fully capable of making and questioning arguments,
• No restrictions on participation,
• The only authority being that of a good argument.
As Sager (1994:6) stated: "Communicative rationality guides communicative action. It is
found in speech meeting the validity claims ofcomprehensibility, truth, rightness and
sincerity, and at the same time aiming at mutual understanding and agreement. Within a
speech situation thus defined, a community can rationally derive the goals to be
collectively pursued. Values and norms, which could not be seen to have any rational
founding under instrumental reason, may come into existence in a communicatively
rational manner."
There have been various interpretations of communicative rationality as a basis for
planning (Forester, 1980, 1989, 1993, 1999; Healey, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997; Healey and
Hillier, 1995; Hillier, 1993; Innes, 1995, 1996; Sager, 1994) and, according to
Allmendiger (2001), three broad categories emerge from these interpretations. First, there
are the micro-political interpretations of planning practice usually based on a combination
of Habermasian ideal speech and post-structuralist concern with language (Forester, 1989,
1993; Fischer and Forester, 1993). Following in this tradition are the second category of
ethnographic studies comparing this ideal to practice (Healey, 1992; Hillier, 1993; Healey
and Hillier, 1995). Finally there are the prescriptive studies aimed at using communicative
rationality as a basis for what has now been termed 'collaborative planning' (Healey,
1992,1996, 1997, 1998, 1999). In this latter category we find the most developed accounts
ofcommunicative/collaborative planning and the critique of instrumental rationality that
aim, in Forester's words, "to work towards a political democratisation of daily
communication" (1989:21).
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According to Allmendinger (2001), following Healey (1992), collaborative planning
involves:
1. Planning as an interactive and interpretive process.
2. Planning being undertaken among diverse and fluid discourse communities or cultures.
3. A respectful interpersonal and intercultural discussion methodology.
4. Focusing on the 'arenas of struggle' where public discussion occurs and where
problems, strategies, tactics and values are identified, discussed, evaluated and where
conflicts are mediated.
5. Advancing multifarious claims for different forms and types ofpolicy development.
6. Developing a reflective capacity that enables participants to evaluate and re-evaluate.
7. Strategic discourses being opened up to be inclusive of all interested parties which, in
turn, generate new planning discourses.
8. Participants in the discourse gaining knowledge of other participants in addition to
learning new relations, values and understandings.
9. Participants being able to collaborate to change the existing conditions.
10. Participants being encouraged to find ways of practically achieving their planning
desires, not simply to agree and list their objectives.
Adherence to the above principles should lead, according to Healey (1996), to public
reasoning which accepts the contributions of all members of a political community and
recognises the range of ways they have of knowing, valuing and giving meaning to issues,
resulting, in Healey's (1992: 152) words, "in ways ofliving together differently through
struggling to make sense together."
The planner's role in this process is to act as a 'neutral facilitator' within the discourse
arena to ensure that the ideal speech situation is maintained, and then to ensure that the
agreed strategy is implemented. As Fainstein (2000:6) put it: "Within communicative
theory the planner's primary function is to listen to people's stories and assist in forging a
consensus among differing viewpoints. Rather than providing technocratic leadership, the
planner is an experiential learner, at most providing information to participants but
primarily being sensitive to points of convergence." Healey (1996:227) described the
planner's role in the following way: "The role of expertise in this context, where experts
act not merely as 'participants' with a point of view, is to facilitate the process ofleaming
about, and sorting through, arguments and claims. It involves asking questions to the
discussion members which help to open up meanings, or making links between an issue
raised by one member and its potential implications for another. It may also involve
offering key organising ideas to help the discussants focus their thinking."
We can see from this brief description that communicative/ collaborative planning is
essentially a theory ofplanning. It is primarily concerned with planning process: it
addresses the question, what makes a good planning process? However, it could also be
construed as a theory for planning in the sense that the fundamental goals of planning, or
political/philosophical rationale for planning, are left open: they are what the participants in
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the process make them. These could be conservative, radical or even reactionary depending
on the political community. The theory is not offered by its proponents, however, as a
radical transformative approach to planning but rather as an alternate reformist approach
situated within conventional planning theory, i.e. as 'societal guidance' rather then 'social
mobilisation' to use Friedmann's terms. Moreover, its potential to inform a radical
approach to planning is limited given, amongst other things, its refusal or inability to
confront directly the class structure of capitalist society and the unequal distribution of
power, both socio-economic and political, resulting from these class divisions.
There have been a number of critiques of collaborative planning (Allmendinger, 2001;
Fainstein, 2000; Harvey, 1992, 1997; Lauria and Whelan, 1995; Richardson, 1996;
Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger, 1998). Most centre on its inability to deal adequately
with the plurality of values and interests in a capitalist system and the unequal distribution
ofpower inherent to a class-based society. As Allmendinger (2001: 127) pointed out: "The
search for consensus will always involve political choices in the winning of arguments, and
this winning of arguments ... will always mask power and interests behind a facade of
agreement."
The unequal distribution of power in capitalist societies is recognised, but communicative
rationalists suggest that by building up trust and confidence across these fissures 'new
relations of collaboration and trust ... [will] shift power bases' (Healey, 1997:263), or 'the
power of the 'better argument' will confront and transform the power of the state and
capital' (Healey, 1996:219). The theorists are dependent upon a shift in power as a result of
collaborative approaches to decision making in the planning arena, or by confronting and
transforming the state and capital by 'better arguments', propositions that are
unsupportable in a modem capitalist society. History has repeatedly shown that elites will
resort to extreme repression to maintain their privileges. The expectation that collaboration
and argumentation will result in the voluntary and peaceful redistribution of power is naive
and unrealistic, and has no theoretical or empirical justification.
As Fainstein (2000:31) stated: "Democratic pluralism [collaborative planning], with its
emphasis on group process and compromise, offers little likelihood of escape from
dominance by those groups with the greatest access to organisational and financial
resources ... Given the existing system of social domination, it cannot be assumed that
participation by stakeholders would be transformative in a way that would improve most
people's situation." Moreover, if consensus cannot be reached, the theory breaks down. As
Allmendinger (2001) pointed out, the use of courts as adjudicators accepts a dominatory
and representative approach to politics absent from communicative rationality and involves
using the same mechanisms rejected by Habermas. Reaching agreement through open
discourse is then dependent upon a threat of imposition, thus hardly 'uncoerced' as
advocated by communicative rationalists.
According to Allmendinger (2001), earlier translations of Habermas into communicative
planning theory suggested that those involved in the discourse arena would challenge the
hierarchical structures within which planning is set, through questioning the role and
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directives of central government, for example, and establishing an opposing 'bottom-up'
view formulated through collective decision making. Later interpretators recognised that to
achieve any meaning to consensus, and to facilitate practical planning outcomes, wider
institutional, legal and political restructuring is required. As Allmendinger (2001: 136)
stated: "The problems with collaborative planning, not least of which is the reluctance of
its proponents to tackle deeply-embedded institutional mechanisms [and power relations]
by focusing merely upon processes, precludes any realistic prospect for it as a basis for
planning practice."
Planning practice has not been much influenced by collaborative planning theory and,
according to Allmendinger (2001), one of the main criticisms of the collaborative approach
is that it fails to explain how it could translate from theory to practice. As Allmendinger
(2001: 122-136) stated: "This lack ofpractical application has left collaborative planning
largely in the academic realm... There are few, if any, champions for collaborative
planning practice." According to Fainstein (2000: 13): "The theoretical lacunae of
communicative theory reveal themselves in practice. Scrutiny of efforts to base planning on
dialogue reveals serious problems of implementation and the continued dominance of the
already powerful." As Fainstein (2000:7) further stated:
"The communicative model should not be faulted for its ideals of openess and diversity.
Its vulnerability rather lies in a tendency to substitute moral exhortation for analysis.
Although their roots, via Habermas, are critical theory, once the communicative
theorists move away from critique and present a manual for action, their thought loses
its edge. Habermas posits the ideal speech situation as a criterion by which to register
the distortion inherent in most interactions. As such, it supplies a vehicle for
demystification. But when instead ideal speech becomes the objective of planning, the
argument takes a moralistic tone, and its proponents seem to forget the economic and
social forces that produce endemic social conflict and domination by the powerful.
There is the assumption that if only people were reasonable, deep structural conflict
would melt away."
Thus, there seems little likelihood that communicative/ collaborative planning could
inform a radical transformative approach to planning. By playing down, and failing to
address, the deep structural and class based divisions within capitalist society it can at best
contribute to a reformist approach to societal change (and it claims no more than this).
Even then, serious questions remain over its effectiveness in achieving such aims. There is,
however, considerable potential for the insights gained by research into communicative
rationality and collaborative planning to inform a post-transformative form ofplanning. In
a society where the means ofproduction are collectively owned and controlled, where class
structures no longer generate fundamental socio-economic divisions within society, and
where there is a genuine public interest and notion of the common good, communicative
rationality and collaborative planning could offer useful insights into a practical form of
collective planning. The potential of collaborative planning could thus be realised in a
classless society but its usefulness in achieving that classless society is at best limited.
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Some commentators have labelled the recent divergence in planning theory, starting with
the challenge to the rational comprehensive model in the 1970s, as 'post positivist'
(Allmendinger, 2002; Fainstein, 2000; Healey, 1996) and even 'postmodern'
(Allmendinger, 2001; Beauregard, 1989, 1991; Dear, 1986; Goodchild, 1990; Innes, 1995;
Sandercock, 1998; Soja, 1997; Taylor, 1998). Allmendinger (2001), for example, argued
that contemporary society is shifting to new, or postmodern times, which both favour and
require different conceptions ofplanning not found in enlightenment ideals, i.e. the claim
and assumption that planning is founded upon 'scientific knowledge born of modernity' .
According to Allmendinger, economic, cultural and political globalisation, along with their
various consequent manifestations, have led to changed sensibilities, outlooks and
expectations, and a fragmentation of world views. In such a world the plurality of
positions and values means that it is difficult, and inappropriate, to impose one particular
view over others. This fragmentation, Allmendinger argued, has had a significant impact
upon social theory and planning.
The traditional view ofplanning, according to Allmendinger (2001:5), saw it based upon
"the neutrality of observation and the giveness of experience; the ideal of unequivocal
language and the independence of data from theoretical interpretation; the belief in the
universality of conditions of knowledge and criteria for theory choice." In place of this we
have instead a recognition of indeterminacy, incommeasurability, variance, diversity,
fragmentation, complexity: traits that question the very notion ofplanning. For, according
to many commentators, the postmodern at its most essential is a celebration of difference
and a suspicion of foundation and truth. The postmodern is, in Lyotard's (1984) phrase, an
'incredulity towards meta-narratives'. In other words, a scepticism or suspicion towards
meta-theory or totality - indeed, totality and consensus are described as 'terror' (Lyotard,
1984).
Milroy (1991: 182), reviewing the development of the postmodern debate in planning
thought, identifies four 'broad characteristics' to the challenge postmodernism presents to
modernism: "It is deconstructive in the sense of questioning and establishing a sceptical
distance from conventional beliefs and, more actively, trying both to ascertain who derives
value from upholding their authority and to displace them; antifoundationalist in the sense
of dispensing with universals as bases of truth; nondualistic in the sense of refusing the
separation between subjectivity and objectivity along with the array of dualisms it
engenders, including the splits between truth and opinion, fact and value; and encouraging
ofplurality and differences."
Thus, according to postmodernism, there is no one 'correct' theoretical position in relation
to planning. Indeed, the main problem with 'modernist' planning has been its insistence
upon a 'meta-theory', a correct procedure or set ofprocedures designed to improve land
use and development and their associated socio-economic and environmental outcomes. In
fact, according to some postmodern commentators we should give up the notion of
planning altogether. According to this view, at best it is ineffective and, at worst,
counterproductive or even destructive of human sensibilities and values, of difference and
variety.
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Whatever the merits of the modern/postmodem debate, and there have been some
worthwhile materialist analyses that relate the superstructural changes involved to
structural reconfigurations in global capitalism (Aglietta, 1979, 1982; Best and Kellner,
1991; Eagleton, 1996; Hall and Jaques, 1989; Harvey, 1989; Jameson, 1984), the potential
of the various theoretical positions included under the rubric of 'post-positivist or
'postmodem' to inform a radical theory and practice ofplanning is, once again, limited.
These initiatives do not seek to transform the capitalist mode ofproduction but rather to
reform aspects of it. Indeed, postmodemists are particularly critical of the Marxist 'grand
narrative' or 'meta-theory', as they are of any meta-theorising. Their insistence on the
celebration of difference or diversity, and their suspicion of consensus or uniformity,
merely serves to fragment effective opposition to the capitalist mode ofproduction and, in
this way, is anti-progressive from a Marxist perspective. Postmodem approaches to
planning fall, therefore, into the category Friedmann (1987) termed 'societal guidance'
rather than 'social mobilisation'. Even the term 'societal guidance' may be inappropriate,
given the postmodem aversion to specific recommendations for future collective action.
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3.2 Social Mobilisation
Friedmann (1987), in his book Planning in the Public Domain: From Knowledge to Action,
examined the historical development ofplanning thought and exposed the relationship
between procedural and substantive theories ofplanning and their political and
philosophical sources and underlying rationales. Within that analysis Friedmann
distinguished different approaches to planning based upon differing philosophical/political
presuppositions about the objectives of social action. He distinguished two broad
categories ofplanning action in the modem era: societal guidance (social reform) and
social mobilisation (social transformation). Within the broad parameters of societal
guidance he situated three traditions: social reform, social learning and policy analysis
(social reform being dominant). Within social mobilisation he positioned the three major
oppositional movements of utopianism, social anarchism and historical materialism, which
he described as 'the great counter-movements to social reform' (see Figure 2).
Conventional planning theory is concerned with societal guidance, i.e. providing assistance
and support for continued capitalist development. This form ofplanning accepts the
existing socio-economic structure as a given. It seeks within the existing relations of
production to alleviate the worst excesses of industrial capitalism: to mitigate
environmental dysfunctions to enable the biophysical reproduction of the capitalist mode of
production, and to ameliorate socio-economic conflicts to ensure its social reproduction. In
short, the main task ofplanning within the societal guidance tradition is to enable the
continued expansion and concentration/centralisation of capital through the accumulation
process by providing infrastructural and institutional support and resolving short-term
contradictions and social conflicts (Camhis, 1979; Harvey, 1996b; Preteceille, 1982; Scott
and Roweis, 1977). It also enables the reproduction of capitalism by assisting in the
development and maintenance of capitalist hegemony through 'educating consent', and by
acting as a coercive force legitimising and enforcing the actions of the state (Gramsci,
1971).
Social mobilisation, in contrast, aims at fundamental change in the very socio-economic
system that the social reform tradition attempts to support. It seeks transformation of the
capitalist mode of production. It views the existing socio-economic system - with its
underlying property relations, class divisions, and associated privileges and deprivations,
together with its inherent expansionist dynamic - as socially oppressive, economically
exploitative, and ecologically unsustainable. It proposes radical change to achieve a mode
ofproduction capable of overcoming these fundamental dysfunctions. Its distinguishing
characteristic is a commitment to emancipation: the removal of social barriers that block
the full development of human potential and which prevent a reconciliation between
human society and other nature. As Friedmann (1987:308) stated: "It points to an
economics, a politics, and a sociology that reject the seeming inevitability ofuneven
development, powerlessness, exploitation, and alienation that are the hallmarks of the
capitalist world system". We would add here that it also points to a socio-economic system
that recognises the ecological and thermodynamic constraints imposed by a finite global
biosphere.
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This thesis is concerned with the social mobilisation tradition. This tradition of planning
thought is largely, and understandably, ignored by orthodox planning theorists in the West.
Radical planning has, however, a rich intellectual heritage and its influence on
conventional planning theory and practice has been profound (Fishman, 1977; Hall, 1988;
Hall and Ward, 1998). Part One of the thesis will examine the history of radical planning
thought and its influence on conventional planning theory and practice. This will be
accomplished by analysing the theories of a small number of influential planning theorists
from the turn of the nineteenth century until the present. The historical analysis will show
that, initially, modem planning developed in response to the dysfunctions of nineteenth
century industrial capitalism. Its objectives at the time were not, however, confined to
merely reformist measures.
The founding fathers ofplanning sought not only to ameliorate the adverse effects of
industrial capitalism (particularly as manifest in rapidly growing urban centres) but the
actual transformation of the capitalist mode of production itself. This transformative
approach to planning was based upon utopian socialist and utopian anarchist visions of
society. Other influential planning theorists have likewise advocated radical approaches to
planning, and their prescriptions have also profoundly influenced conventional planning
theory and practice. Two of the most influential of these later theorists, Frank Lloyd Wright
and Le Corbusier, will be examined, along with Friedmann's recent theory of radical
transformative planning, which will be critically assessed for its relevance to contemporary
capitalism.
Friedmann (1987) traced the origins of social mobilisation to the emerging social critique
of early industrial capitalism. That critique was directed against the senses of oppression
and alienation afflicting society at the time. The existing capitalist mode ofproduction was
viewed as exploitative of human and non-human nature. The benefits of the new
technologies that were rapidly developing in the recent phase of industrialisation, were
seen as accruing disproportionately to a minority of the population. The working and living
conditions of the great majority of the population were recognised as inhumane, and would
eventually, if allowed to persist, result in civil unrest and violent insurrection. Thus,
industrial capitalism was seen as creating destructive divisions within society. It was also
seen as creating and maintaining an artificial separation between town and country, and
thus alienating humankind from non-human nature. The existing system of industrial
capitalism was viewed as transitory. Sooner or later it would be transformed to a higher
phase of human development, one based on human emancipation and reconciliation
between society and nature.
As Friedmann (1987) pointed out, two major approaches to social transformation
developed. Utopians and some anarchists advocated an evolutionary transformation of the
capitalist mode ofproduction through the establishment of increasing numbers of self-
sufficient communities 'de-linked' from the capitalist economic system. These would, by
merit of example and moral persuasion, lead to the gradual replacement of the capitalist
socio-economic system by a decentralised federation of largely autonomous communities
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based on material self-sufficiency and direct political control by the immediate community.
A second group composed of historical materialists and some anarchists looked to the
revolutionary transformation of the capitalist mode ofproduction and the overthrow of
existing relations of production. This tradition depended upon a mass uprising of the
oppressed classes in society and the radical restructuring of society into a classless
association ofproducers free from oppression and alienation.
Friedmann (1987:83-84) wrote about "Two kinds ofpolitics... involved in social
mobilization". He stated: "For utopians and anarchists, there is a politics ofdisengagement
carried on by 'alternative communities' that demonstrate to others new ways ofliving. For
Marxists and neo-Marxists [and some anarchists] there is a confrontational politics that
emphasizes political struggle as necessary to transform existing relations ofpower and
create a new order that is not based on the exploitation of labor and the alienation of man
from what is distinctly human".
Friedmann (1987) traced the anarchist tradition back to the publication ofProudhon's
Philosophy ofPoverty (1846) and the Marxist tradition to the Communist Manifesto
(1848). "Here", he stated, "for the first time, were 'radical' views ofplanning enshrined in
the doctrines of anarchism and historical materialism" (p.53). Modem utopianism, on the
other hand, had its beginnings in the early part of the nineteenth century with Robert Owen,
a Scot, and his French contemporary Charles Fourier. Many commentators would also
include Saint Simon as a founding father of utopian socialism, although Friedmann locates
him outside the grouping of social mobilisation. Friedmann (1987:229) claimed: "It was
their visionary imagination that gave rise to the building of 'intentional communities'
which followed blueprints for perfection".
Owen and Fourier were convinced that life could be something other than privation and
oppression, that the evils of industrialism could be abolished, and that it lay within human
capacity to change the world and bring it into accord with a vision of life as it might and
ought to be. It was believed that human beings and society were perfectible, given a proper
nurturing environment (Friedmann, 1987). Another distinguishing characteristic, according
to Friedmann, was its emphasis on voluntarism. For utopians, creation of the ideal society
is not primarily a political act but rests on the force of ideas, moral persuasion, and
determination. Utopian socialism can be distinguished from Marxist 'scientific socialism'
by its belief in the possibility of total social transformation without the necessity of class
struggle and the revolutionary role of the proletariat in accomplishing this transformation
(Stedman Jones, 1983).
Utopianism begins with a detailed description of the 'Good Society'. The typical
community is limited in size and engaged in agriculture and manufacture aimed largely at
self-sufficiency. There is limited contact outside the community. There is a desire to
overcome the distinction between town and country. The alienation of industrial society is
overcome by grouping society into one large 'family'. Owenite communities make
education a central concern. Fourierists stress the importance ofhuman passions. In both
types of community, public and private spheres would merge (Friedmann, 1987). In both,
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the design of the physical space for communitarian life is of the utmost importance.
Reproduction of the utopia is evolutionary - it is brought about by example and through
moral persuasion. As Engels put it: "[T]heir socialism is the expression of absolute truth,
reason and justice and has only to be discovered to conquer all the world by virtue of its
own power" (Anti-Diihring:20).
Although the first detailed exposition of anarchism was made by William Godwin, the
roots of modem anarchism are commonly traced back to Pierre Joseph Proudhon.
Proudhon urged a path of structural reform which, in the midst of the capitalist system,
would create an alternative order based on self-governing communities. Friedmann (1987)
distinguished two branches of social anarchism that developed from Proudhon's thoughts.
The first, advanced peaceful means of cooperation as the route to an anarchist social order.
Its early proponents were Proudhon himself and Kropotkin, an exiled Russian aristocrat.
The second tradition advocated the violent overthrow of existing authority. Its
spokespersons were Bakunin and Sorel. Common to both is an uncomprimising
denunciation of all forms of imposed authority, particularly that of the state, seen by
anarchists as intrinsically repressive.
A further distinction should be made here - that between individualist anarchism and
socialist anarchism. The former emphasises individual liberty, the sovereignty of the
individual, the importance ofprivate property and possessions, and the inequity of all
forms of monopoly. It may be viewed as liberalism taken to its extreme ends. Socialist
anarchism, in contrast, rejects private property along with the state as a major source of
social inequality. By insisting on social equity as a necessary condition for the maximum
individual liberty of all, its ideal may be characterised as 'individuality in community'
(Ostergaard, 1983). It is socialist anarchy that Proudhon advocated and that has
subsequently become the main force in anarchist thought.
Proudhon advocated a minimalist state. In the course of time, this state would evolve into
anarchy, which he called the 'condition of total liberty' . Social organisation is based on the
commune and the self-government of each separate community. Communes are joined
through principles of voluntary federation in which lower order units retain more power
than they relinquish and disassociation is always an option. The natural unit above the
commune is the province or region governed autonomously through its constituent
communes (Friedmann, 1987). Anarchy is spontaneously generated and maintained by
enlightened individuals and the self-governing institutes they create. Their consciousness,
according to Proudhon, would be formed by two specific practices: science, which is the
systematic investigation of nature, and the law of commutative justice, or fair exchange,
which he called 'mutualism'. In his ideal vision, there takes place a convergence of the
public and the private sphere: the collective and the individual. When this occurs 'society's
laws will operate by themselves through universal spontaneity' (Friedrnann, 1987).
Kropotkin, the second major spokesperson for social anarchism, also proposed a peaceful
transition to anarchism. Like his predecessor, Kropotkin advocated a minimalist state, the
recovery of individual liberty in free association with others, and the principle of federation
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as the preferred mode of societal association. Social classes would be abolished, and from
this follows the abolition of the state as an instrument of oppression. "The no-capitalist
system", stated Kropotkin, "implies the no-government system" (in Friedmann, 1987:242).
Kropotkin advocated a form ofcommunism in which land, labour and capital would be the
'common property of society' to be 'managed in common by the producers of wealth' . This
system of anarchy, Kropotkin believed, would emerge spontaneously from the cooperative
activity of working people. It requires struggle, but not violent revolutionary struggle.
The second branch of anarchism advocated the violent overthrow of the state rather than
peaceful transformation of the capitalist system. The major early figure was Michael
Bakunin, another Russian aristocrat this time turned revolutionary. Like Fourier, Bakunin
believed in the priority ofpassion and freedom over constraint. For him, freedom was the
absence of all forms of external restraint. Hence, the state, which represented the principal
constraint on liberty, had to be destroyed. There could be no revolution 'without a
sweeping and passionate destruction, since by means of such destruction new worlds are
born and come into existence' (in Friedmann, 1987:239).
George Sorel, an anarcho-syndicalist, was Bakunin's successor. He likewise advocated the
overthrow of the state and posited the general strike as the appropriate weapon. He stated:
"The social revolution is an extension of that war in which each great strike is an episode;
this is the reason why Syndicalists speak of that revolution in the language of strikes; for
them, Socialism is reduced to the conception, the expectation of, and the preparation for
the general strike, which like Napoleon's battle, is to completely annihilate a condemned
regime" (Sorel, 1950:274; in Friedmann, 1987:240).
Thus, social anarchism rejected the state and capitalist relations ofproduction as
oppressive forces and advocated small-scale, decentralised, self-managing communities,
stressing their voluntary character, their mutualist cooperative nature, and the principle of
confederation as a means of linking them into larger regional and national systems of
organisation. Centralisation was viewed as creating a barrier between town and country
which would be overcome by dispersing smaller communities over the countryside in place
of giant urban conglomerations. Two very different paths to achieve this anarchistic state
were proposed. The first, a spontaneous and peaceful emergence of anarchistic forms from
within capitalist society relying upon the 'politics of disengagement'. This, over time,
would result in the evolutionary transformation of the capitalist mode ofproduction. The
second was Bakunin's path ofviolent uprising, and the revolutionary transformation and
destruction of the capitalist state. This called for the 'politics of confrontation'.
The third great movement within the social mobilisation tradition is that of historical
materialism, described by Friedmann (1987) as 'the theoretical basis of scientific
socialism' (as opposed to 'utopian socialism'). Scientific socialism is a political movement
which advocates a revolutionary transformation of the capitalist mode ofproduction. Its
founders were Marx and Engels. Historical materialism is a doctrine that encompasses a
comprehensive socio-historical analysis of human society and its relationship to non-
human nature. It is sometimes thought of as a philosophy, a historiography, a sociology, an
34
economics, or a politics. More properly, it can be considered a social science. In
Heilbroner's (1980:23) words it is "a grand synthesis of human understanding - a synthesis
that begins with a basic philosophic perspective, goes on to apply this perspective to the
interpretation of history, moves thereafter to an analysis of the present as the working-out
of historical forces in the existing social order, and culminates in an orientation to the
future that continues the line of analysis in an unbroken trajectory of action".
What distinguishes historical materialism as an intellectual movement is: (1) a dialectical
approach to knowledge, (2) a materialist conception of history, (3) a critical analysis of
capitalism, and (4) a commitment to revolutionary change.
According to Heilbroner (1980): "The dialectical core [of historical materialism] is
principally revealed in a view that considers the innermost nature of things to be dynamic
and conflictual rather than inert and static; a view, therefore, that searches within things for
their 'contradictory attributes"'. 'Vulgar' empiricism or positivism, or 'mechanical'
materialism, treats appearances as reality and treats reality as composed of reducible things
or entities. This results in a one-sided, restricted view ofreality, the essence of which can
only be discovered by delving below surface appearances to discern the inner motions, the
inner relations and tensions. And this type of dialectical analysis, as Heilbroner (1980)
pointed out, allowed Marx and Engels to discover and elucidate an 'unsuspected level of
reality beneath the surface of history' .
History is viewed as a succession of 'modes ofproduction' or historical epochs (e.g. Asian,
ancient, feudal, capitalist) each distinguished by a productive capacity (particular forces of
production) associated with distinctive forms ofproperty ownership (relations of
production). The forces ofproduction include the means ofproduction (raw materials,
machinery, etc.) plus labour power. The relations ofproduction are constituted by the
economic ownership and/or control ofproductive forces, i.e. the means of production and
labour power.
At a certain stage of development the material forces of production come into conflict with
the existing relations of production (the existing property relations). Instead of acting to
facilitate the development of productive forces, the relations ofproduction turn into
'fetters' and impede further progress. These underlying economic conflicts or
contradictions, all of which are objectively determined, are expressed in subjective form as
class struggle: conflict over the material interests ofparticular groups within society. It is
through revolutionary class struggle that one mode of production is succeeded by another.
Thus, history is presented as a dialectical process of conflict in the underlying economic
structure (the base) of society fought out in the realm of superstructure through class
struggle.
Marx and Engels posited the division of capitalist society into two opposing classes: the
bourgeoisie and proletariat. It was the proletariat that Marx and Engels identified as the
revolutionary force capable of radically transforming the capitalist mode ofproduction.
This would occur through a revolutionary uprising resulting in the overthrow of the
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capitalist state and its replacement with a classless society that Marx and Engels called
communism. According to historical materialism, just as former modes ofproduction have
been transformed so too will the present mode of production give birth to its successor.
Moreover, this transition, although determined 'in the last instance' by objective economic
conditions resulting in periods of crisis and revolutionary potential, will be realised by
human praxis in the form of a proletarian revolutionary movement.
Having uncovered the intellectual roots of social mobilisation, we now turn to examine
how these intellectual traditions have influenced modem planning theory and practice. We
will see how the founding fathers of urban and regional planning - Ebenezer Howard and
Patrick Geddes - were influenced by utopian socialist and anarchist philosophy, and how
this philosophy informed their visions of the good society and the methods for achieving
their visions. As Hall (1988:3) pointed out: "The visions of these anarchist pioneers were
not merely of an alternative built form, but of an alternative society, neither capitalist nor
bureaucratic-socialist: a society based on voluntary co-operation among men and women,
working and living in small self-governing commonwealths".
We will then examine two later influential figures who, whilst advocating radical
transformation of the existing socio-economic system, profoundly affected subsequent
planning theory and practice - Frank Lloyd Wright and Le Corbusier. Both advocated
utopian visions, one based on extreme decentralisation, the other on hierarchical
centralisation. Whilst Wright's vision can be looked upon as a form of individualistic
anarchy, with the fundamental economic unit the individually-owned family homestead, Le
Corbusier based his vision on an amalgam of revolutionary syndicalism and central
planning by a technocratic elite. We will conclude by examining Friedmann's recent theory
of transformative planning and its relevance to contemporary planning. Here we will see
that Friedmann was influenced by various intellectual traditions, including utopianism,
anarchism and, in particular, historical materialism.
It will be shown that in each case the intent ofplanning interventions proposed was to
radically transform the capitalist mode ofproduction. Physical design, spatial arrangement,
and methodology were but practical manifestations of a proposed fundamental change in
the underlying socio-economic system. In practice, however, the radical social and political
prescriptions of Howard, Geddes, Wright and Le Corbusier were discarded whilst their
spatial elements and methodology were appropriated to serve subsequent reformist
approaches to planning. It remains to be seen what the long term effects of Friedmann' s
proposals will be. They may, indeed, contribute to the emergence of a new mode of
production to challenge that of capitalism but it seems more likely, because of internal


































Figure 2: Historical Roots of Radical Planning (adapted from Friedmann, 1987)
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3.3 Ebenezer Howard and the Garden City Concept
"Town and country must be married, and out of this joyous union will spring a new
hope, a new life, a new civilization" (Howard, 1898:10).
The first and, according to Hall (1988), overwhelmingly the most important response in
planning terms to the dysfunctions of Victorian capitalism was the Garden City concept of
Ebenezer Howard conceived in the last two decades of the nineteenth century. As Hall
(1988) explained, it proposed to solve the problems of the Victorian city through the
creation over time of a constellation of self-contained new towns (Garden Cities) built in
the open countryside which would combine the best of urban and rural living.
Howard put forward his ideas in 1898 in a book called To-morrow! A Peaceful Path to
Real Reform, which was reissued in 1902 under the title Garden Cities ofTo-Morrow. This
modest book, as Lewis Mumford (1965) acknowledged, has done more than any other
book to guide the modem town planning movement. As Hall and Ward (1998) pointed out,
within a decade Howard's book had sent a shock-wave around the world. The first Garden
City was launched at Letchworth in 1903, others were soon to follow in Europe, and
translations of the book were appearing in language after language. Fifty years after its
publication this small book had spawned an act of Parliament and a score of new towns not
only in his native country but throughout the Western World. As Hall and Ward (1998:3)
concluded: "Seldom in history can any book have had such an extraordinary impact".
The change of title upon reissue, however, is indicative of the way Howard's message (and
the view of Howard himself) altered over time - from social visionary to physical planner.
As Hall (1988) pointed out, in most later views Howard was a physical planner concerned
with the spatial arrangement of urban and rural development. This view, however, ignores
the fact "that his garden cities were merely the vehicles for a progressive reconstruction of
capitalist society into an infinity of co-operative commonwealths" (Hall, 1988:87). As
Fishman (1977:8, 24) added, the Garden City represented "a plan for moderate
decentralization and cooperative socialism... Howard was, in his quiet way, a
revolutionary who originally conceived the Garden City as a means of superceding
capitalism and creating a civilization based on cooperation".
To better understand the significance of Howard's social prescriptions and the source of his
ideas, he must be set against the socio-economic-political conditions of his time. He
developed his ideas in the London of the 1880s and the 1890s, an age of radical ferment
(Hall, 1988). The city was a hotbed of radical activities and social 'causes' (Hall and Ward,
1998). He became deeply involved in what was then termed 'the social question' - the
nature and causes of the poverty and social malaise afflicting the cities and countryside of
his time. He joined a number of 'discussion groups', largely middle class intellectuals and
philanthropists concerned with the social and economic problems of society (Fishman,
1977).
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These middle class 'radicals' viewed Victorian England with alarm. They believed that the
economic life of the nation was corrupt, inhumane, inefficient, and immoral, and that
political power, despite the appearance of democracy, was unjustly concentrated in the
hands of a few. Eventually, this concentration would ruin the nation if allowed to persist
(Fishman, 1977). In the countryside the near monopoly oflandholding by large owners was
destroying agriculture. The farm workers, driven off the land, were swelling the urban
slums where they were exploited by the industrialists or demoralised by unemployment. If
those trends continued, the result would be a society polarised between capital and labour,
resulting ultimately in violent class conflict (Fishman, 1977).
Their proposed remedy was decentralisation and cooperation. The reformists wanted to
break the power of the landed gentry and institute fundamental land reform. This would
draw workers back from the slums and create a new class of agricultural small holders:
prosperous and independent. For urban industrialised areas, the radicals called for
cooperation to replace unfettered competition. Profit sharing in production would gradually
erase the distinction between worker and employer, thus ending class conflict (Fishman,
1977).
The radicals devoutly believed in progress, they held that human society was evolving
toward a higher stage of social organisation - a cooperative commonwealth - in which
universal brotherhood would become the basis of social life (Fishman, 1977). They rejected
government intervention or class struggle as the way to achieve this social ideal, and relied
instead upon moral persuasion and individual and group endeavour to spread the message.
Small scale cooperative enterprises set up by the faithful were to provide the way forward
(Fishman, 1977). The 'Back to the Land Movement' which flourished between 1880 and
1914 was one such initiative. The movement established a number of rural communities
based on the ideals of utopian socialists, agrarian socialists, sectarians and anarchists (Hall,
1988).
This is the general background to the development of Howard's ideas - a middle class that
was repelled by the inequity and social dislocation of Victorian capitalism; fearful of its
revolutionary potential; viewed such a society as transitory; believed in the inevitability of
a better, more humane world; offered largely utopian visions of what this world would look
like; but had little in the way of concrete proposals to accomplish it.
There were, however, other important influences on Howard from sometimes more obscure
sources. Two of them, according to Hall and Ward (1998), presented Howard with the
'critical keys' to the formulation of his social ideas. One was Edward Bellamy's futuristic
book, Looking Backward. Published in 1888, Looking Backward won immediate
popularity in the USA. Written against the backdrop of the industrial depression and
growing labour unrest that engulfed both America and Europe in the late nineteenth century
the book presented a graphic depiction of a future society in which these problems have
been overcome. This society was organised on moral principles. All means of production
were owned in common. Competition had been replaced by centralised planning.
Production and distribution had been efficiently grouped into one government owned
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cooperative Trust organised centrally. Poverty and unemployment were unknown, all
citizens between 21 and 45 occupied ranks in the 'industrial army', and everyone received
an equal salary (Fishman, 1977).
Howard read Looking Backward at one sitting and was, in his own words, 'fairly carried
away'. The next morning: "I went into some of the crowded parts of London, and as I
passed through the narrow dark streets, saw the wretched dwellings in which the majority
of the people lived, observed on every hand the manifestation of a self-seeking order of
society and reflected on the absolute unsoundness of our economic system, there came to
me an overpowering sense of the temporary nature of all I saw, and of its entire
unsuitability for the working life of the new order - the order ofjustice, unity and
friendliness" (Howard, 1910:195; in Fishman, 1977:33).
If Bellamy's vision convinced Howard of the 'absolute unsoundness and quite transitory
nature' of existing society, and the need for a 'socialist community' based on the common
ownership of the means ofproduction and distribution, his proposals for the regulation of
the future society - the concentration and centralisation of production and distribution into
a centrally controlled bureaucracy - did not appeal to Howard. Bellamy had seized upon all
the forces of concentration and centralisation in late nineteenth century capitalism and saw
there the possibility for a more humane society through central planning and large scale
production (Fishman, 1977). Howard was deeply suspicious of the potential
authoritarianism of centralised control by government bureaucracies and the large scale
production centred in industrial cities that continued to be a part of Bellamy's future.
Howard, instead, turned to another source and a different prescription for his future society.
This was Peter Kropotkin, the Russian anarchist whose articles appeared in the widely read
Londonjournal, The Nineteenth Century, between 1888 and 1890. These articles, later
collected as Fields, Factories and Workshops (1899), argued that while steam energy and
the railroads had brought forth large factories and great cities, the new age of electricity and
new technology would make possible a rapid decentralisation. He saw the future in what he
called 'industrial villages', set in the countryside. There electrically powered cooperatively
owned cottage industries would produce goods more efficiently than the old urban
factories, and the occupants of the village would benefit from its rural location (Fishman,
1977).
Kropotkin's views were readily accepted in English radical circles, especially his
prediction that all the great urban concentrations of people and power were destined to
disappear, his conviction that the future belonged to small-scale cooperatives, and his
belief that decentralisation would make possible a society based on freedom and
brotherhood. Kropotkin, whom Howard called "the greatest democrat ever born to wealth
and power" (in Fishman, 1977:37), convinced Howard that rather than Bellamy's large-
scale centrally organised society, the future lay in decentralised, small scale communities
dispersed over the countryside. "On a small scale", Howard proposed, "society may readily
become more individualistic than now and more socialistic" (Howard, 1965:131).
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Large cities were to have no place in the society of the future. Surveying the "ill-ventilated,
unplanned, unwieldy, and unhealthy cities - ulcers on the very face of our beautiful island",
he proclaimed: "These crowded cities have done their work; they were the best which a
society based on selfishness and rapacity could construct, but they are in the nature of
things entirely unadapted for a society in which the social side of our nature is demanding a
larger share of recognition" (Howard, 1965:145-146). According to Fishman (1977),
Howard was then ready to formulate the fundamental principle of the Garden City:
"Radical hopes for a cooperative civilization could be fulfilled only in small communities
embedded in a decentralized society" (Fishman, 1977:37). In decentralised communities,
based on small business and agriculture and the communal ownership of land, social
problems would be amenable to cooperative solutions and the proper balance of order and
freedom could be achieved (Fishman, 1977).
Howard turned to the task of how to achieve this civilization and what its physical form
would take. He was not looking for a revolutionary uprising to bring about his cooperative
society. Nor did he have faith in government intervention. What Howard was searching for
was a 'peaceful road to reform' based upon cooperation and goodwill. This peaceful road,
once started down, would lead to the gradual transformation of existing centralised
industrial capitalism, city by city, region by region.
It was an obscure and eccentric radical, Thomas Spense, who provided Howard with what
seemed to be the answer. To dispossess the landlords, described by Spense as 'usurpers and
tyrants', each parish should become a corporation and take up its lost rights in collectivity.
Rents would then be paid to the parish to be used for public purposes like building and
maintaining houses and roads. Moreover, these rents would soon produce a surplus for
distribution to the needy and for social expenditure such as schools and public libraries. In
Spense's 'Spensonia', the community would be regulated by a board of directors elected
from and by the shareholders (Hall and Ward, 1998).
These ideas were appropriated into Howard's prescriptions for establishing his Garden
Cities. The Garden City complex was to be established by citizens themselves in the form
of a limited dividend company. They would purchase rural land at depressed prices. The
citizens would own the land in perpetuity and as land values increased capital would flow
back into the community. The citizens would pay a modest rate-rent for their houses,
factories or farms, sufficient to repay the interest on the money originally borrowed, to
provide a sinking fund to repay the capital, and then, progressively as the money was paid
back - to provide funds for the creation of a local welfare state - all without need for local
or central taxation, and directly responsible to the local citizens (Hall, 1988).
Howard wrote: " ... it is obvious that a migration of population on any considerable scale to
any particular area will be certainly attended with a corresponding rise in the value of land
so settled upon, and it is also obvious that such an increment of value may, with some
foresight and pre-arrangement, become the property of the migrating people" (Howard,
1898:21). Rent-rates would be raised to reflect rising land values and this would allow the
company to payoff the mortgage debt and, increasingly, to generate a fund for social
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purposes (Hall and Ward, 1998). Howard thus believed he had solved the riddle that had
vexed the land reformers: to create an ideal community by appropriating for itself the land
values it created by its own existence, thus achieving land nationalisation step by step
without resorting to revolutionary means or relying upon government intervention (Hall
and Ward, 1998).
In A Peaceful Road to Reform Howard outlined the plan for his ideal community. He
started with the famous diagram of the 'Three Magnets' (Figure 3). Town and country were
compared to magnets each with its particular drawing power, its particular combinations of
attraction and repulsion. The town possessed social and cultural advantages and
employment opportunities yet suffered from lack of nature, high rents and prices, slums
and social malaise. The country possessed the bountifulness of nature, idle land and low
rents, yet was afflicted with economic stagnation and a 'lack of society'. The task of the
planner would be to create a third magnet by combining the best of town and country in a
new kind of settlement, 'Town-Country' (Fishman, 1977).
He envisaged this new settlement, the Garden City, as a tightly organised urban centre of
about 30,000 inhabitants occupying some 1000 acres ofland (Figure 4). This would be
surrounded by a perpetual green belt of farms and parks comprising some 5000 acres. This
agricultural belt plays an integral role in the economy of the Garden City. The 2000 farmers
who live there supply the town with the bulk of its food, making the city largely self-
sufficient. And because the size of the town is fixed (it cannot spread and encroach upon
the green belt) citizens are ensured ofboth a compact urban centre and free access to ample
open countryside (Fishman, 1977).
Within the urban area there would be both quiet residential neighbourhoods and a full
range of commercial, industrial and cultural activities. At the centre of the city is a central
park within which is situated the civic centre: town hall, library, museum, concert and
lecture hall, and the hospital. Here the highest values of the community are brought
together - culture, philanthropy, health, and mutual cooperation. Surrounding the park is a
glassed-in arcade which Howard termed the 'Crystal Palace'. This comprises a circular
shopping mall where 'manufactured goods are exposed for sale' from a variety of small
shops, but limited to one for each category of goods (Fishman, 1977).
Next comes the residential areas comprising houses with gardens for all classes. The most
substantial homes would border Grand Avenue, a circular park and promenade that runs
through the residential areas. In the middle of Grand Avenue is situated the school, in
Howard's estimation, the most important neighbourhood institution. On the periphery of
the urban area, adjacent to the railway that surrounds the town and connects it to the main
line, is situated a manufacturing belt. Located here are the industrial enterprises appropriate
to a decentralised, largely self-sufficient community: the small machine shop, the
cooperative printing press, the jam factory, the clothing and furniture works, the boot




Figure 3: Ebenezer Howard's Three Magnets (from Howard, 1965)
The celebrated diagram from Garden Cities ofTomorrow (first published in 1898) setting
out the advantages and disadvantages of town and country life. A hybrid form for the
future, the planned Town-Country or Garden City, combined the advantages of both








GARDEN CITY AND RURAL BELT
Figure 4: Garden City and Rural Belt (from Howard, 1965)
The Garden City combines town and country. The urban centre covers 1000 acres with a
rural belt of 5000 acres. Total population for the Garden City is around 30,000 people.
Because the size of the town is fixed, citizens are assured ofboth a compact urban centre
and easy access to open countryside.
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The town as a whole is divided into wards (Figure 5) representing slices of the circular
whole. Each ward would comprise 5,000 people or about 1000 families. Each ward, said
Howard, 'should in some sense be a complete town by itself. The Garden City could thus
be built ward by ward (Fishman, 1977). As one Garden City reached its planned limit,
another would be started a short distance away. Thus, over time, there would develop a vast
planned agglomeration, extending almost without limit. Within the complex, each Garden
City would be largely self-sufficient, but each would be connected to the others by a rapid
transport system. Howard called this polycentric vision - 'Social City' (Figure 6). This
agglomeration, not the individual Garden City was the physical realisation of town and
country (Hall, 1988).
We have seen that the Garden City and Social City were more than just a physical
blueprint. As Hall (1988) pointed out, the words underlying the Third Magnet, FREEDOM,
CO-OPERATION, were not simply rhetoric, they were the heart of the plan. It was a social
utopia that Howard was advocating. Mumford (1965), in his foreword to Howard's book,
emphasised that Howard was much less concerned with physical form than with social
reconstruction.
Each Garden City would be an exercise in local management and self-government based
upon communal ownership of land. People would build their own homes with capital
provided by building societies, friendly societies, or cooperative societies. Services would
be provided by the municipality or by the people themselves (Hall and Ward, 1998). It was
a vision of a decentralised, anarchistic, cooperative society - a curious mixture of
socialism, communal ownership, cooperation and individualism. This would be achieved
not by government proclamation nor by revolutionary uprising but by the progressive
spread of communal land ownership brought about by the gradual extension of the Garden
City complex - the Social City. It represented, in fact, the evolutionary transformation of
industrial capitalism, or as Howard described it, 'the natural growth of sound ideas' .
Thus, as Hall (1988) pointed out, for Howard the Garden City and Social City were far
more than a planned physical environment. They represented a third socio-economic
system, superior to Victorian capitalism and bureaucratic centralised socialism.
Howard was also not simply a visionary. He put substantial effort into realising his vision.
He organised a city planning movement that to this day continues to keep his ideas alive.
He and his supporters founded two English cities, Letchworth (1903) and Welwyn Garden
City (1920), which still serve as models for his ideas. The postwar programme ofNew
Towns in Britain was inspired by his works and planned by his followers (Fishman, 1977).
In the USA the 'Greenbelt Cities' project undertaken by the Resettlement Administration
in the 1930s owed their form to the example of the Garden City. In 1969 the National
Committee on Urban Growth Policy urged the United States to build 110 new towns to










WARD AND CENTRE OF GARDEN CITY
Figure 5: Ward and Centre of Garden City (from Howard, 1965)
Each Garden City is divided into wards representing slices of the circular whole. Each
ward comprises 5000 people and six wards compose the city. At the centre of the city is a
central park within which is situated the civic centre: town hall, library, museum, concert
and lecture halls, and the hospital. Surrounding the park is a glassed-in arcade, which
Howard termed the 'Crystal Palace', functioning as a circular shopping mall. Next comes
residential areas comprising houses with gardens for all inhabitants. The most substantial
houses would border Grand Avenue, a circular park and promenade. In the middle of
Grand Avenue is situated the school. On the periphery of the urban area, adjacent to the
railway that surrounds the town and connects it to the main line, is situated a
manufacturing belt. Located here are the industrial enterprises appropriate to a
decentralised, largely self-sufficient community.
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Figure 6: The Social City (from Hall, 1988)
This diagram, from the first edition of Howard' s book, demonstrates his full conception of
Garden Cities grouped in planned urban agglomerations of a quarter million people or
more. Within the complex, each Garden City would be largely self-sufficient, but each
would be connected to the others by an intricate system of canals and railways. Howard
called this polycentric vision, 'Social City'. This agglomeration, not the individual Garden
City, was the physical realisation of town and country.
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From the beginning, however, the Garden City concept was separated from its underlying
radical socio-economic philosophy. Over time the physical and spatial elements of
Howard's prescriptions came to serve reformist ends. They became incorporated into the
planning tradition of societal guidance intended to alleviate the dysfunctions of the
capitalist system to enable its reproduction rather than to contribute to its radical
transformation. As Fishrnan (1977) commented, instead of a peaceful alternative to
capitalism the Garden City became a device for preserving it.
Both Letchworth and Welwyn Garden City retained the basic elements of Howard' s
proposals. They were set up with public company funding and they attracted an industrial
base and a population to serve this industry and surrounding agriculture. In other words,
they became largely self-supporting new communities. They were laid out essentially
following Howard's prescriptions by combining the best of town and country, with a
commitment to providing all residents with healthy and pleasant living conditions.
However, neither Garden City stimulated the spread of cooperative land ownership, nor the
development of local welfare institutions free from government controL They provided a
modest return to their investors, admittedly with an element of cooperative ownership, but
capitalism continued unabated, albeit in a much more pleasant environment (Hall, 1988).
The satellite towns and garden suburbs that followed in Britain represented a further
departure from Howard's vision of socio-economic reconstruction. They were not self-
supporting communities in any sense - both forms served as dormitory settlements for
places of work in existing city centres. Although incorporating elements ofHoward's
physical prescriptions - principally the emphasis on combining the best of town and
country to provide pleasant and healthy environments to live in - they retained little of his
socio-economic philosophy. Whilst starting out as cooperative housing ventures,
developments such as Ealing Garden Suburb and Hamstead Garden Suburb (whose
objectives included 'day-to-day coexistence which would soon heal the estrangement of the
classes') quickly became gentrified and distinctly middle class rather than classless (Hall,
1988). Howard's underlying philosophy of cooperative anarchistic socialism was once
again submerged beneath a more aesthetic capitalism.
Finally, the objectives of the Garden City movement became so removed from the actual
initiatives that were occurring under its name that complaints were registered at the time
that 'quite a number of schemes ... take the title 'Garden City' promiscuously, without
having any claim whatever to use the name, their objects being as foreign as possible to the
conception of the founders of the movement' (in Hall, 1988:105).
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3.4 Patrick Geddes and Regional Planning
"Eutopia, then, lies in the city around us; and it must be planned and realised, here or
nowhere, by us as its citizens - each a citizen of both the actual and the ideal city seen
increasingly as one ... " (Geddes, 1972:112).
The second major response to the dysfunctions of capitalism around the turn of the
nineteenth century was the vision of regional planning developed soon after 1900 by the
Scots biologist, Patrick Geddes and interpreted during the 1920s by the founding members
of the Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA), in particular Lewis Mumford.
Later initiatives in America were influenced by Geddes: the Southern Regionalists led by
Howard Odum, New Deal planners like Rexford Tugwell, even, indirectly, Frank Lloyd
Wright (Hall, 1988).
Geddes had a profound influence on planning in Britain: as a reference point for the
development of more sophisticated planning procedures by some of the leading planners of
the time, such as Thomas Adams and Patrick Abercrombie; and (along with Howard) as a
stimulant to the regional 'New Town' developments in post war Britain (Muller, 1992).
Over time, Geddes' ideas fused with Howard' s closely related visions and spread
throughout the world (Hall, 1988).
Trained as a biologist, Geddes became involved in planning through his interest in
sociology. As a student in London in the 1870s, Geddes was exposed to the extremes of
wealth and poverty that characterised London at that time. He became interested in the
emerging discipline of sociology as an approach to understanding the social ills that
confronted him. The early French sociologist, Frederic Le Play, had been one of the first
social scientists to undertake practical work in the cause of 'social peace', and it was to Le
Play that Geddes first turned for inspiration. He took Le Play's threefold depiction of social
life - 'Place, Work and Folk' - and applied them to his own study of contemporary society.
This involved a comprehensive study of all the elements affecting a particular social
formation: 'Place' entailed a study of geography, 'Work', a study of economics, and 'Folk',
a study of anthropology (Meller, 1979).
Geddes combined this approach with his appreciation of Darwinian evolutionary
principles. However, rather than the notions of conflict and struggle and the 'survival of the
fittest' as posed by Herbert Spenser, Geddes, following Kropotkin (1902), saw cooperation
and mutual dependency in nature, and it was these principles that he applied to his study of
sociology. Sociology, an evolutionary study of society and 'Life' and not 'a war of all
against all' but as cooperative and mutually supportive, was the unifying force expressed in
evolutionary progress. As he put it; "For with this fully biological outlook, geography and
ecology, anthropology and evolution, are all at one in the understanding of Place, Work and
People, in living interaction, psychological as well. And yet these are physical, biological
and social too. Life is the unity; its full study is synthetic; its analyses are but temporary
divisions of labour, of which the results have ever to be incorporated into our
understanding of life" (in Meller, 1979:28).
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He considered two aspects the key elements for sociological study: an understanding of the
physical environment through a comprehensive study of the region, and an understanding
of those elements of the past which had shaped the present. In this way, the present could
be explained by the past and the future informed by both. He developed an evolutionary
model of history and applied it to sociology. History was thus' a drama in time' moving
from one stage of evolution to another. Hence, Geddes developed his idea of an
evolutionary utopia. Utopia could be realised here and now, albeit at some lower stage of
its fullest potential. But if the lower stage was consciously and actively achieved, that in
itself would provide further impetus towards achieving the next higher stage (Meller,
1979).
Although Geddes espoused a visionary idealism or utopianism, albeit one derived from
what he perceived as 'scientific' principles, he was concerned primarily with practical
efforts to improve society and move it towards his utopia. He was a 'practical' idealist, a
distinction Geddes insisted upon to differentiate himself from philosophical idealists and
utopians. According to Meller (1979), Geddes tried to understand the complexities of
modem life not to define or analyse it but rather to promote informed social action to
improve it. To do this, he established his famous 'Outlook Tower', a civic and regional
museum, described by Geddes as a 'social laboratory' dedicated to educating and
instructing others on his sociological approach. In the Outlook Tower he sought to
establish cooperative enterprises and to establish mutual aid as the best way of achieving a
higher social evolution (Meller, 1979).
Geddes promoted a programme of community regional planning whereby each region
would be harmoniously developed on the basis of its own natural resources, consistent with
the principles of ecological balance and sustainable resource use and in accord with
established evolutionary principles. Cities within the region would develop as organic parts
of the whole in line with evolutionary imperatives and, in this sense, cities would be
subservient to the natural region and its resources yet still be part of an historical,
evolutionary progression (Hall, 1988).
He was strongly influenced by the two founding fathers of modem French geography,
Elisee Reclus and Paul Vidal de la Blache. From them he got his idea of the natural region,
as exemplified by his well known 'Valley Section' following the course of a river from
mountains to coast (Hall, 1988). Planning must start, according to Geddes, with a survey of
the resources of such a natural region. The student of cities, he asserted, must first study the
natural region. Through "[s]uch a survey of a series of our own river basins... will be
found the soundest of introductions to the study of cities" (Geddes, 1905: 106).
Geddes' survey was based upon a profile "of that general slope from mountains to sea
which we find everywhere in the world [which] we can readily adapt to any scale, and to
any proportions, of our particular and characteristic range of hills and slopes and plain.
Only such a 'Valley Section', as we commonly call it, makes vivid to us the range of
climate, with its corresponding vegetation and animal life ... the essential sectional outline
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of a geographer's 'region', ready to be studied" (Geddes, 1925:289-90; in Hall, 1988:142)
(Figure 10). At the centre of this region lay the 'Valley in the Town' where "we must
excavate the layers of our city downwards, into its earliest past - the dim yet heroic cities
over and upon which it has been built; and thence we must read them upwards, visualizing
them as we go" (Geddes, 1925:396; in Hall, 1988:142).
Thus, the survey proposed by Geddes, was to be made comprehensive by including
biophysical elements (such as geology, topography, climatology, vegetation, hydrology,
etc.) and historical socio-economic conditions (population characteristics, urban
conditions, manufacturing and residential locations, etc.). Geddes' emphasis on the
importance of the survey was revealed when he stated, in response to the newly introduced
Housing and Town Planning Act of 1909:
"We welcomed and highly appreciated the Town Planning Act of 1909, and... have
addressed ourselves... to the nature and method of the City Survey which we are
unanimously of the opinion is necessary before the preparation of any Town Planning
Scheme can be satisfactorily undertaken... Without this, municipalities and others
interested are in danger of taking the very opposite course, that ofplanning before
survey. Our suggestion towards guarding against this is hence of the most definite kind,
viz: before proceeding to the preparation of a Town Planning Scheme, it is desirable to
institute a Preliminary Local Survey" (Geddes, 1949:124-6; in Muller, 1992:126).
Geddes has been credited by planning historians with developing the rudiments ofplanning
methodology (Breheny and Batey, 1981; Hall, 1992; Muller, 1992). The Geddesian model
of 'survey before plan' can be construed, according to Muller (1992), as the beginnings of
rudimentary 'scientific validation' in the process ofplanning. As Muller (1992: 129) stated:
"Geddes must be credited with having formulated the incipient methodological model".
Breheny and Batey (1981: 111) agreed. "Undoubtedly", they stated, "much of the credit for
promulgating the first, rudimentary ideas about planning methodology belongs to Patrick
Geddes". Indeed, according to Hall (1992), from the1920s until the 1960s the work method











Figure 7: Geddesian Model (after Muller, 1992)
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However, Geddes was not simply interested in a planning methodology that could mitigate
the ills of the industrial cities of his time. Nor was his emphasis on regional survey merely
concerned with ameliorative strategies aimed at achieving ecological balance and
sustainable resource use within the conftnes of the current socio-economic system. Geddes
was, in fact, advocating the actual transformation of centralised industrial capitalism. His
methodology was intimately linked to a radical philosophical outlook. As Hall (1988:42)
pointed out: "for Geddes, the region was more than an object of survey; it was to provide
the basis for the total reconstruction of social and political life".
From his contacts with the French geographers at the turn of the century, Geddes was
influenced by the creed of anarchistic communism based on free confederations of
autonomous regions (Hall, 1988). Reclus and Kropotkin were anarchists as well as
geographers, and both were influenced by the French anarchist/socialist, Pierre Joseph
Proudhon, who advocated a decentralised, non-hierarchical system of federal government,
a philosophy shared by the Russian anarchist, Bakunin (Hall, 1988).
Reclus and Kropotkin were heirs to this tradition and both, according to Hall (1988), met
Geddes more than once during the 1880s and 1890s. Reclus argued that the naturally
collectivist small-scale societies of primitive people had been destroyed by colonialism.
Kropotkin advocated a return to non-hierarchical, collectivist, dispersed communities. His
creed was'Anarchist Communism, Communism without government - the Communism of
the Free' (Kropotkin, 1906:28; in Hall, 1988:144). In effect, he argued society must rebuild
itself on the basis of cooperation among free individuals in self-sufftcient communities
dispersed over the countryside in self-governing communities.
As we have seen in relation to Howard, in Fields, Factories and Workshops, Kropotkin
(1913) argued that the new sources of energy (especially electric power) and technological
advances meant that centralised industry was no longer necessary and should in fact be
relocated to the country. "This scattering of industries over the country - so as to bring the
factory amidst the fields ... and to produce a combination of industrial with agricultural
work - is surely the next step ... This step is imposed by the very necessity ofproducing for
the producers themselves; it is imposed by the necessity for each healthy man and woman
to spend a part of their lives in manual work in the free air" (Kropotkin, 1913:361; in Hall,
1988:145).
Influenced by Kropotkin's Fields, Factories and Workshops, Geddes distinguished
different stages of industrial development - the 'palaeotechnic' period (the 'earlier and
ruder elements of the Industrial Age') was that of the Industrial Revolution when the new
science and technology was in its infancy and society was so engrossed in production that
humanity was subjugated to economic imperatives. The old palaeotechnic order he saw as
"dissipating resources and energies, as depressing life under the rule of machine and
mammon, and as working out accordingly its speciftc results, in unemployment and
misemployment, in disease and folly, in vice and apathy, in indolence and crime" (Geddes,
1915:86; in Hall, 1988:146-7).
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He then distinguished a 'neotechnic age' when technology became more sophisticated and
was harnessed not only to produce more goods but to improve the conditions of labour.
What he looked for in the future was a 'geotechnic age', when science and technology
could be used to further improve the material and physical conditions of the people.
Finally, a 'eugenic age' would emerge when the whole system would be devoted to the
nurture ofpeople and nature (Meller, 1979). Only in this new era would humankind "apply
our constructive skill, our vital energies, towards the public conservation instead of the
private dissipation of resources, and towards the evolution instead of the destruction of the
lives of others" (Geddes, 1912:177; in Hall, 1988:145). In this new age people would
become master of their own destiny and 'Eutopia' would be within reach of all.
As with Howard, society had to be reconstructed not by sweeping government measures,
nor by revolutionary uprising, but through the efforts of individuals and communities. The
'eugenic era' meant the creation, city by city, region by region, of 'Eutopia'. Regional
planning, for Geddes, was intimately part and parcel of this social reconstruction. Geddes
was advocating a transformation of industrial capitalism to a decentralised federation of
largely self-sufficient communities based on natural regions that determine the scale and
pattern of development.
In such a society, he believed, the need for centralised government would soon be obsolete.
The road to progress and higher civilization was to be found through cooperation amongst
individuals at the local scale. Cities, towns, villages, groups and associations would work
out their own regional salvation. To do this they needed freedom to develop their own
ideas and the vision to plan. What Geddes was concerned with was the evolution of a
society whose main concern was to nurture its people within the biophysical constraints of
its regional resources. At some stage the economic and social system had to be fitted to the
people and the natural environment, and not the other way round (Meller, 1979). The key
to this future was through regional planning based upon the survey, and by involving more
and more people in local initiatives dependent upon the results of these surveys. It was
through the actual work of the survey that a plan for social action would be devised.
Geddes' theories exercised a profound influence on planning methodology in Britain. Most
later developments in planning procedures started from Geddes' survey-before-plan
prescription (Muller, 1992). For example, Patrick Abercrombie (1933), in his celebrated
textbook, Town and Country Planning, acknowledged that without the inspiration of
Geddes, the practice ofplanning in England would have been a 'more elementary thing'
(Muller, 1992). Abercrombie, following Geddes, perceived planning as an activity
scientifically based on knowledge and understanding of a particular urban area and its
regional setting, with the purpose of controlling patterns of physical growth and
remodelling urban form to meet modem requirements (Muller, 1992).
Abercrombie's crowning achievement was the Greater London Plan of 1944. It built on
earlier plans, most notably Unwin' s 1929 Report of the Greater London Regional Planning
Committee, which proposed a complete reversal of the existing planning system. Instead of
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planning authorities trying to reserve parcels ofland for open space (the rest being
available for development) they should allocate certain areas for development on the
assumption that all the remainder be left open space. This would result in clearly defined
urban areas against a backdrop of open countryside rather than the sporadic urban sprawl
and ribbon development that was occurring.
Abercrombie, following these principles, proposed in the Greater London Plan a regionally
based strategy of limiting the spread of Central London by establishing a 'gigantic Green
Belt around built-up London', eight new towns between 20-35 miles from London, and
controlled extensions to existing towns. This would allow for the 'organic growth' of the
whole region based upon a carefully controlled distribution between urban and rural
development set against a backdrop of open countryside. Not only were all eight originally-
planned new towns built, but a further three were added in the 1960s to accommodate
further growth. As Hall (1988) pointed out, it was the vision of regional planning at last
realised. Mumford himself called it 'the best single document on planning, in every respect,
that had come out since Howard's book itself' (in Hall, 1988:171). Hall (1988: 172) also
claimed that "the London region is one of the few places in the world where it is possible
to see the Howard-Geddes-Mumford vision of the world made actual". It was their spatial
vision only, however, that was implemented, and not the radical socio-economic
philosophy that had inspired it.
In adapting Geddes' ideas on regional planning and regional surveys Abercrombie was
interested only in the practicalities ofplanning. The radical, utopian-anarchist visions
underlying Geddes' regionalism was submerged beneath a pragmatic approach to
addressing the obvious and pressing dysfunctions of industrial society. Abercrombie was
interested in spatial reformation, not social transformation. As Hall (1988: 165) made clear,
the underlying philosophy was "planning as the art of the possible: planning should not try
to achieve more than marginal changes, and it must work within the limits of existing
powers".
I Formulation of Objectives I
I Civil and Sociological Survey I
I Analysis of Survey Information I
I Preparation of Development Plan I
Figure 8: Abercrombie's Methodology (after Muller, 1992)
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Geddes' proposals concerning regional planning, along with Howard's theories on Garden
Cities, had a profound influence in America, particularly on the RPAA, the core members
of which included Lewis Mumford, Clarence Stein, Henry Wright, Frederick Ackerman,
Stuart Chase and Benton MacKaye (Hall, 1988). In Mumford, Geddes had found an
influential ally and articulate advocate for his ideas. In a special issue of The Survey in
1925, described by Hall (1988) as one of the most important documents in planning
history, the RPAA outlined its manifesto. Mumford opened with the following statement:
"This number has been produced by a group of insurgents who, as architects and planners,
builders and rebuilders, have tried to remould cities in conventional ways and, finding the
task a labour of Sisyphus, have pinned their faith boldly to the new concept of the Region"
(in Hall, 1988:150).
In the opening article, 'The Fourth Migration', Mumford described three former
movements in the development of America: "The first migration that cleared the land west
of the Alleghenies and opened up the continent, the work of the land pioneer; the second
migration, that worked over this fabric a new pattern of factories, railroads and dingy
industrial towns, the bequest of the industrial pioneer; and fmally ... the America of the
third migration, the flow of men and materials into our financial centres, the cities where
buildings and profits leap upwards in riotous pyramids" (Mumford, 1925a: 130; in Hall,
1988:150).
In the 1920s, according to Mumford, America was once again in a time of flow, a fourth
migration, based on "the technological revolution that has taken place during the last thirty
years - a revolution that has made the existing layout of cities and the existing distribution
of population out of square with our new opportunities" (Mumford, 1925a: 130; in Hall,
1988:150). And this technological revolution, based upon new communication technology
- the automobile, the telephone, radio and postal services - together with electric power,
allowed for the dispersal ofpopulation rather than its concentration in city
conglomerations.
The new technologies were making large cities into 'Dinosaur Cities', which were breaking
down under the weight of congestion, inefficiency and escalating social cost (Hall, 1988).
In addition, the unnecessary movement of goods around the country was viewed as
inefficient, and a waste of resources, particularly energy. What was required was
intervention in order to correct the existing malaise. And this intervention, based upon the
revolution in communication technology, was centred on planning, specifically planning on
the basis of regional resources. A 'national plan' would involve "regions delimited on the
basis of natural geographic entities... a maximum of foodstuffs, textiles and housing
materials grown and manufactured in the home region... a minimum of interregional
exchanges based only on such products as the home region cannot economically produce...
plus regional power plants, short hauls by truck and a decentralised distribution of
population" (Chase, 1925:144; in Hall, 1988:151).
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Based on Geddes' theories, the development of such a national plan would involve
comprehensive regional surveys along the lines of 'Valley Sections'. As Muller (1992)
pointed out, Mumford advocated a four stage process (Figure 9), commencing with a
thorough survey of the region's resources. This was followed by a 'revaluation' of
conventional assumptions about the region on the basis of the latest information. The third
stage involved the preparation of the plan, and the process would end with implementation
including, where necessary, modification to the plan. We see here a further development of
planning methodology based upon Geddes' two stage model of 'survey-plan'.





Figure 9: Mumford's Regional Planning Process (after Muller, 1992)
As with Geddes, Mumford's methodology was underpinned by a radical philosophical-
rationale: the transformation of the existing capitalist socio-economic system to a planned,
decentralised federation of largely self-sufficient regions. Chase, one of the RPAA's
members, admitted: "We were willing... to abandon large areas of the free market in favor
of a planned economy... we were not doctrinaire socialists. We were open-minded, kind of
Fabian Socialists" (in Hall, 1988:152). It was essentially a utopian socialism, based on
social concerns and ecological principles, described by Mumford as the 'New
Conservation' .
"Regional planning is the New Conservation - the conservation of human values hand in
hand with natural resources ... Permanent agriculture instead of land-skinning,
permanent forestry instead of timber mining, permanent human communities, dedicated
to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, instead of camps and squatter-settlements,
and to stable buildings, instead of the scantling and false work of our'go-ahead'
communities - all this is embodied in regional planning" (Mumford, 1925b:151; in Hall,
1988:153).
As with Geddes' theories in Britain, the radicalism of the RPAA was discarded in
subsequent attempts to initiate forms of regional planning in America. The Regional Plan
56
ofNew York, undertaken by Thomas Adams, and based upon Geddesian principles, was to
be, as Hall (1988:156) pointed out, "no revolutionary prescription but a set of mild controls
on market abuses to aid efficiency - only incremental change was [deemed] possible".
Other initiatives adapted Geddes' and Mumford's regional planning to the demands of
pragmatic yet reformist approaches to planning in America. Roosevelt's New Deal
planning was heavily committed in principle to a programme along RPAA lines. The result
was the Greenbelt Cities Programme developed by Tugwell which combined Howard's
Garden City concept with the RPAA's regionalism and proposed the building of25 new
towns throughout the United States. Only three were actually built (Hall, 1988).
Although most ofRoosevelt' s plans remained just that - plans - the influence ofGeddes
and the RPAA is obvious. Their radicalism, however, was submerged beneath the
pragmatic efforts of the time to ameliorate the dysfunctions of capitalism exposed by the
Great Depression. In the late 1960s and 1970s the spatial and methodological ideas of
Howard and Geddes informed the building of a number ofnew towns in the USA but, once
again, not as an attempt to transform capitalism but rather as part of a national urban
growth strategy to assist capitalist development. Thus, as with Howard, the radical
transformative elements of Geddes' and the RPAA's regional planning were reduced to
mere reformism - solving the short-term contradictions of capitalism to enable its
reproduction. Their spatial prescriptions and methodology, however, had a profound and
lasting effect on the theory and practice of mainstream planning throughout the world.
MINER WOODMAN HUNTER SHEPKERD PEASANT GARDENER FISHER
Figure 10: Geddes' Valley Section (from Hall, 1988)
The essence ofGeddes' regional scheme: Folk-Work-Place in perfect harmony.
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3.5 Frank Lloyd Wright and Broadacre City
"The creative artist is by nature and by office the qualified leader in any society, natural,
native interpreter of the visible forms of any social order in or under which we choose to
live" (Wright, 1935:243-244).
Whilst Howard's and Geddes' radical proposals for future planned societies arose as a
response to the dysfunctions of Victorian capitalism in Britain, Frank Lloyd Wright's
utopian vision was a response to American capitalism in the early part of the twentieth
century. It was a reaction to the slow decay of rural America and the growing problems of
urban centres. These were exacerbated by the Great Depression that afflicted global
capitalism in the 1930s. In this sense, his proposals can be conceived as a response to a
crisis in the capitalist mode of production, just as the early reactions of Howard and
Geddes were responses to crises in the 1880s and 1890s.
Wright was an architect by profession, and was to become one of the most celebrated in
American history. However, he was much more than a designer of buildings. His interests
flowed from architecture and design to philosophy, economics, politics and sociology, and
from these to planning, and not merely urban and regional planning in the traditional
reformist sense. Wright, like Howard and Geddes, wanted to transform the socio-economic
system he was confronted with. Wright viewed centralised, industrial capitalism with
contempt. To him it was a system founded on greed that extolled the worst of human traits.
It was, in addition, profoundly undemocratic. 'True democracy' would involve the radical
transformation of society. And for Wright, it was the creative artist who would give
meaning and direction to social change by expressing society's inchoate desires in physical
form. The artist was thus the essential planner and natural leader of society (Fishman,
1977).
Wright spent his early adulthood in Chicago, which at that time was emerging as one of the
world's great industrial centres. Here Wright was exposed to the concentrations of wealth
and poverty that characterised the industrial cities ofhis time. The skyscrapers of Chicago
expressed the explosive sense of growth, power, and mastery of industry which constituted
the city's wealth. Its miseries were exposed in the ever-expanding slums, the increasingly
bitter unemployment crises and labour unrest (Fishman, 1977). Wright was to come to
despise the large cities of capitalist America. He saw the city as a monstrous aberration, a
'cancerous tumor' on society, built by greed and unbridled competition. He viewed cities as
an impediment to efficient production and destructive of human values.
These impressions of the industrial city contrasted with his rural upbringing, a time when
he had spent his childhood summers on his grandfather's farm in Wisconsin. Here his
grandfather and uncles fanned their 'Valley' in self-imposed isolation providing most of
their economic and social necessities through their own endeavours. The extended family
had its own chapel, its gristmill, its own school, and owned and cultivated most of the land
in the valley. The place was a 'hive ofwork, prayer and song' all centred on the family-
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economically independent and largely self-contained (Fishman, 1977). This contrast
between city and rural life was to have a profound impact on Wright throughout his life.
Like Howard and Geddes, Wright was influenced by earlier critiques of industrial
centralisation, in particular those of Kropotkin and Henry George (Hall, 1988). However,
he was much influenced by the Jeffersonian tradition in American thought which
celebrated the individualistic, self-reliant rural proprietor. Louis Sullivan, a celebrated
architect and Wright's early mentor, likewise expounded the virtues of individualism.
Democracy for Sullivan meant freedom for individual development and expression. And,
according to Sullivan, it was the architect's role to produce an 'Architecture of
Democracy' , one reflecting the democratic principle of the supremacy of the individual
(Fishman,1977).
This too had a profound effect on Wright. He was determined to become the master builder
of American democracy (Fishman, 1977). For Wright, it was the architect's capacity to
shape and promote technology that was the source of his power. He distinguished two
stages in industrial development: the first, in which the machine was 'in the service of
greed', and the second, then about to begin, in which the machine was 'under the control of
the creative artist'. As Fishman (1977:109) pointed out, in Wright's view, "The architect
combined the engineer's understanding of technology with the artist's intuitive grasp of the
deepest values of his culture. He thus had the capacity to use the machine wisely. In a
society tom apart by the stress of industrialization, this capacity made the architect a
natural leader. He alone could give humane form to the city". Thus, it was to be the
'Architect-Planner' who was to be the master builder of the new society.
According to Fishman (1977), Wright first advanced a summary of his plan in a series of
lectures delivered at Princeton University in 1930. The complete plan was expounded in
his book, The Disappearing City, published in 1932. In 1935 he exhibited a detailed scale
model of the future society at an industrial arts exposition held in the Rockefeller Centre in
New York. There, inside the 'entrails of enormity' as he put it, Wright showed for the first
time his three-dimensional 'cross section of a whole civilization' that had been radically
decentralised (Figure 11). As Fishman (1977:9) stated:
"Wright wanted the whole United States to become a nation of individuals. His planned
city, which he called 'Broadacres', took decentralization beyond the small community...
to the individual family home. In Broadacres all cities larger than a county seat have
disappeared. The center of society has moved to the thousands of homesteads which
cover the countyside. Everyone has the right to as much land as he can use, a minimum
of an acre per person. Most people work part-time on their farms and part-time in the
small factories, offices, or shops that are nestled among the farms. A network of super
highways join together the scattered elements of society. Wright believed individuality
must be founded on individual ownership. Decentralization would make it possible for
everyone to live his chosen life style on his own land".
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Figure 11: Wright's Broadacre City (from Wright, 1935)
Wright's three-dimensional 'cross section of a whole civilization' that has been radically
decentralised. All urban areas larger than a county seat have disappeared. The centre of
society has moved to the thousands of units which cover the countryside. The most
important is the family homestead, economically independent and largely self-sufficient.
Industries and commerce are scattered amongst, and subservient to, the homestead. Civic
centres are small-scale and localised. The whole countryside has become a mosaic of
individual family farms and small production units connected by an intricate web of
highways and communicative networks.
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Wright had taken decentralisation about as far as it was possible. In Broadacre City there
are no recognisable urban centres at all. The basic unit is the family homestead,
economically independent and largely self-sufficient. Industries and commerce are
scattered amongst, and subservient to, the homesteads. Civic centres are small-scale and
localised. Local government is minimal and merely administrative. The whole countryside
has become a mosaic of individual family farms and small production units connected by
an intricate web ofroading and communicative networks (Figure 12).
Yet, as Fishman (1977) emphasised, Broadacre City was not a plan for return to a
subsistence economy. On the contrary, it represented Wright's vision of the true form of
the 'Machine Age'. The city with its centralised institutions and overcrowded living
arrangements was not, Wright asserted, the greatest embodiment ofprogress but the
greatest barrier to it. People would reap the benefits of the Machine Age, Wright
proclaimed, only when they returned to their natural home, the land. Thus, scattered among
the farms of Broadacre City are all the institutions of an advanced society: factories,
schools, stores, professional buildings, and cultural centres. They are all small-scale and
placed to ensure that there is not a centre around which people and power could
accumulate.
And in the tradition of Kropotkin, Howard, Geddes and Mumford it was the development
of new technologies that would allow, or rather, make necessary this transformation. As
Hall (1988:288), quoting Wright (1945), described it: "The new technologies, as Kropotkin
had argued more than three decades earlier, were transforming, even abolishing, the
tyranny of geography. 'Given electrification, distances are all but eliminated as far as
communication goes ... Given the steamship, airship, and the automobile, our human
sphere of movement immeasurably widens by many mechanical modes, by wheel or air' .
Now, 'not only thought but speech and movement are volatile: the telegraph, telephone,
mobilization, radio. Soon, television and safe flight' . Modern mobility was available even
for the poor man, 'by means of a bus or a Model A Ford'''.
If the Garden City of Ebenezer Howard had its genesis in the railroad era, Broadacres City
belongs to the beginnings of the automobile age (Fishman, 1977). Wright envisaged the
personal car and widespread public transport as providing mastery of time and space on
which a new type of city could be built. Not only did the automobile make possible a
dramatic new urban scale, it also introduced an unprecedented freedom of design. With a
modern road system, the automobile is not restricted to a few lines or stops. Since virtually
any point is as accessible as any other, people need not crowd into compact areas -
complete dispersal was now possible and, in Wright's view, inevitable (Fishman, 1977). It
was the automobile that gave complete freedom of movement, and it was the highways and
roads that connected the dispersed elements of Broadacre City into a coherent whole.
Broadacres was more than a physical blueprint. As with Howard's Garden City and the
regional planning of Geddes and the RPAA, its plan was an expression of the designer's
deepest values. As Fishman (1977:94) stated: "Howard's [and Geddes'] fundamental
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commitment was to cooperation, so it was appropriate that his ideal city [would] take the
form of a physically compact community where sharing and fellowship would be the basis
of everyone's life. Wright's central belief was individualism... If he broke up Howard's
well-organised city, it was to permit each citizen and his family to live their own lives on
their own ground."
Wright never doubted that the only firm foundation for the democracy to which he was so
ardently attached was the physical and economic independence of its citizens. Only radical
decentralization could lay this foundation, yet Wright believed the goal to be not merely
possible but almost inevitable. Already the automobile had undermined the justification for
centralized cities. Advanced technology, which seemed to have destroyed the kind of
independence Wright advocated, was in fact leading directly to its rebirth. Broadacre City,
he announced, was not just the destiny of a mature industrial society, it was 'the plastic
form of a genuine democracy' .
Wright's essential insight was that decentralisation, if taken to its logical end point, would
create the material conditions for a nation of independent farmers and proprietors. In turn,
this would create true democracy. The diffusion ofpopulation would be based upon the
universal ownership of land. The political economy of concentrated wealth and power
would be replaced by one in which the means ofproduction would be widely held. A
society ofproprietors, Wright believed, was a society of independent citizens - a
democracy. "When every man, woman, and child", he proclaimed, "may be born to put his
feet on his own acres, then democracy will have been realized" (Wright, 1958: 119; in
Fishman, 1977:125). Wright was, in effect, advocating a utopian vision based upon
individualistic anarchism in a Jeffersonian mold.
The principal means to achieving this end was through the abolition of rent. According to
Fishman (1977), 'rent' was to Wright synonymous with exploitation. He distinguished
three forms of rent: rent for land, rent for money (interest), and rent for ideas (control of
inventions). All three support the 'vicarious' life of the rentier, whose existence was
vicarious in the economic sense because it was based on the labour of others, and vicarious
psychologically because the rentier could have no sense of himself as a productive
individual. The city was the great locus of rent, and hence home to what Wright termed, the
'satellites of rent' - the experts who directed the artificial economy of cities and the 'white
collar armies' who carried out their commands. In a competitive, urbanised world, Wright
held, rather than productive labour a struggles over spoils predominate.
The city, he concluded, has 'made of the Man a piece ofcheap speculative property' . His
answer to this was to redistribute land to all who needed it on the basis of what they could
productively use themselves. Thus: "Emancipated from rent, were good ground made
available to him, he - the machine worker rented by wages - paying toll to the exaggerated
city in order that the city give him work to do - why should not he, the poor wage-slave, go
forward, not backward, to his native birthright? Go to the good ground and grow his family
in a free city?" (Wright, 1945:86; in Hall, 1988:289).
62
F RMLI T LE
M






Figure 12: Centre of Broadacre City (from Wright, 1945)
The centre of Broadacre City. There is no recognisable urban centre. Scattered among the
farms ofBroadacre City, however, are all the institutions of an advanced society: industry,
shops, schools, universities, professional buildings, cultural centres and recreational
facilities. They are all small scale and placed to ensure that there would be no centre
around which people and power could accumulate.
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Wright's plans for Broadacre City clearly presupposed legislation that would expropriate
alllandholdings larger than anyone family required for their immediate use. This radical
attack on property was, in Wright's plan, the means to a conservative strengthening of
individual property rights that remained. Everyone would have an absolute right to the area
he or she used and improved. Neither banks nor the government could challenge the
individual's claim to their homestead. For Wright, as for Howard, property served to define
and to protect society's greatest good. This, in Wright's view, was individuality. He
believed that the independence he wished to safeguard rested, in the last analysis, on the
individual's absolute right to property (Fishman, 1977).
The basic unit of Broadacre City was thus the individually owned family homestead. After
the great land reforms had made property available to everyone, the urban factory worker
could move to the countryside and, with his former rent money, purchase and assemble the
mass-produced components of a house. Once the homestead was complete, the worker
would cease to be a property-less proletarian. On his own land he could never be
'unemployed or a slave to anyone'. This independence would increase his economic power,
even when he was working part-time for others. Since he could live by his own labour if
necessary, he did not have to submit to exploitative wages or poor working conditions
(Fishman, 1977). Thus, the return of the family homestead as the basic economic unit
would prevent exploitation, overcome class conflict, and ensure social cohesion.
Factories and other economic institutions were thus subservient to the individual family
homestead - they were 'support units' for the largely self-sufficient family unit. Wright
believed that factories in Broadacre City could be either privately or cooperatively owned.
The important factor was that they be small and located within convenient driving distance
of the homesteaders who were employed in them. In fact, as Fishman (1977) pointed out,
Wright usually favoured private enterprise as more consistent with his ideal of
individualism, but he always opposed any centralisation of industry which would
overwhelm the homestead. He supported a limited measure of inequality. The houses he
designed for Broadacre City ranged in size from 'one-car houses' to 'five-car houses'.
Strict equality, he held, would threaten individuality. But to prevent concentrations of
wealth, and hence power, that could threaten true democracy any disparity in wealth must
be kept within strict limits. Within these limits there could be no rigid hierarchy.
As long as the homestead, supplemented by the small factory, remained the foundation of
the Broadacre economy Wright saw little need for government intervention. All that was
required for the economy to function properly was an appropriate system of banking and
currency. According to Fishman (1977: 131), Wright's own unhappy experience with the
banking system made its reform a special concern of his. Both as an architect and as a
radical he despised what he called "the grandomania of the pillared 'Temples-of-the-
Unearned-Increment'". In Broadacre City, credit would be decentralised and readily
available: everyone could command the finance to set himself up as an independent farmer
or businessman.
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Wright was extremely careful about government institutions becoming centralising
influences. In Broadacre City the county offices occupy a functional building by the side of
a lake. They are accessible but hardly the focus of the community (Fishman, 1977). County
government would be virtually the only government in Broadacres. The national
government would wither away until it concerned itself only with administrative matters.
The county government, too, was largely concerned with administrating basic services. The
important questions were resolved in another way, as we shall see. The independent
citizens of Broadacre City thus had little cause to concern themselves with politics. ''No
politician as such could make a living in Broadacre City" Wright proudly boasted (in
Fishman, 1977:136).
Yet Wright's vision of democracy contained a contradiction. Among the small number of
officials that Wright permitted in Broadacre City was the county architect. He was the
central figure in Broadacres. All other officials were mere administrators. The county
architect, in contrast, was a genuine planner with authority to enforce his decisions. The
physical structure of the city - the basis of the society's way of life - was his prime
responsibility (Fishman, 1977).
As Fishman (1977) argued, the county architect's first duty was to design a comprehensive
and coherent system of communication. These transportation links would create the
community, uniting the citizens without directing them to any 'monarchical' centre. The
county architect also had full responsibility for land allotment. He decided who should get
land and how much. He also intervened when he judged that an individual's accumulation
ofland ceased to be self-improvement and became 'feudal' exploitation. The county
architect was the guardian of the principles of 'Organic Architecture', whose task it was to
adapt them to local conditions and ensured that they were followed. "His must be one of
the best minds the city has" Wright asserted (in Fishman, 1977:143).
Wright never specified how this architectural Philosopher-King would be chosen or what
his relationship would be to representative institutions. According to Fishman (1977),
Wright realised that the community needed leadership, 'disciplinary as well as cultural', yet
his extreme individualism seemed to undercut all authority. Wright's reconciliation of this
apparent contradiction is best understood in his conception of the artist and his or her role
in society. The creative artist, he asserted is the true representative of society. He alone had
both the insight into the true interests ofhis people and the ability to express those interests
as 'prophetic form'. As Wright (1935:243-244; in Fishman, 1977:142) stated:
"The creative Artist is by nature and by office the qualified leader in any society, natural,
native interpreter of the visible form of any social order in or under which we choose to
live". Furthermore, Wright (1937:275; in Fishman, 1977:144) explained: "What is it to
be an artist? Simply to make objective in form what was subjective in idea. It is to make
things within and yet beyond the power of the ordinary man. The artist may feel no
deeper, may see no further but has the gift that enables him to put that insight into form
in whatever medium he uses".
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As Fishman (1977) pointed out, for Wright the mark of the true artist-leader was his
'vision'. The forces of technological change were blind; the spirit of a nation inarticulate.
The artist, Wright believed, could visualise force and spirit in a plan that would be both
truly democratic and powerful. The plan was democratic not because it had been debated in
a legislature, or approved in an election, but because it was representative of the nation's
deepest feelings as understood by the artist. The plan was powerful because it embodied
those feelings and merged them with the current of technological change. Thus, it was the
artist's role to express society's inchoate desires in physical form - to present a vision that
would guide his fellow citizens.
Just as this encapsulated the artist's role in the society of the future, so it was the task of the
artist-planner to bring about this future. This was the task Wright set himself, and he
travelled the country exhibiting his plan. However, he had no practical strategy to
implement his vision. Unlike Howard, Geddes, Mumford and the RPAA, who not only
outlined utopian visions of what their future society should look like but also advocated
and implemented methods to achieve their vision, Wright offered no such prescriptions. He
believed, according to Fishman (1977), that revelation ofhis vision to his fellow citizens
would lead inevitably to its implementation.
As Fishman, (1977:95) put it: "Once the alternative had been seen, then the path to
Broadacre City would be open". Where Howard looked to cooperation to change the world,
and Geddes and Mumford to regional planning, Wright relied on an 'appeal to
imagination'. Wright's major concern was to perfect his vision of the future and to
construct ever more inspiring visions. He had no interest in working out a day-to-day
strategy for moving from the ideal to the reality. "I am not guilty", he once remarked, "of
offering a plan for immediate use" (in Fishman, 1977:146). The effort that Howard had put
into organising, and Geddes and Mumford into regional surveys, Wright and his students
devoted to the intricate details of planning and assembling their scale model of
Broadacres.
According to Fishman (1977), he occasionally toyed with the idea that a 'statesman with
the vision and personal responsibility of a Jefferson or a Thomas Paine ... could in one
lifetime lay down the outlines on which we could build the Democratic State ... " (Wright,
1939:11; in Fishman, 1977:146). He wrote in 1945 that "we need only the slight concerted
political effort to remove the key-logs from the jam" (Wright, 1945:9; in Fishman,
1977:146). At other times he emphasised that 'organic growth' was 'slow growth'. He
envisaged the steady shrinking of the cities through the migration of 'runaways' from the
cities which would create the conditions for the wholesale instigation of Broadacre City in
'three or four generations' (Fishman, 1977).
Nevertheless, as Fishman (1977) pointed out, Wright offered no 'working model'to
mediate between reality and his vision. "1 have never been more than tolerant of reform" he
once stated. "It is true form 1am seeking" (Wright, 1932; in Fishman, 1977:146).
Broadacre City could not be built incrementally. It could come into existence only as the
product of the wholesale conversion of the nation to its principles. "Broadacre City is
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everywhere or nowhere. It is the country itself come alive as a truly great city" (in Fishman,
1977:146).
Wright's proposals, however, received little support, despite his numerous exhibitions.
Over time he became increasingly discouraged. Publicly he continued his crusade. In
private he was less certain. He admitted that the model 'had not been carried far enough to
be easily understood' and although the model had been seen by several hundred thousand
people, 'by only the Few was the City recognised for what it really was' (in Fishman,
1977: 148). He began to lose faith in his fellow citizens and in the possibility of change in
the United States. The Great Depression seemed to have offered an opportunity for radical
decentralisation, but the Second World War had imposed its own commanding
centralisation, and its own destructive uses of technology.
According to Fishman, Wright having despaired of change during and immediately
following the war, regained his faith before he died. This coincided with a rebirth of his
architectural career after the war. In his ninetieth year, he completely rewrote (for the
fourth time) the book he had published in 1932 as The Disappearing City. As Fishman
(1977) pointed out, the city had not disappeared in the intervening twenty-five years: urban
areas had grown, and the countryside had been further depopulated. Nevertheless, Wright
still asserted that decentralisation was an 'innate necessity'. He left the theory virtually
unchanged. Broadacre City remains one man's vision of the future, unaltered by time. The
vision seemed remote, but Wright was confident that 'our nation is learning... A new city
is as inevitable as sunrise tomorrow though rain may fall'. This last affirmation of
Broadacre appeared in 1958 as The Living City (Fishman, 1977).
We can see, therefore, that for Wright, as for Howard, Geddes and Mumford, his radical
plan for extreme decentralisation was much more than a physical blueprint for the spatial
arrangement ofurban and regional settlement. The physical form of planning was only the
concrete manifestation of a much more fundamental socio-economic change in society.
Wright was not proposing incremental reform to the existing mode of production but rather
the radical transformation of centralised industrial capitalism including its economic basis -
the ownership ofproperty.
As Hall (1988:286-287) pointed out: "The skyscraper city, for him, represented 'the end of
an epoch! The end of the plutocratic republic of America'. Through another mass
migration, as huge and as momentous as the original homesteading of America, the new
pioneer would replace the plutocracy of the landlords and the giant corporations by 'a more
simple, natural-basis right to live by and enough to live upon according to his better self".
Furthermore, as Hall (1998:286-289)stated:
"The conception shared many philosophical affinities with the ideas of the RPAA, and
some of these with Ebenezer Howard. There is the same rejection of the big city-
specifically New York - as a cancer, a 'fibrous tumor'; the same populist antipathy to
finance capital and landlordism; the same anarchist rejection ofbig government; the
same reliance on the liberating effects of new technologies; the same belief in the
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homesteading principle and the return to the land ... But there are also differences,
particularly in comparison with Howard... Wright claimed to liberate men and women
not in order to join in cooperation, but to live as free individuals; he desired not to marry
town and country, but to merge them. Above all, there is the notion that the new
technological forces could recreate in America a nation of free independent farmers and
proprietors: 'Edison and Ford would resurrect Jefferson"'.
Although Wright's vision of future America never struck a chord with his fellow citizens
as he had believed it would, nor was it viewed favourably by government institutions, it did
express an important vision that was peculiarly American, and one that paradoxically
proved remarkably prophetic and influential on subsequent mainstream planning. Wright's
vision of the individual family unit, based upon the mobility provided by the private
automobile and an extensive network of highways and roads, became a reality. Widespread
suburban planning throughout America incorporated this very prescription into its
procedures. However, these efforts were not intended to transform the existing mode of
production. Instead they were aimed at facilitating its reproduction by transferring part of
the population of the congested city centres to plots of land on the outskirts.
More than this, suburban redevelopment represented a new spatial arrangement of living
facilitated by the freedom in mobility provided by the private automobile, but it was driven
by, and undertaken largely in the interests of, the giant automobile manufacturing
corporations, the oil magnates and speculative land development capital. Ironically, the
vision of a dispersed settlement pattern based upon the individual family plot, connected by
an intricate system of roads and highways, was actualised in the interests of the very
plutocracy that Wright had hoped to transform. In this way, just as with Howard and
Geddes, the spatial element of Wright's radical proposals were appropriated to reformist
measures that served to perpetuate the very system that had prompted their utopian visions
in the first place. This was the ultimate irony. As Hall (1988:291) summed up: "Americans
had got the shell without the substance".
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3.6 Le Corbusier and the Radiant City
"A Town is a tool. Towns no longer fulfil this function. They are ineffectual; they use
up our bodies, they thwart our souls. The lack of order to be found everywhere in them
offends us; their degradation wounds our self-esteem and humiliates our sense of
dignity. They are not worthy of the age; they are no longer worthy of us" (Le Corbusier,
1971:1).
As Fishman (1977) pointed out, Frank Lloyd Wright and Le Corbusier seem predestined
for comparison. Their ideal communities confront each other as opposing visions on the
same utopian theme. Both viewed the industrial cities of the early twentieth century as
aberrations - relics of a past era destined to be superceded. Both witnessed the social
upheavals caused by the Great Depression and were profoundly affected by this experience.
Both believed that industrialisation had produced the conditions for a new era ofjustice,
harmony and beauty, and that this era would commence with the replacement of all
existing cities by new forms of community suited to the new age. Both advanced the view
that this physical restructuring of society was the necessary form of a fundamental
transformation of the existing political economy. And both maintained that it was the artist-
planners' role to present the spirit of the new age in physical form.
Wright, as we have seen, wanted to radically decentralise society, to replace the existing
urban centres with a continuous union of town and country based upon the individually-
owned family homestead. In this way, Wright believed, concentrated wealth and power
would be dispersed and 'true democracy' would be achieved. It was an anarchic vision
exalting the supremacy of the individual, opposed to all forms of authority save that of the
'spirit of the age' as embodied in the 'artist-planner' - the local county architect. Le
Corbusier, like Wright, recognised the city as the locus of centralised power. However, he
wanted to exalt it, and to consolidate an even more rigidly centralised hierarchy. Le
Corbusier's future society depended upon large bureaucracies of experts housed in grand
cities whose total administration of society would bring the order and harmony that both he
and Wright sought (Fishman, 1977).
Whereas Wright believed that the congestion then afflicting industrial cities could only be
alleviated by dispersing the inhabitants, Le Corbusier proposed to decongest them by
(paradoxically) increasing their density (Hall, 1992). He proposed that the centres of the
major cities be levelled. In place of the old buildings, geometrically arranged skyscrapers of
glass and steel would rise out of parks, gardens and super highways. And although up to
85% of the land area would remain as open space the density ofpopulation in the new
cities would be greater than it had previously been. These centres would be the command
posts for their regions. They would house a technocratic elite of planners, engineers,
intellectuals and artists who would bring beauty, prosperity and harmony to society. Le
Corbusier called his plan 'the Radiant City a city worthy of our time' (Fishman, 1977).
Thus, if the skyscraper city represented to Wright 'the end of an epoch' for Le Corbusier it
promised the beginning. Whilst for Wright, large cities were an impediment to human
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progress to Le Corbusier they were the essential tool. IfWright wanted to radically
decentralise society to enable 'true democracy' , Le Corbusier proclaimed cities as the
necessary form for the centralised technocratic control of society. Both, however, agreed on
the revolutionary role planning would play in the necessary transformation of society. As
Le Corbusier (1971:viii) professed "town planning is ... a manifestation of resurgence it
is the concrete expression of human needs, of human means, and of human intentions the
decisive act of government ... a revolution",
Le Corbusier was born Charles-Edouard Jeanneret and grew up in the Swiss city of La
Chaux-de-Fords, where he was apprenticed to be a watchcase engraver (Hall, 1992). He
witnessed at first hand the impact of the Industrial Revolution on the traditional
watchmaking industry (Fishman, 1977). However, despite the upheaval to the craft
industries, Le Corbusier saw that technical innovation and industrialisation was inevitable -
the artisan tradition was powerless to resist the forces of economic evolution. At the same
time, he believed that destruction of the artisans' way oflife and its aesthetics did not
equate to the destruction of art itself. Art, to survive, had to become an expression of the
'Machine Age'. Only an understanding of both advanced technology and art could bring
the necessary beauty to the products of the machine (Fishman, 1977).
Encouraged by his art teacher and aided by his natural talent for drawing, the young
Jeanneret took up architecture. After completing his first commission, a local chalet, he left
La Chaux-de-Fords to travel abroad. Settling in Paris in 1916, he immersed himself in the
Parisian avant-garde, and over time became a leading member, first as a painter, then as an
architectural critic and finally as an architect and planner (Fishman, 1977). In Paris, the
former Swiss artisan recreated himself as 'Le Corbusier' , the Parisian radical of the
revolution in modem architecture.
As Fishman (1977) pointed out, for Le Corbusier, Paris embodied both the grandeur and
the misery of the modem industrial city. As the centre of arts and industry, the locus of
decision-making, the home of the elite, the realm of the avant-garde, and the focus of
imagination and power it represented the highest aspirations of human society. As Fishman
(1977: 182) put it: "It was potentially the site of a magnificent urban civilization for the
Machine Age, but in its 'pre-mechanical' state the machine was killing the city". The
cramped and congested city centre was inefficient while outdated building codes prevented
reconstruction. Factory conditions were dangerous for workers and housing was inadequate
for all classes. The automobile threatened to choke completely the cities arteries and
obliterate its beauty. In the slum areas unsanitary conditions undermined public health, and
living conditions threatened civil unrest. As Fishman (1977:183) stated: "Paris was his
symbol of a whole civilization in danger ofbeing destroyed by the very tools which might
save it. Mechanical power, confined to the irrational structure of an earlier era, had turned
cancerous, spread in wild disorder, and poisoned the lives of the people".
However, Le Corbusier concluded that the machine if controlled could create a society of
order, abundance, harmony and beauty. First it had to be confronted and mastered at its
centre - the great city. He stated (1971 :87): "The great city determines everything: war,
70
peace, and toil. The great cities are the spiritual workshops in which the work of the world
is done. The solutions accepted in the great cities are those which are singled out in the
provinces: fashions, styles, development of ideas and technical methods. This is the reason
why the reorganization of the great city carries with it the renewal of the whole country".
The machine has to be put back into the service of the people, rather than the reverse. Once
this had been accomplished its beauty and functionalism would become apparent. And, as
Fishman (1977:187-189) made plain, it was the architect who "must create a new social
harmony. This was his special mission. The engineer and the businessman had pioneered
new forms of production. Now the architect must design... radiant cities that will extend
the 'essential joys' of the new era to everyone. He must create a whole new environment in
which the techniques of industrialization serve the citizens in his daily life. Then disorder
will cease... His task was to create a complete environment in which man, nature and the
machine would be reconciled".
Le Corbusier's first systematic attempt to present such an environment was his plan for the
'Contemporary City' (La Ville Contemporaine, 1922) published in a book entitled
Urbanisme in 1925 and later in English with the misleading title of The City ofTomorrow
(in Le Corbusier, 1971). As Fishman (1977) pointed out, the title of his plan, 'A
Contemporary City for Three Million People', was in fact a proclamation that this was not
an exercise in science fiction but 'the city for our times' . It was, he wrote, 'an act of faith in
favour of the present'. He believed the time had come for a series of' great works' which
would sweep away the 'leavings of a dead era' and usher in the age of 'collective spirit'
and 'civic pride'. The building of the new city would signify that the 'radiant hour of
harmony, construction, and enthusiasm' had finally arrived.
Fishman (1977) further emphasised that Le Corbusier attempted to be explicitly scientific
in his approach. He wanted to portray an 'ideal type' of industrial city, to formulate an
image which would express graphically the general truths which he believed were
applicable to all modem societies. He compared his task to that of an 'investigator in his
laboratory... constructing a rigorous theoretical structure'. His aim was to formulate 'the
fundamental principles of modem town planning' , to create 'the rules according to which
development will take place' . (Le Corbusier, 1971: 160). City planning, he believed, must
take its place as one of the applied sciences, the province of specifically trained theorists
and technicians. The design of cities was too important to be left to uncoordinated
individual decisions. The organic city, the city that grew incrementally, was a thing of the
past. In the Machine Age a rigorous plan based upon theory and implemented from above
was essential to achieve the harmony that is the basis of efficiency and beauty (Fishman,
1977).
To accomplish this, the architect must build 'geometrically' on a 'clear site' (Hall, 1988).
The centres of the great cities must be levelled and reconstructed according to modem logic
and the demands of modem living. As Fishman (1977:190) pointed out: "For Le Corbusier,
order was expressed by pure forms. The Contemporary City is a perfectly symmetrical grid
of streets. The right angle reigns supreme. Two great superhighways (one running east-
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west, the other north-south) form the central axes; they intersect at the exact center of the
city ... The fearful symmetry of the Contemporary City symbolized the victory of reason
over chance, ofplanning over anarchic individualism, of social order over discord" (Figure
13).
'To order is to classify', Le Corbusier observed. In the Contemporary City everything is
classified by function. Industry, housing, and offices each occupy a separate sector
connected by efficient communication links. The transportation system represents the very
life of the city. "The street is a traffic machine", proclaimed Le Corbusier (1971:131), "it is
in reality a sort of factory for producing speed traffic". According to Le Corbusier
(1971: 179), the success of a city is its capacity for speed. Speed is freedom, the freedom to
exchange, to meet, to trade, to coordinate. "A city made for speed" he wrote, "is made for
success" . Hence, according to Fishman (1977), he strove to build speed into the very
structure of the Contemporary City. He designed an elaborately coordinated system of
transportation: superhighways, subways, access roads, even bicycle paths and pedestrian
walks. The very centre of the city is a multilevel interchange for the whole system. The two
great superhighways cross there; below them is the station where all the subway lines
intersect; above the highways, mounted on great steel pillars, is the main railroad terminal;
on the roof of this huge structure is an aerodrome for 'aero-taxis'.
Surrounding the central terminal are twenty-four glass and steel skyscrapers, each sixty
stories high. They house the business centre of the Contemporary City, the 'brain' of the
surrounding region. According to Fishman (1977: 191): "The symmetrically organized
skyscrapers represent Le Corbusier's most daring and original contribution to urbanism".
Each stands in the midst of a great park. There are no more 'corridor streets' - no more
narrow roadways congested with traffic and lined with crowded buildings. Instead the
streets are vertical - 'streets in the sky' as Le Corbusier called them. And although 500 to
800 thousand people could work in the twenty-four skyscrapers, these towers cover less
than 15% of the total area in the business centre. The remainder is devoted to parks and
gardens. Thus, although the centre is now more densely populated than the most crowded
sections of the city it is completely decongested with ample open spaces (Hall, 1988).
Work in the towers takes place in an atmosphere of sunlight and quiet; every window
possesses a magnificent view of the surrounding parkland. The park is not in the city, but
rather the city in the park (Fishman, 1977).
Thus, according to Fishman (1977) the skyscraper, a tool given by the engineer to the
architect, permitted Le Corbusier to reconcile the apparent contradictions of urban design:
density and open space. Le Corbusier's synthesis was not a compromise between two
opposites but a triumphant affirmation ofboth. And just as the skyscraper represented the
potential of technology to reconcile apparent contradictions in urban density so too would
housing in the Contemporary City represent the synthesis of the functionality of machine
production with the social requirements for beauty and harmony. It was in this context that
Le Corbusier (1960:89; in Fishman, 1977:186) made his most famous (or notorious)
pronouncement: "A house is a machine to live in". The modem house, he proclaimed, must
be as perfectly executed as a modem machine. This does not mean that it would lack
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beauty or harmony, but rather that beauty and harmony must be combined with machine
production to produce the true aesthetics of the Machine Age.
In the Contemporary City all dwellings would be mass-produced, but they are not all alike.
One's house and its location depend upon one's position in the hierarchy ofproduction and
administration. The elite live in luxurious apartment blocks within the city. Their
subordinates occupy more modest garden apartments in the satellite towns on the outskirts.
As Fishman (1977) pointed out, the structure of the residential areas - the elite in the
centre, the workers at the outskirts - corresponds to the hierarchy of functions in
production. And the new social order was to be one of triumphant rationality. The rule of
reason meant the dominance of a bureaucracy of experts - technocrats, intellectuals, artists
and planners housed in the central city skyscrapers (Hall, 1988). As Le Corbusier
(1971: 187) stated:
"Such offices will give us the feeling of'look-outs' dominating an ordered world. And
actually these sky-scrapers will contain the city's brains, the brains of the whole nation.
They stand for all the careful working-out and organization on which the general activity
is based. Everything is concentrated in them: apparatus for abolishing time and space,
telephones, cables and wireless; the banks, business affairs and the control of industry;
finance, commerce, specialization".
Le Corbusier thus extolled precisely what had most disturbed Howard, Geddes and Wright
about the modem city: its contribution to the centralisation and polarisation of society. In
contrast to Howard, Geddes and Wright, he believed that society must be guided centrally
from above. The business centre would be the headquarters of the large organisations
required to 'put the world in order'. It was the natural 'seat ofpower' in the 'widest sense
of the word'. The great towers would be the headquarters of the intellect as well as
industry. He listed among their occupants 'captains of business, of industry, of finance, of
politics, masters of science, of pedagogy, of thought, the spokesmen of the heart, the artists,
poets, musicians' (Le Corbusier, 1925:93; in Fishman, 1977:193). Thus, any industrial
society must be hierarchically organised and administered from above, with the best
qualified people in the most responsible positions.
Le Corbusier attempted to operationalise his grand plan for the Contemporary City. In 1925
he produced his 'Plan Voisin' for Paris. As Fishman (1977) pointed out it was not a modest
beginning. He proposed that an area of almost two square miles in the heart of Paris be
completely demolished. Eighteen skyscrapers would rise in its place, surrounded by luxury
apartments and gardens, and bisected by a great highway (Figure 14). Not surprisingly, the
plan was almost universally condemned. In fact, Le Corbusier was denounced as a
'barbarian' (Hall, 1988). In addition, his plan received little support from the industrial
elite, the large corporations Le Corbusier had hoped would begin the 'era of great works'.
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Figure 13: Le Corbusier's Contemporary City (from Le Corbusier, 1971)
To build 'the city for our times', the architect must build 'geometrically' on a clear site.
The Contemporary City is a perfectly symmetrical grid of streets. The right angle reigns
supreme. Two great superhighways (one running east-west, the other north-south) form the
central axis; they intersect at the exact centre of the city. The fearful symmetry of the
Contemporary City symbolised the victory of reason over chance, ofplanning over
anarchic individualism, of social order over discord.
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Figure 14: The Plan Voisin (from Le Corbusier, 1971)
Le Corbusier attempted to operationalise his grand plan for the Contemporary City. In 1925
he produced his 'Plan Voisin' for Paris. He proposed that an area of almost two square
miles in the heart of Paris be completely demolished. Eighteen skyscrapers would rise in its
place, surrounded by luxury apartments and gardens, and bisected by a great highway.
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Thus began Le Corbusier's disillusionment with capitalism. Ifprivate enterprise was not
equal to the task of grand reconstruction, then it was unworthy of the new era. It must be
replaced by a system capable of great works, otherwise 'the lifeblood of the new era will be
squandered by obsolete, cruel and inhuman organizations' (in Fishman, 1977:213). This
disenchantment was confirmed by the 1929 Stock Market Crash. For Le Corbusier it was
proof that capitalism was too chaotic to serve as a basis for order. According to Fishman
(1977:220), in a 1931 article he placed this caption under a photograph of Wall Street: "All
is paradox, disorder; the liberty of each destroys the liberty of all. Indiscipline".
He concluded that capitalism and parliamentary democracy had failed the new era. They
were incapable of forming an elite fit for leadership or ofproviding the authority the
Machine Age required. He believed that the crisis of the 1930s would create a new
leadership and a new social structure with sufficient authority to begin the new era ofgreat
works. Le Corbusier searched among increasingly radical alternatives until he settled upon
a doctrine that to him offered the potential to implement the necessary reconstruction of
society - revolutionary syndicalism, a movement that combined elements of the extreme
right and the extreme left (Fishman, 1977).
This ideology grew out of the French trade union movement of the 1880s and 1890s. Its
fundamental tenet was that independent groups ofworkers - the syndicats - must own and
manage the means ofproduction. Following the revolution, which was to be brought about
by a spontaneous uprising in the form of the general strike advocated by the anarcho-
syndicalist, Georges Sorel, each syndicat would run its own factory, each member would
participate equally, and there would be a minimum of organisation. Although, syndicalism
began as a quasi-anarchist doctrine, later developments added conflicting and contradictory
elements. In particular, it was modified by authoritarian contributions from the extreme
right, such as the reactionary doctrine of corporatism which sought to revive the old guild
system as the answer to capitalism and its class struggle (Fishman, 1977). This fusion of
right and left led to an odd hybrid which combined workers organisations with the
hierarchical structures of a medieval guild.
According to Fishman (1977), Le Corbusier adapted this arrangement to his own version of
hierarchical control. He shaped the doctrine to accommodate his vision ofplanning; and, as
we shall see, syndicalist ideas caused him to alter fundamentally the form of his ideal city.
The plan now was for 'a complete system, coherent, just and indisputable'. This system, he
declared, would be 'nothing more or less than a revolutionary event'. This revolutionary
event took the form of an ideal city for a syndicalist society - the 'Radiant City' . Instead of
the wasteful anarchy ofcapitalism and the impotency ofparliamentary democracy, in the
Radiant City every aspect of productive life is administered from above according to one
central plan. This plan replaces the marketplace with total administration; experts match
society's needs to its productive capacities; coordination becomes conscious and total
(Fishman, 1977).
This hierarchy of administration replaces the state. The divisive issues ofparliamentary
politics do not arise for, according to Le Corbusier, everyone shares a common concern
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that the resources of society be administered as efficiently as possible. Even the tasks of the
national council are administrative rather than political. Their task, like that of all other
functionaries, is a 'technical' one: they carry out the plan. And, according to Le Corbusier,
'Plans are not political'.
The plan is formulated by an elite of experts detached from all social pressure. Their plans
are'established serenely, lucidly. They take account only of human truths' . In the planner's
formulations, 'the motive forces of a civilization pass from the subjective realm of
consciousness to the objective realm of facts' (Le Corbusier, 1967:153-154; in Fishman,
1977:229). The planner shares the detachment which is common to the artist and the
scientist. His loyalty is to society as a whole, and to the ideal of order. Planners form a
special corps within the elite, uniquely qualified to coordinate the goals of society. They
provide both the vision and the technical expertise to guide society toward harmony. Their
task is to 'pose the problem, arrange, organize, take hold, and create that indispensable
lyricism that, in the last analysis, alone raises our hearts and moves us to action' (in
Fishman, 1977:211).
In the Radiant City Le Corbusier has displaced the towers of administration from the
central position they occupied in the Contemporary City. The residential areas now stand at
the centre of the city. Above them is the business district and below the industrial sites
(Figure 15). It is, moreover, a transformed residential district. No longer is housing
segregated according to class - elite in the centre, proletariat at the outskirts. The residential
district embodies Le Corbusier's new conviction, as a revolutionary syndicalist, that the
world of freedom must be egalitarian. 'If the city were to become a human city' , he
proclaimed, 'it would be a city without classes' (Le Corbusier, 1967:167; in Fishman,
1977:230).
The centre of life in the Radiant City are the great apartment blocks, which Le Corbusier
called 'Unites'. These structures, each of which is a neighbourhood with 2,700 residents
marks the culmination of Le Corbusier's principles of housing - housing as a 'machine for
living in'. The apartments in the Unite are not assigned on the basis of a worker's position
in the industrial hierarchy but according to the size of his family and their needs (Hall,
1988). The emphasis in the Unite, however, is not on the individual apartment but on the
collective services provided to all the residents. These facilities, moreover, take on a clear
social function as reward and recompense for the eight hours per day of disciplined labour
in a factory or office required of all citizens in a syndicalist society (Fishman, 1977).
As Fishman (1977) pointed out, Le Corbusier perfected his vision of the ideal society
during the depths of the Great Depression. Like Wright, he saw the existing economic and
social disorder as a vindication of his criticisms of the old industrialism and proof that a
new order was at hand. The Depression, he declared, was an industrial 'time of troubles'
which would lead to the 'Second Machine Age'. During the 'First Machine Age' (1830-
1930) the machine had oppressed humans. It was the age of greed, ugliness, conflict and
oppression. The Second Machine Age about to dawn would be an age of harmony in which
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the machine's potential for liberation would at last be realised - this would be the time of
the Radiant City (Le Corbusier, 1967:340-341; in Fishman, 1977:235).
Yet Le Corbusier awaited the coming time in vain. And as he waited he became ever more
concerned. The continuing incapacity of the Western democracies to overcome the
Depression intensified his disdain for parliamentary methods (Fishman, 1977). He
increasingly turned to authoritarian solutions. 'France needs a Father' he proclaimed. 'It
doesn't matter who' (in Fishman, 1977:237). He considered fascism, visiting Mussolini's
Italy in 1934. He was enthusiastically received and in the pro-fascist Stile futurista wrote:
"The present spectacle of Italy, the state of her spiritual powers, announces the immanent
dawn of the modem spirit. Her shining purity and force illuminate the paths which have
been obscured by the cowardly and the profiteers" (in Fishman, 1977:140). As Fishman
(1977) pointed out, the language clearly indicates Le Corbusier was hoping that Mussolini
would be the authority who would decree the Radiant City. But the 'immanent dawn'
refused to shine. Mussolini lost interest in modem architecture and Le Corbusier returned
to France empty-handed. He concluded that although fascism was 'worthy to be studied
very closely, the financial ties which ensnared the fascist government prevented it from
attempting to resolve the problems of capitalism' (in Fishman, 1977:240).
During the War Le Corbusier turned instead to the Vichy regime (Hall, 1988). Here
perhaps was the authority required to initiate the great transformation. He set out to gain a
position with the new regime. After eighteen months of fruitless attempts to persuade the
appropriate authorities of the merits of his plan he conceded defeat and left Vichy deeply
disappointed. According to Fishman (1977) from this time on Le Corbusier became
increasingly disillusioned. He began to lose faith in his mission. He finally realised that the
great transformation of society he foresaw would have to occur slowly, if at all. "The
dreams of my twenties", he predicted "will be realized in three hundred years" (in Fishman
1977:253).
Ironically, as Fishman (1977) pointed out, he lost faith in his great mission just as his own
reputation as a leader of modem architecture was finally established, and when authority at
last permitted him to build on an urban scale. In 1945 the French Ministry of
Reconstruction commissioned Le Corbusier to build a Unite for Marseilles. In 1950 the
state of Punjab in India appointed him architectural adviser for its new capital, Chandigarh.
The Unite and Chandigarh were the crowning achievements of Le Corbusier's career as a
city planner but also, according to Fishman (1977), the crowning ironies. In both cases he
created masterpieces ofdesign appropriate for the Radiant City, but not for the societies in
which they were actually built.
More significantly, perhaps, was the fact that those who subsequently appropriated Le
Corbusier's architectural designs also ignored the social and historical context that they
were intended to represent, often with dubious and sometimes disastrous consequences. As
Hall (1988:204) put it: " ...their impact on twentieth-century planning has been almost
incalculably great ... Ideas, forged in the Parisian intelligensia of the 1920s, came to be
applied to the planning of working-class housing in Sheffield and St. Louis, and hundreds
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of other cities too, in the 1950s and 1960s; the results were at best questionable, at worst
catastrophic".
The skylines of many historical city centres were altered almost beyond recognition by the
construction of corporate towers of glass and steel. The business centres of most large
cities now resemble Le Corbusier's Contemporary City but without the parks and open
spaces and without the great transportation links or lavish entertainment facilities.
Completely new cities such as Brasilia, the purpose-built capital of Brazil, were
constructed according to Le Corbisier's prescriptions. However, rather than ushering in an
age of social harmony and universal prosperity, these glittering monumental city centres
often contrast with neighbouring districts of slum housing, continuing poverty and
increasing social disorder.
Most notorious were the application of Le Corbusier's concepts to public housing
redevelopment in many countries around the world in the period following the Second
World War. In Britain, as Hall (1988) pointed out, after the war a new generation of
architects and planners under the spell of Le Corbusier were determined to apply the
master's principles to urban redevelopment. In the 1950s and 1960s countless high and
medium rise tower blocks were constructed throughout Britain to provide working class
housing. The ideas were straight from Le Corbusier - maintain or increase inner city
population densities by building upwards - and Le Corbusier's streets in the sky were
realised in the east end of London and the inner cities of Birmingham and Sheffield.
This is not meant to imply that planners and architects were acting independently within a
socio-political vacuum. Nor is it meant to suggest that better design, on its own, would
have overcome the very real deep seated socio-economic problems that existed at the time.
It simply illustrates how a particular set of spatial designs were applied in a totally different
soci-political context than that in which they were developed, not surprisingly, with mixed
results.
The results were mostly deleterious, partly due to the concept itself and partly due to poor
design and construction. With few exceptions, the people they were built for did not want
to live there. The apartments were inadequate, particularly for families with children. They
were easy prey for house breakers. Occupants barricaded themselves in and often lived in
fear. The lifts were unreliable and frequently vandalised. The open spaces between the
blocks became wasteland, often the haunt of muggers and drug dealers, completely
unsuited for children. Vehicles were exposed to theft and vandalism. There was no sense of
community, no collective sense of security or solidarity.
People refused to live in them. They became hard to let, lettable to only the poorest and
often squatted by the homeless. Finally the authorities stopped building them, and in the
worst cases began knocking them down. The lesson was plain to see - people, particularly
families with children did not want to live in streets in the sky. They preferred streets on
the ground with neighbours on either side, a sense of community and security and private
gardens for children to play in. As Hall (1988:225) concluded: "The remarkable fact was
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how long it took for anyone to see that it was wrong". Frederic Osbome had written to
Lewis Mumford as early as 1952 decrying the'cult of Corbusier' at the Architectural
Association School in London: "the young men under his influence are completely
impervious to economic or human considerations' (in Hall, 1988:220-221).
In America during the 1950s and 1960s the same thing happened. In cities across the
United States urban renewal projects replaced old inner city housing with high rise tower
blocks or medium rise high density estates following the Corbusian model. By the end of
the 1970s they were contemplating their abandonment. Many were 30-40% vacant (Hall,
1988). The classic case was Pruitt-Igoe, an award winning 1955 project in St Louis, which
achieved notoriety by being blown up seventeen years after it was built. As Hall (1988 :235)
stated: "That day, the demolition preserved for posterity on film, it became an instant
symbol of all that was perceived as wrong with urban renewal, not only in the United
States but in the world at large".
So once again, as with Howard, Geddes, Mumford and Wright, the radical social and
political elements of Le Corbusier's utopian vision were discarded and the spatial design
adapted to reformist planning measures. Le Corbusier's 'machines to live in' were used by
mainstream planning authorities and urban developers to maintain population densities in
inner city housing developments. High land values in inner city business districts were
partly off-set by building taller and taller office tower blocks. And the final irony is that
rather than usher in a new era of beauty and harmony and technological benevolence - the
new Machine Age - Le Corbusier's legacy in the housing estates around the world is
largely one of increased social dislocation, visual blight, and technological malevolence.
One could even say - manifestations of the machine'gone mad' .
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Figure 15: The Radiant City (from Le Corbusier, 1967)
The Radiant City was a plan for 'a complete system, coherent, just and indisputable'. It was
to be the ideal city for a syndicalist society. Instead of the wasteful anarchy ofcapitalism
and the impotency ofparliamentary democracy, in the Radiant City every aspect of
productive life is administered from above according to one central plan.
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3.7 Friedmann's Social Reconstruction
"As far as planning is concerned... this much is clear... Such planning in the public
domain as we have known in the West has been dominated by the bourgeois state. It was
an integral part of the management of civil society, part of its policy ofpolitical
pacification. Now the time has come for a regenerative form ofplanning linked to the
practices of social transformation" (Friedmann, 1987:387-388).
In his book, Planning in the Public Domain: From Knowledge to Action, Friedmann
(1987) outlined a comprehensive history ofplanning thought. He also suggested where the
future emphasis in planning theory and practice ought to lie. Planning in the future, he
claimed, must aim not merely at the incremental reform of industrial capitalism in response
to its short-term contradictions, but at the actual transformation of the capitalist mode of
production itself. He concluded by outlining a theory and practice of radical planning
(within the tradition he called 'social mobilization') aimed at achieving socio-economic
transformation through a strategy of 'collective self-reliance in development' and the
'recovery ofpolitical community' (p10).
Friedmann (1987:9) explained his position as follows: "As we approach the end of this
century, the social mobilization tradition is becoming ever more relevant to planning. For
there are signs that the system of industrial capitalism is so deeply mired in crisis that it
may never fully recover". He listed a number of symptoms afflicting the modem capitalist
world.
1. The weakening of the nation-state, as capital becomes truly global.
2. The growing impoverishment of the Third World.
3. The finite capacity of the biophysical environment to accommodate growth in
population and production.
4. Redundancy and the increasing impoverishment of labour throughout the world.
5. The staggering volume of international indebtedness, particularly in the Third World.
6. The formation of a military-industrial complex including a vast arsenal of nuclear
weaponry.
In this sense, Friedmann (1987:322) wrote of an 'historical crisis' caused by mounting
contradictions in the global capitalist economy. As he explained; "The basis of this view
rests upon four arguments which take, as their point of departure, the world economy as a
whole, meaning the linked system of global markets and their spatial organization into
core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral areas articulated through a global hierarchy... "
He argued that:
1. When the costs and benefits of industrial capitalism are calculated in socially relevant
terms on a global basis, it is highly probable that the costs of continued growth will
exceed the benefits by a growing margin. This will create an inherently unstable
situation that cannot continue without limit.
82
2. There is no inherent tendency towards equilibrium in the global market economy, as
major oligopolistic actors seek short-term strategic advantage. The weakened national
economies of semi-peripheral and peripheral states react more violently to the periodic
ups and downs of the global business cycle, and so contribute to an on-going crisis.
3. As the social costs of economic growth rise, there is a decline in the state's ability to
alleviate hardship; to regulate private corporations in the public interest; and to repair
the damage done to workers, resources, natural environments, and human communities.
Efforts by individual states to protect themselves against the arbitrary actions of
transnational capital become increasingly ineffectual.
4. The impact of the global economy on semi-peripheral and peripheral countries will
worsen. In the semi-periphery, inequalities both social and regional become more
pronounced. Such conditions, if they persist, become politically destabilising.
In addition, Friedmann (1987:312-313) described the 'massive environmental degradation'
resulting from an 'ever-expanding world economy' and the 'environmental limits to a
mode ofproduction that thrives on the unlimited expansion ofproduction' .
Conventional planning aimed at reformist measures is, according to Friedmann, unable to
address these fundamental dysfunctions in the modern industrial capitalist system. In fact,
he argued that reformist planning actually perpetuates, and often aggravates, the problems.
He stated: "Because it is inevitably integrated into the state apparatus, planning for societal
guidance [reformism] is incapable of coping with the crisis of industrial capitalism... By
serving corporate capital, it is caught up in the vortex of unlimited economic expansion"
(p.l 0-11). He thus talked of a 'crisis in planning' . He explained: "In speaking of a crisis in
planning, I have in mind mainstream planning by the state. It is fundamentally a crisis in
the idea of societal guidance. Some would call it a crisis of the state. More precisely, it is a
crisis in the state's ability to satisfy the legitimate needs of the people" (p.311-312).
According to Friedmann (1987:308), social mobilisation is the only tradition in planning
that can challenge the dominant capitalist order. It alone "points to an economics, a
politics, and a sociology that reject the seeming inevitability of uneven development,
powerlessness, exploitation, and alienation that are the hallmarks of the capitalist world
system". He described his approach as follows: "The argument is both visionary and
theoretical. It ends by affirming oppositional movements that will lead to a genuine
political life with widespread citizen involvement, a measure of territorial autonomy in
production and politics, the collective self-production of life, and the discovery of one's
individuality in the context of specific social relations" (p.14).
Thus, Friedmann envisaged the transformation of industrial capitalism as a 'project of
social reconstruction' . The socio-economic and political system must be transformed from
one dominated by global corporate capital to a system dedicated to the needs of all citizens
at all levels of life. This project of social reconstruction rests upon a process of 'remaking
everyday life' whereby personal transformation coincides with social transformation and
both depend upon a 'reactivated' community politics. "The aim, then, of this revolution-
in-the-making is not to 'capture' the state or even to 'smash' capitalism... but to remake
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everyday life ... The problem we face is, therefore, in the first instance, a political problem.
At issue is the question ofpersonal transformation in the course of changing human
relationships" (Friedmann, 1987:342).
Friedmann advocated a gradual transformation of corporate industrial capitalism, not a
revolutionary uprising. In line with what he described as the 'politics of disengagement' (in
contrast to a 'politics of confrontation') he envisaged a growing sphere of social, economic,
and political space reclaimed or 'selectively de-linked' from the capitalist economy. This
liberated space would point the way to a new mode ofproduction that would eventually
replace the present system of industrial capitalism.
To accomplish this he described a 'counterforce' of social movements opposed to
industrial capitalism. He explained that although diversely inspired, these social
movements appear to coalesce around two central strategies: 'collective self-reliance in
development' and the 'recovery ofpolitical community'. By 'collective self-reliance in
development' , or what he called elsewhere the'collective self-production of life' ,
Friedmann is describing a form of material and social self-sufficiency. He is not advocating
a subsistence economy but rather a partial de-linking (what he called 'selective de-linking')
from the capitalist economy and increasing autonomy both economically and socially at
localised levels. By the 'recovery ofpolitical community' he is referring to an increased
political involvement and control of the social economy by the citizenry at these localised
levels.
Friedmann (1987: 14) outlined four arenas of action to reclaim political community and
develop collective self-reliance in development - the household economy, the regional
nexus of work place and home, the peasant periphery of the Third World, and the global
community. He argued that in the industrialised countries, this social reconstruction must
begin in small ways within local communities, neighbourhoods, and the household itself -
especially in the last, which is both an economy and a political community, the smallest
social entity, and the 'protoplasm of the social order'. The immediate aim is to enlarge the
space of the household 'mode ofproduction' and, beginning from there, to branch out into
other political communities: the locality, the region, and beyond, until the furthest limits of
the globe are reached, which is the 'ultimate political community' .
Friedmann advanced the view that the capitalist mode ofproduction has introduced'an
unnatural division into human life' which is manifested first of all at the level of the
household - production separated from consumption and work from leisure. Both are
organised to serve the interests of capital: the first through labour markets, the second
through markets for commodities. He argued that this arrangement led to a conceptual
separation ofwhat people called 'work' from what they termed 'life', with the later set
equal not to what households produced for themselves but to what they can afford to buy.
In the supermarkets and department stores, 'life' is put on sale. "Freedom", he stated,
"meant choosing from among commodities offered for sale; more choice, more freedom"
(p.349).
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As a result, the household becomes a sphere of consumption separated from the sphere of
production which occurs in places of work organised by capital. Following Marx,
Friedmann maintained that human 'species-being' is distinguished by productive activity.
The meaning to human life is derived from creative production, for it is through the
material production of our lives that we produce meaning. This comes about because in
producing our material lives we critically confront what we produce as part of an objective
world. 'Man contemplates himself in a world he has created', declared Friedmann, quoting
Marx. Under capitalism, because production is production for capitalist exchange, the
producer does not own the products he creates, has little say in what he produces, and has
little control over the production process. He thus becomes alienated from the products of
his labour (and thus from nature), from the production process, from his fellow producers
(and consumers), and ultimately from himself (self-alienation). Thus, the household
divorced from creative production becomes alienated and alienating. It derives its meaning
only from consumption, resulting in a fragmented, fetishised world.
To rectify this fragmented, partial life-world, Friedmann argued, requires the 'collective
self-production of life' starting in the household. Households must become units of
production as well as consumption - they must 'selectively de-link' from the dominant
system of market transactions and aim towards self-sufficiency. He argued that if we are
going to recover political community, it must be done from within restructured households
that have shed their passivity and embraced 'production of life' as their central concern. To
do this, "we must recover the vision of the multi-person household as a unit ofproduction -
a household economy - and as a political community making decisions about its common
life" (p.354).
Friedmann (1987:362) concluded that restructuring the household as both an economy and
a political community is the first step toward the recovery ofpolitical community at the
level of the whole society. Without first decolonising the household domain, without its
democratisation as a political community, without its self-empowerment as a collective
actor in the public domain, without its reaching out to other households in cooperative
action to achieve an alternative vision of the future, little can be achieved at a higher level.
Although the starting point for Friedmann's social reconstruction is the household he
advanced the 'urban commune' as the basic political and administrative unit for the
community. This commune coincides with a household's 'life space', the spatial limits
within which most of its everyday activity is conducted. According to Friedmann, this is
within roughly a five mile radius of the home, or a 15 minute journey by car. This life
space corresponds to the household's political community. In addition, the urban commune
as the basic administrative level would be supplemented by a federated metropolitan
assembly with the power to make laws, subject to ratification by local councils, for the
entire region. He stated: "The formation of a regional legislative assembly, with delegates
chosen from local city councils [urban communes], would enable the political community-
so enlarged - to deal with economic questions at a level that is also relevant for capital. It
would create another level ofpolitical community above that of the urban commune
through the instrumentality of a Proudhonian federation" (p.370).
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It would allow political space to coincide with economic space at a regional level and thus
allow political processes to more effectively control economic processes, to control capital
mobility. This extension of the political sphere to the regional scale would also facilitate a
move toward greater local self-reliance and a de-linking of the regional economy from the
national and international economy. This self-reliance could be assisted by developing
small businesses, including joint ventures with community capital and worker-owned
enterprises; creating and expanding community-based services that would facilitate the
self-production of life by the household economy; and recovering the street as a place for
people (rescuing the political space of the neighbourhood).
At the present time, Friedmann envisages little possibility for radical regenerative practice
at the level of the national state in Western countries, particularly the USA. According to
Friedmann, the national state is too powerful and too remote from the centres of radical
practice to become an arena in its own right and that, for the time being, radical action is
better concentrated in local communities.
However, he envisaged a different practice in the peasant periphery. Here, according to
Friedmann, the national state is the essential instrument for directing development to avoid
the collective misery which, for most countries of the Third World, is the most probable
outcome of projected trends. Only the state is able successfully to organise resistance to a
path of development that benefits no one but a small minority. And it is only the state
which can organise people for an alternative development based on the country's own
means ofproduction. But to accomplish those tasks, the state must first be able to express
the genuine popular will of the country. It cannot merely echo the voices that manage the
international economy (Friedmann, 1987).
Friedmann advocated that countries of the periphery selectively de-link from the global
capitalist economy and pursue a more self-reliant course of development. In addition,
peripheral countries must join forces in regional assemblies of countries that share a basic
commitment to an alternative development. He stated (1987:378):
"In any event the selective uncoupling of a peasant society from international capitalism
is but the first, albeit necessary, step in what amounts to a fundamental restructuring of
the national economy... A self-reliant development requires the refocusing ofpriorities
around the needs of peasant populations who are in the majority... Such a refocusing
would be aimed at increasing the productivity of agriculture ... ; expanding rural markets;
and developing an industrial base that would, over the next cycle of development, serve
primarily the rising needs of an increasingly prosperous peasantry. In a spatial sense,
rural development would be articulated through a decentralized system of small to
medium-sized cities (urban communes), which stand in close interaction with, but do
not dominate, the surrounding countryside".
He admitted that this would be viewed as 'a serious threat to the hegemony of the leading
core states of the world economy' , especially the United States. He cited examples of
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'repeated acts of aggression' carried out against countries that had in the past attempted an
alternative course of development 'outside the logic of capital' (China, Cuba, Chile,
Nicaragua, Vietnam, Jamaica, Grenada, Angola, Mozambique). ill addition, such countries
have been subjected to ruthless economic sanctions that have destabilised their economies.
Similar acts could be expected in the future by any countries attempting to de-link from the
global capitalist system. However, Friedmann maintained that a self-reliant development of
the peasant periphery will come about because it is the only course available to Third
World countries that does not promise the continuing impoverishment of its population.
First World dominance will be powerless, in the long run, to prevent such a course of
action.
Friedmann also discussed reclaiming political community at the global level. He argued
that to focus on the local community, or even on the nation state, as the exclusive arena of
radical practice would be to overlook the global independencies that actually exist, and that
demand new institutional arrangements in support of an alternative course of development.
He explained: "Global interdependency is not likely to unravel. It is capitalism's chief
legacy to future generations. At some point, we will have to acknowledge the connection
that inevitably links the smallest political community to the largest, the household to the
world. To help to build a world community - a political order that will sustain diverging
local paths to happiness - must be seen as an important task for radicals" (p.383).
Thus, Friedmann argued that the struggles for political community, occurring
simultaneously in four distinct arenas of radical practice, are ultimately converging,
becoming part of a 'dialectical movement' that involves both social integration at the
global level and territorial differentiation at all lower levels. He explained: "Being
convergent, these struggles are ultimately linked into a great solidarity front in opposition
to the established powers of state and corporate economy, which are increasingly failing to
satisfy the basic human need for an active, socially useful life; the self-development of
human capacities and skills; freedom from hunger and from fear; the bonds of social
solidarity; and a voice in political assemblies. The great oppositional movement seeks to
reclaim what capitalism has taken away" (p.387).
Friedmann argued that the course of this great oppositional movement will increasingly
determine the shape of our lives. He warned, however, that precise outcomes cannot be
foreseen. ill response to an evolving situation, new social forces will appear that will carry
the action forward against an opposition that can be expected to grow in 'ruthlessness,
cunning, and repressive power' as its legitimacy in the public eye declines (p.387).
ill relation to the role ofplanning in this project of social reconstruction, Friedmann was
quite explicit. He stated: "As far as planning is concerned... this much is clear: along with
the gradual disappearance of the old regime, planning must be reconsidered. Such planning
in the public domain as we have known in the West has been dominated by the bourgeois
state. It was an integral part of the management of civil society, part of its policy of
political pacification. Now the time has come for a regenerative form ofplanning linked to
the practices of social transformation" (p.387-388). Friedmann outlined what form this
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planning would take and what role radical planners would play in this transformative
process. He stated:
"Radical planners are committed to an alternative world-historical project that points to
greater self-reliance and a more active political life. As part of this undertaking, they
perform critical roles in their facilitation and promotion of efforts that will lead to the
self-empowerment ofhouseholds, local communities, and regions; encourage thinking
without frontiers; help to devise practical visions of the future; assist in building
political coalitions to advance the aims of the counterforce; inform the strategic choices
of activists; and encourage the practice of dialogue and mutual learning" (p.14).
Thus, according to Friedmann, radical planners must assume an ideological position; they
cannot remain neutral. Standing in opposition to 'hegemonic power', they put their work in
the service of emancipatory values and a strong political community. They must
themselves become a part of the alternative, not as 'consultants for hire' but as 'committed
partisans' to a project Friedmann described as 'the emancipation ofhumanity from social
oppression'. He elaborated: "It is a project undertaken in the face of all the forces of
repression, chief among which are the bureaucratic state and the large corporation, and so it
requires struggle. This struggle can be violent or nonviolent, political or nonpolitical,
revolutionary or reformist. In every instance, however, it requires the overcoming of
resistance" (p.301).
The 'client' in this struggle he described as 'the mobilized community or group'.
According to Friedmann, in Western countries because it is oppositional, radical practice
(and the planning associated with it) cannot be organised and sponsored by the state. The
impulse for it must come from within the community itself. It must be self-mobilisation.
These processes may require the outside intervention of 'organizers' and others who can
teach both a new awareness and the necessary skills for self-reliant practice. The
community must not only acquire a 'critical consciousness' of its own conditions of
oppression, but also learn to engage in direct action, to negotiate and to translate its
passions into realisable, effective programs for structural change.
And planners, according to Friedmann, can play the role of 'organisers' and 'mediators' in
this process of community mobilisation. For example, he stated: "Planners can help
communities and groups that are already mobilized to search for practical solutions to the
problems perceived by them. To this search they bring a strong analytical ability, a sense of
what is likely to work. " a knowledge of institutional constraints, a knowledge of what has
worked or failed elsewhere, and an ability to assess and evaluate alternative solutions"
(p.304).
Devising an appropriate strategy, which is the next step in radical practice, requires,
according to Friedmann, timely, accurate, and 'richly textured' information (what he called
'intelligence'). It also requires correct interpretation of this intelligence; a careful
assessment of actual options; and the continuous monitoring of the action itself, its results,
and the changing context of collective action. Planners can, Friedmann argued, provide
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mobilised groups with the intelligence they need for devising a successful strategy of
action. In addition, Friedmann maintained, most solutions to deep-seated problems, even
radical, transformative solutions, have technical aspects that must be considered: questions
of design, of cost, of location, and so forth. Planners can help mobilised groups refine the
technical aspects of transformative solutions.
At least as important as localised action is the 'building of linkages' between independent
initiatives. Planners have a critical role to play here. According to Friedmann, there are
three kinds of linkages: (1) functional, from place of residence to place of work, and from
work place to work place; (2) horizontal, from community to community, region to region,
into ever larger patterns of territorial cooperation; and (3) vertical from community to
region, region to nation, and nation to groups of nations and the world. These linkages
require new institutions, and care in devising them, so that democratic control is
maintained. Planners can help establish these institutions and reinforce linkages between
various movements.
He went on to list the skills that planners possess that are useful to a radical practice. These
include: communication skills; group process skills; familiarity with planning theory;
analytical skills; synthesising skills; substantive knowledge; and experiential knowledge in
social transformation. But these skills must be 'embedded in critical thinking' and in 'a
moral commitment to an ethic of emancipation'. And crucially, they must be informed by
theory. For, according to Friedmann, radical practice must be informed and guided by
appropriate theory. Indeed, it must be 'saturated' with theory. Radical planners must assist
in 'mediating theory and practice' in the process of social transformation. This is their
critical task.
According to Friedmann (1987:389), 'transformative theory' in planning is a set of
complexly related statements about the world that:
1. Focuses on the structural problems of capitalist society viewed in a global context -
problems such as racism, patriarchy, class domination, resource degradation,
impoverishment, exploitation, and alienation;
2. Provides a critical interpretation of existing reality, emphasising those relations that,
from period to period, reproduce the 'dark underside' of the system;
3. Charts, in a historical, forward-looking perspective, the probable future course of the
problem, assuming the absence of countervailing, transformative struggles;
4. Elaborates images of a preferred outcome based on an emancipatory practice; and
5. Suggests the choice of a 'best' strategy for overcoming the resistance of the established
powers in the realisation of desired outcomes.
Friedmann (1987:389-391) emphasised the importance of the relationship between theory
and practice. He stated: "Such theory cannot be arbitrarily invented. It must grow out from
and be informed by long periods of sustained oppositional practice. Based on experience, it
combines an amalgam of analysis, social vision, and hard strategic thinking with the intent
to shape ongoing political practice, even as it continuously absorbs new learning...
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Because its usefulness is ultimately determined in practice, critical reflection on practice
forms the basis of its continued renewal".
Thus, radical practice must be guided by appropriate theory, but theory itself must come
from practice. Divorced from practice, it ceases to be meaningful. The mediations involved
here are accomplished through 'communicative acts' in which takes place an exchange of
ideas about the proper direction ofpractice and its wider meaning. In this exchange, radical
planners, whose job is partly to shape theory to the requirements ofpractice, can play a
major role (Friedmann, 1987). The task is to shape transfonnative theory to the
requirements of an oppositional practice in specific local settings, to create opportunities
for the critical appropriation of transfonnative theory by groups organised for action, and to
rework this theory in ways that will reflect firsthand experience gathered in the course of
radical practice itself.
Fundamental to radical planning is an epistemology adaptable to the purposes of social
transformation. Friedmann advanced 'social learning' . According to Friedmann, the
process of social learning is premised on dialogue, which allows mutual learning between
client and actor. He called this process, which he maintained leads to a new synthesis of
knowledge relevant for action and which incorporates both experiential and formal codes,
'transactive planning' (Friedmann, 1973). Thus, according to Friedmann, the knowledge
required for radical practice comes from practice itself. It is knowledge acquired by the
mobilised group in the course of its own actions. He explained: "The social learning model
is iterative and recursive; it 'feeds' on its own practice... What has been learned from
practice constitutes valuable knowledge, especially if the knowledge is also used to expand
and revise theoretical and ideological components oftransfonnative practice" (p.304).
And the counterpart of ideological construction for oppositional movements is critique of
the existing order. As Friedmann (1987:257-258) emphasised: "Whatever its variant, the
starting point ofplanning in the tradition of social mobilization is a thoroughgoing social
critique... Social criticism is thus the inevitable prelude to radical practice". He elaborated:
"Social criticism - this curious amalgam of moral passion, philosophical reflection,
political economy, and prophecy - is the first and necessary step in the construction of an
ideological framework for action". According to Friedmann, such a framework is necessary
to sustain and orient all political practice. A composite of several elements, it generally
includes a description and explanation of reality from a critical perspective, a vision of the
future, and an indication of what must be done.
Thus, it can be seen that Friedmann advocated an ambitious, yet ambiguous, project of
social reconstruction at various geographical levels aimed at the eventual transformation of
global corporate industrial capitalism. Beginning with the household and expanding
through urban communes, regional federations, nation states (initially the peripheral and
semi-peripheral countries of the Third World) to ultimately encompass the global
community, Friedmann advanced a vision of increasing areas of society 'liberated' from
corporate capitalism. These liberated spaces would aim at achieving a measure of 'self-
reliance in production' and a 'reclamation ofpolitical community'.
90
This would result in political and economic control over the life-processes of communities
at various levels to ensure an adequate material standard of living for all citizens of the
global community. This material well being would be fully cognisant of the ecological
constraints imposed by the realities of a finite biosphere. It would also activate a political
community that ensured all citizens would participate fully in decisions regarding their own
communal well being. It would aim at overcoming the distinction between production and
consumption that results in a fragmented, alienated life-world, thus inaugurating a
community that is whole, unalienated, and that is capable of realising the full potential
inherent in humankind. It would also reconcile the present antagonisms between human
nature and non-human nature.
Friedmann's project of social reconstruction retains elements of a utopian future and like
most utopian visions shares a belief in force of example and moral persuasion to achieve its
ends. Although Friedmann talked of struggle and overcoming resistance, his project
primarily employs the 'politics of disengagement', as opposed to the 'politics of
confrontation', to bring about the desired end state. Although recognising the repressive
potential of the state and the overwhelming power of global corporations, it is, like
Howard's vision, essentially a 'peaceful road to reform', a gradual extension of the
alternative society. It also possesses similarities to the regionalism of Geddes, and
Mumford, in advocating a federation of regional bodies aimed at a measure of regional
self-reliance in production and political control. And, in line with Wright's vision of
Broadacre City based upon the independent homestead, it sees the household as the
fundamental political, economic and social unit in society. However, it is the urban
commune that remains the centre of administrative control of this reconstructed society. As
such, it exhibits elements of Le Corbusier's urban centralism.
As did Howard, Geddes, Wright and Le Corbusier before him, so Friedmann envisaged an
important role for planners in this process of social transformation. They are not the
technocratic experts of Le Corbusier or the 'artist-planners' of Frank Lloyd Wright
controlling society according to the spirit of the new Machine Age. They are, more in line
with Howard's and Geddes' prescriptions: pragmatists - protagonists and practitioners -
who help organise and actualise the alternative society. They are ideologically committed
to the project of emancipation from the control of corporate capital and work intimately
within the sphere of civil society to assist in liberating space from the capitalist economy.
They are critically concerned with mediating theory and practice in a process of 'social
learning' generating the epistemology of the emerging movement. They thus create the
necessary ideology of the new movement whilst ruthlessly critiquing the existing order.
They are intimately part of Friedmann' s vision of social reconstruction.
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3.8 Evaluation
The theory and practice of radical transformative planning have their roots in the social
critique of industrial capitalism that arose in the early nineteenth century. This critique led
to a tradition of social thought that Friedmann (1987) labelled'social mobilisation'. It
comprised the three great oppositional movements to capitalism - utopianism, anarchism,
and historical materialism.
Deeply troubled by the divisions in early industrial capitalist society, utopians proposed
detailed prescriptions for future settlements based upon a moral ordering of society which,
when implemented, would bring about harmony between people and between human and
other nature. Human society, and its relationship to nature, was seen as perfectible if
nurtured in the proper circumstances. Thus, constructing the appropriate social and
physical environment was ofparamount importance to utopians. The 'correct' social and
physical configurations would overcome disharmonies in society and between society and
nature. This would result in a universal brotherhood: a human 'family' based upon
cooperation and good will between people, together with harmonious relationships with
nature. This utopian vision would be realised by establishing alternative communities
within the existing structure of capitalist society.
Social anarchists rejected the state and capitalist relations of production as oppressive
forces, and argued for small-scale, decentralised, self-governing communities. They
stressed their voluntary character, their mutually cooperative nature, and the principle of
confederation as the means of linking them into larger regional and national systems of
organisation. Individualist anarchists, on the other hand, emphasised the importance of
private property, the sovereignty of the individual and the repressive nature of all forms of
centralised power, corporate as well as state. Both stressed the importance of individual
liberty and freedom from constraint as the two main organising principles of society, and
both saw the future role of the state, the main instrument of oppression, as minimal. Two
paths to transforming the capitalist mode ofproduction were advocated: the first, a
peaceful transition based upon cooperation and spontaneity; the second a violent
revolutionary overthrow of existing authority.
For their part, historical materialists viewed history as a dialectical process ultimately
linked to underlying material conditions, the tensions of which are expressed subjectively
in class conflict. Capitalism, it was argued, is a socio-economic system that replaced
former historical modes of production, each distinguished by fundamental differences in
productive methods and property relations and each with its own social consciousness. The
capitalist mode of production would in turn be replaced by a socio-economic system based
upon different methods of production, different relations of production, and a different
social consciousness, the seeds of which were seen to be developing within the present
system. For this transition to be progressive (regression to barbarism or fascism remains a
possibility) it must be a radical transformation carried out by 'the immense majority in the
interests of the immense majority' . In other words, it relies upon a revolutionary proletarian
movement fully conscious of its historical role. This role was to bring about a transition to
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a classless society founded upon common ownership of the means ofproduction and the
distribution of social wealth according to need. Only then would human alienation and the
estrangement between human and non-human nature be resolved.
All three movements viewed industrial capitalism - with its underlying property relations,
class divisions, and alienation of nature - as socially repressive, economically exploitative
and ecologically disruptive. They rejected the alienation and oppression, and the
environmental degradation that characterised early capitalist society. All three viewed
capitalism as transitory and believed human progress depended upon the transformation of
the capitalist mode of production to a higher phase of human development capable of
overcoming the dysfunctions afflicting the existing system.
Two main approaches to social transformation were advanced. Utopians and most
anarchists advocated an evolutionary transformation of the capitalist mode ofproduction
through the establishment of increasing numbers of largely self-sufficient communities
uncoupled from the capitalist system. These would, by merit of example and moral
persuasion, lead to the gradual transformation of capitalism. This transition relied upon the
'politics of disengagement' carried out by alternative communities demonstrating new
ways of living. In contrast, historical materialists and some anarchists looked to the
revolutionary transformation of the capitalist mode of production and the immediate
overthrow of existing relations ofproduction and state authority. This approach relied upon
the development ofa class consciousness that would lead to an uprising of the oppressed
masses and the total replacement of the capitalist system with a classless society. The task
called for a 'confrontational politics' emphasising political struggle and possibly violent
assault on the state apparatus.
Those traditions of thought had a profound (if indirect and largely unacknowledged) effect
on modem planning. Indeed, the founding fathers ofmodem urban and regional planning,
Ebenezer Howard and Patrick Geddes, were strongly influenced by social anarchism and
utopian socialism. Frank Lloyd Wright followed the tradition of individualistic anarchism
(in its Jeffersonian form) together with a utopianism founded upon an almost mystical
belief in the role of the 'artist-planner'. Le Corbusier, on the other hand, relied upon a
combination of revolutionary syndicalism and technocratic centralised planning to express
his utopian vision of society. And, lastly, Friedmann combined elements of social
anarchism, utopianism and historical materialism in his theory of social reconstruction.
In the tradition of earlier oppositional movements, Howard, Geddes, Wright, Le Corbusier,
and Friedmann all reacted to the dysfunctions afflicting the capitalism of their times.
Howard and Geddes rejected the social and environmental degradation of the Victorian
industrial city, whilst Wright and Le Corbusier reacted to the rural depopulation and
squalid urbanisation that took place before and during the Great Depression. Friedmann
reacted to the social, economic and ecological dysfunctions of global capitalism at the close
of the twentieth century. Thus, just as earlier radical thinkers had reacted to crises in the
capitalist mode ofproduction in the nineteenth century, so too can the prescriptions
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advocated by the radical planners following them be seen as responses to later crises in the
historical trajectory of capitalism.
All five of the planners discussed in this chapter viewed the industrial capitalism of their
day as transitory, destined to be superceded by a new socio-economic system founded upon
a commitment to human emancipation and reconciliation between human society and
nature. Following earlier thought in the radical tradition, this transition was linked to
technological developments. Howard, influenced by Kropotkin's views, saw productive
and communicative technology as assisting the realisation of his prescriptions for a
moderately decentralised society. Moreover, he realised that the railway system which had
contributed to the growth of great cities could serve the planned decentralisation of society
equally well (Fishman, 1977).
Geddes distinguished different stages of technological development: the 'palaeotechnic'
period of the Industrial Revolution, when society was subjugated by economic imperatives;
then the 'neotechnic' followed by a 'geotechnic' age, when technologies were
progressively used for human emancipation and rational interaction with nature; and,
finally, a 'eugenic' age when the whole system would be devoted to the nurture of people
and nature. Both Howard and Geddes advocated a moderately decentralised system of
settlement based upon new technologies, socialisation of the means ofproduction,
reconciliation between town and country, and regionally-based confederative organisations.
Frank:Lloyd Wright understood that the private automobile and an elaborate network of
roads could create suitable conditions for an even more radical decentralisation (Fishman,
1977). His utopian anarchistic vision of extreme decentralisation, founded as it was upon
the individually-owned family homestead, would allow the transition of industrial society
from its initial period, when technology is 'in the service of greed', to a second stage
'under the control of the creative artist' . True democracy would be realised when 'every
man, woman and child may be born to put his feet on his [sic] own acres' .
Le Corbusier, in contrast, looked to technology to promote an opposite trend. Re made use
of the skyscraper as a 'street in the air', as he called it, which would permit greater urban
densities while eliminating the inefficient and 'souless streets' of the old city (Fishman,
1977). Cities, in their 'pre-mechanical' state had to be transformed into structures worthy
of the new 'Machine Age'. This would restore order to industrial society and herald the
'radiant hour of harmony, construction, and enthusiasm'. This harmony would be regulated
by a technocratic elite housed in the giant skyscrapers, in conjunction with a syndicalist
social organisation ofproduction.
Friedmann, at the close of the twentieth century, talked of industrial corporate capitalism
'mired in crisis'. Re called this an 'historical crisis' caused by mounting contradictions in
the global capitalist economy. It was the new technologies of globalised capitalism that
Friedmann was, in part, reacting to; in particular, the inherent instability of the
interdependent global financial market, the inequity of the global market for goods, and the
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environmental consequences of technology dedicated to continuous economic growth on a
global scale.
The radical plans advanced by those theorists were intended to establish a framework for
the necessary reconstruction of society. They were the practical manifestations of a
fundamental transformation of the capitalist socio-economic system. As Fishman (1977:6)
put it, in relation to Howard, Wright and Le Corbusier, "the transformation of the physical
environment is the outward sign of an inner transformation in the social structure". Their
plans "were complete alternative societies, intended as a revolution in politics and
economics as well as in architecture. They were utopian visions of a total environment in
which man would live in peace with his fellow man and in harmony with nature. They
were social thought in three dimensions" (Fishman, 1977:7).
Following the traditions ofutopianism and anarchism, all five planners relied upon the
evolutionary transformation of capitalism to realise their visions. Howard and Geddes, in
particular, advocated a gradualist approach - the setting up of alternative communities that
would proliferate through 'the natural growth of sound ideas' and lead down a 'peaceful
road' to transformation. Whilst Wright and Le Corbusier both initially hoped for a
wholesale adoption of their ideas through radical social change initiated by a strong
visionary leader or, in the case of Le Corbusier, by a radical political movement, they
eventually conceded that their proposed restructuring of society might take many decades
to accomplish. Friedmann advocated a strategy of 'selective de-linking' from the capitalist
economy and a 'recovery ofpolitical community' at various territorial levels ranging from
the household to the global which, over time, would make increasing inroads on the global
capitalist economy.
Instead of leading to the transformation of capitalist society, the radical socio-political
philosophies of Howard, Geddes, Wright and Le Corbusier were subsequently discarded by
Western societies. Their spatial designs and methodology, however, were incorporated into
reformist planning approaches designed to support the very system that they had originally
intended to transform. The Garden City concept had a profound effect on conventional
planning and was introduced throughout the world in various forms, ranging from entire
new towns to garden suburbs. Geddes' regional planning (elaborated by Mumford and
others), founded on regional surveys, was appropriated widely to serve reformist planning
measures. His'survey before plan' prescription served as the basis ofplanning
methodology until after the Second World War. Frank Lloyd Wright's vision of the
individually-owned family homestead was manifest in the detached suburban bungalow on
its own plot of land that spread out from cities throughout the Western world following the
Second World War. Le Corbusier's 'streets in the sky' likewise appeared in all major inner
cities as corporate office towers or inner city housing developments.
It remains to be seen what the fate ofFriedmann's theory of social reconstruction will be.
As a recent theory of radical planning applicable to contemporary capitalist society it,
however, warrants further evaluation. In addition, a critical appraisal of Friedmann's theory
presents an opportunity to develop alternative, or supplementary, theoretical expositions on
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radical transformative planning. This will be undertaken in Part Two of the thesis, where
an alternative approach to Friedmann's will be developed, not so much as a refutation of
Friedmann's position but more as an extension or expansion of his theory.
The first task is to examine Friedmann's analysis of contemporary society and ask whether
it points to a transformation of capitalism and supports a radical approach to the theory and
practice ofplanning. Any planning intervention in society requires legitimisation, a
political/philosophical rationale for adopting particular planning objectives. This
constitutes a body of knowledge we described earlier as the 'socio-philosophical
presuppositions' ofplanning action. It comprises, in short, a theoryfor planning. The
tradition of societal guidance (or reformism) takes its rationale, usually implicitly, as the
reproduction of the capitalist mode of production, facilitating continuing capital
accumulation and maintaining the existing relations ofproduction. A transformative
approach to planning likewise requires legitimation and a socio-philosophical rationale.
The earlier radical planners based their rationales largely on moral arguments, linked to
technological and environmental determinism rather than on a rigorous socio-historical
analysis. Being profoundly idealistic, they followed earlier utopian socialist and anarchist
thought in their underlying socio-philosophical positions and their prescriptive visions.
Friedmann based his rationale primarily on an historical materialist analysis of
contemporary capitalism, although he reverted at times to moral arguments. He accepted
the broad historical trajectory outlined by historical materialism and the role of struggle in
this historical process. However, he preferred a reformulated class structure of society
based not upon a conception of the proletariat defined strictly by its position in the
production process but rather upon a coalition of elements opposed to capital. These
elements were differentiated along the lines of gender, ethnicity, and various other social
delineations in addition to traditional working class formations. At the same time, he
recognised the need for a widespread oppositional movement (a proletarian movement in a
redefined sense) to challenge the dominance of corporate industrial capitalism.
Friedmann recognised the existence of a dominant bourgeois social consciousness
dependent upon and legitimising capitalist relations of production. He also recognised the
repressive nature of the capitalist state as protector of the interests of capital. This
repression depended upon existing inequities in power within capitalist society with real
economic and political power residing in the corporate/state nexus. He located
conventional planning (societal guidance) within this social consciousness and state
apparatus, and saw little role for it in a progressive sense. According to Friedmann, it is
merely part of the ideology ofcapital and, by assisting the reproduction of capitalism,
serves to perpetuate its socio-economic and ecological dysfunctions. For planning to be
progressive it must be radical; it must be transformative. Friedmann emphasised the
necessity of developing a radical consciousness in opposition to the dominant bourgeois
consciousness to inform this transformative movement.
Friedmann also agreed with Marx's analysis of capitalism as crisis prone, and subject to
expansionist and polarisation tendencies which result in socio-economic and ecological
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dysfunctions. He extended this to the contemporary reality of global instability brought
about by interdependent markets for finance capital, global polarisation due to deregulated
global markets for capital and goods, and a global dimension to environmental degradation.
He acknowledged the conflict between a finite biosphere and a socio-economic system
predicated on continuously expanding economic growth. He recognised the diminishing
ability of the nation state to regulate global capital (productive and finance). He thus talked
of a crisis in the state's ability to satisfy the needs of the people in light of the arbitrary
actions of transnational capital.
Friedmann accepted that capitalist production results in a fundamental alienation and
oppression of human society and an estrangement between human and non-human nature.
He extended this alienation to the household by presenting it as a partial life-world based
primarily on consumption separated from production. Within the household, 'life' is
presented as consumption and 'freedom' as choice to consume. Practical, creative activity,
on the other hand, becomes a commodity estranged from the producer (and the household)
and sold on the labour market. Human 'species-being' is thus alienated and this alienation
extends to the household, the fundamental socio-economic unit in society. He also
concurred with the dialectical approach to knowledge that historical materialists insist
upon. The'social learning' he proposed as the epistemology of radical practice involved
the active production of knowledge through a dialectic between theory and practice. Theory
must be informed by practice and practice by theory, and critique is the starting point for
both theory and practice. Critique must be aimed at confronting the dominant ideology and
constructing a counter-ideology to inform the growing oppositional movement to capital.
Thus, Friedmann's analysis of contemporary capitalism is essentially founded on an
historical materialist approach. His underlying socio-philosophical presuppositions for
planning action and his rationale for adopting a radical approach to planning theory and
practice (his theoryfor planning) relies upon a materialist socio-historical analysis,
although at times he resorts to moral justification. However, his legitimisation lacks rigour
in its analysis of the contradictions inherent to capitalism.
Friedmann accepted the expansionist dynamics exhibited by capitalism, together with its
tendency towards the polarisation of wealth, as well as economic and political power. He
also recognised the socio-economic and ecological dysfunctions consequent upon such
dynamics. Friedmann, however, did not demonstrate that these dynamics (and their
consequences) are, ofnecessity, immanent to the capitalist mode ofproduction; that they
are not simply trends that can be put right, but are fundamental to the reproduction of the
socio-economic system itself. This is crucially important. If capitalism is inherently reliant
upon the ever-increasing production of commodities then in a finite world it must
inevitably result in the increasing transformation of nature, increasing ecological
degradation and, ultimately, prove a threat to the reproduction of the capitalist system.
Likewise, if the concentration and centralisation of capital is immanent to capitalism then
the consequent polarisation of wealth and economic and political power cannot be
overcome by reformist measures but will continually reassert itself in social deprivation
and increasing social conflict.
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In addition, Friedmann did not analyse the basic contradiction between the forces of
production and the relations ofproduction which historical materialists insist as essential to
an understanding of the transition from one historical mode ofproduction to another. This
requires analysis of the underlying dynamics of capitalism and their relationship to each
other. This relationship is fundamental to any understanding of the contradictions exhibited
by contemporary capitalism - and thus to its historical trajectory - together with its long
term sustainability as a mode ofproduction. It is also fundamental to providing a rationale
for the transformation of capitalism and for legitimising a radical approach to planning
theory and practice aimed at assisting this transformation.
An alternative rationale, or theory for planning, is presented in Chapter 4 of the thesis. It
involves a dialectical analysis of the capitalist mode of production to reveal its inner
dynamics and contradictions, and thus establish its inherent movements towards capital
expansion and capital concentration and centralisation together with the conflict between
the forces ofproduction and relations ofproduction consequent upon these. This is
intended not as a refutation of Friedrnann's rationale for radical planning but as a
theoretical supplement to his socio-philosophical presuppositions for advancing a
transformative approach to the theory and practice of planning. It is intended to support
Friedmann's claim that reformist approaches to planning are inadequate to overcome the
contemporary contradictions of capitalism and thus provide a theoretically rigorous
legitimisation for adopting a transformative approach.
Friedmann's approach to the task of transforming the capitalist mode of production is
incomplete and relies primarily upon the 'politics of disengagement' whilst eschewing the
use of 'confrontational politics'. This approach is informed by utopian and anarchist
traditions of thought which rely upon the evolutionary transformation ofcapitalism brought
about by the establishment of 'alternative' communities within the existing structure of
capitalist society. Hence, Friedmann talked of a 'selective de-linking' of spheres of life
from capitalist society and a 'reclamation ofpolitical community' from the dominance of
capital. He thus envisaged the gradual transformation of the capitalist mode ofproduction
through the progressive 'liberation' (politically and materially) of growing spheres oflife
from capitalist political and economic domination. This liberation was to take place on a
number of territorial scales ranging from the individual household, through urban
communes, regional confederations, to entire nations on the periphery and semi-periphery
of international capitalism.
Friedmann also viewed the arena for radical practice as primarily confined to civil society,
to community-based initiatives that would not directly challenge the state or political
society (except in the Third World where the state is proposed as the instigator of
alternative forms of development uncoupled from global capitalist relations). Once again,
this is a strategy based upon utopian and anarchist traditions of thought. It relies upon
moral persuasion, the merit of example, and cooperative endeavour to bring about a
fundamental change in society. Although arguing for the development of oppositional
movements to capital, and the coalescing of these movements to form a counter-force to
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the dominance of capital, once again this approach is primarily concerned with establishing
increasing spheres of life partially de-linked from capitalist society rather than directly
confronting capitalist social relations ofproduction. In addition, whilst Friedmann insisted
upon the necessity of an alternative consciousness to inform this oppositional movement, it
is not a revolutionary consciousness that he referred to, but rather a 'consciousness of
disengagement' capable of informing the de-linking process.
According to Friedmann, the transformation of capitalist society can take place without
revolutionary confrontation. Although it requires struggle (including political struggle), this
struggle never escalates to 'capturing the state' or 'smashing capitalism' but occurs
primarily through 'remaking everyday life' aimed at 'reclaiming what capitalism has taken
away'. It is committed to democratic procedures, relying upon an increasing citizen
participation in democratic processes at various territorial levels. Citizens are to be
'reactivated' politically and democratically to peaceably reclaim political community from
state and corporate dominance. This relies upon the development of a 'critical
consciousness' to inform the politically reactivated community.
Friedmann was unwilling to admit a revolutionary strategy based upon confrontation
between the two great opposing groups in society - bourgeoisie and proletariat (i.e. the
interests of capital and those subjugated to the interests of capital). He thus does not
subscribe to the basic tenet of historical materialism - the ultimate necessity for
revolutionary class struggle - but instead reverts to utopian socialism with its belief in
evolutionary transformation. Friedmann, in fact, advocated a revisionist strategy in line
with earlier revisionist splits from scientific socialism. He accepted, like the revisionists,
historical materialist's analysis of capitalist society but not their commitment to
revolutionary change. It is, in essence, wishing for a revolutionary transformation of society
without revolution.
Friedmann's reliance on evolutionary change disregards the basic tenets of historical
materialism and dialectics. History has taught us, according to historical materialism, that
the privileged classes never willingly hand over their privileges. The expropriators are
never expropriated without a struggle. In the final analysis, as Marx reminded us, 'material
force must be overthrown by material force' . According to dialectical analyses, gradual
quantitative change results in revolutionary qualitative change, the basic constituent of
change is the negation of the negation, and in the clash of opposites one opposite negates
another to produce a newer form containing something ofboth negated forms. This,
according to dialectics, is the process of historical change. This does not deny the reality of
evolutionary change. However, the fundamental transformation from one historical mode
ofproduction to another never occurs through peaceful transition. It has always been a
revolutionary act, the conflict of opposite forces that brings about radical change, and that
ushers in a new historical epoch.
Friedmann, although admitting a contemporary 'historic crisis' in the capitalist mode of
production, failed to emphasise the importance of structural crisis in the transition from one
mode ofproduction to another. According to historical materialism, revolutions are not
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made but, rather, revolutionary moments are seized. These revolutionary moments rely
upon an 'organic' crisis in the economic base (a maturing of the contradiction between the
forces ofproduction and the relations ofproduction) which are reflected in the
superstructure as social conflict. If the crisis escalates, it may result in a 'catastrophic
moment', a general crisis of legitimacy, or as Gramsci called it 'a crisis of hegemony' .
These are the revolutionary moments, that must be appropriated by progressive forces.
So, without denying the importance of ideological and political struggle prior to moments
of 'organic' crisis, moments of revolutionary potential, it is mere idealism to believe that
capitalism can be transformed without the material preconditions already existing in the
economic structure of society - in essence, the matured contradiction between the forces of
production and the relations of production. As Marx stated: "No social order is ever
destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed,
and new superior relations ofproduction never replace older ones before the material
conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.
Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve, since closer
examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material
conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation"
(Preface to A Contribution to the Critique ofPolitical Economy; in Early Writings:426).
Struggle prior to revolutionary crises is an essential preparation for these moments of
transformative potential. It remains crucially important if the revolutionary potential of
crisis situations is to be grasped by progressive socialist forces. Fascism or barbarism
remain real and frightening possibilities. The seeds of the progressive movement must be
growing within the womb of capitalist society if the masses are to seize the opportunity for
revolutionary change when it arises. This requires the building of an oppositional
movement prior to the outbreak of crisis situations capable ofusing these moments for
progressive ends. An attempt to correct Friedmann's transition theory, and present a more
rigorous theory to inform transformative action, is undertaken in Chapter 5 of Part Two of
the thesis. This will be based upon Marx's writings on proletariat struggle and on
Gramscian transition theory.
Friedmann's role for radical planners in his theory of social reconstruction is inevitably
dependent upon his evolutionist strategy and the politics of disengagement he relies upon.
Planners under this conception are mainly limited to activities within civil society; to
working with community groups and oppositional movements in order to facilitate and
coordinate 'selective de-linking' from capitalist society and the establishment of alternative
ways of life within the structure of capitalism. They perform the roles of' facilitating' and
'promoting' efforts that will lead to the 'self empowerment of households, local
communities, and regions' aimed at 'ever-widening circles of liberated space on the terrain
of state and corporate economy'.
Although Friedmann rightly claimed that radical planners must assume a critical and
ideological position, and must work to reproduce this ideology and critical consciousness
amongst the oppositional movements, it is essentially an 'ideology of disengagement', of
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retreat from capitalist domination: in short, a utopian ideology. Moreover, whilst he
correctly identified theory as a crucial concern for radical planners, and emphasised the
critical relationship between theory and practice, once again it is a theory and practice
devoted to utopian strategies rather than to an historical materialist project. And although
he assigned planners the role of 'organisers' and 'mediators' in the process of community
mobilisation, it is a mobilisation aimed not at confronting capitalism but at reclaiming
'liberated space' from capitalist domination.
In line with his politics of disengagement and his evolutionary strategy, Friedmann saw
little scope for radical planners within political society, especially within the state
apparatus. The role of radical planning was almost exclusively confined to civil society, to
activity within the mobilised community. This relegates planning outside the sphere of civil
society to a role of simply supporting the state and hence capitalist domination. It renders it
redundant in regard to transformative approaches. This conception confines a whole realm
ofplanning activity within the public domain to inaction from a radical perspective.
However, if we reconceptualise the role oftransformative action as an historical materialist
project of confrontation, aimed at the eventual revolutionary transformation of capitalism,
rather than a utopian strategy of gradual uncoupling from capitalist society, then we can
theorise a role for radical planning that is not confined to civil society but has an additional
role in political society and within the state apparatus itself. This retheorised role for
radical planners is outlined in Chapter 6 of the thesis, and relies upon the theoretical
analysis undertaken in Chapter 5.
Friedmann (1987:256) described his theory of social reconstruction as "a third form of
radical practice and planning... that is neither utopian (although it may be informed by
utopian visions) nor revolutionary, but is interested in transformative action". By denying a
commitment to revolutionary practice, Friedrnann most likely condemns his project to the
same fate as those earlier utopian visions of alternative societies outlined by Howard,
Geddes, Wright and Le Corbusier. Utopianism and anarchism have never resulted in
fundamental and widespread social change and, it is argued, are unlikely to. Radical social
change relies upon confrontational struggle between opposing forces. For a socialist
revolution, it must be a movement of the 'immense majority in the interests of the immense
majority' - it must be a proletarian movement - and it must be opposed directly to the
interests of capital.
Finally, the immense majority, what Gramsci termed the 'passive masses', will not become
active in a radical sense until the material circumstances in the structure of capitalist
society bring about a crisis in the dominant hegemony, a legitimisation crisis in the existing
class structure. These are, according to Marxist theory, the moments of potential
revolutionary change and it is in these moments that 'men make their own history' ..
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Part Two - Future Directions: Eco-Radical Planning
In Part One of the thesis the historical roots of radical planning thought and its subsequent
influence on conventional planning theory and practice were examined. Although
originally conceived to transform the capitalist mode ofproduction, those theories were
subsequently appropriated by reformist planners and used to support the very system that
they were intended to transform. The contemporary relevance of radical planning was
examined through a critical evaluation of Friedmann's theory oftransformative planning. It
was concluded that although his prescriptions for a theory and practice of radical planning
contained shortcomings, his insistence on the need for a radical approach to planning in
order to combat the growing dysfunctions of contemporary capitalism was well founded.
In Part Two of the thesis an alternative rationale and methodology to inform a theory and
practice of radical planning will be formulated. In other words, an alternative theory for
planning and a theory ofplanning will be outlined. These theories will be firmly located
within an historical materialist perspective and rely upon a rigorous analysis of the
capitalist mode of production to inform both the rationale for adopting a radical approach
to planning and a methodology for radical practice.
The theoretical rationale is founded on a critique of capitalism based upon Marx's
economic writings. This is explored in Chapter 4 of Part Two. It will be demonstrated that
capitalism is dependent upon two fundamental dynamics: the expansion ofcapital and the
concentration/centralisation of capital. These dynamics lead to intractable contradictions in
regard to the biophysical and socio-economic reproduction of the capitalist mode of
production. They also contain within themselves a further critical contradiction - a conflict
between the forces ofproduction and the existing relations ofproduction.
According to historical materialist theory, it is this conflict, manifest as ecological and
socio-economic dysfunctions, that will lead to a revolutionary crisis - a 'crisis of
hegemony' or a 'legitimation crisis'. The resolution of this crisis will depend upon class
struggle between a progressive proletarian movement and a reactionary bourgeoisie. It is
this revolutionary moment, and its associated class conflict, that has the potential to lead to
a radical transformation of the capitalist mode ofproduction.
The nature of this transformative movement is examined in Chapter 5 of Part Two. The
analysis is informed by Marx's materialist interpretation of history, together with his
theories on class conflict. For an insight into the nature and role of the proletarian
movement in contemporary capitalist society, we turn to the writings of Antonio Gramsci
who outlined a strategy of transformative action appropriate to the advanced capitalist
nations of the West. Gramsci's writings on hegemony, 'war ofposition' , and the role of
intellectuals in the struggle over hegemony provide a theoretical basis for the contemporary
proletarian movement. They also constitute the conceptual basis for a theory ofplanning -
the methodology and procedural prescriptions aimed at transformative practice. This theory
is used to inform a practice of radical planning outlined in Chapter 6 of the thesis.
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Chapter 4: The Contradictions of Capitalism
4.1 Introduction
The intent of this chapter is to provide a rationale for a radical approach to planning
theory and practice. It outlines a theory for planning, a theory for radical transfonnative
planning. It is founded on a critique of capitalism based upon Marx's economic writings,
particularly those contained within Capital, Theories ofSurplus-Value and Grundrisse.
This analysis is intended to demonstrate that the capitalist mode ofproduction is in the
long term unsustainable - that it will result in increasing ecological and socio-economic
dysfunctions ultimately necessitating its own replacement with a future mode of
production based upon the ecological and social rationalities developing within the
present system.
It will be argued that capitalism is ultimately unsustainable because of two fundamental
dynamics inherent to the system. Those dynamics, in their concrete manifestations, reveal
deep-seated contradictions within the capitalist mode ofproduction - contradictions in
relation to both its continued biophysical reproduction and its social reproduction.
Firstly, there is an inherent dynamic within capitalism to accumulate and expand capital.
This results in ever-increasing investment capital and an intractable tendency, over the
long term, for incessant economic growth. This trend, when placed alongside the
biogeochemical realities of thermodynamic equilibrium, a finite biosphere, a finite global
resource base, and a finite global assimilative capacity for waste products, is viewed as
ecologically disruptive and ultimately unsustainable. It is viewed as incompatible with the
intrinsic rights and coexistence ofnon-human nature. This includes the coexistence of
other species and other species associations. In other words, it represents a contradiction
between the human appropriation of nature and the continued biodiversity and ecological
resilience of the biosphere.
Secondly, there is an inherent dynamic within the capitalist mode ofproduction to
concentrate and centralise capital (hence wealth and economic and political power) into
fewer and fewer hands. That is, the means ofproduction are confined to fewer (relatively
if not absolutely) owners of capital over time. At the same time there is an increase in the
size of the proletariat (dependent wage and salary earners) accompanied by a relative
impoverishment of the proletariat as a whole, and the absolute impoverishment of part of
the proletariat. This results in a polarisation of wealth and economic and political power
with growing disparity between rich and poor both intranationally and internationally.
This trend is seen as socially repressive, economically exploitative and in the long term
socially and politically disruptive.
These contradictions themselves contain a further contradiction. Whilst the immense
productive power of capitalism, founded upon its chronic expansionary dynamic, is
ecologically disruptive and ultimately unsustainable, the social relations ofproduction,
expressed as the concentration/centralisation of capital and economic and political power
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(subjectively representing the expansionary dictates of capital) are intrinsically unable to
address the mounting ecological crisis. There is, in other words, a conflict between the
forces of production (capital expansion) and the relations ofproduction (capital
concentration!centralisation).
This is not to deny the relevance of other contradictions contained within capitalism nor
their relation to the contradictions analysed here: for example, the tendency for a falling
rate ofprofit, or Marx's theories of periodically recurrent economic crises inherent to the
capitalist mode of production. Included here are the crises caused by rising wage rates,
underconsumption, disproportionality, and crises within the credit system: i.e. the over
extension of 'fictitious' capital in relation to 'real' productive capital. However,
capitalism until now has shown itself resilient to these periodic crises. (Whether or not it
remains so is subject to debate). Moreover, it can be argued that the long term expansion
of capital, in fact, relies upon periodic crises to overcome decreasing rates ofprofit and
over-production tendencies. On the other hand, the long term concentration and
centralisation of capital and the expansion of capital, it is argued, cannot be reconciled
and will result in increasingly widespread social and ecological disruption at local,
national and global scales. These disruptions are influenced by, and may combine with, a
periodic crisis to produce a general crisis that cannot be resolved.
These dynamics were discovered by Marx, and are explained by his theories of value,
surplus-value and capital accumulation contained within his economic writings,
particularly his expositions in Capital, Volumes 1, 2, and 3, Theories ofSurplus-Value
(the originally planned Volume 4 of Capital) and the Grundrisse. Indeed, Mandel,
(1976a:ll) in his introduction to the Penguin Edition of Capital 1, stated: "What Marx's
Capital explained... was above all the ruthless and irresistible impulse to growth which
characterizes production for private profit and the predominant use of profit for capital
accumulation... so too ... the polarization of society between fewer and fewer owners of
capital and more and more workers of hand and brain."
Since Marx's time, capitalist commodity production has indeed spread throughout the
world and the concentration of wealth and power in a small number of giant industrial
and financial corporations is now a reality. This disparity in wealth has now reached
extreme proportions. For example, it was estimated in 1995 that the world's 385
billionaires then possessed wealth equivalent to that of half the world's population, some
three billion people (UNDP, 1996).
To explain the dynamics of capital concentration! centralisation and capital expansion,
both of which are readily apparent and empirically substantiated, one must delve, as Marx
did, beneath the external appearances of economic phenomena to discover the essence -
the underlying relationships, or 'laws of motion' governing the concrete reality. This
requires an understanding of the method of analysis Marx applied to his work: the method
of the materialist dialectic. While Marx's dialectic method has its roots in Hegel's, it is in
fact the reverse: Hegel's 'turned right side up again'. As Mandel (1976a: 18) explained,
"Hegel's dialectics were idealistic: the basic motion was that of the Absolute Idea;
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material reality was only the outward appearance of ideal essence. For Marx, on the
contrary, the dialectic is materialist, 'the ideal is nothing but the material world reflected
in the mind of man, and translated into forms of thought' ". The full statement from Marx
follows:
"My dialectical method is, in its foundations, not only different from the Hegelian, but
exactly opposite to it. For Hegel, the process of thinking, which he even transforms
into an independent subject, under the name of 'the Idea' , is the creator of the real
world, and the real world is only the external appearance of the idea. With me the
reverse is true: the ideal is nothing but the material world reflected in the mind of man,
and translated into forms of thought" (Capital 1; Postface to the Second Edition: 102).
When the dialectical method is applied to the study of economics, economic phenomena
are not viewed separately, or even as they appear, but rather as an integrated whole
connected to, and dependent upon, inner and deeper relations and dynamics. As Mandel
(1976a: 18) made clear: "These laws of motion of the given mode ofproduction are
discovered to be nothing but the unfolding of the inner contradictions of that structure,
which defines its very nature. The given economic structure is seen to be characterized at
one and the same time by the unity of these contradictions and by their struggle, both of
which determine the constant changes which it undergoes".
The distinction between appearance and essence, which is fundamental to the dialectical
method of investigation, is but a conscious attempt to pierce through successive layers of
phenomena towards the inner dynamics which explain why these phenomena evolve in a
certain direction and in certain ways (Mandel, 1976a). In this way the external
appearance, which Hegel described as the 'one-sided, immediate unity' of the opposites
beneath its surface, can be explained by the underlying essence. Without further analysis,
the 'one-sided immediate unity' of appearances can lead to mystification and illusion
(Nicolaus, 1973). As Marx, in his typically direct manner, stated: "There it will be seen
what the philistine's and vulgar economist's way of looking at things stems from, namely,
the fact that it is only the direct form ofmanifestation of relations that is reflected in their
brains and not their inner connections" (letter from Marx to Engels, 27 June 1867,
Selected Correspondence: 191; in Mandel, 1976a:19).
Marx explained further: "The finished configuration of economic relations, as they are
visible on the surface, in their actual existence, and therefore also in the notions with
which the bearers and agents of these relations seek to gain an understanding of them, is
very different from the configuration of their inner core, which is essential but
concealed..." (Capital 3:311). Thus, concluded Marx: "All science would be superfluous
if the form of appearances of things directly coincided with their essence" (Capital
3:956).
This is not to suggest that surface appearance (or empirical observation) has no value. On
the contrary, Marx set great store on empirical verification. However, empirical
observation is insufficient in itself to investigate the 'inner laws ofmotion' at work. By
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itself it is merely 'vulgar' empiricism. To reveal the 'inner motion' requires abstraction of
the underlying essence from the concrete. Having uncovered the inner dynamics and
relations, one is then in a position to understand and explain the outer appearances: in
Marx's words, to 'work up' observations into concepts. As Mandel (1976a:21) described
it, Marx "starts from elements of the material concrete to go to the theoretical abstract,
which helps him then to reproduce the concrete totality in his theoretical analysis". Marx
himself gave a vivid description of this process in Grundrisse:
"It seems to be correct to begin with the real and the concrete... thus to begin, in
economics, with e.g. the population, which is the foundation and the subject of the
entire social act ofproduction. However, on closer examination this proves false. The
population is an abstraction if I leave out, for example, the classes of which it is
composed. These classes in turn are an empty phrase if I am not familiar with the
elements on which they rest, e.g. wage labour, capital, etc. These latter in turn
presuppose exchange, division oflabour, prices, etc ... Thus, if! were to begin with the
population, this would turn out to be a chaotic conception of the whole. [Rather] I
would ... move analytically towards ever more simple concepts, from the imagined
concrete toward ever thinner abstractions until I arrived at the simplest determinations.
From there the journey would have to be retraced until I had finally arrived at the
population again, but this time not as the chaotic conception of a whole, but as a rich
totality of many determinations and relations ... Along the first path the full conception
was evaporated to yield an abstract determination; along the second, the abstract
determinations lead towards a reproduction of the concrete by way of thought" (p.l 00-
101).
To explain the outward phenomena of capital concentration/centralisation and capital
expansion one must seek the inner dynamics at work. Marx did this, and showed that
these external appearances are but manifestations of 'inner laws of motion', namely those
revealed by his theories of value, surplus value and capital accumulation.
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4.2 The Abstract Labour Theory of Value
Marx's abstract labour theory of value is a further development of the labour theory of
value as it emanated from the 'classical' school ofpolitical economy, particularly
Ricardo's version (Mandel, 1976a). To understand the essential significance of the labour
theory of value (as opposed to non-labour theories) it is useful to examine Adam Smith's
(1974; original 1776) determination of value in the economic sphere, for it is his legacy
that led to a number of very different schools of thought.
Smith's position on the determination of value was ambiguous. Although Smith
recognised labour as a source of value, he never fully resolved whether the value of the
goods produced was determined by the labour time taken to produce them, or the value of
the labour-time commanded by the number of goods produced (Cole, et al., 1991). Marx,
commenting on this in Capital, stated: "Smith here (but not everywhere) confuses his
determination of value by the quantity of labour expended in the production of
commodities with the determination of the values of commodities by the value of labour"
(Capital 1:137).
This distinction is crucial. If value is determined by the labour-time required for
production or labour input, then profit, rent and interest are appropriations from the
product of labour. The sole source of value is, therefore, labour: either actual existing
labour or labour embodied in raw materials and machinery. Alternatively, if the value of
labour is equivalent to the physical products produced by that labour (i.e. as a
measurement rather than a source ofvalue) then the way is open for stock (raw materials
and machinery) to be productive (i.e. to be a source ofvalue) in its own right. Hence,
under this interpretation, raw materials, land and labour are independent sources of value
combined in the production process to produce goods and hence a combined value. So
profit, rent, and wages are a legitimate distribution of this combined value relative to the
value of the individual inputs.
Although the two theories of labour appear side by side in his writings, it is the labour
commanded theory which forms the basis of Smith's analysis (Cole, et aI., 1991).
However, it is Smith's legacy, the way his theories have been developed further, that is
important. By formulating the labour commanded theory of value, Smith raised the idea
that value was not determined by the amount of labour that went in to producing the
commodity (which implies a primary role to labour) but relegated labour to a measure of
the value produced by the combination of three independent inputs: labour, stock and
land. Thus, the value of a good was measured by the amount of labour that could be
bought by selling the commodity. Although he still focused his attention on production,
not consumption, that is on the natural prices of the independent productive inputs, he
opened the way for a theory of valuation of commodities in use or in consumption. This
led, through economists such as Bentham, Malthus, Say, Senior, Jevrons, Walrus, and
others, to the subjective preference theory of value used by conventional neoclassical
economics (Cole, et al., 1991).
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Ricardo, who took up Smith's labour input theory of value, developed an alternative line
of argument to that which became subjective preference theory. He started from the
proposition that whilst value appears in the market it originates and is determined by
decisions to produce, rather than decisions to consume. Ricardo was consistent in arguing
that the total labour-time required for the production of a commodity determined the
value of that commodity. Within this labour-time he included both direct labour, that is
actual wage labour, and indirect labour, or raw materials and tools, which were
themselves products oflabour (Cole, et al., 1991). Although Ricardo focused on labour
not just as a measure but also as a source of value, he limited his attention to labour-time
in particular activities (concrete labour). Thus, he could not distinguish between simple
commodity production and generalised commodity production - between a system in
which there is production for exchange by independent producers or artisans and
capitalism in which labour power itself is a commodity. In other words, he could not see
commodity production as a social relationship within its historical context. This was left
for Marx to reveal.
Marx, following Smith, distinguished between use-value and exchange-value. He stated,
in regard to use-value: "The usefulness of a thing makes it a use-value ... [and is] only
realized in use or consumption" (Capital 1:126). Use values are, quite simply, utility to
humans. They are independent of human labour. A thing can be a use-value even though
it is not mediated through labour. Marx uses the examples of air, virgin soil, and natural
meadows. When labour is combined with nature to produce something useful, it is not the
sole source ofuse-value. Nature also contributes. Marx stated: "Labour is therefore not
the only source of material wealth, i.e. of the use-values it produces. As William Petty
says, labour is the father of material wealth, the earth is its mother" (Capital 1:134). Use-
values cannot be quantified, they are qualitative. They can be considered as an expression
of the "material content of wealth" and the "material bearers of exchange-value" (Marx,
Capital 1:126).
Exchange-value, on the other hand, is "the proportion in which use-values of one kind
exchange for the use-values of another kind" (Marx, Capital 1:126). To determine this
proportion requires the quantification of value. It has been noted that use-values cannot be
quantified, so cannot therefore be used as the determinant of the relationship of exchange.
What is required is something common to all commodities that can determine their values
in exchange. Marx stated, in this regard: " ... the exchange values of commodities must be
reduced to a common element, of which they represent a greater or lesser quantity"
(Capital 1:127).
Marx, like Ricardo, determined that the property that all commodities have in common,
that governs the relationship of exchange, is that they are products of labour. This,
therefore, is the substance of value. The magnitude of value is the quantity of labour-time
required to produce each commodity. This labour-time, once quantified, is thus
commensurable, and the relative values of the commodities can be established as their
exchange-value. The exchange-value is therefore nothing less than the expression of the
underlying labour value or, as Marx put it: "exchange-value is the necessary mode of
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expression, or form of appearance, of value" (Capital 1:128). And that value is labour
expressed quantitatively as labour-time. As Marx explained: "The value of a commodity
is related to the value of any other commodity as the labour-time necessary for the
production of the one as related to the labour-time necessary for the production of the
other. As exchange-values, all commodities are merely definite quantities of congealed
labour-time" (Capital 1:130).
More specifically, it is the labour-time which is necessary on average to produce the
commodity, or what Marx called the 'socially necessary labour-time'. Marx defines this
as: "the labour-time required to produce any use-value under the conditions of production
normal for a given society and with the average degree of skill and intensity of labour
prevalent in that society" (Capital 1:129). So, in Marx' s words: "What exclusively
determines the magnitude of the value of any article is therefore the amount of labour
socially necessary, or the labour-time socially necessary for its production" (Capital
1:129).
In addition, and what differentiated his theory from Ricardo's, Marx distinguished
between 'concrete labour' and' abstract labour'. First, any act of labouring is "productive
activity of a definite kind, carried on with a definite aim". So considered, it is 'useful
labour' or 'concrete labour' and its product is a use-value. This aspect oflabouring
activity is "a condition of human existence which is independent of all forms of society: it
is an eternal natural necessity which mediates the metabolism between man and nature,
and therefore human life itself' (Marx, Capital 1:133). Secondly, any act oflabouring can
be considered apart from its specific characteristics, as purely the expenditure of human
labour-power, "human labour pure and simple, the expenditure of human labour in
general" (Marx, Capital 1:135). The expenditure of human labour considered in this
aspect is called'abstract labour' and it creates value as revealed in exchange (Mohun,
1983). Marx stated, in this regard:
"On the one hand, all labour is an expenditure of human labour-power, in the
physiological sense, and it is in this quality of being equal, or abstract, human labour
that it forms the value of commodities. On the other hand, all labour is an expenditure
of human labour-power in a particular form and with a definite aim, and it is this
quality of being concrete useful labour that it produces use-vales" (Capital 1:137).
Furthermore, "Equality in the full sense between different kinds of labour can be
arrived at only if we abstract from their real inequality, if we reduce them to the
characteristic they have in common, that of being the expenditure of human labour in
the abstract" (Marx, Capital 1:166). "Labour, pure and simple... absolutely indifferent
to its particular specificity, but capable of all specificities" (Marx, Grundrisse:296).
It is only through the exchange process of generalised commodity production that
heterogeneous concrete labours are rendered abstract and homogeneous, that private
labour is revealed as social labour (Mohun, 1983). The abstraction which renders
embodied labour abstract labour is a social abstraction and is historically specific - it is
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specific to the capitalist mode ofproduction. Harvey (1982) makes this clear when he
stated that:
"human labour in the abstract is a distillation, finally accomplished under very specific
relations of production, out of a seemingly infinite variety of concrete labour
activities ... abstract labour can become the measure of value only to the degree that a
specific kind of human labour - wage labour - becomes general. .. this immediately
differentiates Marx's theory of value from conventional labour theories of value
(Ricardo's in particular). Marx turns an a-historical, universal statement into a theory
of value that operates solely under capitalist relations ofproduction... The value
theory comes to reflect and embody the essential social relations that lie at the heart of
the capitalist mode of production. Value is conceived of, in short, as a social relation"
(p.15).
As Marx put it: "This abstraction of labour as such is not merely the mental product of a
concrete totality of labours. Indifference towards specific labours corresponds to a form
of society in which the individuals can with ease transfer from one labour to another, and
where the specific kind is a matter of chance for them, hence of indifference. Not only the
category, labour, but labour in reality has here become the means of creating wealth in
general, and has ceased to be organically linked with particular individuals in any specific
form" (Grundrisse: 104).
So, in summary, the exchange-value of a commodity peculiar to the capitalist mode of
production is its abstract, socially necessary labour content or, put another way, the
amount of abstract, socially necessary labour required for its production. And this
exchange-value is the expression or the appearance of value, being abstract, social
labour. This does not mean that commodities will exchange at their values, revealed as
abstract social labour-time. Value is merely 'the centre of gravity' around which prices
fluctuate. Marx's prime concern in his analysis of value was to uncover the source of
surplus-value or profit which is otherwise mystified or hidden from view. As Fine
(1975:22) pointed out:
"This is not to suggest that commodities do exchange at their values, the labour-time
necessary to produce them taking account both of direct (living) labour inputs and
indirect (dead) labour inputs (the labour-time necessary to produce means of
production, i.e. raw materials and fixed machinery). Market prices will be modified by
differing capital-labour ratios, scarcities, skills, monopolies, and tastes ... They were
not ignored by Marx, but they are irrelevant... for uncovering the social relations of
production specific to capitalism... Marx's labour theory of value incorporates a social
relation: the exchange of the products of individual concrete labour. As a price theory
it is at best a poor approximation, but the important point is that the relationship
between exchange, prices, and values is not purely quantitative, it reflects definite
social relations of production and distribution."
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In Volume 3 of Capital, when dealing with capitalist production as a whole, Marx
demonstrated that commodities do not, in fact, exchange at their values. Assuming a
competitive process which equalises the rate of profit across all branches of industries and
industrial sectors, the exchange of commodities will fluctuate above or below their value
according to their 'prices ofproduction' . As Marx stated: "competition equalizes profit
rates between the different spheres ofproduction to produce an average rate ofprofit, and
this is precisely the way in which the values ofproducts from the various spheres are
transformed into prices ofproduction. This ... happens by the continual transfer of capital
from one sphere to another (Capital 3:310).
The transformation from value to price of production has led to substantial controversy
and an immense literature. It is not my intention to enter this debate, except to point out,
following Harvey (1982), that Marx's transformation procedure is concerned with the
distribution of capital among different industries in accordance with the general rate of
profit leading to the formation ofprices of production, which in turn has the effect of
distributing the surplus-value according to the value compositions and turnover times of
the different capitals. Thus, each capitalist contributes to the total aggregate surplus-value
in society according to the labour-power each employs, and draws upon the aggregate
surplus-value according to the total capital advanced. As Harvey (1982) observed, Marx,
somewhat facetiously, called this 'capitalist communism' - 'from each capitalist
according to his total workforce and to each capitalist according to his total investment'
(Letter to Engels; in Harvey, 1982).
Marx's fundamental concern was to establish a theory of distribution and to make explicit
the relationship between surplus-value and profit. The actual transformation from value to
price of production was a secondary issue. "Disguised as profit, surplus-value actually
denies its origin, loses its character, and becomes unrecognizable... With the
transformation of values into prices of production, the very basis for determining value is
now removed from view" (Marx, Capital 3:267-268).
Marx maintained that value is ultimately the determinant of exchange, and that prices
fluctuate around this value. For example, he stated: "The assumption that commodities
from different spheres ofproduction are sold at their values naturally means no more than
that this value is the centre of gravity around which price turns and at which its constant
rise and fall is balanced out ... [it is] the determination of values that governs the
movement ofproduction; that it is values that stand behind the prices ofproduction and
ultimately determine them" (Capital 3:279, 311).
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4.3 The Theory of Surplus-Value
Marx considered his analysis of the concept of surplus-value - representing the sum total
ofprofits, interest and rents - as his main theoretical contribution to political economy
(Mandel, 1976a). In a letter to Engels, he commented: "The best points in my book
[Capital] are: (1) the double character of labour, according to whether it is expressed in
use-value or exchange-value... (2) the treatment of surplus-value independently of its
particular forms as profit, interest, ground rent, etc." (Selected Correspondence, Letter 99;
in Fine, 1975:9).
The theory of surplus-value not only explains apparent dynamics in the sphere of
capitalist production (i.e. the accumulation, expansion and centralisation of capital, along
with Marx's theories of recurrent economic and social crises) but also informs Marx's
economic interpretation of history (the theory of historical materialism). As Mandel
(1976a: 52) explained: "It ties together the historical science of society and the science of
the capitalist economy, explaining both the origin and content of the class struggle and
the dynamics of capitalist society".
To uncover the existence of surplus-value we can start, as Marx did, with the circulation
of commodities; for it is "[t]he circulation of commodities [that] is the starting point of
capital" (Capital 1:247). Marx first distinguished simple circulation, represented by:
C-M-C (Commodity-Money-Commodity) described by Marx as "the transformation of
commodities into money and the reconversion of money into commodities: selling in
order to buy" (Capital 1:248).
It is important to differentiate simple commodity production from generalised commodity
production; or, in other words, non-capitalist modes ofproduction from the capitalist
mode ofproduction. Under simple commodity production, each producer owns and works
with his own means ofproduction. He therefore owns the end-product (although he may
have to surrender part of it as tribute or extortion). Under capitalism, labour, for the most
part, has been separated from the means ofproduction and becomes wage labour, i.e.
becomes itself a commodity to be bought and sold. The owners of the means of
production (including purchased labour-power), the capitalists, therefore own the end-
products - the commodities produced. It is a mode of production that is historically
specific and relies upon a distinctive social and economic relationship, that between the
bourgeoisie (the owners of the means ofproduction and employers of wage labour) on the
one hand, and on the other, the proletariat (the class of wage or salary workers who,
having no means ofproduction of their own, are reduced to selling their labour-power in
order to live).
As Marx stated: "The historical conditions of its existence are by no means given with the
mere circulation of money and commodities. It can spring into life only when the owner
of the means ofproduction and subsistence meets in the market with the free labourer
selling his labour-power. And this one historical condition comprises a world's history.
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Capital, therefore, announces from its first appearance a new epoch in the process of
social production" (Capital 1:274).
In simple commodity production the producer sells his product in order to purchase other
products which satisfy his specific wants. He starts with commodities, turns them into
money and thence once again into commodities. Commodities constitute the beginning
and the end of the transaction which finds its rationale in the fact that the commodities
acquired are qualitatively different from those offered for exchange (Sweezy, 1942).
Money acts only as a means of exchange and the sole purpose of the transaction is the
exchange ofuse-values. As Marx stated: "[T[he whole process accomplishes nothing
more than the exchange of the product of... labour for the product of someone else's,
nothing more than an exchange of products" (Capital 1:200). Or, in short, "the exchange
of commodities pure and simple... money serves here as money of account" (Capital
1:259).
Moreover, there is no increase in value resulting from this exchange. It is the exchange of
equivalent values, and is thus not a source of increased value. Marx explained: "The same
value, i.e. the same quantity of objectified social labour, remains throughout in the hands
of the same commodity-owner, first in the shape of his own commodity, then in the shape
of the money into which the commodity has been transformed, and finally in the shape of
the commodity into which this money has been re-converted. This change of form does
not imply any change in the magnitude of the value" (Capital 1:260).
Marx then described what he called 'the general formula for capital', the circulation of
commodities under generalised (capitalist) commodity production. He stated: "But
alongside [the earlier] form [C-M-C] we find another form, which is quite distinct from
the first: M-C-M the transformation ofmoney into commodities, and the re-conversion of
commodities into money: Buying in order to sell" (Capital 1:248).
Under generalised commodity production, the capitalist possesses money with which he
purchases commodities (the means of production and labour-power) and converts these
through the production process into marketable commodities, which he sells for money.
In contrast to simple commodity exchange the circulation begins and ends with money.
There is no qualitative difference. The driving force of this circulation is to reap a
financial gain. "Its driving force and motivating force, its determining purpose, is
therefore exchange-value" (Marx, Capital 1:250). The qualitative transformation ofuse-
values is here replaced by the quantitative expansion of exchange-value as the objective
of the transactions (Sweezy, 1942). This change in motivation is fundamental to the
economic process.
Marx described the process: "The complete form of this process is therefore M-C-M',
where M'= M + 6. M, i.e. the original sum advanced plus an increment. This increment or
excess over the original value I call 'surplus-value'. The value originally advanced,
therefore, not only remains intact while in circulation, but increases its magnitude, adds to
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itself a surplus-value, or is valorized. And this movement converts it into capital"
(Capital 1:251-252).
In Volume 2 of Capital, Marx gives the expanded form of the circuit as:
r-- l
M - C ..... p ..... (C+c) - (M+m);
~mp
where:
C = commodities; M = money; I = labour power; mp = means of production; P =
productive capital; and c + m = surplus-value in commodity and money forms.
Having uncovered the existence of, and motive for, surplus-value, Marx then turned to
the task of explaining its origins, and these origins are to be found in his theory of value.
We know from the abstract labour theory of value that the value of a commodity is
determined by the quantity of socially necessary abstract labour materialised in its use-
value, i.e. by the socially necessary labour time required to produce it. It is further
revealed, upon scrutiny, that the source of surplus-value is also labour - surplus labour, or
more simply, the unpaid labour of wage workers. As Marx stated: "It is just as important
for a correct understanding of surplus-value to conceive it as merely a congealed quantity
of surplus labour-time, as nothing but objectified surplus labour, as it is for a proper
comprehension of value in general to conceive it as merely a congealed quantity of so
many hours oflabour, as nothing but objectified labour" (Capital 1:325).
Under capitalism (where labour has been separated from the means ofproduction) the
worker, as his sole means of sustenance, sells his labour-power (his capacity to work for a
given period of time). Labour-power thus becomes a commodity. As such it has a specific
value (exchange-value): the quantity of social labour necessary to reproduce it - that is the
value of the consumer goods necessary to sustain the worker and his family. Marx
described this value in the following way: "the value of labour-power is the value of the
means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance of its owner... [and] must include the
means necessary for the workers replacement, i.e. his children, in order that this race of
peculiar commodity-owners may perpetuate its presence in the market" (Capital 1:274-
275).
Marx did not mean that this value is literally absolute subsistence. He recognised an
'historical and moral element' to the determination of the value of labour-power.
"Nevertheless, in a given country at a given period, the average amount of the means of
subsistence necessary for the worker is a known datum" (Marx, Capital 1:275). Harvey
(1982:56) described the value of labour-power as the "socially necessary remuneration of
labour-power" - socially necessary from the standpoint of the continual accumulation of
capital. Thus, he described it as a "perpetually moving datum point regulated by the
accumulation process".
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Labour, as a commodity, also has a use-value, and that use-value is to produce value, and
not only value but surplus-value. Labour has the double capacity to conserve value, that
is, to transfer into the finished product the value of the raw materials and of a fraction of
the machinery used up in this process ofproduction, and to create new value, by spending
itself(Himmelweit, 1983). Thus, in the process ofproduction workers produce value over
and above the value of their own labour-power, i.e. over and above the equivalent of the
wages they receive to sustain themselves. This is the origin of surplus-value. Thus, Marx
talked of "the hidden abode ofproduction, on whose threshold there hangs the notice 'No
admittance except on business'. Here we shall see not only how capital produces, but how
capital is itselfproduced. The secret of profit-making must at last be laid bare" (Capital
1:279-280).
As Marx stated: "The activity of labour-power, therefore, not only reproduces its own
value, but produces value over and above this. This surplus-value is the difference
between the value of the product and the value of the elements consumed in the formation
of the product, in other words the means ofproduction and the labour-power" (Capital
1:317).
For example, if it takes a worker six hours to add to the value of the raw materials and
machinery used up in the production process a value sufficient to cover his own (and his
family's) means of sustenance, and if this same worker works a 12 hour day, then the
additional six hours represents surplus-value which is appropriated by the owner of the
means ofproduction, the capitalist. Consequently, the working day can be divided into
two parts: necessary labour and surplus labour. Under conditions of capitalist production
the product ofnecessary labour accrues to the worker in the form of wages, while the
product of surplus labour is appropriated by the capitalist in the form of surplus-value
(Sweezy, 1942).
Marx also distinguished between the components of value. He shows that the value of any
commodity produced under capitalist production can be analysed into three component
parts. The first part, which represents the value of the materials and machinery used up in
production "does not undergo any quantitative alteration ofvalue in the process of
production" (Capital 1:317) and is therefore called'constant capital'. The second part,
that which represents the value of labour-power does undergo an alteration of value in the
process ofproduction. "It both reproduces the equivalent of its own value and produces
an excess, a surplus-value, which may itself vary, and be more or less according to
circumstances" (Capital 1:317). This second part is therefore called 'variable capital'.
The third part is surplus-value itself (Sweezy, 1942). The value of a commodity can be
expressed thus:
total value = (c + v) + s,
where: c = constant capital; v = variable capital; and s = surplus-value (Capital 1:320)
The rate of surplus-value is defined as the ratio of surplus-value to variable capital: slv
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sNPlus labour
and this can be further defined as: slv = necessary labour (Capital 1:324-327).
Marx derived two further relationships from the formula (c + v + s). Firstly, what he
called the'organic composition of capital', which is the measure of the relationship
between constant and total capital in the production process. This is given as:
.£
organic composition of capital = c + v
Secondly, the rate of profit, in other words, the ratio of surplus-value to total capital
outlay. This is given by:
§.
rate of profit = c + v (Capital 3:133).
These two relationships are critical to Marx's theories on recurrent economic crises and
the tendency for a falling rate ofprofit. (I will return to these later in relation to capital
accumulation).
The magnitude of the rate of surplus-value is directly determined by a number of factors:
the length of the working day, the intensity of labour, the quantity ofcommodities
entering into the real wage, and the value of commodities entering into the real wage (in
turn determined by the productivity of labour). The first two determine the total value
produced by each worker, and the latter two together determine the proportion of the
working day to be divided between necessary and surplus labour.
The rate of surplus-value may be raised in two distinct ways. The first, Marx called an
increase in 'absolute surplus-value'. This is accomplished by increasing the total value
produced by each worker without changing the amount of necessary labour. This can be
brought about by either an extension of the working day or by an increase in the 'intensity
of labour' (defined by Marx as "the increased expenditure of labour in a given time"
(Capital 1:660). There are physical limits to both of these methods and both meet
resistance from workers. The production of absolute surplus-value is determined therefore
by a constant "struggle over the limits of [the working] day, a struggle between collective
capital, i.e. the class of capitalists, and collective labour, i.e. the working class" (Capital
1:344). Marx called this the 'formal subsumption of labour under capital' (Results ofthe
Immediate Process ofProduction:l019).
Secondly, the rate of surplus-value may be raised by an increase in what Marx termed
'relative surplus-value'. This is accomplished by reducing the value of labour-power
leading to a reduction of necessary labour time. The value of labour-power (or the real
wage) can be reduced by either reducing the quantity of commodities entering the real
wage, i.e. the quantity of commodities consumed by the worker and his family for their
sustenance, or by reducing the socially necessary labour time required to produce the
same quantity of goods. The former encounters the same physical limits, and worker
resistance, as before. The latter can be accomplished by an increase in the productivity of
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labour in those commodities that contribute to the worker's sustenance. An increase in
productivity resulting from new methods ofproduction and improved technology lowers
the value of commodities, and when these goods form part of the worker's consumption,
the value of labour-power falls. When the value of labour-power falls the amount of
necessary labour time falls. Thus a greater proportion of the working day can be devoted
to the production of surplus-value (Himmelweit, 1983). This was termed by Marx: the
'real subsumption of labour under capital' (Results ofthe Immediate Process of
Production: 1023).
This results in an insatiable drive to increase surplus-value by increasing the productivity
of labour through improved production methods and technological innovation. As Marx
stated: "Capital therefore has an immanent drive, and a constant tendency towards
increasing the productivity of labour" (Capital 1:437).
When we examine the circulation ofcapital over time, we discover another determinant
of the magnitude of surplus-value. This is what Marx called, the 'time of capital turnover'
(Capital 2:235-236). Turnover time represents the complete rotation of a given quantity
of industrial capital. Because surplus-value is produced during the production process, the
frequency that the same quantity of capital can be used in production, i.e. turned over,
will determine (amongst other things) the mass of surplus-value produced by that quantity
of capital. Generally speaking, the faster the rate of capital turnover, the greater the
amount of surplus-value produced over time, all other things being equal.
Concerning the theory of surplus-value, it is important to note that in Marx's analysis
surplus-value represents the sum total of profits, interest and rents. He stated: "surplus-
value is distributed under the various headings of profit, interest, rents, etc." (Capital
1:328). Having appropriated the surplus-value produced by labour in the production
process, the capitalist may have to surrender some as rent to the owners of land, some as
interest on borrowed capital, and some to pay unproductive labour, such as production
supervision and commodity marketing, etc. What remains after these payments is called
by Marx the 'profit of enterprise' (Foley, 1983). Marx wrote in this regard:
"The capitalist who produces surplus-value, i.e. who extracts unpaid labour directly
from the workers and fixes it in commodities, is admittedly the first appropriator of
this surplus-value, but he is by no means its ultimate proprietor. He has to share it
afterwards with capitalists who fulfill other functions in social production taken as a
whole, with the owner of the land, and with yet other people. Surplus-value is
therefore split up into various parts. Its fragments fall to various categories ofperson,
and take on various mutually independent forms, such as profit, interest, gains made
through trade, ground rent, etc." (Capital 1:709).
Marx analysed this distribution of surplus-value in Volume 3 of Capital. However, as
Harvey (1982:69) made clear: "The theory of surplus-value... stands on its own
independently of any theory ofdistribution apart from that most fundamental to all
distributional arrangements, which separates labour from capital. The surplus-value is
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converted into profit through the social process of competition. Profit is in turn split into
the components ofprofit on merchant's capital, interest on money capital, rent on land
and profit of enterprise".
The decisive point of his analysis, however, is that the sole source of surplus-value is in
the production process, the actual production of commodities, and that it represents an
appropriation of surplus social labour by a particular class driven by a particular motive -
the quantitative increase in money capital. The motive for production is not the exchange
of use-values, a qualitative exchange to satisfy mutual wants, but rather the quantitative
expansion of exchange-value. As Marx emphasised: "The production of surplus-value, or
the making ofprofits, is the absolute law of this mode ofproduction" (Capital 1:769).
This has profound implications, as we shall see, for the theory of capital accumulation,
and the consequent dynamics of capital concentration and centralisation and capital
expansion.
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4.4 The Theory of Capital Accumulation
"Accumulate, Accumulate! That is Moses and the prophets! 'Industry furnishes the
material which saving accumulates'. Therefore save, save, i.e. reconvert the greatest
possible portion of surplus-value or surplus-product into capital! Accumulation for the
sake of accumulation, production for the sake ofproduction..." (Marx, Capital 1:742).
With these words Marx revealed what in his analysis is the most important imperative or
driving force in the capitalist mode of production. For Marx, it is of the essence of capital,
as revealed by his theories of value and surplus-value, that it must be accumulated (Fine,
1983). It is the goal of the logic laid bare thus far (Mandel, 1976a).
For example, we have seen how surplus-value is produced in generalised commodity
production, i.e. M - C - M'. The original sum of money advanced not only remains intact
but increases its magnitude, adds to itself a surplus-value, or is valorized. Moreover, it is
the production of surplus-value that is the 'raison d' etre' for capitalist production. The
sole motive for production is a quantitative increase in exchange-value. Without this
increase, production would not take place. So it is inherent to the capitalist mode of
production that surplus-value (a quantitative increase in money) is realised.
The surplus-value thus produced, if it is not to lose its value, requires valorization in its
own right. It must be 'thrown back into circulation' . And this movement converts it to
capital and begins the accumulation process. As Marx stated, "The employment of
surplus-value as capital, or its reconversion into capital, is called accumulation of capital"
(Capital 1:725). Moreover, it is a continuous process on an ever-increasing scale. Marx
described it as follows:
" ...the final result of each separate cycle ... forms of itself the starting-point for a new
cycle. The simple circulation of commodities - selling in order to buy - is a means to a
final goal which lies outside circulation, namely the appropriation of use-values, the
satisfaction ofneeds. As against this, the circulation of money as capital is an end in
itself, for the valorization of value takes place only with this constantly renewed
movement. The movement ofcapital is therefore limitless (Capital 1:253) . .. Value
therefore now becomes value in process, and, as such, capital. It comes out of
circulation, enters into it again, preserves and multiplies itself within circulation,
emerges from it with an increased size, and starts the same cycle again and again"
(Capital 1:256).
To illustrate this point, Marx distinguished between 'simple reproduction' and 'enlarged
reproduction'. Simple reproduction, described as a "mere repetition of the process of
production, on the same scale as before" (Capital 1:712) is a hypothetical situation where
all surplus-value is consumed by its owner (the capitalist) after that portion required to
maintain production at its previous level has been reinvested. It results in no
accumulation.
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Enlarged reproduction, or what Marx called 'capitalist production on a progressively
increasing scale', presupposes that not all surplus-value is unproductively consumed. Part
of it is transformed into additional capital by being used to buy additional plant and
equipment, additional raw materials and additional labour-power. The intent being, not
only to maintain production at the previous level, but to increase production over and
above this level, i.e. to increase the extraction of surplus-value and in this way enhance
accumulation. Enlarged reproduction is thus the process of capital accumulation - the
transformation of surplus-value into additional capital, which can produce new
increments of surplus-value, leading to new increments ofcapital (Mandel, 1976a). As
Marx explained: "Looked at concretely, accumulation can be resolved into the production
of capital on a progressively increasing scale. The cycle of simple reproduction alters its
form and, to use Sismondi's expression, changes into a spiral" (Capital 1:727) ... "And
this is what is called creating capital out of capital" (Capital 1:729).
The accumulation process is thus fundamental to capitalism; it is an objective feature of
this particular mode of production. Firstly, for unconsumed surplus-value to maintain its
value it must itselfbe valorized as either productive capital or interest bearing capital. If it
is taken out of circulation it is 'virtually devalued' or its value is 'negated'
(Grundrisse:62l). It must continue its movement from M - C back to M. Surplus-value is
thus impelled back into circulation merely to maintain its value. Secondly, as we have
seen, to maximise the extraction of surplus-value from production (which is its sole
motive) there is a constant attempt to increase the productivity of labour through
improved methods ofproduction, technological innovation and economies of scale. These
improvements necessitate increased inputs of capital both for research and for alterations
to the production process itself. Hence there exists an imperative for the reinvestment of
surplus-value on a constantly increasing scale. Thirdly, and crucially, it is a matter of
survival. Because of competition the preservation of capital is impossible unless it is
accumulated (Fine, 1983). Merely to survive in a competitive market a firm must
maintain (or increase) its market share. To maintain its market share in the face of
competition requires increased productivity. As before, this necessitates improved
methods ofproduction, technological innovations, and economies of scale. Increasing the
scale ofproduction, in turn, requires greater inputs of labour and the means ofproduction
(raw materials and stock). Once again, surplus-value is impelled back into the production
process on an ever increasing scale.
So, this reinvestment in production, the throwing of surplus-value back into circulation, is
not a matter ofchoice. It is a coercion that is intrinsic to the economic system. Capital
must be accumulated; it cannot do otherwise. As Marx put it: "the development of
capitalist production makes it constantly necessary to keep increasing the amount of
capital laid out in a given industrial undertaking, and competition makes the immanent
laws of capitalist production to be felt by each individual capitalist as external coercive
laws. It compels him to keep constantly extending his capital, in order to preserve it, but
extend it he cannot except by means of progressive accumulation"(Capital 1:739).
This objective value expansion process is reflected in the subjective aim of the capitalist
(Sweezy, 1942). As Marx, in this memorable passage, stated:
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"The objective content of the circulation we have been discussing - the valorization of
value - is [the capitalist's] subjective purpose, and it is only in so far as the
appropriation of ever more wealth in the abstract is the sole driving force behind his
operations that he functions as a capitalist, i.e. as capital personified and endowed with
consciousness and a will. Use-values must therefore never be treated as the immediate
aim of the capitalist; nor must the profit on any single transaction. His aim is rather the
unceasing movement ofprofit-making. This boundless drive for enrichment, this
passionate chase after value, is common to the capitalist and to the miser; but while the
miser is merely a capitalist gone mad, the capitalist is a rational miser. The ceaseless
augmentation of value, which the miser seeks to attain by saving his money from
circulation, is achieved by the more astute capitalist by means of throwing his money
again and again into circulation" (Capital 1:254-255).
In relation to this incessant drive to accumulate capital, Marx discussed 'the
circumstances which... determine the extent of accumulation'. He named as factors: "the
degree of exploitation of labour-power, the productivity of labour, the growing difference
in amount between capital employed and capital consumed, and the magnitude of the
capital advanced" (Capital 1:747). As he stated, "the magnitude of the capital
accumulated clearly depends on the absolute magnitude of the surplus-value... Hence all
the circumstances that determine the mass of surplus-value operate to determine the
magnitude of the accumulation" (Capital 1:747).
As we have seen, the rate of surplus-value depends in the first place on the degree of
exploitation of labour-power. This involves either the extension of the working day, or
the intensification of the labour process, or both. To enhance accumulation, therefore,
there is a drive to increase both the length of the working day and the intensity of the
labour process (i.e. the appropriation of absolute surplus-value). Secondly, surplus-value
can be increased by reducing the means of subsistence for labour (i.e. reducing the
volume ofconsumer goods entering the real wage). There is thus a constant tendency to
reduce the cost of labour or to seek out labour of lower cost. In this way, "it transforms
the workers' necessary fund for consumption, within certain limits, into a fund for the
accumulation of capital" (Capital 1:748). Thirdly, by increasing the productivity of
labour, the value of labour-power is reduced, and consequently the rate of surplus-value is
increased and hence the accumulation of capital. There is thus a constant effort to
improve the production process through technological innovation and more efficient
organisation of labour. In addition, with growing productivity and the consequent
cheapening of those commodities consumed by the capitalist, all other things remaining
equal, there will be a relative increase in that portion of surplus-value available for
reinvestment, and thus enhanced accumulation.
The mass of surplus-value produced is also determined by the number of workers
simultaneously exploited; this corresponds, although in varying degree, to the magnitude
of capital. Thus, the more that capital increases by the means of successive
accumulations, the more workers are able to be employed, and the greater the mass of
surplus-value available for further accumulation. Hence, there exists a constant tendency
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to increase the scale ofproduction. Finally, the mass of surplus-value is further influenced
by the rate of capital turnover. The faster the rate of capital turnover the greater the
extraction of surplus-value and hence of accumulation. There exists, thus, an inherent
tendency to increase the rate of capital turnover - to ensure as much as possible that time
does not pass by 'unseized'. As Harvey (1982:86) stated: "There is ... considerable
pressure to accelerate the velocity of circulation of capital, because to do so is to increase
both the sum ofvalues produced and the rate ofprofit... [and] [s]ince an accelerating rate
of turnover of capital reduces the time during which opportunities pass by unseized, a
reduction in turnover time releases resources for further accumulation". Marx explained,
in the Grundrisse:
"Capital exists as capital only in so far as it passes through the phases of circulation,
the various movements of its transformation, in order to be able to begin the
production process anew, and these phases are themselves phases of its realization -
but at the same time... of its devaluation. As long as capital remains frozen in the form
of the finished product, it cannot be active as capital, it is negated capital. Its
realization process is delayed in the same degree, and its value-in-process negated.
This thus appears as a loss for capital, as a relative loss of its value, for its value
consists precisely in its realization process. This loss of capital means in other words
nothing else but that time passes by unseized, time during which it could have been
appropriating alien labour" (p.546).
"So", as Mandel (1983:192) emphasised, "capitalism lives under the constant pressure of
the law of capital accumulation. In order to survive, it must grow. Capital can only exist if
more capital is being accumulated". And the' spiral' of accumulation grows larger and
larger and revolves faster and faster - what Harvey (1982:96) termed the 'merry-go-round
of perpetual accumulation' .
That is not to imply, however, that accumulation is a straightforward process. On the
contrary, as Marx recognised, it is complex and contradictory, beset with recurrent
periods of expansion, over-production, contraction, and crisis. As Marx put it: "The
contradictory movement of capitalist society impresses itself upon the practical bourgeois
most strikingly in the changes of the periodic cycle through which modem industry runs
and whose crowning point is the general crisis" (Capital]: 103). Mandel (1983) pointed
out that Marx did not leave a completed theory of crises. His observations on the
industrial cycle and economic crises are dispersed among several of his major works. The
most complete analysis is revealed in Part III of Capital 3, whilst other important
references are contained in Volumes 1 and 2 of Capital, Theories ofSurplus-Value, and
the Grundrisse. A full exposition was most likely intended for the proposed Volume 5 of
Capital which Marx had intended to write.
The specific form of capitalist crises is an interruption of the circulation (and hence the
accumulation) process. As Marx stated: "The circuit of capital proceeds normally only as
long as its various phases pass into each other without delay. If capital comes to a
standstill in the first phase, M-C, money capital forms into a hoard; if this happens in the
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production phase, the means of production cease to function, and labour-power remains
unoccupied; if in the last phase, C' -M', unsaleable stocks ofcommodities obstruct the
flow of circulation" (Capital 2: 133).
Thus, interruptions in the circulation of capital result in accumulation crises with a
consequent devaluation of capital in the form of idle money capital, unutilised productive
capacity, unemployed or under-employed labour-power, and a surplus of commodities.
There are a number ofcauses for an interruption in the circulation and accumulation
process, mostly involving a decline in the rate ofprofit below its usual level (Sweezy,
1942). There is a decline in profit caused by a rise in wages. As accumulation grows so
too does the demand for labour. This may lead to a rise in real wages. The rise in wages
may thus reduce the rate of surplus-value and thus the rate ofprofit. Whilst reduction in
the rate ofprofit may interrupt the accumulation process, it does not do so to the extent
that it threatens the economic system as a whole. Marx made clear: "at the best of times
an increase in wages means only a quantitative reduction in the amount ofunpaid labour
the worker has to supply. This reduction can never go so far as to threaten the system
itself' (Capital 1:769-770).
In addition to the periodic fluctuations in the industrial cycle due to the effect of an
increase in wages, Marx identified a further contradiction in the accumulation process.
This he called the falling tendency of the rate ofprofit. This is explained by the
composition of capital and the changes it undergoes in the course of accumulation.
As we saw earlier Marx determined the relationship between the various components of
value as:
c + v + s, where: c = constant capital; v = variable capital; and s = surplus-value
From this he derived a relationship which he called the 'organic composition of capital' -
the measure of the relationship between constant and total capital in the production
process. This is given as:
~
organic composition of capital = c + v
As we have seen, accumulation is accompanied by a progressive increase in the
productivity of labour due to technological advances in production methods and
organisational improvements in the production process. This means that the same amount
of labour using more sophisticated production techniques can process greater amounts of
raw materials and turn out ever-increasing quantities of finished goods (Sweezy, 1942).
This, in turn, means that the outlay ofcapital for plant and equipment and raw materials
(constant capital) increases relative to the outlay on labour (variable capital). In other
words, the organic composition of capital (the ratio of capital outlay on materials and
stock to total outlay) displays a steadily rising trend.
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As already established, profit originates from surplus-value. Surplus-value is produced by
living labour, and by living labour alone, i.e. by that part of capital which is used to buy
labour-power (variable capital). Thus, ifvariable capital becomes a progressively smaller
part of the total capital (due to a rising organic composition of capital) the relation
between profit and total capital (which Marx called the rate ofprofit) will tend to decline,
all other things remaining equal (Mandel, 1983). This can be expressed as follows:
s slv §.'
rate ofprofit, r = c + v = clv + 1 = 0 + 1
where: s = surplus-value; v = variable capital; c = constant capital; s' = rate of surplus-
value; 0 = organic composition of capital
It can be readily seen that if the organic composition of capital rises and the rate of
surplus-value remains the same, then the rate of profit must decline accordingly. This
does not imply that the falling tendency of the rate ofprofit imposes an absolute or final
barrier to capital accumulation. As Sweezy (1942) pointed out, Marx enumerates various
'counteracting influences' which 'check and cancel' the general law of the falling rate of
profit, 'giving it simply the character of a tendency' (Capital 3:339). Marx also made it
clear that the tendential fall in the rate ofprofit is completely consistent with continued
capital expansion. In fact: "A fall in the profit rate, and accelerated accumulation, are
simply different expressions of the same process, in so far as both express the
development ofproductivity" (Capital 3:349). "The same laws, therefore, produce both a
growing absolute mass of profit for the social capital, and a falling rate ofprofit" (Capital
3:325). Thus: "As the capitalist mode ofproduction develops, so the rate of profit falls,
while the mass ofprofit rises together with the increasing mass of capital applied"
(Capital 3:356).
Yet another cause of declining profitability, leading to interruptions in the accumulation
process and possible crisis, is the inability to realise the full value of commodities
produced - what are known as 'realisation crises'. Realisation crises include crises arising
from 'disproportionality' among the various branches ofproduction, and crises arising
from 'underconsumption' (Sweezy, 1942).
Crises of disproportionality, which have their roots in the planless, anarchic character of
capitalist production, arise from overproduction (and!or contraction) in one (or more)
particular branches of industry affecting production in other branches, and thus spreading
to the whole economy, generating a general crisis. Although Marx did not elaborate fully
a theory of disproportionality, he did acknowledge its existence and possible effects. In
both Capital 2 and Theories ofSurplus-Value, he talked of' disproportional production'
or 'a faulty distribution of social labour among the individual spheres ofproduction' .
Later commentators, such as Hilferding (1910) developed comprehensive theories of
disproportionality using Marx' s reproduction schemas outlined in Volume 2 of Capital.
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Underconsumption, on the other hand, originates in the tendency for capitalist production
to expand the capacity to produce consumption goods more rapidly than the demand for
them. This creates a 'demand gap' and may express itself either in crisis or in stagnation,
or both (Sweezy, 1942). As we have seen, capitalist production is not intrinsically
concerned with producing use-values. Its motivating force is a quantitative increase in
exchange-value. However, because production and consumption are separated 'logically
as well as in space and time' there is no guarantee that production and consumption will
coincide. In fact, because the social relations of capitalist production enforce a restriction
on consumption and at the same time spur on unlimited expansion ofproduction there is a
tendency to disequilibrium (Sweezy, 1942). Once again, Marx did not elaborate a theory
of underconsumption but left scattered references to it throughout his economic writings.
For example, in Theories ofSurplus-Value, he stated:
"It is in the nature of capitalist production to produce without regard to the limits of the
market. Since market and production are two independent factors the expansion of one
does not correspond with the expansion of the other. [Overproduction] is specifically
conditioned by the general law ofproduction of capital: to produce to the limit set by
the productive forces ... without any consideration for the actual limits of the market or
needs backed by ability to pay; and this is carried out through continuous expansion of
reproduction and accumulation... while on the other hand the mass of the producers
(the working class) remain tied to the average level of needs, and must remain tied to it
according to the nature of capitalist production" (in Harvey, 1982:92-93).
Moreover, in Grundrisse, he described overproduction - "supply without demand" - as the
"fundamental contradiction of developed capitalism", which "discharges itself in great
thunderstorms which increasingly threaten... the foundation of society and of production
itself' (p.411-415). He described overproduction further as "production which cannot be
transformed into money, into value; production which does not pass the test of
circulation" (PA12). Finally, in Volume 3 of Capital Marx stated quite clearly: "The
ultimate reason for all real crises always remains the poverty and restricted consumption
of the masses, in the face of the drive of capitalist production to develop the productive
forces as if only the absolute consumption capacity of society set a limit to them" (
p.615).
As in the case of the falling tendency of the rate ofprofit, the tendency to
underconsumption remains just that - a tendency. There are counteracting influences that
serve to obscure or even annul its realisation. Nor should it be assumed that
underconsumption posses ultimate limits to accumulation. It does, however, help explain
some of the manifestations of capitalist production, such as recurrent periods of
stagnation or economic crisis, together with the propensity to constant geographic
expansion of the spheres of capitalist production and marketing. (Some Marxist
commentators have postulated absolute limits to capital accumulation because of
underconsumption. Rosa Luxemburg (1963) is perhaps the most widely known).
125
So, it can be seen that the accumulation process is subject to numerous dislocations and
contradictions. These are manifested as recurrent periods of expansion, overproduction,
contraction, stagnation and crisis in the industrial cycle. However, these interruptions do
not divert the immanent dynamic inherent to capitalist production for the accumulation of
capital on an ever-increasing scale. They serve, rather, to resolve contradictions within the
economic system thereby enabling further accumulation to take place. As Marx stated:
"Crises are never more than momentary, violent solutions for the existing contradictions,
violent eruptions that re-establish the disturbed balance for the time being (Capital
3:357). Ultimately, Marx explained: "The devaluation of the elements of constant capital
[in a crisis] would itself tend to raise the rate ofprofit. The mass of constant capital would
have increased in relation to variable, but its value may have fallen. The ensuing
stagnation ofproduction would have prepared - within capitalist limits - a subsequent
expansion ofproduction" (Capital 3:363-364). Or, as he stated elsewhere: "business
passes through successive periods of stagnation, moderate activity, over-excitement,
crisis ... But a crisis is always the starting-point of a large volume ofnew investment"
(Capital 2:264). And finally, "over-production does not call forth a constant fall in profit
but periodic over-production occurs constantly... Permanent crises do not exist"
(Theories ofSurplus-Value 2:468-497; in Harvey 1982:191).
Whether capitalism can continue to overcome these periodic crises is a matter of intense
debate. However, up until now, capitalism has shown itself resilient to economic crises,
and the long-term trend of ever-increasing capital accumulation is self-evident.
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4.5 The Expansion of Capital
The imperative to accumulate capital, itself resting upon the inner dynamic to maximise
surplus-value (representing the unpaid labour of workers) manifests itself concretely as
the expansion of capital, a propensity to incessant economic growth in the form of ever
increasing commodity production over the long term. As Marx stated:
"We have seen that capitalist production is the production of surplus-value, and as such
(in the process of accumulation), it is at the same time the production of capital and the
production of the entire capitalist relationship on a steadily increasing (expanding)
scale" (Results ofthe Immediate Process ofProduction: 1058-1059). Moreover: "The
material result of capitalist production... is to raise the quantity ofproduction and
multiply and diversify the spheres of production and their sub-spheres ... 'Production
for production's sake' - production as an end in itself - does indeed come on the
scene... It makes its appearance as soon as the immediate purpose ofproduction is to
produce as much surplus-value as possible, as soon as the exchange-value of the
product becomes the deciding factor" (Results ofthe Immediate Process of
Production: 1037).
Smith (1984:49) observed: "Under dictate from the accumulation process, capitalism as a
mode ofproduction must expand continuously if it is to survive ... To this end, capital
stalks the earth in search of material resources". Mandel (1978a:77) pointed out that
Volume 1 of Capital indicates why capital, by its very essence, is value in perpetual
search of additional value. The 'unquenchable thirst' for surplus-value is thus the
"fundamental motor of economic growth, technological revolution, research and
development spending, improvement ofcommunications, sales drive and market
research". Foster (1994:124) emphasised that "An exponential growth dynamic is
inherent to capitalism, a system whereby money is exchanged for commodities, which are
then exchanged for more money on an ever increasing scale".
Furthermore, Marx made it clear that this 'inherent tendency' becomes 'indispensable'
once 'the specific mode of capitalist production... has become a reality' (Results ofthe
Immediate Process ofProduction: 1037). He stated: "With the development of capitalist
production and the resultant reduction in prices, there must be an increase in the quantity
of goods, in the number of articles that must be sold. That is to say, a constant expansion
of the market becomes a necessity for capitalist production" (Results ofthe Immediate
Process ofProduction:967).
According to Mandel (1976b), Marx considered the constant expansion of the capitalist
market as absolutely necessary for the survival of the capitalist mode of production.
Because capitalist production is production through a growing mass of machinery, a
growing fixed capital, a growing organic composition of capital, it is also of necessity
mass production of commodities on a constantly increasing scale, whose sale demands a
constantly expanding market. Mandel (1976b) in his introduction to the Results ofthe
Immediate Process ofProduction, pointed out that since the publication of this originally
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planned Part Seven of Volume 1 of Capital (published in English for the first time in
1976) Marx's position on the expansion ofcapital, sometimes contested, has been
clarified.
Mandel (1978a:78) thus described a 'spiraling movement' of capital, and a 'veritable
avalanche' of commodities released. He stated: "Obstacles on the road of self-expansion -
such as the enforced lingering of commodities in the sphere of circulation, or the
protracted character of the production process itself - are swept away by the avalanche,
thanks to social division of labour within the capitalist class; the appearance of
commercial and banking capital; and the constant striving to accelerate the transport of
commodities, build up a world-wide system of communications and reduce the length of
the circulation process to a minimum. An immense mountain of commodities is
distributed with lightening speed around the globe."
The expansion of capital manifests itself in two ways: firstly, as a quantitative expansion
in the total output of commodities, or gross product and, secondly, as a geographic
expansion of the sphere of commodity production, a spatial extension. As Marx stated in
Grundrisse: "A precondition ofproduction based on capital is therefore the production of
a constantly widening sphere of circulation, whether the sphere itself is directly expanded
or whether more points within it are created as points ofproduction" (p.407).
We have seen that the sole source of surplus-value is in the realm of production. More
specifically it represents surplus labour, and takes its form as surplus product. It is the
actual production of commodities that produces surplus-value and thus enables
accumulation. Therefore, to maximise surplus-value and enhance accumulation, requires
an ever increasing expansion of commodity production. As Marx emphasised, this
becomes 'indispensable' to the capitalist mode ofproduction. "This becomes a law,
independent of the will of the individual capitalist. And this law only becomes reality
because instead of the scale ofproduction being controlled by existing needs, the quantity
ofproducts made is determined by the constantly increasing scale ofproduction dictated
by the mode ofproduction itself. Its aim is that the individual product should contain as
much unpaid labour as possible, and this is achieved only by producing for the sake of
production" (Results ofthe Immediate Process ofProduction: 1037-1038).
The compulsion to increase the scale of commodity production exerts itself at the level of
the individual firm (the 'single capital') and manifests itself at the national ('many
capitals') and global ('accumulation on a world scale') levels.
There are numerous dynamics at work to increase the scale ofproduction at the level of
the single capital. Firstly, as we have seen, the mass of surplus-value expropriated and
made available for accumulation depends on the exploitation of labour (the rate of
surplus-value) and the amount oflabour exploited (variable capital advanced). In other
words, the mass of surplus-value is determined by the product of the number of workers
simultaneously exploited and the degree of exploitation of each individual worker. There
is thus an inherent compulsion to increase the number of workers employed in each
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enterprise since the number employed directly increases the mass of surplus-value
available for accumulation. This manifests itself as a propensity to constantly increase the
size of individual enterprises. As Harvey (1982) observed, since the beginning of the
Industrial Revolution there has been a tendency for the representative firm to increase in
size from the workshop, to the factory, to the national corporation, to the multidivisional
corporation and, now, to the multinational corporation.
Not only does the absolute number of workers involved in a production process directly
increase the mass of surplus-value but, in addition, the organisation of labour in the
production process indirectly increases the mass of surplus-value by increasing the rate of
surplus-value through increased productivity oflabour. This is brought about by co-
operation of labour, division of labour, and mechanisation of the labour process. Marx
called this the 'productive power of social labour' . Thus, through the increased
productivity of social labour (through cooperation, division of labour, and
mechanisation), the increased scale ofproduction brought about by larger and larger
enterprises, and the comprehensive application of science and technology to the
production process there is an immense expansion in the sheer volume of commodities
produced.
The expansion ofproduction at the level of many capitals is a result of the expansion of
individual capitals together with the expansion ofcapital into new areas ofproduction.
Thus, capital gradually takes over all branches of production - manufacture, agriculture,
mining, communications, and so on. Not only does it expand into all traditional economic
spheres ofproduction, it also creates auxiliary ones.
In the Grundrisse, Marx discussed the development of 'new systems of needs' . He
described the "pulling-away of the natural ground from the foundations of every industry
and [the] transfer of its conditions of production outside itself, into a general context-
hence the transformation of what was previously superfluous into what is necessary, as a
historically created necessity - [as] the tendency of capital" (p.528). Furthermore: "The
greater the extent to which historic needs - needs created by production itself, social needs
- needs which are themselves the offspring of social production and intercourse, are
posited as necessary, the higher the level to which real wealth has become developed"
(p.527). Capital also creates new spheres of accumulation from social functions
traditionally viewed as a public good, and from professions previously considered outside
the realms of commercial exploitation. Marx stated:
"The more production becomes the production of commodities, the more each person
has to, and wishes to, become a dealer in commodities, then the more everyone wants
to make money, either from a product, or from his services, if his product only exists
naturally in the form of a service, and this money-making appears as the ultimate
purpose of activity of every kind. In capitalist production the tendency for all products
to be commodities and all labour to be wage-labour, becomes absolute. A whole mass
of functions and activities which formerly had an aura of sanctity about them, which
passed as ends in themselves, which were performed for nothing or where payment
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was made in roundabout ways (like all the professions, barristers, doctors, in England
where the barrister and the physician neither could nor can sue for payment to this very
day) - all these become directly converted into wage-labourers, however various their
activities and payment may be" (Results ofthe Immediate Process ofProduction: 1041-
1042).
In other words, capital seeks to commodify all functions and services that are capable of
yielding surplus-value. Hence, we see the commodification of fields of human activity
formerly considered separate from commercial consideration - health-care, education,
internal and external security, parks and recreational facilities, prisons, intellectual
property, libraries, etc. - and utilities previously considered to be in the public realm such
as water, roading, waste disposal, ports, airports, etc. In fact, as Marx explained in
Grundrisse, "the degree to which capital has subjugated all conditions of social
production to itself [is indicative of the] development of capital - the degree to which the
real community has constituted itself in the form of capital" (p.531-532).
Not only does capital expand into spheres traditionally viewed as outside the realm of
exchange, it also, when faced with possible barriers to further accumulation, creates new
sources of surplus-value by creating new needs and demands and thus new commodities
to satisfy these needs and demands. Here advertising acts as the handmaiden of capital.
As Mandel (1976b:945) stated: "Thereby capital, rather than adapting itself to a given
structure of demand or socially acknowledged needs, by revolutionizing production
revolutionizes demands and needs themselves, expanding markets, provoking new needs,
creating new products and new spheres into which production of exchange values for
more value, production for profit, makes its appearance". Marx added: "This compulsion
[to produce surplus-value] implies also the necessity of forming needs, and creating the
means of satisfying them ... " (Results ofthe Immediate Process ofProduction: 1026).
Harvey (1982) likewise talked of the creation of wants and needs under capitalism and the
creation of 'new consumption' as a necessary aspect to the accumulation of capital. He
quoted Marx in pointing out that this production of consumption can be accomplished in
a variety of ways: "firstly, quantitative expansion of existing consumption; secondly,
creation of new needs by propagating existing ones in a wide circle; thirdly, production of
new needs and discovery and creation of new use- values" (Grundrisse:408).
This results, claimed Marx, in the "exploitation of all ofnature in order to discover new,
useful qualities in things; universal exchange of the products of all alien climates and
lands; new (artificial) preparation of natural objects, by which they are given new use-
values; the exploration of the earth in all directions, to discover new things ofuse as well
as new useful qualities of the old ... likewise the discovery, creation and satisfaction of
new needs arising from society itself.. , This creation of new branches of production... is
not merely the division of labour, but is rather the creation, separate from a given
production, of labour with a new use-value; the development of a constantly expanding
and more comprehensive system of different kinds oflabour, different kinds of
production, to which a constantly expanding and constantly enriched system of needs
corresponds" (Grundrisse:409).
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That these new products often serve no socially meaningful purpose (for example, those
dictated by fashion, trend, or social esteem) is of no concern to capital. It has only one
objective - the extraction of surplus-value. As Marx stated: "But capital is in itself
indifferent to the particular nature of every sphere ofproduction. Where it is invested,
how it is invested and to what extent it is transferred from one sphere ofproduction to
another or redistributed among the various spheres ofproduction - all this is determined
only by the greater ease or difficulty of selling the commodities manufactured" (Results of
the Immediate Process ofProduction: 1013). Horton (1997) described this as the
'precedence of exchange-value over use-value'. Although commodities must have a use-
value in the sense that they must be sold to realise their exchange value, this does not
mean that they necessarily add to social well being. They may indeed be socially harmful.
As Horton stated: "The value of a commodity is finally dependent not on its (individual)
use but its (social) ability to be sold" (p.130).
The production of luxury goods is also an inherent feature. More than this, Marx
considered them essential to capitalist production. He emphasised: " ... luxury goods are
absolutely necessary for a mode ofproduction which creates wealth for the non-producer
and which therefore must provide that wealth in forms which permit its acquisition only
by those who enjoy" (Results ofthe Immediate Process ofProduction: 1046).
Military expenditure provides a more sinister example of the anarchical compulsion to
extract surplus-value unconcerned as to the purpose of that production. As Sweezy (1942)
pointed out, since military expenditure performs the same economic function as
consumption expenditure, the expansion of military expenditure constitutes an
increasingly important offsetting force to the tendency to underconsumption in many
capitalist countries. Also, to the extent that production of armaments utilises labour power
and means ofproduction for which there would otherwise be little demand, militarism
actually provides capital with increased opportunities for profit. "For all these reasons,
militarism tends to develop its own expansionist dynamic in capitalist society" (Sweezy,
1942:310).
In addition, and related to, the expansion of commodity production through the increased
social productivity of labour and the extension of capitalist production into all possible
spheres and subspheres of accumulation, there is an expansion in the sheer volume of
commodity output through an increase in the rate of capital turnover. As we have seen,
the faster a given mass of capital is turned over the greater the mass of surplus-value
realised over time. There exists, therefore, a propensity to speed up the turnover time,
resulting in an increase in commodity output - what Harvey (1989) called the 'time-
compression' of capital. This impulse 'speeds up both consumption and production'.
In Grundrisse, Marx discussed the 'space of time' of capital circulation. He stated: "The
frequency with which capital can repeat the production process, self-realization, in a
given amount of time, evidently depends on the speed with which this space of time is run
through, or on its duration" (p.SI8). Furthermore, "the velocity of circulation, the time in
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which it is accomplished, is a determinant of how many products can be produced in a
given period of time; how often capital can be realized in a given period of time, how
often it can reproduce and multiply its value" (p.538). This manifests itself in an
increasing tendency towards the production of non-durables (as opposed to durable
commodities) or in other words, the planned obsolescence of consumer commodities. The
shorter the life-span of a commodity, the sooner it requires replacement and the faster
capital can be recycled through that commodity, thus increasing the rate of capital
turnover. There is thus a prodigality of use-values to maximise exchange-value, or 'a
priority of exchange-value over use-value' (Horton, 1997).
There exists also a tendency towards the premature obsolescence of fixed capital in the
form of machinery, buildings, etc. brought about by competition between individual
capitals for increased productivity. As Mandel (1978a:73) stated: "'Moral' wearing out of
equipment (obsolescence) generally predates 'physical' breakdown under capitalism
given the pressures of competition and accelerated technical progress". Horton
(1997: 134) described the devaluation and premature destruction of fixed capital, both in
the form of machinery and buildings, as 'a waste of nature'. The production of non-
durables (or the planned obsolescence of commodities), together with the premature
obsolescence of fixed capital, is thus an immanent feature of the capitalist mode of
production.
Harvey (1982) emphasised the importance of the development of the credit system in
facilitating the expansion ofcapital. He stated in this regard: "The credit system
permits... 'an enormous expansion of the scale of production and of enterprises', the
replacement of the individual capitalist by 'social' and 'associated' forms of capital (joint
stock companies, corporations, etc.), the separation of management from ownership, the
creation of monopolies that call forth state interference, and the rise of a 'new financial
aristocracy'. It thereby 'accelerates the material development of the productive forces'
and establishes the world market" (p.288). As Marx explained: "A reciprocal effect takes
place ... The development of the production process expands credit, while credit in turn
leads to an expansion of industrial and commercial operations" (Capital 3:612). In
Grundrisse, Marx described credit as "an essential, developed relation ofproduction
[which] appears historically only in circulation based on capital or on wage labour...
credit in any developed form appears in no earlier mode ofproduction" (p.535).
So it can be seen that the accumulation process manifests itself at the level of the
individual capital and at the level of many capitals as a constantly increasing output of
commodities; an increase in gross product. This is brought about by an increase in the
size ofproductive operations, together with an increase in the productivity of labour;
along with the extension of commodity production into all traditional realms of economic
activity, the commodification of traditionally non-economic relations, the creation of
entirely new fields of exploitation, and an increase in capital turnover. This can be termed
an internal expansion of capital. In addition, and related, to this internal expansion there
arises yet another manifestation of the accumulation process: the external expansion of
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capital, or, in other words, a geographic or spatial expansion - the emergence of
'accumulation on a world scale', or 'the annihilation of space by time'.
As Marx made clear: "Capital by its nature drives beyond every spatial barrier. Thus the
creation of the physical conditions of exchange - of the means of communication and
transport - the annihilation of space by time - becomes an extraordinary necessity for it"
(Grundrisse:524). Furthermore, "capital must on one side strive to tear down every spatial
barrier to intercourse, i.e. to exchange, and conquer the whole earth for its market [and]
on the other side to annihilate this space with time, i.e. to reduce to a minimum the time
spent in motion from one place to another. The more developed the capital, therefore, the
more extensive the market over which it circulates, which forms the spatial orbit of its
circulation, the more does it strive simultaneously for an even greater extension of the
market and for greater annihilation of space by time" (Grundrisse:539). Marx described
this as the 'universalizing tendency of capital'.
This initially takes place during the early period of capitalism which Marx differentiated
as the 'Stage of Manufacture' (roughly speaking from the middle of the sixteenth century
to the end of the eighteenth) and manifests itself in the early stage of colonialism. During
this period the major trading nations (Spain, Holland, France, and England) built up
world-wide colonial empires. The emphasis was on procuring raw materials and food
products for capitalist countries and extending markets for manufactured goods. This was
often achieved by the state protected activities of monopolistic trading houses such as the
English East India Company. As Marx stated: "The colonial system ripened trade and
navigation as in a hot-house. The 'companies called Monopolia' ... were powerful levers
for the concentration of capital. The colonies provided a market for the budding
manufacturers, and a vast increase in accumulation which was guaranteed by the mother
country's monopoly of the market' (Capital 1:918).
The achievement of these objectives entailed the restructuring, and often destruction, of
the economies and social relations of colonised societies and the establishment of socio-
economic relations determined by (and advantageous to) the 'mother country'. This
involved subjugation of the indigenous inhabitants to capitalist social relations and/or the
establishment of slave labour relations. Hence, during the early period of colonisation, the
international movement of capital was dominated by merchant capital and consisted
primarily of commodity capital (manufactured goods) from the capitalist countries and
raw materials and food products (elements of constant capital) from pre-capitalist
societies (Weeks, 1983).
By the middle of the nineteenth century capitalism had entered the period termed by Marx
'Modem Industry', and characterised by increasing mechanisation, centralisation of
capital including the development of credit institutions to facilitate that centralisation,
joint-stock corporations, emergence of finance capital, and increasing monopolisation of
capitalist production (Weeks, 1983). This led to a further external expansion of capital
and a renewed impetus for colonial dominance - a trend termed imperialism by Lenin and
others. Unlike the earlier colonisation process, this new imperialism was not aimed purely
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at the procurement of raw materials and markets (although it was this as well) but
involved the export ofproductive capital itself, largely in the form of finance capital.
According to Lenin (1934:81) this stage of imperialism was distinguished by the
following five essential features:
1. The concentration ofproduction and capital, developed to such a high stage that it has
created monopolies which play a decisive role in economic life.
2. The merging of bank capital with industrial capital and the creation, on the basis of
this 'finance capital', of a financial oligarchy.
3. The export of capital, as distinguished from the export of commodities, becomes of
particularly great importance.
4. International monopoly combines of capitalists are formed which divide up the world.
5. The territorial division of the world by the greatest capitalist powers is completed.
This new imperialism, like the earlier period of colonialism, entailed a restructuring of the
socio-economic relations in the colonised countries. This involved the forcible
transformation of pre-capitalist societies and the establishment of a new international
division of labour, whereby their economies were internally disarticulated and integrated
externally with the metropolitan economies (Alavi, 1983). They were no longer self-
sufficient, or relatively self-contained economies, but were compelled to produce raw
materials and food products for the advanced capitalist countries, and provide markets for
manufactured commodities supplied by the 'mother' countries. Additionally, they were
now viewed as profitable fields for investment for metropolitan capital. This was initially
in agricultural and extractive industries, but later also in processing industries and labour
intensive manufacturing which exploited cheap labour in the colonies. This created the
conditions (to varying degrees) for the development over time of indigenous capital in
industry as well as agriculture and commerce (Alavi, 1983).
This led to revival of aggressive colonial policy by all the major capitalist countries. It
was designed to secure valuable sources of raw materials, extend the scope ofprotected
markets, and guarantee profitable investment outlets for exported capital. As Sweezy
(1942) pointed out, Africa, which had been less than 10% under foreign domination in
1875, was almost completely partitioned by the European nations during the next 25
years. Moreover, this often resulted in direct political involvement, not only aimed at
enabling and protecting the activities of the colonising country, but also at excluding the
influence of rival colonial powers. Thus, by the middle of the twentieth century much of
the Third World was subject to direct colonial rule. Their internal economies were to a
greater or lesser extent integrated into the global capitalist economy, albeit on a
dependent or semi-dependent basis.
With the rise of national liberation movements and a change in the balance of world
power after the Second World War, i.e. the emergence of the Soviet bloc and American
economic supremacy, a process of decolonisation began (Alavi, 1983). However, the
dependent nature of the economies of the newly independent nations, organically linked
and financially indebted as they were to Western imperialist countries, meant that their
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dependence on metropolitan capital was maintained. They remained (by and large) firmly
tied to the global capitalist economy and often in an unequal relationship. The degree of
dependency, the actual mechanisms ofdependency, and the nature of the resulting
'uneven' development have been the subject of intense debate. Whilst some post-colonial
countries have developed and become major centres of accumulation in themselves,
others have remained relatively undeveloped and peripheral in comparison to the centres
of accumulation.
More recently, Marxists such as Amin (1973), Baron (1957), Frank (1969) and others
have extended the concepts of uneven development into a theory ofunderdevelopment for
the post-colonial capitalist world economy. This model is based upon 'metropolitan'
centres of accumulation dominating 'satellite' or 'peripheral' economies through an
expropriation of their 'surpluses' resulting from an imposition of an export orientated
economic strategy (amongst other things) which restricts the potential growth of the
domestic economy, resulting in a sectorally 'distorted' development (Taylor, 1983). In
addition, Marxist geographers such as Harvey (1982, 1985, 1989, 1996a) and Smith
(1984) have analysed the spatial implications of capitalist development at scales ranging
from the local to the global. Smith (1984: 131), for example, wrote of a "dialectic of
geographic differentiation and equalization" that is "ultimately responsible for the pattern
of uneven development". He proposed that uneven development is the "hallmark of the
geography ofcapitalism... the systematic geographical expression of the contradictions
inherent in the very constitution and structure of capital" (p.xiii).
Leaving aside further debates as to the actual mechanisms and precise manifestations of
the development/underdevelopment process, it is clear that capitalist production has
indeed spread throughout the world. (More so since the demise of the Soviet bloc, and
partial penetration into Communist China.) This external expansion of capital manifests
itself as early colonialism, imperialism and, latterly, the internationalisation of commodity
and productive capital through the emergence of the multi-national corporation and
international finance institutions. The establishment of global capitalist regulatory and
investment organisations such as the World Bank, the IMF, GATT and WTO, etc. is a
further manifestation of the global nature of capital expansion.
Thus, as Marx foresaw, the capitalist mode ofproduction inevitably becomes
international in character. It results in, as he put it: " ... the entanglement of all peoples in
the net of the world market, and, with this, the growth of the international character of the
capitalist regime" (Capital 1:929). Furthermore, "This is at once the precondition and
the result of capitalist production" (Theories ofSurplus-Value 3:253).
Likewise, Marx argued in the Grundrisse that a "precondition ofproduction based on
capital is ... the production of a constantly widening sphere of circulation", so that "the
tendency to create the world market is directly given in the concept of capital itself. ..
Capital drives beyond national barriers ... tearing down all the barriers which hem in the
development of the forces ofproduction, the expansion of needs, the all-sided
development ofproduction, and the exploitation and exchange of natural and mental
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forces" (pA07-409). Thus, there appears capital's 'universalizing tendency', and this
tendency 'distinguishes it from all previous stages of production' .
It is also abundantly evident that this expansion of capital is geographically uneven,
resulting in a disparity in the development of capital accumulation, wealth, and economic
and political power between advanced capitalist centres and undeveloped peripheral
regions (both at a global and intranationallevel). As revealed by Marx's theories on
capital accumulation and economic crises, this expansion is subject to numerous periodic
or cyclic dislocations over time.
In summary, it can be seen that the accumulation process, resting upon the inherent drive
to expropriate surplus-value, manifests itself concretely as the expansion of capital; a
propensity to incessant economic growth in the form of ever increasing commodity
production over the long term. This is brought about in two interrelated ways. Firstly,
there is a quantitative expansion in the total output of commodities, or gross product at
the level of the single capital and at the level of many capitals. There is thus an internal
expansion of capital. And secondly, there is a geographic expansion of the sphere of
commodity production, a spatial extension. This represents an external expansion of
capital - accumulation on a global scale. These two movements are of course interrelated.
Both serve to ensure the ever expanding production of exchangeable commodities, a
manifestation that is indispensable, an absolute necessity, to the continuation of the
capitalist mode ofproduction.
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4.6 The Concentration and Centralisation of Capital
The accumulation process manifests itself concretely in yet another form - the
concentration and centralisation ofcapital. That is, the means ofproduction are confined
to fewer and fewer owners of capital over time. At the same time, the proletariat
(dependent wage and salary earners) increases in size along with the need to maintain a
surplus population or pool ofunemployed and semi-employed workers. Associated with
these movements is a relative impoverishment of the proletariat as a whole, and the
absolute impoverishment of sections of the surplus population. This results in a
polarisation of wealth and economic and political power, together with chronic disparity
between rich and poor both intranationally and internationally.
Smith (1984) distinguished between 'social' and 'spatial' concentration and centralisation
of capital. The social concentration and centralisation he described as "a process
according to which individual units of capital come to control larger and larger quantities
of capital. The spatial concentration and centralization process refers to physical location
of capital..." (p.119) or, as he put it elsewhere, "social centralization is the centralization
of exchange-value in fewer and fewer hands [and] spatial centralization is the physical
centralization of use-values". Moreover: "The social centralization ofcapital both
produces and requires a certain spatial centralization ofcapital, and at the scale of the
individual capital, this provides the primary impetus toward the geographic differentiation
of the conditions and levels ofproduction" (p.122).
It is necessary to distinguish between the concentration and centralisation of capital in its
form as the social control ofproductive forces (i.e. economic and political power) and its
concrete material form, which through the expansion of capital involves the 'uneven'
spatial configuration ofproductive forces - a tension between spatial centralisation and
decentralisation. In other words, whilst there is a spatial (uneven) extension of the
circulation of capital, there is a concurrent social concentration and centralisation of the
control over that capital. It is the later sense that Marx meant by the concentration and
centralisation of capital, and to which I refer also.
In regard to the movement of capital, there are two distinct processes involved. One, the
process of increasing concentration through accumulation, which Marx called the
'concentration of capital'; the other, the process of increasing concentration through
competition and credit, which he called the 'centralization ofcapital' (Shaikh, 1983). As
for the concentration of capital, it is purely the result of accumulation; in fact, in Marx's
words, "it is identical with accumulation". As accumulation takes place, concentration of
the means ofproduction in the hands of individual capitals occurs. As Smith (1984: 120)
observed: "This is concentration proper, where each capital grows by reinvesting
increasing quantities of surplus-value as capital". However, the total social capital is still
divided amongst many independent and competitive capitals. The process of
centralisation of capital is a further process of capital concentration, but this time between
existing capitals. Marx made this clear when he stated:
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"The fragmentation of the total social capital into many individual capitals, or the
repulsion of its fractions from each other, is counteracted by their attraction. The
attraction of capitals no longer means the simple concentration of the means of
production and the command over labour, which is identical with accumulation. It is
concentration of capitals already formed, destruction of their individual independence,
expropriation of capitalist by capitalist, transformation ofmany small into few large
capitals ... Capital grows to a huge mass in a single hand in one place, because it has
been lost by many in another place. This is centralization proper, as distinct from
accumulation and concentration" (Capital] :777).
Centralisation is brought about by competition and the extension of credit. As Marx
stated: "Commensurately with the development of capitalist production and
accumulation there also takes place a development of the two most powerful levers of
centralization - competition and credit" (Capital] :778-779). In respect to competition,
competitive advantage is gained by the cheapening of commodities. The cheapness of
commodities depends, all other circumstances remaining the same, on the productivity of
labour, and this depends in turn on the scale ofproduction. The larger firms, possessing
economies of scale, squeeze out the smaller firms. The smaller firms, therefore, crowd
into spheres ofproduction which large scale industry has taken control of only
sporadically or incompletely. Here competition rages once again. As Marx made clear: "It
always ends in the ruin of many small capitalists, whose capitals partly pass into the
hands of their conquerors, and partly vanish completely" (Capital] :777). In regard to the
effect of credit, Marx stated:
"Apart from this [competition], an altogether new force comes into existence with the
development of capitalist production: the credit system. In its first stages, this system
furtively creeps in as the humble assistant of accumulation, drawing into the hands of
individual or associated capitalists by invisible threads the money resources, which lie
scattered in larger or smaller amounts over the surface of society; but it soon becomes
a new and terrible weapon in the battle of competition and is finally transformed into
an enormous social mechanism for the centralization of capitals" (Capital] :777-778).
One of the effects of centralisation is to enable larger scale industries to develop.
Centralisation supplements the work of accumulation by enabling industrial capitalists to
extend the scale of their operations. The increased scale of industrial establishments in
turn encourages greater centralisation. And so it continues - an ongoing process
transforming smaller independent production units into large scale combinations. Another
effect is to speed up the accumulation of capital necessary for large-scale undertakings.
Marx stated in this regard:
"But accumulation, the gradual increase of capital by reproduction as it passes from
the circular to the spiral form, is clearly a very slow procedure compared with
centralization, which needs only to change the quantitative groupings of the constituent
parts of social capital. The world would still be without railways if it had had to wait
until accumulation had got a few individual capitals far enough to be adequate for the
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construction of a railway. Centralization, however, accomplished this in the twinkling
of an eye, by means ofjoint-stock companies... The masses ofcapital welded together
overnight by centralization reproduce and multiply as the others do, only more rapidly,
and they thereby become new and powerful levers of social accumulation" (Capital
1:780).
Marx recognised the emergence of the joint stock corporation as an essential instrument
of centralisation (Sweezy, 1942). He attributed the following effects to the development
of stock companies:
1. A tremendous expansion in the scale of production, and enterprises, which were
impossible for individual capitals.
2. Capital now receives the form of social capital in contrast to private capital, and its
enterprises appear as social enterprises as opposed to private ones. This is the
abolition of capital as private property within the confines of the capitalist mode of
production itself.
3. Transformation of the actual functioning capitalist into a mere manager, in charge of
other people's capital, and the capital owner into a mere owner, a mere money
capitalist (Capital 3:567).
With the development of the joint stock company and the associated stock market, the
actual ownership of capital thus becomes separated from the production process itself.
There is a 'freeing of the industrial capitalist from the function of industrial entrepreneur'
leading to a transformation of industrial capitalists to 'mere money capitalists'. The
management function, or direct control, of capital is separated from the specific
ownership of capital. Marx distinguished between 'the owners of capital' who receive
interest, and the 'employers of capital' who receive profit-of-enterprise (Capital 3:512).
Interest now becomes a predominant form in which surplus-value is appropriated, forcing
a division ofprofit into interest and profit-of-enterprise, and the whole ofprofit takes on
the appearance of interest.
This leads to the emergence and growing importance of financiers and financial capital in
the realm of capitalist production and, hence, to an increasing interdependence of
investment banking and industrial corporations (bank capital and industrial capital). This
led to the development of what Hilferding (1910) called 'finance capital', formed by the
integration of financial and industrial capital. Thus, banking and industrial interests merge
through finance capital taking major or controlling shareholdings in industrial firms. In
this way, the centralisation of capital in the industrial sphere finds a counterpart in the
centralisation of capital in the financial sphere. Furthermore, control of the two spheres
are closely related. As Sweezy (1942:266) stated, "on this basis there arises a union of
interlocking directorates and communities of interest which bind together the most
important banking and industrial magnates in all the advanced capitalist countries".
Besides laying the foundation for the development of finance capital, the separation of the
industrial capitalist from his role in the production process leads to a further centralisation
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of control over capital. Sweezy (1942) pointed out that nominal control in the corporation
rests in the hands of the body of stockholders. In practice, however, through their voting
power, the large owners of stock have virtually complete control over the capital
contributed by all the stockholders. Thus the large owners of capital are able to bring
under their control much larger amounts of capital than what they formerly owned. As
Sweezy (1942:260) stated: "While ownership of shares as such is divorced from the
control and direction of production, nevertheless ownership of a sufficiently large
quantity of shares carries with it control over production on a multiplied scale".
Through intercorporate ownership of stock, centralisation of control over capital is further
enhanced, enabling a specific mass of capital to control assets far in excess of the value of
that particular amount of capital. Hilferding (1910) noted: "with the development of the
corporate form there comes into existence a special financing technique which has the
purpose of assuring to the smallest amount of ones own capital dominance over the
greatest possible amount of other people's capital" (in Sweezy, 1942:260-261). Thus,
through the joint stock corporations, control over vast masses of capital is concentrated in
the hands of relatively few owners (or representatives) of capital, in the form of either
industrial or finance capital, and this capital can be invested so as to secure control over a
far larger aggregate of capital (Sweezy, 1942).
In addition to centralisation brought about by joint stock corporations, there is a further
centralisation of capital in the form of cartels, trusts, and mergers - combinations aimed
directly at monopolistic control over the market. As Sweezy (1942) pointed out, Marx
died before the combination movement got underway and, consequently, there is no
analysis of it in his writings. However, Engels when editing Volume 3 of Capital in the
mid 1880s, inserted a long note into Marx's discussion of corporations which referred to
"the second and third degree of stock companies" in the form of cartels and "in certain
branches ... the concentration of the entire production of the branch into one great joint
stock company under unified management" (Capital 3:568).
Thus, the concentration and centralisation of capital acts, over time, to confine the means
ofproduction to fewer hands, relatively if not absolutely. This trend is readily apparent
over the short history of capitalist production: for example, the early development of large
industrial and banking trusts in the late nineteenth century, the emergence of finance
groups controlling large industrial interests through holding companies, and the growth of
large monopolistic and oligopolistic firms in key sectors of industry, all bare testimony to
this. In addition, the emergence of the multinational corporation in the later half of the
twentieth century signifies the concentration and centralisation of capital on an
international scale (Mandel, 1976a). As Mandel (1976a:83) stated: "Concentration and
centralization of capital has led to a situation where not only do a couple of hundred giant
corporations dominate the economy of each imperialist country, but a few hundred
multinational corporations also concentrate in their hands one third of all the wealth of
the capitalist world economy".
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At the same time as the concentration and centralisation ofcapital confines the ownership
of the means ofproduction to fewer and fewer owners of capital, there is a concurrent
increase in the size of the proletariat (those dependent wage and salary earners who are
compelled to sell their labour-power to survive). I adopt the defmition ofproletariat given
by Mandel (1983) following that ofMarx and Lenin. Mandel stated:
"The definition of the proletariat as the sum total of those under economic compulsion
to sell their labour power - given by Plekhanov and Lenin in the first programme of the
Russian Social-Democratic Workers Party - situates outside the proletariat all those
salary-earners (top managers, top functionaries of the bourgeois state, professional
people like doctors and lawyers working under contract as hired labour, etc.) whose
income is high enough to enable savings, making possible accumulation of capital, and
who actually own enough capital to live from the proceeds (interests, rents, dividends)
thereof. If they sell their labour power, it is not because they don't have other means of
livelihood, but for other reasons, i.e., out of a 'free choice'. This is precisely not the
case for normal workers and employees, who have no choice in the matter" (p.200).
Conversely, those salary earners (of whatever employment) who do not have independent
means of livelihood, and are thus compelled to sell their labour-power, are by definition
part of the proletariat. Hence, I use the term 'dependent wage and salary earners' when
referring to the proletariat. This includes state sector employees as well as those in the
private sector. As Marx pointed out, the state is merely the political representation of
capital and acts in the interests of capital by protecting capitalist property relations and
facilitating accumulation. Therefore, state sector employees can be viewed as employed
by capital, albeit indirectly. Engels argued in Anti-Diihring: "the modem state, no matter
what its form, is essentially a capitalist machine, the state of the capitalists, the ideal
personification of the total national capital. .. The workers remain wage-workers -
proletarians. The capitalist relation is not done away with" (p.266).
Independent owners of their own means ofproduction, such as owner-operators (shop-
keepers, independent trades-people, etc.), the 'petty bourgeoisie', are not part of the
proletariat and constitute a class of their own. The position of farmers is variable. Farmers
who own and operate their own farms with no more than occasional hired help can be
seen to be petty bourgeois. Farmers who own their own farm and employ wage labour on
a continuous basis are bourgeois. Farm managers employed by agri-business are, on the
other hand, proletarian, as are all farm workers hired as wage labour.
The increase in the size of the proletariat is brought about by the reduced number of small
and medium-sized capitalists, and a declining fraction of 'self-employed' members of
society (independent owners of their own means of production). The declining proportion
of independent owners of means ofproduction (the petty bourgeoisie) was, according to
Marx, a direct result of the accumulation process and competition. As accumulation
expands so too does the capital required to enter, or remain, in business. In addition,
economies of scale make competition with larger firms increasingly difficult (for
example, the battle between small shop-owners and large supermarket chains).
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Furthermore, their specialised skills are often rendered superfluous by new production
techniques. Over time, the petty bourgeoisie are, to a large extent, expropriated and
absorbed into the proletariat. As Marx and Engels stated:
"The lower strata of the middle class - the small tradespeople, shopkeepers, and retired
tradesmen generally, the handicraftsmen and peasants - all these sink gradually into the
proletariat, partly because their diminutive capital does not suffice for the scale on
which Modem Industry is carried on, and is swamped in the competition with the large
capitalists, partly because their specialized skill is rendered worthless by new methods
ofproduction. Thus the proletariat is recruited from all classes of the population"
(Communist Manifesto:40).
Mandel (1983: 199-200) observed: "Hence the tendency towards a growing polarization of
society between a declining number of buyers of labour power and a constantly growing
number of sellers oflabour". Empirical evidence fully substantiates this trend. As Mandel
(1983:201) pointed out: "In key industrialized capitalist countries, the fraction of the
active population composed of sellers of labour power has jumped from less than 50% ...
to around 75% within one generation. In another generation, it has jumped to 85-90%,
topping 90% in the USA, Britain and Sweden".
The argument has been raised that, rather than an increase in the proletariat, this
movement has resulted in the formation of two classes of relatively greater or lesser
extent - a 'middle' class and a 'working' class. Socially (in a superficial sense) there may
be some validity to this claim but economically there is not. For Marx, the essential
distinction turned on the economic compulsion to sell one's labour-power (Mandel,
1983). This is common to the proletariat as a whole. The only differences between the so-
called middle and working classes is the magnitude of the return they receive for their
labour-power, and whatever superficial social distinctions this confers. The basic
economic relationship with capital is not altered. The reliance on capital to provide them
with the means of production (and thus livelihood) is just as precarious whatever their
social status (as evidenced today by insecurity of employment, through restructuring, of
middle management, academics, teachers and health workers). This distinction is crucial.
It confirms that the so-called middle classes are just as bound to, and dependent upon,
capital as the working class. And it is this relationship that binds them to the dictates of
capital as surely as the industrial proletariat Marx was largely concerned with. This has
important implications for objective conditions (relative impoverishment and alienation)
and subjective positions (in regard to transformative change) of the proletariat as a whole.
What concerns us here, however, is the indisputable polarisation of capitalist society into
a diminishing number of owners (or controllers) of capital (the bourgeoisie) and an
increasing number of sellers of labour-power (the proletariat). Not only has this profound
implications for the distribution ofwealth but also for the distribution of economic and
political power. As we have seen, the proletariat is dependent on capital to furnish its
means ofproduction, its means of livelihood. It is absolutely bound therefore to the
dictates of capital. The freedom of choice offered by the labour market is nothing more
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than an illusion. The proletariat, with no other means of subsistence, has little choice but
to bow to the demands of capital (although labour organisation can temper those demands
to varying degrees).On the other hand, there is no immediate compulsion for individual
owners of capital to employ workers. If conditions are not favourable to accumulation
they can hold off investment or seek other avenues of return, or simply hoard their money
until circumstances improve. (Of course, over the long term and in regard to capital in
general, there are, as we have seen, both objective and subjective dynamics at work to
impel capital back into circulation. However, on an individual and immediate level this is
not, in most instances, a matter of life or death).
Thus, objective economic power and subjective economic decision-making are firmly and
absolutely placed with capital. As with economic power so too with political power.
Political power is merely a manifestation of economic power (or a reaction against it), and
as with the latter, so the former is firmly wedded to capital. As Marx made clear: "Each
step in the development of the bourgeoisie was accompanied by a corresponding political
advance of that class" (Capital 2:162). And: "The bourgeoisie has at last, since the
establishment ofmodem industry and of the world market, conquered for itself, in the
modem representative state, exclusive political sway" (The Revolutions of1848:69).
It has been argued that since the Second World War, with the further development of
Keynsian economic policies and the extension of the state into more and more spheres of
economic activity (or what has been termed 'state monopoly capitalism'), the state, in
fact, represents the plural interests of all social classes. This is erroneous, as Marx and
Engels made clear. In Anti-Diihring, Engels stated unequivocally:
"But the transformation [of production and distribution] ... into state ownership, does
not do away with the capitalist nature of the productive forces ... the modem state... is
only the organisation that bourgeois society takes on in order to support the general
external conditions of the capitalist mode ofproduction against the encroachments as
well of the workers as of individual capitalists. The modem state, no matter what its
form, is essentially a capitalist machine, the state of the capitalists, the ideal
personification of the total national capital. The more it proceeds to the taking over of
productive forces, the more it actually becomes the national capitalist" (p.265-266).
So when we talk of a concentration and centralisation of capital and the consequent
increase in the size of the proletariat we are also talking about a concentration and
centralisation of economic power (objectively and subjectively) and a concentration and
centralisation of political power (representing the interests of capital). In other words,
economic and political decisions are subjectively being made by, or on behalf of, fewer
and fewer owners (or representatives) of capital, according to the objective dictates of
capital.
Not only is there an absolute increase in the size of the proletariat, together with an
associated political and economic disimpowerment, there is also a relative
impoverishment - financially (comparative to the owners and top functionaries of capital),
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in the quality oflife (and work-life) and, most significantly, in human potentiality. The
relative impoverishment of the proletariat is a complex and much misunderstood
manifestation of the accumulation process. Misunderstood largely because, firstly, it is
reduced to a purely financial impoverishment. And secondly, it is miss-construed as an
absolute financial impoverishment. This is a mistake on both counts. The financial
impoverishment of the proletariat relative to the owners of capital is a real phenomenon
but is only one facet of a much more encompassing and fundamental impoverishment. In
addition, there is no absolute impoverishment of the proletariat as a whole, although there
is certainly an absolute impoverishment of sections of the proletariat.
What Marx was referring to, and what has subsequently been substantiated, is the relative
impoverishment of the proletariat on a number of levels. Firstly, there is relative financial
impoverishment of the proletariat in comparison to the owners (or top functionaries of
capital) resulting from what Marx called the 'antagonistic character of capital
accumulation' . Even though the material conditions of the proletariat may improve over
time, its position relative to the bourgeoisie worsens. As Marx stated: "If the working
class has remained 'poor' only 'less poor' in proportion as it produces for the wealthy
class 'an intoxicating augmentation of wealth and power', then it has remained relatively
just as poor. If the extremes of poverty have not lessened, they have increased, because
the extremes of wealth have" (Capital 1:806).
Secondly, in regard to quality oflife (including the quality of work-life) there is a further
impoverishment of the proletariat. That is, despite an improved standard of living brought
about by an increase in the mass of consumer goods comprising the means of sustenance
(a rise in the real wage) there exists an impoverishment in the life-world of the proletariat.
There is an impoverishment of the proletariat brought about by the production methods of
capitalism (i.e. division oflabour, mechanisation oflabour, and the intensification of the
labour process) dehumanising human labour and turning it into mere drudgery. Not only
is the work process dehumanised, but in addition the life-world of the worker is
relentlessly dominated by work, by the absolute need to spend the greater portion of his
life procuring the necessary means of sustenance. Despite the increasing productivity of
labour, the worker experiences no diminution in his work time or the intensity of his
labour. In fact, under the dictates of accumulation the worker is likely to experience an
increase in both.
In addition, because the proletariat is absolutely dependent on capital to furnish its means
of production, there is constant insecurity of employment (of livelihood) under
capitalism. Contributing to this increased insecurity of employment is the constant
restructuring and upheaval in the methods of capitalist production. As Marx explained:
"Thus large-scale industry, by its very nature, necessitates variation of labour, fluidity of
functions, and mobility of the worker in all directions [and] this ... does away with all
repose, all fixity and all security as far as the worker's life-situation is concerned; how it
constantly threatens, by taking away the instruments of labour, to snatch from his hands
the means of subsistence, and, by suppressing his specialized function, to make him
superfluous" (Capital 1:617-618).
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Finally, and most significantly, what Marx also referred to was the impoverishment of the
proletariat in relation to its human potentiality. This is largely brought about by the
process of alienation. Marx described the process as follows:
"Since alienated labour: (1) alienates nature from man, and (2) alienates man from
himself, from his own active function, his life activity; so it alienates him from the
species... (3) ... It alienates from man his own body, external nature, his mental life
and his human life ... (4) A direct consequence of the alienation of man from the
product of his labour, from his life activity and from his species life is that man is
alienated from other men .. , In general, the statement that man is alienated from his
species life means that each man is alienated from others and that each of the others is
likewise alienated from human life ... Every self-alienation of man, from himself and
from nature, appears in the relation which he postulates between other men and
himself and nature" (Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts; in Petrovic,
1983a:12).
The worker, therefore, under capitalism through his self-alienation is unable to achieve or
approach his potentiality as a non-alienated whole - to reach full human potential within
himself, through his relationship to nature, through the work process, his relationship to
fellow workers through the production process, to fellow citizens through the exchange
process, and to society at large through socio-economic organisation. And as for the
individual worker so, too, for the proletariat as a whole. The proletariat, as a class, is
alienated from its human potentiality. It is denied its historically determined possibilities
for fulfilling, creative activity, communality, and emancipation. Moreover, it is denied its
potentiality to de-alienate itself from nature. To become, once again, part of nature.
In addition to the relative impoverishment of the proletariat as a whole, there is a further
(sometimes absolute) impoverishment brought about by the existence and maintenance of
what Marx called the 'relative surplus population' or the 'industrial reserve army of
labour' . By this he means a permanent strata of unemployed or under-employed workers
(of greater of lesser extent) whose existence is a consequence of, and a necessity for, the
maintenance of the capitalist mode of production. It is, in other words, an integral feature
of capitalism. It is the essential mechanism by which wages are kept at a level that does
not threaten the rate ofprofit, over the long term. If wages rise and threaten the accepted
level ofprofit, two things may happen. One, the capitalist increases mechanisation at the
expense of labour; and two, as profits are squeezed, accumulation falters, production
slows, and workers are laid off or new labour is not taken on. As the reserve army swells
it exerts a downward pressure on wage rates, which, over time, are reduced in real terms
to a level conducive to further accumulation. Production once again picks up, workers are
taken on, wages once again rise, and so the cycle proceeds (Sweezy, 1942).
In Results ofthe Immediate Process ofProduction, Marx identified another source of
relative surplus population. This is labour that has become 'superfluous to capitalist
production' because it does not produce surplus-value, i.e. does not furnish a profit. He
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stated: "Since the purpose of capitalist production... is not the existence of the producer,
but the production of surplus-value, it follows that all necessary labour which does not
produce surplus labour is superfluous and worthless to capitalist production... All this
conflicts with, for example, the antiquated view typical of earlier modes ofproduction
according to which the city authorities would, for instance, prohibit inventions so as not
to deprive workers of their livelihood. In such a society the worker was an end in himself
and appropriate employment was his privilege, a right which the entire order was
concerned to maintain" (p.1049-1050). Thus, given the dictates of accumulation, there is
no compulsion under capitalism to provide full employment for all citizens. On the
contrary, there is an imperative to render superfluous employment that does not produce
surplus-value and reduce such workers to the ranks of the industrial reserve army.
Marx also recognised a tendency to overwork the employed portion of the population,
'the active army', whilst maintaining an unemployed or under-employed surplus
population, a trend strikingly borne out in contemporary times. He stated in this regard:
"The over-work of the employed part of the working class swells the ranks of its reserve,
while, conversely, the greater pressure that the reserve by its competition exerts on the
employed workers forces them to submit to over-work and subjects them to the dictates of
capital. The condemnation of one part of the working class to enforced idleness by the
over-work of the other part, and vise versa, becomes a means of enriching the individual
capitalist, and accelerates at the same time the production of the industrial reserve army
on a scale corresponding with the progress of social accumulation" (Capital] :789-790).
So, we have here a permanent feature of the capitalist mode of production that serves to
maintain further impoverishment ofpart of the population. The relative surplus
population is, to a greater or lesser extent, a necessary manifestation of capitalism and is
essential to its continued existence. It is therefore a permanent feature contributing to the
polarisation of capitalist society. This impoverishment also approaches absolute poverty
at times. The fact that some countries have instituted welfare programmes to prevent
absolute destitution does not negate this trend; it merely alleviates the worst excesses of
its manifestation. In many Western capitalist countries, despite welfare programmes, the
continued presence ofpoverty, homelessness, and pauperism is readily apparent.
Moreover, many Third World countries do not have welfare programmes (or very
rudimentary ones). Poverty, destitution, pauperism, and degradation are widespread. In
fact, where capitalism has penetrated non-capitalist societies the result is often an increase
in impoverishment for part of the population. This, in a sense, is a result of a
'globalization' of the reserve army. As Mandel (1976a:63-64) stated:
"On a world scale ... [a]s Marx predicted, capitalism spread not only by creating new
jobs but also by creating new unemployment (by destroying employment ofprevious
wage earners, and especially ofpreviously self-employed small farmers and
handicraftsmen) ... Indeed, ever since industrial capitalism in the West started to
swamp the rest of the world with its cheap, mass-produced commodities... a divergent
trend has appeared in the world economy: a long-term decline of the reserve army of
labour in Western Europe (as a result of exports of both emigrants and commodities)
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and a rise in the reserve army in the underdeveloped countries... The dynamics of
'capital accumulation on a world scale' have therefore to be seen as those of an
organic whole, and not as the simple sum of capital accumulation processes in distinct
countries".
Thus, the polarisation of wealth takes on a global perspective, with a wealthy developed
core and an impoverished under-developed periphery.
In summary, the underlying dynamics revealed and explained by Marx's theories of value,
surplus-value, and capital accumulation manifest themselves concretely as the
concentration and centralisation of capital. The concentration and centralisation of capital
is accompanied by an increase in the size of the proletariat and the maintenance of a
relative surplus population. Associated with these movements is a relative
impoverishment of the proletariat as a whole and the absolute impoverishment of a part of
the proletariat. This results in a polarisation of wealth and economic and political power
with, growing disparity between rich and poor both intranationally and internationally.
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4.7 Empirical Analysis
The expansion of capital and the concentration/centralisation of capital (and their
resultant contradictions) are theoretically explained by Marx's dialectical analysis of
capitalism's inner motions and relations. They are also readily revealed by empirical
analysis. The intent of the thesis is to provide a theoretical rationale for a transformative
approach to planning, hence its emphasis on Marx's analysis of capitalism to reveal its
inner dynamics. However, a brief examination of historical trends in regard to the
expansion and concentration/ centralisation of capital will serve to substantiate the
theoretical analysis.
This exposition is necessarily brief, but further information is readily available in
publications from the Worldwatch Institute: The State ofthe World, and Vital Signs,
published annually; World Resources, published annually by the World Resources
Institute in conjunction with the United Nations Environment Programme and the United
Nations Development Programme; the Human Development Reports, published annually
by the United Nations Development Programme; the World Environment Reports,
published annually by the United Nations Environment Programme; WorldBank:
publications; and numerous other sources.
The dynamics of capital expansion and capital concentration/centralisation are both
readily discernible from historical records and are widely recognised as resulting in
increasing ecological degradation and increasing polarisation of wealth and economic and
political power respectively. For example, the 1996 Human Development Report (UNDP,
1996) talked of 'ruthless' growth, where the fruits of economic growth mostly benefit the
rich, leaving millions ofpeople struggling in ever-deepening poverty. It also talked of
'futureless' growth, where the present generation squanders resources needed by future
generations. It stated:
"Rampant and uncontrolled economic growth in many countries is laying waste to
forests, polluting rivers, destroying biodiversity and depleting natural resources. This
damage and destruction is increasing, driven overwhelmingly by demand in the rich
countries, inadequate conservation in the developing countries and the pressure of poor
people pushed onto marginal lands in poor countries. On past trends, global production
will triple by about 2030. Unless serious conservation and pollution controls are in
place soon, production will be long past the point of sustainability' (UNDP, 1996:4).
Historically, the surge in global economic production and consumption corresponds with
the emergence and spread of the capitalist mode of production. Maddison (2001) analysed
the world economy over the last two millennia. He found that over the past 1000 years
world population rose 22-fold, per capita income increased 13-fold, and world GDP
expanded nearly 300-fold. This contrasted sharply with the preceding millennium, when
world population grew by only a sixth, there was little advance in per capita income, and
global GDP increased only slightly (see Table 1).
148
Table I: Growth of Global Population, GDP Per Capita and Global GDP Over Two
Millennia (from Maddison, 2001)
Year 0 1000 1820 1998
Population 230.8 268.3 1,041.1 5,908
(millions)
GDP per capita 444 445 667 5,709
(1990 dollars)
Global GDP 102.5 116.8 694.4 33,726
(billions 1990
dollars)
From the year 1000 to 1820 the advance in per capita income was a slow crawl - the
world average rose about 50%. Most of the growth went to accommodate a four-fold
increase in population. Global GDP increased six-fold over the same period. Since 1820
world economic growth has been explosive. While global population rose five-fold, per
capita income increased more than eight-fold. Global GDP increased almost 50-fold, and
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Figure 16: Global GDP Over Two Millennia - trillions 1990 dollars (from Maddison,
2001)
Growth in the global economy since 1820 has been exponential, dwarfing any earlier
advance and compressing it into a very short time span. What impresses is the scale of
recent change. The sweeping developments over the past century or so all occurred in a
period that represents just 1% of the time since humans first practiced agriculture. To
illustrate just how explosive this growth rate has been, it has been estimated that the
growth in economic output in just three years - from 1995 to 1998 - exceeded that during
the 10,000 years from the beginning of agriculture until 1900 (Brown et al., 1999).
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Since 1950, the growth has been accelerating. World GDP increased six-fold from 1950
to 1998 with an average growth rate of 3.9% per annum, compared with 1.6% from 1820
to 1950, and 0.3% from 1500 to 1820. Part ofthe acceleration went to sustain faster
population growth, but real per capita income rose by 2.1% per annum, compared with
0.9% from 1820 to 1850, and 0.05% from 1500 to 1820. Thus, per capita growth was 42
times as fast as in the protocapitalist (mercantile) epoch and more than twice as fast as in
the first 13 decades of the modern (industrial) capitalist epoch (Maddison, 2001). World
trade has grown from US$380 billion in 1950 to US$5.9 trillion in 1997, a 15-fold
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Figure 17: Global GDP 1900 to 1998- trillion 1997 dollars (from Brown et al., 1999)
By differentiating the world historically into an advanced capitalist metropolitan centre,
comprising Western Europe, Western offshoots (USA, Canada, Australia, New Zealand),
and Japan, and a periphery of less developed countries, such as Latin America, Africa,
Asia (except Japan), and Eastern Europe and the former USSR, Madison (2001) shows
that the expansion in global production and consumption is disparate. Moreover, it is not
directly linked to population increase. Population growth has been greatest in the
periphery during the twentieth century whilst by far the greatest increase in production
and consumption has been in the metropolitan centre. For example, while population
grew around five-fold between 1820 and 1998 in the centre, GDP per capita increased
.around 20-fold, and total GDP increased over 90-fold. In the periphery, population
increased around six-fold, GDP per capita around five-fold and total GDP around 30-fold
(Table 2).
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Table 11: Growth of Population, GDP Per Capita, and Total GDP for Capitalist
Centre and Periphery (from Maddison, 2001)
Population (millions)
Year 1000 1500 1600 1700 1820 1998
Centre 35 76 95 110 175 838
Periphery 233 362 461 493 866 5,069
Per Capita GDP (1990 international dollars)
Year 1000 1500 1600 1700 1820 1998
Centre 405 704 805 907 1,130 21,470
Periphery 440 535 548 551 573 3,102
Total GDP (billions 1990 international dollars)
Year 1000 1500 1600 1700 1820 1998
Centre 14.1 53.2 76.1 100.0 198.0 17,998
Periphery 102.7 194.0 252.9 271.8 496.5 15,727
This has resulted in a widening gap in production, consumption and income between the
core metropolitan capitalist countries and those on the periphery. Global inequalities have
been widening steadily since the beginning of industrial capitalism and are accelerating
(see Figure 18). An analysis oflong term trends in world income distribution (between
countries) shows that the disparity between the richest and poorest countries was about 3
to 1 in 1820, 11 to 1 in 1913, 30 to 1 in 1960 and over 70 to 1 today. The poorest
countries, with by far the greatest proportion of the global population, have seen their
share of global production, consumption and income decrease drastically relative to the
richest countries, and in some cases have experienced absolute declines in GDP per
capita. In fact, the five richest countries had a per capita income in 1820 five to six times
that of the poorest in 1992 (UNDP, 1999).
Overall, world consumption has expanded at an unprecedented pace over the twentieth
century, with private and public consumption expenditure reaching US$24 trillion in
1998, twice the level of 1975 and six times that of 1950. In 1900 real consumption
expenditure was barely US$I.5 trillion. Global consumption expenditure, private and
public, has grown on average 3% a year since 1970 (UNDP, 1998). Once again,
consumption is disparate between core metropolitan countries and those on the periphery,
with by far the greatest consumption expenditure occurring in the metropolitan centre. For
example, the 20% of the global population in the highest income countries account for
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Figure 18: Trends in GDP Per Capita 1820 to 1992 (from UNDP, 1999)
In many ways, the defining economic development of the twentieth century is the
harnessing of the energy in fossil fuels, particularly oil. In 1990, only a few thousand
barrels of oil were used daily. By 1997, that figure had reached 72 million barrels per day.
In total, global energy consumption has increased ten-fold since 1900 (see Table 3).
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Table HI: World Energy Use - 1900 and 1997 (from Brown et al., 1999)
1900 1997
Energy Source Total Share Total Share
(million tons of oil (percent) (million tons of oil \percent)
equivalent) equivalent)
Coal 501 55 2.122 22
Oil 18 2 2.9-10 30
Natural gas 9 1 2.173 23
Nuclear 0 0 579 6
Renewables' 383 42 1.833 19
Total 911 100 9,6-17 100
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Figure 19: World Energy Use- in millions of terajoules per year (from Meadows et
al., 1992)
There has also been a vast increase in the use ofmaterials over the last century or so,
including growth in the use of metals from 20 million tons annually in 1900 to 1.2 billion
tons in 1995. Aluminium production has increased 3,000-fold since 1900. The use of
paper increased six-fold between 1950 and 1996, reaching 281 million tons. Production
ofplastics, largely unheard of in 1900, reached 131 million tons in 1995. Passenger cars
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have increased from 53 million to 456 million and bicycles from 11 million to 109
million since 1950. The human economy now draws on all 92 naturally occurring
elements in the periodic chart, compared with just 20 in 1900. Moreover, more than
100,000 new chemical compounds have been developed since the 1930s, boosting
synthetic chemical production 3,000-fold over the last 70 years. (Brown et al., 1999).
Recent studies by the World Resources Institute (1997, 2000) have shown that the total,
material requirements of industrial countries is between 45 and 80 metric tons per capita
annually. Except for the relatively modest quantities of materials recycled or added each
year to stock in use (largely in the form of infrastructure and durable goods), physical
inputs are quickly returned to the environment as pollution or waste. The studies found
that despite industrial economies becoming more efficient in their use of materials,
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Figure 20: World Materials Production 1963 to 1995 (from Brown et al., 1999)
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As with the expansion of capital, the increasing concentration and centralisation of capital
is strikingly revealed through empirical analysis. The Human Development Reports
published annually by the United Nations Development Programme are a ready source of
such data. The 1996 Human Development Report stated:
"Widening disparities in economic performance are creating two worlds - ever more
polarized. The world has become more polarized and the gulf between the poor and
rich of the world has widened even further... The poorest 20% of the world's people
saw their share of the global income decline from 2.3% to 1.4% in the past 30 years.
Meanwhile the share of the richest 20% rose from 70% to 85%. That doubled the ratio
of the shares of income between the richest and the poorest from 30: 1 to 60: 1"
(UNDP, 1996:2). Today, the income gap between the world's richest fifth and its
poorest fifth stands at 74:1 (UNDP, 1999).
Historical evidence shows clearly how the income gap between the richest 20% and
poorest 20% of the world's population has widened over a time period corresponding to
the growth of global industrial capitalism. The income ratios are shown below (from








The above comparison is based on the distribution of income between rich and poor
countries. Adding the maldistribution within countries, the richest 20% of the world's
people get at least 150 times more income than the poorest 20% (UNDP, 1992).
Not only has there been a widening income gap in relative terms between the richest and
poorest sections of the global population over the last thirty years or so, there has also
been an absolute decline in income in many of the poorest nations. Since 1980 there has
been a surge in economic growth in some 15 countries, bringing rapidly rising incomes to
many of their 1.6 billion people, a quarter of the world's population. At the same time,
since 1970, economic decline or stagnation has affected 100 countries, reducing the
incomes of 1.6 billion people, again around a quarter of the world's population. In 70 of
these countries average incomes are less than they were in 1980, and in 43 countries less
than they were in 1970 (UNDP, 1996: 1). The 1996 Human Development Report stated:
"The advances have often been at rates exceeding anything seen since the start of the
industrial revolution some two centuries ago. The declines have also been unprecedented,
far exceeding in duration, and sometimes in depth, the declines of the Great Depression
of the 1930s in the industrial countries".
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External debt continues to be a heavy burden for developing countries. The total external
debt of developing countries has increased twenty-fold in the last three decades: from
US$100 billion in 1970 to around US$650 billion in 1980 and US$1,350 in 1990. In 1997
the total debt of developing countries reached almost US$2.2 trillion. This has resulted in
a massive US$750 billion net transfer on long term lending from the poor to the rich
countries. The current debt related net transfer from developing countries to industrial
countries stands at US$50 billion per year (UNDP, 1999).
Hardest hit have been the 41 heavily indebted poor countries, 33 of them in Africa. Since
1980, the debt of the heavily indebted poor countries has more than tripled, two-thirds the
result of arrears unpaid on earlier debt (UNDP, 1999). Debt service payments exceed
annual expenditure on health and education in nine heavily indebted countries, and they
exceed health spending in 29, including 23 in Sub-Saharan Africa. Tanzania's debt
service payments are nine times what it spends on primary health care and four times
what it spends on primary education (UNDP, 1999). Real interest rates have been four
times higher for poor nations than for rich ones. Developing countries paid 17% per
annum on their foreign debt during the 1980s while the rich nations paid 4% (UNDP,
1992).
"Today, global inequalities in income and living standards have reached grotesque
proportions" (UNDP, 1999:104). The world's 200 richest people doubled their net worth
in the four years to 1998 to more than US$l trillion, a figure that approaches the
combined annual income of the poorest one half of humanity (some three billion people).
Indeed the assets of the three richest individuals exceed the combined annual economic
output (measured at the current exchange rate) of the 48 poorest countries. The fifteen
richest have assets that exceed the total GDP of Sub-Saharan Africa. The wealth of the 32
richest exceeds the total GDP of South Asia. The assets of the 84 richest exceed the GDP
of China, the most populous country with 1.2 billion inhabitants (UNDP, 1998). It is
estimated that the additional cost of achieving and maintaining universal world-wide
access to basic education, health care, adequate food, safe water and sanitation is roughly
US$40 billion per year. This is less than 4% of the combined wealth of the 225 richest
people in the world (UNDP, 1998). A yearly contribution ofjust 1% of the wealth of the
200 richest people (US$7-8 billion) could provide universal access to primary education
for all children in the world (UNDP, 1996).
At the same time, a quarter of the world's population, around 1.3 billion people, live in
severe poverty surviving on incomes of less than US$l per day. More than 800 million
people do not get enough to eat. More than half a billion are chronically malnourished.
Over 160 million children are moderately or severely malnourished. Nearly a billion
people are illiterate. Well over a billion lack access to safe water. More than 100 million
are homeless. And nearly a third of the people in the least developed countries - most of
which are in Sub-Saharan Africa - are not expected to survive to age 40 (UNDP, 1997).
And these statistics are worsening. Between 1987 and 1993 the number ofpeople with
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incomes of less than US$l per day increased by almost 100 million, and the number
continues to grow.
Shares in global production are similarly disparate. By far the largest share of global
production is in the industrial countries. Of the US$23 trillion of global GDP in 1993,
US$18 trillion was in the industrial countries - only US$5 trillion in the developing
countries, even though they have nearly 80% ofthe world's population (UNDP, 1996).
Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia increased their share of global population between
1960 and 1990 from 27% to 32%, yet their share of global GNP declined by 20% and
their share of global trade reduced to less than half of its 1960 level (UNDP, 1992).
By the late 1990s, 20% of the world's people living in the highest income countries had:
• 86% ofworld GNP, the bottom 20% just 1%.
• 82% of world export trade, the bottom 20% just 1%.
• 95% of commercial lending, the bottom 20% just 0.2%.
• 68% of foreign direct investment, the bottom 20% just 1% (UNDP, 1999).
Moreover, 83% of direct foreign investment goes to the industrialised countries. In 1993,
just 10 countries accounted for 84% of global research and development expenditure and
controlled 95% of the US patents of the past two decades. Moreover, more than 80% of
patents granted in developing countries belong to residents of industrial countries
(UNDP, 1999).
Inequities in consumption are equally stark. Globally, the 20% of the global population in
the highest income countries account for 86% of global consumption expenditure; the
poorest 20% just 1.3%. More specifically, the richest fifth:
• Consume 84% of the world's paper, the poorest fifth 1.1%.
• Consume 58% oftotal energy, the poorest fifth 1.5%.
• Consume 45% of all meat and fish, the poorest fifth 5%
• Have 74% of all telephones, the poorest fifth 1.5%.
• Own 87% of the world's vehicle fleet, the poorest fifth less than 1%. (UNDP, 1998).
The industrial countries (with about 25% of the world's population) consume 70% of the
world's energy resources, 75% of metals, 85% of wood, and 60% of food (UNDP, 1992).
On the other hand, the average African household today consumes less than it did 25
years ago (UNDP, 1998). In low income countries (except China and India) private
consumption expenditure per capita has declined by about 1% annually over the past 15
years. Both public and private consumption per capita are about 20% less in Africa today
than in 1980 (UNDP, 1998).
The polarisation of wealth is not only occurring between nations but is also evident
within countries, industrialised as well as developing. Among the 73 countries with data
(80% of the world's population), 48 have seen inequality increase since the 1950s, 16
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have experienced no change, and only 9 - with just 4% of the world's people - have seen
inequality fall (UNDP, 1998). Recent studies show inequality rising in most OECD
countries during the 1980s and 1990s. Of 19 countries, only one showed a slight
improvement. In the USA, for example, between 1970 and 1990 the richest 1% of the
population increased its share of total assets from 20% to 36%.
In the USA the richest 20% of the population appropriates 46% of national income while
the poorest 20% receive 5%. In the United Kingdom the corresponding figures are 43%
and 6% and in Australia 41% and 6%. The figures for developing countries are, for the
most part, worse. In Brazil the richest 20% appropriates 64% of national income while the
poorest 20% receives 2%. In Chile the figures are 61% and 3%. In Mexico, 57% and
3.5%. In South Africa, 65% and 3%. In Nigeria, 56% and 4% and Sierra Leone, 64% and
1% (UNDP, 2002).
In the United Kingdom the number of families below the poverty line rose by 60% in the
1980s, in the Netherlands by nearly 40%. In Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom and
the USA at least half the single-parent households with children have incomes below the
poverty level (UNDP, 1999). According to the new human poverty index, some 3-17% of
the population in industrial countries is poor (UNDP, 1998). In the USA 14% of the
population lives below the poverty line. In the UK it is 13%, France 12%, Belgium 12%,
Germany 12%, Australia 8%, Canada 6%, Japan 4% and Norway 3% (UNDP, 1997).
Despite high per capita incomes more than 100 million people in OECD countries live
below national poverty lines, over 30 million are unemployed, and more than five million
are homeless (UNDP, 1996).
In developing countries the statistics are much worse. In 1992 about 45% of Sub-Saharan
Africans lived in poverty. In Gambia and Zambia nearly two thirds lived in poverty, and
in Kenya and Nigeria more than one third. South American countries also have a
significant portion of their people living in poverty: for example, Peru has 49%,
Columbia 45%, Ecuador 31%, Panama 26%, Mexico 15% and Chile 15%. In South Asia,
the poverty averages 43%. India has 40% of its population living in poverty, Bangladesh
30% and Pakistan 25% (UNDP, 1997). The 1992 Human Development Report concluded:
"Whatever the indicator, the evidence points to large and widening disparities ... at both
the national and international levels" (UNDP, 1992:39). According to the United Nations
Development Programme, poverty levels are set at US$1 (1985 PPP$) a day per person
for most of the developing world. For Latin America and the Caribbean it is US$2 (1985
PPP$) a day per person. For countries in Eastern Europe, US$4 (1990 PPP$) a day per
person, and for industrial countries it is US$14.40 (1985 PPP$) which corresponds to the
income poverty line in the USA (UNDP, 1997).
As for economic power, mergers and acquisitions are concentrating industrial power in
megacorporations. Indeed, of the world's largest economies, 50 are megacorporations and
their annual turnover exceeds the GDP of many countries (UNDP, 1997). By 1998 the top
10 companies in pesticides controlled 85% of a US$31 billion global market. The top 10
in telecommunications 86% of a US$262 billion market (UNDP, 1999). Just four media
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groups own 85% of the United Kingdom's daily newspapers, accounting for two thirds of
total circulation. In the USA, just six companies control most of the media (UNDP,
2002). Cross-border mergers and acquisitions (majority foreign-owned) accounted for
59% of total foreign investment in 1997 (UNDP, 1999).
The 1999 Human Development Report stated: "More and more it is multinational
corporations that dominate global markets. Their foreign affiliates accounted for an
estimated US$9.5 trillion sales in 1997. Their value added was 7% of world GDP in
1997, up from 5% in the mid 1980s. Their share of world exports increased as well, from
a quarter in the late 1980s to a third in 1995 ... And the large multinationals are becoming
even larger as takeovers and mergers proliferate" (p.32). The Report continued: "Capital
is becoming even more concentrated globally as megacorporations merge ... From 1990 to
1997 the annual number of mergers and acquisitions more than doubled, from 11,300 to
24,600. Cross border mergers and acquisitions accounted for US$236 billion in 1997.
Multinationals now dwarf some governments in economic power" (UNDP, 1999: 114).
Multinational corporations are involved in more than 60% of world trade and dominate
the production, distribution and sale of many goods and services. About a third of world
trade is conducted as intrafirm trade within multinational corporations (UNDP, 1999).
The 1999 Human Development Report stated: "Intergovernmental policy making in
today's global economy is in the hands of the major industrial powers and the
international institutions they control - the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund,
the Bank for International Settlements ... And developing countries, with about 80% of
the world's people... have little influence" (UNDP, 1999:34).
The Report went on to state: "Some have predicted convergence. Yet the past decade has
shown increasing concentration of income, resources and wealth among people,
corporations and countries" (p.3). The 1996 Human Development Report elaborated:
"The imbalances in economic growth over the past 15 years are clear enough. But if
allowed to continue well into the next century, they will produce a world gargantuan in its
excesses and grotesque in its human and economic inequalities" (UNDP, 1996:8). It
concluded: "In sum: development that perpetuates today's inequalities is neither
sustainable, nor worth sustaining" (UNDP, 1996:4).
It is clear from this very brief analysis that the two dynamics identified earlier as inherent
to the capitalist mode ofproduction - capital expansion and the concentration!
centralisation of capital - are strikingly supported by empirical data. The enormous
increase in economic production and the growing disparity in wealth have coincided
precisely with the period of industrial capitalism. Moreover, these dynamics show no
signs of abating; in fact, it is readily apparent that they are becoming even more dominant
over time. It will be argued in the next chapter that the dynamics identified, and
substantiated, result in two fundamental contradictions threatening the reproduction of the
capitalist mode of production: an ecological contradiction threatening its biophysical
reproduction and a social contradiction threatening its socio-economic reproduction.
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4.8 Contradictions
It has been argued in this section that there are two dynamics inherent to the capitalist
mode ofproduction. Firstly, there is an inherent imperative to expand capital. This
manifests itself concretely as a quantitative expansion in the total output of commodities,
a chronic increase in gross product, together with an external expansion of the sphere of
commodity production, a spatial extension. There occurs as a result of these dynamics an
'unleashing' of the global capitalist forces ofproduction leading to an ever-increasing
capacity to transform nature on a global scale.
Secondly, there is an immanent movement towards the concentration and centralisation of
capital. This results in the increasing confinement of the means ofproduction, material
wealth, and associated economic and political power, in the hands of fewer (relatively if
not absolutely) owners of capital, together with an expanding proletariat more or less
dependent on, and subject to, the dictates of capital. There is thus a polarisation in the
relations ofproduction, i.e. the social ownership of the means ofproduction and labour
power, and hence, economic and political power - the 'social power of capital'.
Both imperatives were recognised by Marx and are explained by the underlying relations -
the 'inner motions' - revealed in his theories ofvalue, surplus-value and capital
accumulation. These theories reveal that the concrete manifestations are merely the
appearances of their underlying essence; their inner dynamics and contradictions. In this
sense they are immutable. They are the unavoidable consequences of a particular mode of
production - capitalism. Capital must expand quantitatively and must concentrate and
centralise qualitatively. It cannot do otherwise. Both movements are inherent to the
system. They are the 'immanent laws of capitalist production'. As Heilbroner (1980)
stated when writing of the 'immanent behavioral propensities' peculiar to capitalism: "It
is the peculiar nature of capitalism alone that its fate seems to be the inevitable
consequence of the conflicting elements within it" (p.119).
These dynamics result in two fundamental contradictions within the capitalist mode of
production. Firstly, the chronic quantitative increase in the production of commodities is
ultimately unsustainable. In time, it must meet its biophysical limits. These are
determined by the restrictions imposed by the Laws ofThermodynamics and the
ecological constraints of biological reproduction. Stated simply, thermodynamics and
ecology reveal that there are limits to human-induced transformation of nature. Infinite
economic growth in the form of ever increasing commodity production inherent to the
capitalist mode of production is therefore ultimately unsustainable. There is, in other
words, a conflict between capitalism and its continued biophysical reproduction. Hence,
this can be called the ecological, or external, contradiction ofcapital.
Secondly, the concentration and centralisation of capital with its associated polarisation of
wealth, economic and political power is socially unsustainable. This trend is seen as
socially repressive, in the sense that it denies a greater proportion of the global human
population its historical creative, social, and emancipatory potential. It is seen as
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economically exploitative, in that the surplus social product arising from the increased
social productivity of labour does not accrue to the producers of that surplus - the
proletariat. And it is seen, in the long term, as socially and politically disruptive due to
increasing social, economic and political inequities, intranationally and internationally.
There is, in other words, a conflict between the capitalist mode ofproduction and its
social reproduction. This can be called the social, or internal, contradiction of capital.
Both contradictions are founded on exploitative relationships inherent to the capitalist
mode ofproduction. The ecological contradiction is founded on exploitation of other
nature by humans. The social contradiction is founded on exploitation of one social group
by another. Both lead ultimately to alienation: the alienation of human nature from non-
human nature, and the alienation of human nature from itself, or, in other words, self-
alienation.
Whilst the social or internal contradiction of capital has traditionally been subject to
intense scrutiny from both Marxist and non-Marxist perspectives, the ecological or
external contradiction has only recently become the subject of serious analysis. Since the
early 1960s, economists such as Galbraith (1962; 1967), Boulding (1966), Mishan (1967),
Georgescu-Roegen (1971), Schumacher (1972), Ricklefs (1976), Daly (1977; 1987)
Norgaard (1984; 1985), Costanza (1991) and Leff(1995) have questioned the desirability
and, indeed, possibility of continuous economic growth. In addition, scholars such as
Burgess (1978), Castree (1995), Fitzimmons (1989), Foster (1997), Grundmann (1991),
Harvey (1989, 1996a), O'Connor (1984, 1994, 1998), Parsons (1977), Perelman (1979),
Schmidt (1971) and Smith (1984) analysed the relationships between capitalism, nature
and ecology from a Marxist perspective.
Although economists had previously recognised that limits to growth existed, indeed
many of the classical economists such as Smith, Ricardo, and Mill were aware of the
constraints exerted by the environment on both the feasibility and desirability of
continuous economic growth, the dominant view of bourgeois neo-classical economics
was, and still is, that the maximisation of economic growth is not only possible but is, in
fact, essential to the optimal operation of the economy - so much so that exponential
growth in commodity production is taken as a given.
However, three interrelated conditions - finitude, entropy, and complex ecological
interdependency - combine to form the fundamental biophysical limits to growth (Daly,
1987). All life on earth functions within the constraints imposed by the physical laws of
energy and matter. The Laws ofThermodynamics provide the overarching scientific
framework for the unfolding of all physical activity in the world, including that of the
human economy (Rifkin, 1980). According to the First Law of Thermodynamics, energy-
matter is neither created nor destroyed; it is merely transformed from one form to another.
The earth, essentially a closed system to matter, is therefore finite. Biophysical resources
available for human use are likewise finite. There are thus ultimate limits to the human
appropriation of nature. For biologically renewable resources there is a maximum
utilisation rate if they are not to be depleted beyond regenerative capacity. There is
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increasing evidence that for many biological resources this maximum utilisation rate is
rapidly being reached and in some cases has been exceeded (see, for example, Brown et
al., 1999; Meadows et al., 1992; UNEP, 1999; Vitousek et al., 1997; Weber, 1994). For
non-renewable resources there is a definite, and definable, limit to the quantum of each
resource available for human use.
Not only do the physical laws on the conservation of matter imply a finite resource base,
they also dictate a finite capacity for the biosphere to receive and assimilate the
byproducts ofproduction and consumption (high entropy wastes). The natural
environment is essentially fixed in terms of assimilative and regenerative capacity (Rees,
1990). Meadows et al. (1992:19) used the expression 'sources and sinks' to refer to the
limits of the biosphere to provide resources and to receive wastes. Each resource is
limited by both its sources and its sinks.
The Second Law of Thermodynamics states that any system, plus its surroundings, tends
spontaneously towards increasing disorder or randomness (i.e. increased entropy). Thus,
every time energy-matter is transformed from one state to another, there is an increase in
disorder (entropy) until it is dissipated as heat embodied in the random motion of
molecules. Energy flow is thus linear and irreversible from low entropy (available or
'free' energy) to high entropy (unavailable or 'bound' energy). Ultimately, the earth is
going to end in a final equilibrium state or 'heat death' (Rifkin, 1980). What is of
immediate concern to contemporary society, however, is its utilisation oflow entropy
energy sources. While solar low entropy remains essentially constant, the terrestrial
sources upon which the modern industrial economy relies are finite. Growth in the
modern economy is limited by the stock of terrestrial low entropy not the stock of solar
low entropy, which is superabundant but flow-limited (Daly, 1987).
In addition, all life on earth (as it now exists) relies upon complex ecological relationships
between living and non-living components of the environment. Organisms are organised
as populations, groups ofpopulations as communities, and communities together with
their environment make up ecosystems. All the various ecosystems make up the biosphere
forming a complex and diverse network of interrelated systems and subsystems. The
complex interrelationships between the living and non-living components of the
biosphere are responsible for maintaining conditions supportive of life on earth. Human
disruption of these essential ecological life-support processes may fundamentally alter
those conditions to the detriment ofpresent life forms. The physical principle of cause
and effect, together with the ecological principle of the interdependency between living
and non-living matter, means that no things or activities exist or take place in isolation.
The living and non-living components of the biosphere are inextricably connected in each
and every action having an impact on its environment. Because of the complexities of the
relationships involved the effects are often obscure and difficult to predict. Moreover,
they are often cumulative and interactive. Disruption to these often delicate ecological
relationships may have far reaching and unforeseen consequences.
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The basic limits outlined above - finitude, entropy, and ecological interdependence -
interact. Finitude would not be so limiting if everything could be recycled, but entropy
prevents complete recycling. The entropy law would not be so limiting if environmental
sources of low entropy and sinks for high entropy were infinite, but both are finite. The
fact that both are finite, together with the entropy law, means that exponential growth of
the economy (growth in the transformation of matter-energy) will increasingly interfere
with the ecological life-support systems and natural biogeochemical cycles upon which
the economy and, indeed, all life on earth depends. We are presently witnessing this
interference with increased carbon dioxide levels in the atmosphere causing global
warming and associated downstream effects (Daly, 1987).
Thus, the human economy, in its physical dimension, can be viewed as an open
subsystem of a larger, but finite, ecosystem (the biosphere) which is both the supplier of
low entropy raw materials and the recipient of high entropy wastes. The growth of the
economic subsystem is limited by the size of the overall system, by its dependence on the
overall system as a source of low entropy inputs and as a sink for high entropy outputs,
and by the essential ecological processes and life-support systems which are more likely
to be disrupted as the scale of the economic subsystem grows relative to the total
ecosystem or biosphere (Daly, 1987).
The explosive increase in global production and consumption, particularly in the
advanced capitalist countries, is now having a major impact on the Earth's ecosystems
and is leading to environmental stress both locally and globally. In an analysis of the
human impact on global ecosystems, Vitousek et al. (1997) stated:
"Human alteration of the Earth is substantial and growing. Between one third and one
half of the land surface has been transformed by human action; the carbon dioxide
concentration in the atmosphere has increased by nearly 30 percent since the beginning
of the Industrial Revolution; more atmospheric nitrogen is fixed by humanity than by
all natural terrestrial sources combined; more than half of all accessible surface
freshwater is put to use by humanity; and about one quarter of the bird species on
Earth have been driven to extinction... Moreover, all of these seemingly disparate
phenomena trace to a single cause - the growing scale of the human enterprise. The
rates, scales, kinds, and combinations of changes now are fundamentally different from
those at any other time in history" (p.494-498).
Many ecosystems are dominated directly by human activity and no ecosystem on Earth's
surface is free ofpervasive human influence. Moreover, human activity is now altering
major global biogeochemical cycles. Many of these changes are substantial and
reasonably well quantified; all are on-going and many are accelerating. Finite resources
are being depleted at an increasing rate and renewable resources are being exploited at
rates often exceeding their regenerative capacities. For example, the world's fish catch
has climbed rapidly in recent decades, expanding five-fold since 1950. However, after
reaching 100 million tons in 1989, the total catch has since declined. The United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organisation, which monitors fish catch and stocks, reports that all
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17 major oceanic fishing areas are now being fished at, or beyond, capacity. The catch in
all but two has fallen. Nine are in a serious state of decline, and four are commercially
fished out (Weber, 1994).
Over the next 50 years, the world's population is forecast to increase by around 50% to
nine billion, and global economic activity is expected to increase roughly five-fold.
Conventional demand studies suggest that global energy consumption is likely to rise
nearly three-fold and manufacturing activity at least three-fold. Global throughput of
materials is also likely to triple, according to conventional projections. Based on these
predictions, increased resource use and continuing ecological degradation is inevitable.
Despite growth in the service sector, and increased efficiency in energy and materials use
in the advanced capitalist countries, the global transformation ofnature can be expected
to increase substantially, and on present trends most accepted analyses indicate this to be
unsustainable over the long term (Vitousek et al., 1997).
It is important that the ecological contradiction outlined above is not reduced to simply a
'Malthusian' or 'Neo-Malthusian' problematique, i.e. pressure ofpopulation on natural
resources, or a 'natural law' ofpopulation control. Marx himself, both in Capital and
Theories ofSurplus Value, took issue with Malthus and his so-called 'natural law' of
population. He exposed it as merely apologetics for the misery afflicting the lower classes
at the time and for the continued excessive consumption by the landed aristocracy and
clergy, of which Malthus was a member.
Recent Marxist commentators, such as Benton (1989, 1991, 1996), Castree (1995),
Fitzimmons (1989), Foster (1997), Harvey (1974, 1982, 1992, 1996a), O'Connor (1989a,
1989b, 1994, 1998), Perelman (1979) and Walker (1979), have examined this issue and
have generally agreed, following Marx, that notions of resource scarcity are historically
and socially produced. Although there are ultimate limits within which the human
appropriation of nature must operate, particular resource scarcities are a result of historic
and socio-economic imperatives rather than 'inevitable' or applicable as a general law of
population control. Examining resource scarcity abstracted from social and historical
contexts is therefore misleading.
However, as Harvey (1974) pointed out, Marx saw capitalism as creating needs and wants
endlessly so as to enable the never-ending' spiral' of capital accumulation. This results in
the capitalist economy pushing constantly against the limits of its natural resource base.
Resource limits can be extended by technological advances but the tide of capital
accumulation soon catches up to these new limits (Harvey, 1974). Ultimately, the conflict
with the natural world can only be resolved by a new form of social production not based
on production for production sake, i.e. the continuous expansion of capital. Therefore, the
pressure on resources would be overcome by a change in the mode ofproduction, a socio-
historical change, not a change in the availability of resources nor a restriction on
population numbers (although Marx and Engels did not discount the need ultimately for
population control).
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Humans are thus able to change social arrangements and social modes ofproduction and
thereby restructure the whole resource scarcity problematique. Needs and wants above
subsistence level are socially and culturally determined. Moreover, needs and wants are
specific to a particular mode ofproduction. Likewise, resources can only be defined in
relation to a particular technical, cultural and historical stage of development. What are
resources to contemporary capitalism were not resources to earlier periods, nor are they
likely to be in future.
This does not mean that there are not limits to the human transformation of nature.
Harvey (1974), following Marx, recognised this. However, it is not a Malthusian problem
that is at the heart of capitalism's dysfunctional relationship with nature. It is abundantly
clear, after even the most cursory of analyses, that overwhelmingly the greatest increase
in production and consumption has been, and continues to be, in the wealthy metropolitan
capitalist countries where population is stable or even declining. Certainly there are
population pressures in some developing countries that result in localised or regional
environmental degradation, but these are often caused by the introduction of capitalist
economic relations into these countries, e.g. using productive land for export crops while
pushing food production onto marginal land, etc.
So, whilst there is a limit to the human transformation of nature this does not equate to a
Malthusian problem of population pressure on natural resources nor a 'natural law' of
population controL It results from a system of production which is predicated upon the
continuous and increasing production of commodities: i.e. the maximisation of exchange
value and the accumulation of capital on an ever increasing scale.
Finally, it can be seen that the ecological and social contradictions of capital outlined
above contain a further contradiction. While capital, on the one hand is subject to chronic
expansion quantitatively, on the other it is subject to increasing concentration and
centralisation qualitatively. There is a double movement of capital, and this double
movement itself contains a contradiction.
The immense productive power of capitalism, founded upon its chronic expansionary
dynamic, is in the long term ecologically unsustainable. At the same time, the social
relations of production - i.e. the concentration and centralisation of capital, and economic
and political power (subjectively representing the expansionary dictates of capital) - are
intrinsically incapable of addressing this mounting ecological crisis. The concentration
and centralisation of capital results in the concentration and centralisation of economic
and political power: what Marx called the 'social power of capital'. Thus, economic and
political power are confined, more or less, to a powerful but diminishing bourgeois elite
whose subjective interests coincide with and reflect the objective dynamics of capitaL In
other words, the bourgeois interest represents the objective dynamics of capital: self-
expansion, and concentration/centralisation. Thus, subjective bourgeois economic and
political decision-making represents the objective dictates of self-expanding capitaL
165
Marx described the bourgeoisie as the 'personification of capital'; they are the
functionaries of capital, and are tied to capital just as much as the proletariat. At the same
time, capital represents a social relationship between classes. In capitalism, the class
relationship is expressed economically as the necessity to extract the maximum amount of
surplus-value from the production process and to throw this surplus-value back into
circulation, resulting in a 'spiralling' accumulation of capital. As Mandel (l976a:32)
pointed out, "capital not only appropriates surplus value; it produces surplus value", and
this is precisely what distinguishes capitalism from earlier modes ofproduction.
The subjective imperatives common to all class societies - the appropriation of surplus
product from the producing classes - becomes in capitalism (as the inherent dynamic for
ever-increasing capital accumulation) an objective movement of the system. It is a
dynamic necessary to the continued reproduction of the mode ofproduction itself. In this
way, the objective dictates of capital become the subjective motives of the bourgeoisie.
And, in oppositional unity, the subjective interests of the expropriating class (the
bourgeoisie) become the objective dictates of capital. The relationship is precisely
dialectical.
That the bourgeois interest represents the objective dynamics of self-expanding capital is
further reinforced by (a) the separation of capital ownership from direct involvement in
production, i.e. a separation of ownership of capital from direct control and responsibility
for the consequences of that capital, and (b) the separation of the bourgeoisie from direct
involvement in the mediation of nature through the labour process, i.e. the separation
materially and logically from direct confrontation with nature (see Smith, 1984:42-43).
Both of the above result in the alienation of the bourgeoisie from nature - from direct
intercourse with nature in the labour process and from direct responsibility for the
ecological consequences of that interaction with nature.
The bourgeoisie, subjectively, has no wish to contribute to an ecological crisis. However,
it cannot act effectively to avert one. Its historical existence ensures this. To avert an
ecological crisis, i.e. to negate the self-expansion of capital, is to deny its own historical
role, its raison d'etre, indeed its very existence. Thus, the concentration and centralisation
of capital, and its associated economic and political power, in the form of a relatively
diminishing bourgeoisie acting in the interests of self-expanding capital, is unable to avert
the impending ecological and socio-economic crises.
Thus, reformism is shown in its true light, as intrinsically unable to address these
fundamental contradictions. Marx and Engels show that reformism can never escalate
into substantive change. It is always trapped within capitalism's own logic. In a critique
of 'Conservative' or 'Bourgeois Socialism', they presage social welfarism and social
democratic capitalism, and describe it as merely wishing for 'a bourgeoisie without a
proletariat' (Communist Manifesto). This is significant in the sense that capitalism has
subsequently succeeded in extending bourgeois hegemony over an increasing portion of
the proletariat (i.e. an 'embourgeoisment' of the proletariat ideologically, culturally and
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politically), whilst at the same time 'proletarianising', in an economic sense, a growing
portion of the total population.
We have established that there is a conflict between the forces ofproduction (capital
expansion) and the relations ofproduction (capital concentration Icentralisation). The
forces ofproduction were conceived by Marx as encompassing the means ofproduction
(i.e. raw materials, auxiliary materials, and instruments of labour), together with labour
power itself. Productive forces thus consist of the social organisation of labour, its
associated technological development, and its interaction with nature. As Marx stated,
"all productive force resolves itself into a given relation to nature" (Grundrisse:540). It
represents, in short, the human capacity to transform nature. Harvey (1982:99) explained:
"By 'productive force' Marx means the sheer power to transform nature". Thus the
expansion of capital, in essence the growing forces ofproduction, represents an
increasing human capacity to transform nature.
The relations ofproduction are constituted by the economic ownership (and/or control) of
the productive forces. Under capitalism the most fundamental of these relations is
ownership of the means ofproduction by a capital owning class (the bourgeoisie), and
ownership (but not control) of labour power by the proletariat, the majority of dependent
wage and salary earners. Fundamentally, it is ownership, and/or control, ofproductive
capacity, or productive forces, which is increasingly confined to a minority class or a
property owning elite. In addition, the ownership ofproductive property (capital) confers
economic and political power to this elite.
The forces ofproduction represent the relationship of 'man to nature', whilst the relations
of production correspond to the relationship between 'man and fellow-man'. As
Grundmann (1991 :99) pointed out: "Marx stresses this double relation of man to his
fellow-man and to nature throughout his work... on the level of society... he
differentiates between relations ofproduction and productive forces where the former
correspond to the relation between 'man and fellow-man', the latter to the relation 'man
to nature"'. There is thus in the double movement of capital expansion and capital
concentration/centralisation, a contradiction between human social relations and the
human relationship to nature. In other words, the dysfunctional human/nature relationship
can be seen as the result of a dysfunctional social relationship.
In the final analysis, the contradiction arises, as Marx expressed it, from the fact "that
capital and its self-expansion appear as the starting and finishing point, as the motive and
purpose ofproduction; production is production only for capital, and not the reverse, i.e.
the means ofproduction are not simply means for a steadily expanding pattern of life for
the society of the producers" (Capital 3:358). Keeping in mind, as Marx repeatedly
emphasised, that capital is essentially a social relation, we can reduce the contradiction
down to this: the quantitative expansion of this relationship cannot be contained by its
qualitative manifestation. Ultimately, as Marx stated: "The real barrier to capitalist
production is capital itself' (Capital 3:358).
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Chapter 5: The Transformation of Capitalism
5.1 Introduction
It was argued in the previous chapter that capitalism is ultimately unsustainable because
of two intractable dynamics inherent to the mode ofproduction. These dynamics were
shown by Marx to be manifestations of deeper, inner processes, relations, and conflicts -
the 'inner logic' of the capitalist mode ofproduction. It was further argued that these
dynamics result in two fundamental contradictions - an external constraint, termed the
ecological contradiction, and an internal conflict, designated as the social contradiction.
It was postulated that these movements contain a further contradiction: a conflict between
the quantitative expansion ofproductive forces and the qualitative expression of the
relations ofproduction. This was described as the ultimate contradiction. In effect,
capitalism sows the seeds of its own demise. Its very success proclaims its failure. Its
triumph in increasing production and concentrating capital creates an impasse. It is an
impasse which cannot be resolved by capital. In other words, it cannot be resolved by
reformism. However, this final contradiction contains within itself its own dialectical
resolution, one that involves transformation of the capitalist mode ofproduction to a post
capitalist socio-economic arrangement founded upon the social and ecological
rationalities developing within the existing system.
For insight into this transformation process we again refer to Marx. Marx not only
investigated and explained the underlying dynamics and resulting contradictions of the
capitalist mode of production, his other great achievement was also to situate this mode of
production in its historical context; to show that the dynamics he uncovered were not
absolute, eternal economic laws, applicable to all societies, as the bourgeois economists
would have us believe, but are historically specific and applicable to a particular historical
period, one of relatively recent origin and one, according to Marx, facing eventual
demise. Marx's materialist conception of history shows that just as former modes of
production have been replaced so will the present system give birth to its successor.
Moreover, this transition, although determined 'in the last instance' by objective
economic conditions, will be realised by human praxis in the form of a proletarian
revolutionary movement. This movement aims to transform the capitalist mode of
production to a sustainable post-capitalist society - a classless society Marx termed
communism.
The primary task in this chapter is to analyse how, in contemporary capitalism, this
transformation will occur and, in particular, the subjective role of human agency in this
process. This problem will be approached, firstly, through an analysis of Marx's
economic interpretation of history. Marx's theory of historical materialism lays to rest
idealistic explanations of historical change. Contrary to idealism, it is not religious
imperatives, nor human ideas or consciousness that determine the broad sweep of history.
Rather it is the organisation of economic production which provides the ultimate
determinant of historical change.
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The fundamental explanation of human history is to be sought not in divine intervention,
the deeds ofgreat men, fate or human destiny (although these have their influence) but in
contradictions arising from the economic circumstances pertaining to a particular mode of
production. These contradictions arise essentially from conflicts between the development
ofproduction (the productive forces) and the existing relations ofproduction. Marx posits
the conflict in capitalism to be primarily between the socialisation of the forces of
production and the private appropriation of the social product under existing relations of
production. It is essentially a socio-economic conflict and manifests itself in a whole
range of socio-economic maladies.
This conflict is extended in the thesis to encompass an ecological conflict: a conflict
between the growing forces of production (in the sense of an unsustainable transformation
of nature) and the existing relations ofproduction. It will be shown that although Marx
never attributed the transition from capitalism to communism to a contradiction between
the ecological consequences of the forces ofproduction and the relations of production,
he and Engels were well aware of the destructive potential of the capitalist mode of
production in relation to both human and non-human nature. They did not envisage that
the human transformation of nature was unlimited nor without consequence. Just as they
recognised the civilising role in overcoming the vicissitudes of nature through increased
productivity, so too were they adamant that humans were intimately part of nature and
ultimately dependent on it.
Thus, in addition to the socio-economic crises generated by the capitalist mode of
production and advanced by orthodox Marxists as the catalyst for revolutionary change,
the present analysis widens this prognosis to include ecological conflicts as well. This
does not lessen the relevance of socio-economic crises (which remain as pertinent today,
if not more so, as when Marx first wrote about them), but rather re-examines and re-
theorises the orthodox position in light of contemporary ecological realities. As argued in
the previous chapter, these conflicts are, in fact, intimately related. Ecological conflicts,
representing a dysfunctional human/nature relationship, can be seen as interdependent
with socio-economic conflicts, themselves representing dysfunctional social relationships.
These antagonisms (both socio-economic and ecological) are expressed in subjective
form as class struggle: conflicts over the economic interests and, in our explanation, the
environmental interests ofparticular groups within society. It is through class struggle
that one mode of production is superceded by another. The progressive transformation of
capitalism likewise relies upon revolutionary class struggle; in other words, between the
growing economic, social and ecological contradictions of the capitalist mode of
production on the one hand, and the transformation to a post-capitalist socio-economic
system on the other there is a necessary mediation - the development of an active, class-
conscious proletariat.
In Section 5.4 we examine Marx's theory ofproletarian revolution. Marx had no fatalistic
belief in a communist supercession of capitalism. According to Marx, people have to
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make their own history. Marx posited the proletariat as the active agent of progressive
transformation. The proletariat, however, if it is to fulfill its historic task, must
deliberately grasp revolutionary moments provided by crises in the socio-economic
system. To achieve this they must be fully conscious of their historic role and be
adequately organised to fulfill it. One of their first targets is the bourgeois state. The state
is seen as the instrument of bourgeois class rule and must be overthrown and replaced at
first with a dictatorship of the proletariat. Eventually, this political organisation will itself
'wither away' until state functions become merely 'the administration of things' .
According to traditional Marxist theory, the transformation of capitalism will be brought
about by a popular revolutionary uprising led by a rapidly expanding industrial proletariat
fully conscious of its historical task. However, in contemporary capitalism there is no
indication of this taking place. There is, instead, an actual 'embourgeoisement'
(ideologically, culturally and politically) of the proletariat, and little evidence of the
development of a revolutionary class consciousness. How can we reconcile this reality
with a theory of future proletarian revolution?
For an insight into the nature, and role, of the proletarian movement in advanced
capitalist societies we turn to the writings of Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist, who
analysed the revolutionary movements surrounding the war of 1914-1919. Gramsci
concluded that different revolutionary strategies were required by West and East, by
advanced capitalist nations and less developed countries. These strategies were informed
by Gramsci's concept of hegemony, perhaps his single most important contribution to
Marxist theory.
Gramsci adopted the notion of hegemony used by earlier Marxists (i.e. as a process by
which the proletariat extended its leadership over all the elements opposed to capital) and
applied it to the way capitalism reproduces itself; in effect, how the bourgeoisie
establishes and maintains its dominance over wider society. Gramsci argued that the
dominant class maintains its position, not simply through force and coercion but also by
'educating' the consent of the subordinate classes through a 'moral and intellectual
leadership'. Economic, social, cultural, and ideological influences permeate the complex
superstructure of advanced capitalist countries to diffuse a 'common sense', a common
conception of the world based upon, and legitimising, the interests of the dominant class.
In light of these discoveries, Gramsci differentiated alternate strategies for the proletarian
struggle. One he termed the 'war of manoeuvre' (or 'war of movement'), a popular
uprising culminating in a direct assault on, and the overthrow of, the state. This was the
appropriate strategy in the East (Russia) where the dominant class maintained its position
largely through force and coercion via the state apparatus. The second he described as the
'war ofposition' , a protracted struggle conducted largely in civil society for hegemonic
dominance. This preceded the 'war of manoeuvre' and was the necessary strategy for the
advanced capitalist countries in the West, where civil society was well developed and
formed what Gramsci described as additional lines of defense around the state.
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Gramsci also outlined the tactics involved in the 'war ofposition' , the struggle for
hegemony. In doing so, he elaborated a specific role for intellectuals, particularly for
those he termed the 'organic intellectuals' of the proletariat. The strategy of the 'war of
position' and the tactics of counter-hegemonic struggle (including the role of the
intellectuals) provides the contemporary proletarian movement with a powerful
theoretical insight into the strategy appropriate for the present day realities of advanced
capitalism.
By combining Marx and Engels' explanation for historical change with Gramsci's
theories on the transformation of advanced capitalism, and re-analysing them in light of
contemporary ecological realities, we conclude that the transition from capitalism to a
post-capitalist socio-economic system relies upon a counter-hegemonic struggle by a
'popular front' of elements opposed to capital. In the first instance, a coalition between
the traditional socialist forces opposing human exploitation and the more recent
movements opposed to the exploitation of non-human nature: that is, the radical 'green'
and 'political-ecology' groups. By aligning the traditional socialist movement with the
radical green groups, and organising the coalescence of other disparate elements
conflicting with capital, such as the anti-globalisation movement, indigenous blocs,
feminist groups, movements for national liberation, peace groups, etc. the proletarian
movement has the potential to increasingly challenge the dominant bourgeois hegemony.
It has the potential to become, in Gramsci's words, an 'historic bloc'.
Following Gramsci, this challenge will intensify and may become revolutionary during
times of organic crises - crises of' legitimacy' , or 'authority' of the dominant hegemony.
It is during such crises that the forces opposed to capital (the proletariat in its widest
sense) can realise an effective proletarian class consciousness in opposition to capital, and
in so doing, develop a 'collective political will'; in other words, a genuine revolutionary
potential. At such times, the proletariat is in a position to move from the 'war ofposition'
to the 'war of manoeuvre', to replace the bourgeois state and proceed to construct a truly
classless and ecologically rational society.
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5.2 The Materialist Interpretation of History
The materialist or economic interpretation of history, according to Enge1s, "designates
that view of the course of history which seeks the ultimate cause and the great moving
power of all important historic events in the economic development of society, in the
changes in the modes ofproduction and exchange, in the consequent division of society
into distinct classes, and in the struggle of these classes against one another" (Socialism:
Utopian and Scientific; in Shaw, 1983:206).
Marx and Engels developed their materialist interpretation of history in the 1840s: Marx
initially through a critical reexamination of Hegelian philosophy (A Contribution to a
Critique ofHegel's Philosophy ofRight. Introduction, 1844) and Engels through his
observations on industrial capitalism in England (Outlines ofa Critique ofPolitical
Economy, 1844; and the Conditions ofthe Working Class in England, 1844-45).
There has been some dispute as to the relationship of Engels' writings (particularly his
later writings) to Marx's corpus. Certainly, to the first generation of Marxists (of the
Second International) they were one and the same, with Enge1s' 'philosophical-
cosmological' expositions complementing Marx's 'scientific socio-economic' writings
(Colletti, 1975). Since the publication of Marx's early work (1843-1845) in the late
1920s and early 1930s, there have been differing points of view. It is my intent to treat
their co-authored works (in particular, The German Ideology and the Communist
Manifesto) as true collaborations, and thus the materialist interpretation of history as the
result of a joint effort. It is also my intent to treat Engel's work, particularly in Anti-
Diihring, as representative of historical materialism. However, following Engels, I will
apportion the greater theoretical input to Marx (without denigrating the contribution from
Engels).
In 1845, Marx and Engels together worked out their materialist theory in opposition to the
idealism of German philosophy; in fact, to 'settle accounts' with their philosophical past.
This was carried out in the form of a critique ofpost-Hegelian philosophy. The work was
not, however, published in their lifetime, and they abandoned the manuscript to 'the
gnawing criticism of the mice'. The manuscript was published in 1932 under the title of
The German Ideology. Marx, in the winter of 1846-47 - by which time he had (according
to Engels) 'cleaned up for himself the basic features of his new historical and economic
outlook' - undertook a critique ofProudhon, The Poverty ofPhilosophy. In this work
Marx expounded on his materialist conception of history. In 1848, Marx and Engels once
again collaborated to produce the Communist Manifesto, which contained further
expositions on their theory of history.
Marx's most famous, and most 'pregnant', statement on historical materialism comes,
however, from his 1859 Preface to A Contribution to the Critique ofPolitical Economy.
Its importance is such that it is necessary to quote from it at some length. In it Marx lays
out the foundations of his and Enge1s' view, the 'guiding principles' of historic
materialism. He stated:
172
"My inquiry led me to the conclusion that neither legal relations nor political forms
could be comprehended whether by themselves or on the basis of a so-called general
development of the human mind, but that on the contrary they originate in the material
conditions of life, the totality of which Hegel, following the example of English and
French thinkers of the eighteenth century, embraces within the term 'civil society'; that
the anatomy of this civil society, however, has to be sought in political economy... The
general conclusion at which I arrived and which, once reached, became the guiding
principle ofmy studies can be summarized as follows. In the social production of their
existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their
will, namely relations ofproduction appropriate to a given stage in the development of
their material forces ofproduction. The totality of these relations ofproduction
constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal
and political superstructure and to which corresponds definite forms of social
consciousness. The mode ofproduction of material life conditions the general process of
social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines
their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a
certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into
conflict with the existing relations ofproduction or - this merely expresses the same
thing in legal terms - with the property relations within the framework of which they
have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these
relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in
the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole
immense superstructure. In studying such transformation it is always necessary to
distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of
production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal,
political, religious, artistic or philosophic - in short, ideological forms in which men
become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an
individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of
transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be
explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the
social forces ofproduction and the relations ofproduction. No social order is ever
destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed,
and new superior relations ofproduction never replace older ones before the material
conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.
Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve, since closer
examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material
conditions for its solution are already present or at least in the course of formation. In
broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern bourgeois modes ofproduction
may be designated as epochs marking progress in the economic development of society.
The bourgeois mode ofproduction is the last antagonistic form of the social process of
production - antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism but of an antagonism
that emanates from the individuals' social conditions of existence - but the productive
forces developing within bourgeois society create also the material conditions for a
solution of this antagonism. The prehistory of human society accordingly closes with
this social formation" (Early Writings:425-426).
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According to Marx and Engels, the material provision of life is the starting point for any
analysis of human society or social change. Contrary to conventional wisdom, it is not
human consciousness and ideas that determine society's material existence, but rather it is
social material existence that determines (in the final analysis) human consciousness and
ideas. It is not the consciousness ofmen that determines their existence, but their social
existence that determines their consciousness. This is a critical inversion of idealist
philosophy and has profound consequences for socio-historical analysis.
In opposition to idealist hypotheses, it is not the result of Providence, the influence of
great men, the impress of nationality or race, that (independently) determines the broad
sweep of history but, rather, it is the organisation of economic production that provides
the ultimate determinant ofhuman history. The fundamental explanation for historical
change is to be sought, therefore, not in the ideas of great men, religious imperatives,
monarchical decrees, or 'fantastic' ideas (although, of course, all have their influence) but
in the contradictions arising from the economic circumstances pertaining to each
historical mode of production.
Underlying a surface reality which sees history played out as a myriad of either related or
unrelated occurrences seemingly caused by independent human imperatives, Providence,
or mere chance, there lies a deeper level ofdynamics, relations, and tensions centred on
basic material production and social relations of production. This does not deny the
relevance of human influence on social processes or social change. Marx and Engels
always acknowledged that people make their own history, only not under circumstances
of their own choosing, but under circumstances that are given by the underlying economic
conditions. It is only in the 'final analysis', or by setting the broad parameters (materially
and ideologically) of human endeavour, that the economic conditions hold sway. As
Engels stated:
"From this point of view the final causes of all social changes and political revolutions
are to be sought, not in men's brains, not in men's better insight into eternal truth and
justice, but in changes in the modes ofproduction and exchange. They are to be
sought, not in philosophy, but in the economics of each particular epoch. The growing
perception that existing social institutions are unreasonable and unjust, that reason has
become unreason, and right wrong, is only proof that in the modes ofproduction and
exchange changes have silently taken place with which the social order, adapted to
earlier economic conditions, is no longer in keeping. From this it follows that the
means of getting rid of the incongruities that have been brought to light must also be
present, in a more or less developed condition, within the changed modes of
production themselves. These means are not to be invented, spun out of the head, but
discovered with the aid of the head in the existing material facts ofproduction" (Anti-
Diihring:254-255).
Historical materialism views history as a succession of 'modes ofproduction' or
historical epochs (Asian, ancient, feudal, and capitalist) each distinguished by a
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productive capacity (particular forces of production) associated with distinctive forms of
property ownership (relations ofproduction). The forces ofproduction include the means
of production (raw materials, machinery, etc.) plus labour power. The relations of
production are constituted by the economic ownership and!or control of productive
forces: i.e. the means ofproduction and labour power. Since primitive society, each mode
ofproduction has developed a fundamental division of labour resulting in the
differentiation of society into classes, resting ultimately on some form of exploitation of
one or more groups in society by another (or others). It was the division of labour and the
emergence of class structure that assisted society to progress beyond subsistence level.
Exploitation brought about great advances in the productive forces of society, and in this
sense was viewed by Marx and Engels not as an 'evil' but as an historical reality, indeed,
an historical 'value'.
Associated with each mode ofproduction there arises a particular social consciousness, a
unique set of religious, legal, political, cultural, and philosophical, in short ideological,
characteristics, fundamentally dependent upon and legitimising the existing relations of
production. In this way, the social consciousness of an era is reflective of, and adapted to,
a particular development of the forces ofproduction. Hence, Marx talked of a 'political
and legal superstructure' arising from the economic structure of society. Once again, this
does not imply a vulgar economism, nor does it deny the influence of superstructural
elements on the economic base. It suggests instead that religious, legal, political, cultural,
and ideological forms do not have an existence independent of material concerns 'in the
final analysis'. The relationship is complex and multidirectional (it is in fact precisely
dialectical), but it is material existence that must be the starting point of any analysis and
explanation of superstructural elements.
At a certain stage of development, according to the materialist conception of history, the
material forces ofproduction come into conflict with the existing relations of production
(the existing property relations). Instead of acting to facilitate the development of
productive forces, the relations ofproduction turn into 'fetters' and impede further
progress. These underlying economic conflicts or contradictions (which are objectively
determined) are expressed on the surface of society, in subjective form, as class struggle,
in effect conflicts over the material interests ofparticular groups within society. It is
through revolutionary class struggle that one mode ofproduction is succeeded by another.
Thus, history is presented as a dialectical process of conflicts in the underlying economic
structure (the base) of society fought out in the realm of superstructure through class
struggle.
Marx first formulated his theory in opposition to Hegel's dialectical philosophy of
history. Marx retained the dialectics but replaced Hegel's idealism with a thoroughly
materialist explanation. Hegel interpreted history as the dialectical 'progress in the
consciousness of freedom' . Forms of social organisation thus correspond with
development in the consciousness of freedom. Hence, consciousness determines being.
Consciousness (expressed in its highest form in religion - the 'holy spirit') develops over
historical time through a dialectic struggle and culminates in the bourgeois constitutional
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state - the state as the embodiment of the 'holy spirit' - representing the realm of freedom.
The explanation of historical change is thus a dialectical evolving of the 'Absolute Idea' -
an idealistic progression that expresses itselfmaterially in social, economic and political
forms. In short, it is idealism as a dialectical process determining the material reality of
human life (Fetscher, 1983).
Like Hegel, Marx interpreted history as a dialectical progression but, following
Feuerbach's materialist reinterpretation of Hegel, Marx puts Hegel's dialectics 'back on
its feet' . It is not a progressive development in consciousness (the 'world spirit' or
'Absolute Idea') that determines human material existence, but rather the development of
human material existence that determines consciousness. In addition, human material
existence is subject to a dialectical progression that can be explained through changes in
the economic structure of historical epochs, specifically in the dialectical transformation
of contradictions between the forces ofproduction and the existing relations of
production. Marx transformed Hegel's idealist philosophy into a materialist theory of
history. As Engels stated: "Now idealism was driven from its last refuge, the philosophy
of history; now a materialist treatment of history was propounded, and a method found of
explaining man's 'knowing' by his 'being', instead of, as hithertofore, his 'being' by his
'knowing?' (Anti-Diihring:26-27).
Marx went on to undertake an exhaustive dialectical analysis of the capitalist mode of
production to reveal its inner motions, relations, and contradictions - its underlying
dynamics which influence its historical trends. These were analysed in Chapter 4 of the
thesis and revealed, amongst other things, two critical dynamics inherent to capitalism -
the expansion of capital and the concentration/centralisation of capital. Stated simply,
capitalism relies upon continuous economic growth and this growth results in an
increasing polarisation of wealth. According to Marx, these dynamics contain a
fundamental contradiction. Whilst the enormous productive forces unleashed by
capitalism (which Marx saw as capitalism's historical value) could potentially satisfy the
material needs of human society, the dynamic to concentrate and centralise capital results,
perversely, in a polarisation of material well being and the continuing impoverishment of
a large part of the population. The expansion ofcapital also threatens the biophysical
reproduction of the capitalist mode ofproduction because its interaction with nature is
determined by an incessant need to expand exchange-value rather than relying on socially
determined use-values cognisant of ecological constraints.
The increase in the social production of wealth involves a further contradiction critically
important to an understanding of historical materialism. The increase in social wealth
under capitalism is dependent upon a system ofproduction based upon the exploitation of
both human and non-human nature that results in a fundamental alienation in the
producers of that wealth and between producers and other nature. The actual sources of
wealth, labour and nature, are alienated in the very process of producing that wealth. The
capitalist mode of production separates workers from their means ofproduction, control
over the production process, and from the products of their own labour (and thus from
nature itself). Under capitalism, human labour (and nature) becomes a commodity to be
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bought and sold on the market. Thus, human labour, as a free, conscious practical
activity, the essential, distinguishing human trait (its 'species being' in Marx's terms)
becomes estranged: it is separated from the worker, becomes a commodity, an object of
commerce, and it is subject to the objective laws of commodity production. And nature,
which Marx described as 'man's inorganic body', is likewise commodified and, as such,
becomes estranged from the producer.
Over time, exchange-value, as the driving force of capitalist production, comes to exert
itself to such an extent that the products of human labour in the commodity form, and in
the commodity market, come to dominate the producers themselves. Thus, while human
labour and human relations are reified (that is, human labour is objectified and the
relations between people take on the form of relations between objects) commodities in
particular, and capital in general, take on a life of their own - they become fetishised.
Things (commodities, money, the market, etc.) come to determine people, and people live
their lives according to the dictates of things. As Engels put it: "The product governs the
producers" (Anti-Duhring:259). There is a fundamental inversion of subject and object,
an inversion that is not confined to the superstructure. It is not due to 'false
consciousness', but takes place in reality itself. This is the ultimate estrangement, and it is
critically important to understanding historical materialist's insistence on revolutionary
change. A complete transformation of the socio-economic system is required to overcome
this alienation. A 'political' revolution is insufficient.
These contradictions, which are all manifestations of the fundamental conflict between
the forces ofproduction (the human relationship to nature) and the social relations of
production (the relations between people) have their roots in economics, and are reflected
as social and ecological dysfunctions, which in turn express themselves in social conflict -
conflict between the interests of capital and those interests subordinated to capital. Thus,
Marx posited the division of capitalist society into two opposing classes: the bourgeoisie
(owners and/or controllers of the means of production and employers of wage labour) and
the proletariat (owners of labour power dependent upon its sale as their means of
livelihood). It is the proletariat that Marx identified as the revolutionary force capable of
radically transforming the capitalist mode of production. This would occur through a
revolutionary uprising resulting in the overthrow of the capitalist state and its
replacement, initially with a 'dictatorship of the proletariat' and, following the 'withering
away' of the state, an association of free producers.
According to historical materialism, just as former modes of production have been
transformed so too will the present mode ofproduction give birth to its successor.
Moreover, this transition, although determined 'in the last instance' by objective
economic conditions resulting in periods of crisis and revolutionary potential, will be
realised by human praxis in the form of a proletarian revolutionary movement. However,
the productive progress brought about by capitalism would eliminate the feasibility of,
and the historical rationale for, further class domination. Thus, capitalism is posited as the
last mode of production based upon the differentiation of society into classes. It would
signal the end of human 'pre-history'. The future society would be classless and based
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upon the common ownership of the means ofproduction. Government would be the
'administration of things' rather than the subjugation ofpeople. 'Real history' would then
begin. Human society would pass from the 'realm of necessity' to the 'realm of freedom'.
Society would be regulated by human need rather than exploitation and its social rationale
would take the form of 'from each according to his abilities, to each according to his
need'. Alienation, in all its bourgeois manifestations, would be overcome and society
could fulfill its human potential and overcome its estrangement from nature.
Marx's explanation for historical change, at its most fundamental level, is to be found in
the dialectical resolution of contradictions arising from the economic circumstances
pertaining to a particular historical mode ofproduction. These contradictions essentially
involve conflicts between the forces ofproduction developing within that mode of
production and the existing relations ofproduction. At critical moments, instead of acting
to facilitate the development ofproductive forces, the relations ofproduction act as
'fetters' and impede further progress. Those fetters are cast off through revolutionary
class struggle that replaces the old relations of production with new social arrangements
that enable further development of the productive forces.
This has led some Marxists to theorise an increase in the forces ofproduction as the
'motor' of historical change, or the 'driving force' of history. In this way, history is seen
to be the product of objective economic laws acting outside the realm of human
imperative. Humans thus merely follow the dictates of economic laws, largely
independent of human control. This economic determinism is a misrepresentation of
Marx's view. As Marx and Engels stressed time and time again, the ultimately
determining element in history is the production and reproduction of real human beings,
'men making their own history' , but always within the parameters of a material existence
provided by the past and actively altered by them for the future.
The objective increases in the forces ofproduction, which are real enough and can be
'determined with the precision of natural science', are themselves the result of subjective
factors at work - 'men making their own history'. These subjective factors, which
themselves have a material basis, manifest themselves as objective trends or 'laws' of
economic development. But these laws are merely abstractions of a concrete reality
created by actively producing humans. They are the result of human activity, not the
determining factors ofhuman activity. Humans make their own history, but not
arbitrarily. They make their history according to fundamentally materialist imperatives.
To uncover the subjective factors we must begin the search at the most fundamental
material level of human existence. As Marx and Engels emphasised:
"The premises from which we begin are not arbitrary ones, not dogmas, but real
premises from which abstraction can only be made in the imagination. They are the
real individuals, their activity and the material conditions under which they live, both
those which they find already existing and those produced by their activity... The first
premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals.
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Thus the first fact to be established is the physical organisation of these individuals
and their consequent relations to the rest of nature" (The German Ideology:42).
The first premise of human history is the physical and social organisation ofpeople to
enable the production and reproduction of their material existence - in short, to ensure
their survival (as social individuals and as a species). Thus, if we want to identify a
fundamental driving force for human history we can reduce it to an imperative to increase
material security and ensure reproductive survival of the social group. Initially, this would
have been largely instinctive. Later humans began to consciously organise their social
arrangements to better enable material security and reproductive survival. A primitive
division of labour appeared, and later a defmite class structure evolved out of this division
of labour. Historically, the division of labour, and the differentiation of society into
classes, served to increase the productive potential of succeeding modes ofproduction,
and thus increase material security and ensure reproductive survival. As Engels put it:
"The separation of society into an exploiting and exploited class, a ruling and
oppressed class, was the necessary consequence of the deficient and restricted
development ofproduction in former times. So long as the total social labour only
yields a produce which but slightly exceeds that barely necessary for the existence of
all; so long, therefore, as labour engages all or almost all the time of the great majority
of the members of society - so long, of necessity, this society is divided into classes.
Side by side with the great majority, exclusively bond slaves to labour, arises a class
freed from directly productive labour, which looks after the general affairs of society:
the direction of labour, state business, law, science, art, etc. It is, therefore, the law of
division of labour that lies at the basis of the division into classes (Anti-Diihring:268-
269).
In as much as the division of society into classes served an historical role by increasing
the forces of production, eventually the class system itselfbecomes a fetter on further
human development - on ensuring material security and reproductive survival. As Engels
further stated:
"But if, upon this showing, division into classes has a certain historical justification, it
has this only for a given period, only under given social conditions. It was based upon
the insufficiency ofproduction. It will be swept away by the complete development of
modem productive forces. And, in fact, the abolition of classes in society presupposes
a degree of historical evolution at which the existence, not simply of this or that
particular ruling class, but of any ruling class at all, and, therefore, the existence of
class distinction itself has become an obsolete anachronism. It presupposes, therefore,
the development ofproduction carried out to a degree at which appropriation of the
means ofproduction and of the products, and, with this, ofpolitical domination, of the
monopoly ofculture, and of intellectual leadership by a particular class of society, has
become not only superfluous but economically, politically, intellectually a hindrance to
development" (Anti-Diihring:269).
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Thus, according to the materialist conception of history, the development ofclass society,
culminating in the capitalist mode ofproduction, served to increase the social forces of
production to a level that could potentially provide material well-being and reproductive
security to all of humankind. Class society in general, and the capitalist mode of
production in particular, serves its historical role and eventually renders itself obsolete.
More than this, it renders its own replacement a necessity. It becomes a fetter on further
human development, both in the sense of ensuring the material well-being and
reproductive survival of society, and overcoming the antagonisms, alienation, and social
dysfunction inherent to a class society (and which themselves threaten continued material
security).
Capitalism in particular has engendered such colossal increases in the forces of
production that potentially the material security and reproductive survival of humanity is
possible (leaving aside extra-human events that may threaten both). There is, as Engels
put it: "The possibility of securing for every member of society, by means of socialized
production, an existence not only fully sufficient materially, and becoming day by day
more full, but by an existence guaranteeing to all the free development and exercise of
their physical and mental faculties - this possibility is for the first time here" (Anti-
Duhring:269-270). However, as observed in Chapter 4, capitalism's very success in
increasing the forces ofproduction contains a contradiction. The productive forces
unleashed by capitalism result in the transformation of nature to an extent that threatens
its own biophysical reproduction. In this way, although capitalism contains within itself
the potential to ensure material well-being and reproductive survival for the human
species, at the same time, it actually threatens the continued material well-being and
reproductive survival of humankind.
Thus, capitalism is unable (by its own logic) to overcome the socio-economic and
ecological dysfunctions which it generates. The best it can do is to alleviate short term
conflicts so as to enable increased production. To overcome the more deep-seated
dysfunctions generated by capitalism requires nothing less than the transformation of
capitalism to a mode ofproduction that is capable of successfully addressing these
concerns; in other words, a socio-economic system not reliant upon maximising
exchange-value and 'production for production sake', but rather one based upon the
ecologically rational production of social use-values.
We can see, therefore, that while class societies up to and including capitalism served to
increase the forces ofproduction, and thus assist human material security and
reproductive success, the transition from capitalism to a post-capitalist socio-economic
system, although still driven by a conflict between the forces ofproduction and the
relations ofproduction, does not necessarily rely upon a further increase in the productive
forces but, rather, on the rational use (in a social and ecological sense) of existing
productive forces. According to the tenets of Historical Materialism, it requires transition
to a classless society: one Marx called communism.
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5.3 Transition Theory
Marx and Engels did not attribute the transition from capitalism to communism to
conflicts between the ecological consequences of the forces ofproduction and the
existing relations ofproduction, but referred generally to contradictions between the
forces ofproduction and the relations ofproduction in the sense that the socialisation of
the forces ofproduction (large-scale manufacture, cooperation, division oflabour, etc.)
would prove increasingly incompatible with private ownership of the means of
production and the private appropriation of the results ofproduction.
These contradictions would manifest themselves as socio-economic dysfunctions, such as
the anarchy in production engendered by the capitalist system ofproduction and the
private appropriation of surplus-value which periodically results in crises of
overproduction! underconsumption. Other dynamics inherent to capitalism, such as the
tendency for a falling rate ofprofit or dysfunctions within the credit system, likewise
reflect contradictions between the forces of production and the relations ofproduction
which result in periodic crises. In addition, the alienation and dehumanisation brought
about by the capitalist mode ofproduction would themselves contribute to a proletarian
revolutionary movement aimed at transforming the capitalist mode of production.
It is also true that both Marx and Engels often inferred, and explicitly stated on occasion,
that a transition to communism would further enable development of the forces of
production in the sense of an increase in material production. However, whilst these
aspects are certainly still relevant, let alone essential, to analysing the transition from
capitalism to its succeeding mode ofproduction, we need to re-approach this problem to
account for the historical realities of contemporary capitalism, particularly in regard to its
biophysical reproduction.
It should be borne in mind that widespread ecological degradation and/or resource
depletion were not major concerns in Marx's and Engels' time, although anxieties about
the human/nature relationship were beginning to surface. For example, Marsh's ground-
breaking work, Man and Nature (1864), was published three years before the first volume
of Capital. In it Marsh warned that: "The earth is fast becoming an unfit home for its
noblest inhabitants, and another era of equal human crime and human improvidence...
would reduce it to such a condition of impoverished productiveness, of shattered surface,
of climatic excess, as to threaten the depravation, barbarism, and perhaps even extinction
of the species" (in Bowler, 1992:319).
Similarly, whilst Marx and Engels recognised the possibility for further development in
the forces ofproduction they did not envisage that the human transformation of nature
was unlimited or without consequence. Just as they recognised the civilizing role of the
economy in overcoming the vicissitudes of nature through increased productivity, so too
were they adamant that humans are intimately part of nature and ultimately dependent on
nature. Marx and Engels were well aware of the collapse of earlier civilizations that had
become dysfunctional with their environments. They were also aware of the destructive
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potential of the capitalist mode ofproduction in relation to human and non-human nature.
This is clearly indicated in Marx's own writings, and in Engels' work, particularly his
Dialectics ofNature.
A great deal ofMarx's work was devoted to the immediate environmental conditions of
the industrial proletariat and agricultural workers in regard to their working and living
conditions. Engels also devoted substantial attention to these concerns, publishing in
1845 Conditions ofthe Working Class in England, which dealt explicitly with the squalid,
unhealthy, and grossly polluted environment that the working class were forced to endure
in early English industrial cities. Marx, likewise, for Volume 1 of Capital undertook
painstaking research on the immediate environmental conditions of the industrial
proletariat and agricultural working class, both inside and outside the workplace. Using
Public Health Reports (the 'Blue Books'), Factory Inspectors' Reports, and Reports of
the Children's Employment Commission he laboriously recorded the nutritional
deficiencies of the working poor, the cramped, unventilated living and working quarters,
the lack of sanitation, water supply, and waste disposal, the injurious working conditions
in factory and mine, and the miserable existence of agricultural labourers.
Marx was also well aware of the wider ecological consequences of the expansion of
capital. To begin with, Marx clearly recognised the immense productive powers of
capitalism when he stated: "The bourgeoisie, during its rule of scarce one hundred years,
has created more massive and more colossal productive forces than have all preceding
generations together, subjection ofNature's forces to man, machinery, application of
chemistry to industry and agriculture, steam navigation, railways, electric telephones,
clearing of whole continents for cultivation, canalization of rivers, whole populations
conjured out of the ground - what earlier century had even a presentiment that such
productive forces slumbered in the lap of social labour?" (Communist Manifesto: 37). In
the Grundrisse, Marx likewise underlined the productive potential of capitalism, its giant
impulses to develop the social forces ofproduction. But, simultaneously, he showed how
the specific capitalist form of this development increases many-fold the destructive
potentiality of technology, machinery and exchange-value'gone mad'. That this
destructive potential relates to both human society and other nature is made clear by
Marx, when he stated:
"Just as production founded on capital creates universal industriousness on one side ...
so too does it create on the other side a system of general exploitation of the natural
and human qualities ... For the first time, nature becomes purely an object for
humankind, purely a matter ofutility; ceases to be recognised as a power for itself; and
the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so as to
subjugate it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a means of
production. In accord with this tendency, capital drives beyond national boundaries...
tearing down all the barriers which hem in the development of the forces of
production, the expansion of needs, the all-sided development of production, and the
exploitation and exchange of natural and mental forces" (Grundrisse:409-41 0).
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According to Marx, there are two sources of material wealth - nature and labour. As he
made clear: "Labour is the father of material wealth, the earth is its mother" (Capital
1:134). Elaborating on this elsewhere, he stated: "Labour is not the source of all wealth.
Nature is just as much the source of use-values (and it is surely of such that material
wealth consists!) as labour, which itself is only the manifestation of a force of nature,
human labour-power" (Critique ofthe Gotha Programme; in Grundmann, 1991:96).
That capitalism exploits and degrades both of these sources of wealth is made clear when
Marx, commenting on the effects of modem agriculture and industry, explained that in
modem agriculture, as in urban industry, the increase in the productivity and mobility of
labour is obtained at the cost of debilitating labour-power itself. Moreover, all progress in
capitalist agriculture is gained at the expense, not only of degrading the worker, but of
exploiting the soil; all progress in increasing the fertility of the soil for a given time is a
progress towards ruining the more long-lasting sources of that fertility. The more a
country develops large-scale industry, the more rapid is this process of destruction.
Capitalist production, according to Marx, only develops by simultaneously undermining
the original sources of all wealth - the soil and the worker (Capital 1). As Marx explained
in Capital 3:
"Large-scale industry and industrially pursued large-scale agriculture have the same
effect. If they are originally distinguished by the fact that the former lays waste and
ruins labour-power and thus the natural power of man, whereas the latter does the
same to the natural power of the soil, they link up in the later course of development
since the industrial system applied to agriculture also enervates the workers there,
while industry and trade for their part provide agriculture with the means of exhausting
the soil" (p.950).
Marx remarked elsewhere how the "exploitation and squandering of the vitality of the
soil ... takes the place of conscious rational cultivation of the soil as eternal communal
property, an inalienable condition for the existence and reproduction of a chain of
successive generations of the human race". Preservation of this 'eternal communal
property' requires "the rational cultivation, maintenance and improvement of the soil
itself' (Capital 3:812; in Parsons, 1977:183). Furthermore, in regard to soil fertility, he
explained that capitalist production results in increased urbanisation. This, according to
Marx, has two results. On the one hand, it concentrates the historical motive power of
society; on the other, it disturbs the metabolic interaction between man and the earth, i.e.
it prevents the return to the soil of its constituent elements consumed by man in the form
of food and clothing. Hence, it inhibits the maintenance of the long term fertility of the
soil (Capital 1).
Marx saw the capitalist mode ofproduction as intrinsically destructive of nature. This is
made clear when he states: "The mode ofperceiving nature, under the rule of private
property and money is a real contempt for, and a practical degradation of nature" (On the
Jewish Question; in Parsons, 1977: 17-18). In a statement remarkably resonant with
present day concerns for future generations, he stated: "From the standpoint of a higher
183
socio-economic formation, the private property ofparticular individuals in the earth will
appear just as absurd as the private property of one man in other men. Even an entire
society, a nation, or all simultaneously existing societies taken together, are not the
owners of the earth. They are simply its [occupants], its beneficiaries, and have to
bequeath it in an improved state to succeeding generations, as boni patres familias [good
heads of the household]" (Capital 3:911).
However, it was Engels who elaborated further on the ecological implications of the
capitalist mode ofproduction. For example, in Dialectics ofNature, Engels explicitly
recognised the interdependencies of nature. He stated: "In nature nothing takes place in
isolation. Everything affects and is affected by every other thing, and it is mostly because
this manifold motion and interaction is forgotten that our natural scientists are prevented
from gaining a clear insight into the simplest things" (p.459). He talked specifically of the
ecological effects of human society on nature: "We have seen how goats have prevented
the regeneration of forests in Greece; on the island of St. Helena, goats and pigs brought
by the first arrivals have succeeded in exterminating its old vegetation almost completely,
and so have prepared the ground for the spreading of plants brought by later sailors and
colonists" (Dialectics ofNature:459). He observed that while humans use nature for their
own ends, in fact master nature, he makes it clear that this is not in the sense of
dominating or ruling over nature. He stated:
"Let us not, however, flatter ourselves overmuch on account of our human victories
over nature. For each such victory nature takes its revenge on us. Each victory, it is
true, in the first place brings about the results we expected, but in the second and third
places it has quite different, unforeseen effects which only too often cancel the first.
The people who, in Mesopotamia, Greece, Asia Minor and elsewhere, destroyed the
forests to obtain cultivable land, never dreamed that by removing along with the
forests the collecting centres and reservoirs of moisture they were laying the basis for
the present forlorn state of those countries. When the Italians of the Alps used up the
pine forests on the southern slopes, so carefully cherished on the northern slopes, they
had no inkling that by doing so they were cutting at the roots of the dairy industry in
their region; they had still less inkling that they were thereby depriving their mountain
springs of water for the greater part of the year, and making it possible for them to
pour still more furious torrents on the plains during the rainy seasons ..." (Dialectics of
Nature:460-461).
Then critically important to a correct understanding ofMarx and Engels' view on the
human relationship to nature, he made the following statement: "Thus at every step we
are reminded that we by no means rule over nature like a conqueror over a foreign
people, like someone standing outside nature - but that we, with flesh, blood and brain,
belong to nature, and exist in its midst, and that all our mastery ofit consists in the fact
that we have the advantage over all other creatures ofbeing able to learn its laws and
apply them correctly" (Dialectics ofNature:460-461; my emphasis).
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Engels went on to discuss the inability ofcapitalist social relations to take into account
social effects of generalised commodity production. He argued that as individual
capitalists are engaged in production and exchange for the sake of the immediate profit,
only the nearest, most immediate results ofproduction are taken into account. As long as
the individual manufacturer or merchant sells a manufactured or purchased commodity
with the usual profit, he is satisfied and does not concern himself with what afterwards
becomes of the commodity and its purchasers (Dialectics ofNature). Then, most
significantly, he referred also to ecological effects:
"The same thing applies to the natural effects of the same actions. What cared the
Spanish planters in Cuba, who burned down forests on the slopes of mountains and
obtained from the ashes sufficient fertilizer for one generation of very highly profitable
coffee trees - what cared they that the heavy tropical rainfall afterwards washed away
the unprotected upper stratum of the soil, leaving behind only bare rock! In relation to
nature, as to society, the present mode ofproduction is predominantly concerned only
about the immediate, the most tangible results; and then surprise is expressed that the
remote effects of actions directed to this end turn out to be quite different, are mostly
quite the opposite in character. .." (Dialectics ofNature:463; my emphasis).
He explained that existing social relations ofproduction are such that they cannot address
the long term social and ecological effects of capitalism. When discussing the
development ofclass societies he observed that "the interests of the ruling class became
the driving factor ofproduction, since production was no longer restricted to providing
the barest means of subsistence... This has been put into effect most completely in the
capitalist mode of production... The individual capitalists, who dominate production and
exchange, are able to concern themselves only with the most immediate useful effect of
their actions. Indeed, even this useful effect - inasmuch as it is a question of the
usefulness of the article that is produced or exchanged - retreats far into the background,
and the sole incentive becomes the profit to be made on selling" (Dialectics of
Nature:463). Here, Engels is talking of both the social and ecological effects of
capitalism. He is postulating, in essence, that the capitalist, acting in the objective
interests of self-expanding capital (short term profit) is incapable of addressing the wider
adverse social and ecological effects of commodity production.
When discussing the control and regulation of the social and ecological effects of
production Engels postulated that as our knowledge increases so too does our ability to
regulate these effects: "But in this sphere too, by long and often cruel experience and by
collecting and analyzing historical material, we are gradually learning to get a clear view
of the indirect, more remote social effects of our production activity, and so are afforded
an opportunity to control and regulate these effects as well [as the ecological]" (Dialectics
ofNature:462). And, "with every day that passes we are acquiring a better understanding
of these laws and getting to perceive both the more immediate and the more remote
consequences of our interference with the traditional course of nature" (Dialectics of
Nature:461). He concluded, in a statement that clearly rejects the dualism of Christianity
and of much Enlightenment thinking: "But the more this progresses the more will men
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not only feel but also know their oneness with nature, and the more impossible will
become the senseless and unnatural idea of a contrast between mind and matter, man and
nature, soul and body, such as arose after the decline of classical antiquity in Europe and
obtained its highest elaboration in Christianity" (Dialectics ofNature:461).
However, and crucially, Engels made abundantly clear that as knowledge increases, mere
reformism is inadequate to ameliorate these effects, that alleviation of adverse social and
ecological effects of the capitalist mode ofproduction requires radical change to the mode
ofproduction - in short, transformation. For example, he stated: "This regulation,
however, requires something more than mere knowledge. It requires a complete
revolution in our hitherto existing mode ofproduction, and simultaneously a revolution in
our whole contemporary social order" (Dialectics ofNature:462). This statement by
Engels is most revealing. Here he is admitting that the effective amelioration of both the
social and the ecological maladies resulting from capitalism requires radical
transformation in the capitalist mode ofproduction.
The relationship between human and other nature is fundamental to Marx's and Engels'
view of both the failings of capitalism, and the potentialities ofpost-capitalist society.
Contrary to the main thrust of Enlightenment thinking, they did not pose a 'duality of
man and nature'. In fact, they ridiculed such a notion. Rather, they insisted upon the
fundamental unity of human and other nature; other nature seen as 'man's inorganic
body'. This is not to deny the human role in the transformation ofnature (as part of
nature). This is clearly revealed in Marx's concept of a 'second nature'. But whilst
animals transform nature unwittingly, humans have the ability (this is, in fact, what
differentiates humans from other animals) to 'master' or 'dominate' their interchange
with nature; to construct a second nature in the sense of a dialectically aware, and
creatively controlled relationship with other nature.
It has been wrongfully asserted, and commonly misunderstood, that Marx advocated an
anthropocentric domination of nature in the sense of a human dominated subjugation and
exploitation ofnature. Nothing could be further from the truth. Certainly he recognised
the progressive aspects of the increased social productivity of labour in the sense of
enabling humans to free themselves from the vicissitudes ofnature - the 'realm of
necessity' as he called it. This he saw as enabling human potentiality to reach its full
manifestation free from the demands of procuring immediate sustenance. In other words,
entering the 'realm of freedom'. However, the realm of freedom should not be understood
in the sense of human subjugation of nature. Rather, it is in understanding nature, and
controlling their interactions with nature, that humans enter the realm of freedom. As
Engels explained:
"Hegel was the first to state correctly the relation between freedom and necessity. To
him, freedom is the insight into necessity... 'Necessity is blind only in so far as it is
not understood' [Hegel]. Freedom does not consist in any dreamt-of independence
from natural laws, but in the knowledge of these laws, and in the possibility this gives
of systematically making them work towards definite ends ... Freedom therefore
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consists in the control over ourselves and over external nature, a control founded on
knowledge of natural necessity; it is therefore necessarily a product of historical
development" (Anti-Diihring: 105-106).
To Marx and Enge1s, true freedom is only possible in a post-capitalist society; "a society
in which there are no longer class distinctions or anxiety over the means of subsistence
for the individual, and in which for the first time there can be talk of real human freedom,
ofan existence in harmony with the laws ofnature that have become known" (Anti-
Duhring:l06; my emphasis). As Marx explained: "Freedom in this field can only consist
in socialized man, the associated producers, rationally regulating their interchange with
nature, bringing it [the interchange] under common control, instead of being ruled by it as
by the blind forces ofnature; and achieving this with the least expenditure of energy and
under conditions most favourable to, and worthy of, their human nature" (Capital 3; in
Smith, 1984:64).
Misunderstanding concerning the human relationship to nature partly arises over Marx'
and Enge1s' use of the term 'domination' or 'mastery' of nature. This has been widely
misunderstood as meaning human subjugation and exploitation of nature. Grundmann
(1991) has correctly argued that it should be understood rather as the 'conscious control
of nature', so that 'if nature is harnessed, it is not by violating her laws, but by obeying
them' thus 'domination does not imply violation' (p.59-62). The concept of domination
or mastery ofnature, as Marx and Enge1s used it, is most properly understood as the
conscious control or mastery over the human relationship with nature - the rationalisation
(in a dialectical fashion) of human interchange or interaction with nature.
In addition, Marx's distinction between 'first' and 'second' nature has led some to assert
that he advocated a total transformation of nature, a subjugation of 'first' (in the sense of
untouched) nature to humanly dominated 'second' nature. Once again this is a
misunderstanding of Marx's position. Marx recognised that first nature, in the sense of
pristine nature, was destined to be a thing of the past. All nature would become second
nature, but not as a subjugation of first nature but as an inevitable extension of second
nature - in fact, as the reconciliation of humankind with other nature. In this sense, Marx
talked of nature as 'man's inorganic body' and his 'spiritual inorganic nature'. He stated:
"Species-life, both for man and for animals, consists physically in the fact that man,
like animals, lives from inorganic nature; and because man is more universal than
animals, so too is the area of inorganic nature from which he lives more universal. Just
as plants, animals, stones, air, light, etc., theoretically form a part of human
consciousness, partly as objects of science and partly as objects of art - his spiritual
inorganic nature, his spiritual means of life, which he must first prepare before he can
enjoy and digest them - so too in practice they form a part of human life and human
activity. In a physical sense man lives only from these natural products, whether in the
form of nourishment, heating, clothing, shelter, etc." (Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts; in Early Writings:327-328).
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First nature becomes second nature because the whole of nature is 'man's inorganic
body'. The universality of humankind transforms all nature into second nature - but it is a
second nature that sees humans as intimately part of nature, not estranged from nature nor
dominating nature. As Marx explained:
"The universality of man manifests itself in practice in that universality which makes
the whole of nature his inorganic body, (1) as a direct means oflife and (2) as the
matter, the object and the tool of his life activity. Nature is man's inorganic body, that
is to say nature in so far as it is not the human body. Man lives from nature, i.e. nature
is his body, and he must maintain a continuing dialogue with it if he is not to die. To
say that man's physical and mental life is linked to nature simply means that nature is
linked to itself, for man is part of nature" (Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts;
in Early Writings:328).
Humankind, as an integral part of nature, forms a dialectical relationship with other
nature ('man's inorganic body'). Humans transform other nature, and by doing so
transform themselves as part of nature. It is this intercourse with other nature through
human praxis ('unalienated', conscious, creative social labour) that constitutes human
'essence', human 'species being', the distinguishing human characteristic. As Parsons
(1977:xi) put it: "Man's dialectical relations with nature, in which man transforms it and
is thereby transformed, is the very essence of his own nature". For Marx and Engels,
humans are inseparable from nature. Human praxis, human 'species being' is precisely
social interaction between human and other nature.
We can see from the above analysis that both Marx and Engels were well aware of the
possible adverse environmental effects that could arise from human economic activities.
The immediate environmental effects of the industrial revolution on the working class in
Britain were well known to them. A major part of their work was devoted to studying the
appalling living and working conditions suffered by the industrial proletariat of that time.
These were the most pressing environmental issues confronting Marx and Engels. At the
same time, the wider ecological effects arising from the human transformation of nature
did not go unnoticed. Their comments, as we have seen, reveal a definite awareness of the
ultimate biophysical constraints within which human activity must take place. However,
in the historical context in which they were writing, these were not the most pressing
issues of the time.
At the same time, both Marx and Engels were profoundly aware that humans were
intimately part of nature and ultimately dependent upon nature. In stark contrast to the
main thrust of Enlightenment thinking, they did not pose a duality of man and nature but
insisted upon the fundamental unity of humankind and other nature. Capitalism had, in
fact, contributed to the disruption of this unity, it had 'alienated' humankind from its
inorganic body - from other nature. This alienation could only be overcome by
transforming the capitalist mode of production to a future socio-economic system where
humankind once more become reconciled with other nature - become part of nature.
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What Marx and Engels envisaged in this higher phase of human development was a
planned, controlled, rational interaction with nature; a 'mastery' or 'domination' over
human relations with the environment. The exploitative, ecologically degrading capitalist
mode ofproduction predicated on the self-expansion of capital would be replaced with a
socially planned socio-economic system subject to the determination of social needs and
wants within the parameters of a socially and ecologically rationalised interchange with
nature. This could only occur under a particular social arrangement - a free association of
independent producers where ownership of the social means of production was held in
common, where the 'private ownership of nature was as absurd as the ownership of one
man by another', a society where all human beings would be free to develop fully their
human potentialities and freely regulate their interaction with nature - in short, a
communist society.
Thus, the transition from the capitalist mode ofproduction to a post-capitalist socio-
economic system is fundamentally different from earlier transitions from one mode of
production to another. Previously, all class societies, culminating in the capitalist mode of
production, served to increase the productive capabilities of society - to ensure material
security and reproductive survival. Paradoxically, this very increase in productive forces
now threatens the future material well-being and reproductive survival of humankind.
Class society has now become obsolete. More than this, as Engels put it, it has become
"not only superfluous but economically, politically, intellectually a hindrance to
development" (Anti-Duhring:269; my emphasis). It has become socially and ecologically
a threat to the continuing material security and reproductive survival of contemporary
society.
The transition from capitalism to a post-capitalist mode of production is thus not
primarily concerned with the liberation of further productive forces, but instead with the
rational use of those already unleashed by former modes of production. That is, it is more
concerned with redirecting the forces ofproduction to socially determined (and
ecologically bounded) ends. Whilst in particular spheres there may be a need for further
development ofproductive forces in accordance with social requirements and within
ecological parameters, in other areas there may well be a reduction in productive forces if
this better serves material security and reproductive survival. Once humanity has moved
from the 'realm of necessity' to the 'realm of freedom', the ability to socially and
ecologically rationalise production may well involve a reduction in productive capacity.
This is now made possible because production is not 'production for production sake', i.e.
to serve the dictates of self-expanding capital, but production determined by social need
and cognisant of ecological limits.
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5.4 The Theory of Proletarian Revolution
Having analysed the objective determinants for the transformation of capitalism it would
be a fundamental error to assume from that analysis that the transition to a post capitalist
society would occur spontaneously, or inevitably, on the basis of these contradictions.
This is merely 'utopianism', 'misplaced positivism' or 'vulgar economism', a malady that
afflicted the theorists of the Second International, such as Kautsky and Plekanov. It also
harbours the twin dangers of 'fatalistic passivity' and 'latent reformism'.
In fact, as Mandel (1976a:83-84) emphasised: "Marx was as far removed from any
fatalistic belief in the automatic effects of economic determinism as any social thinker
could be. He repeated over and over again that men made, and had to make, their own
history, but not in any arbitrary way nor independently from the material conditions in
which they found themselves". Marx himself stated: "History does nothing: it does not
possess immense riches, it does not fight battles. It is not 'history' which uses men as a
means of achieving - as if it were an individual person - its own ends. History is nothing
but the activity ofmen in pursuit of their ends" (The Holy Family:300). He insisted that:
"Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not
make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly
encountered, given and transmitted from the past". Thus, Marx proclaimed: "The
traditions of all the dead generations weigh like a nightmare on the brain of the living"
(The Eighteenth Brumaire ofLouis Bonaparte; in McLellan, 1971:232).
It would also be unwise to declare that capitalism will catastrophically collapse at some
particular point in time (although the possibility cannot be ruled out). As Mandel
(1976a:83) pointed out: "Marx never predicted any sudden and automatic collapse of the
capitalist system in one 'final' crisis, due to a single economic 'cause'. In the famous
Chapter 32 of Capital 1, 'The Historic Tendency ofCapital Accumulation', Marx
describes economic tendencies provoking a reaction from social forces ... But ... [t]hey
have to be consciously utilized, at privileged moments of social crisis, to bring about the
revolutionary overthrow of the system".
To these moments of social crisis we can add, in contemporary capitalism, increasing
instances of ecological crisis. It must not be forgotten, however, that both are
manifestations of underlying economic contradictions. Once again, it is unlikely that these
contradictions will result in sudden or catastrophic collapse in the global ecology
(although the possibility cannot be ruled out). More likely, these increasing moments of
ecological dysfunction are likely to manifest themselves on local and regional scales, and,
in accord with Marx's view on social crises, have to be consciously utilised in an active
attempt to resolve the fundamental causes, i.e. through the conscious transformation of
the capitalist mode of production.
The crucial point is that increasing social and ecological crises (determined by underlying
economic contradictions), or even the collapse of global capitalism, will not automatically
and inevitably result in a progressive transition to communism. Indeed, as Mandel
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(1976a) pointed out, Classical Marxists, following the young Marx, formulated their
prognosis in the form of a dilemma: socialism or barbarism? The crisis (or crises), if
severe enough, may result in collapse of the socio-economic organisation to the point of
regression to tribalism or social disintegration (as is already occurring in parts of Africa)
or, alternatively, to the imposition of authoritarianism in the form of fascism or military
dictatorship (as occurred in Germany, Italy and Spain during the inter-war period). If less
severe, capitalism may reconfigure itself to overcome such challenges (such as after the
Great Depression).
To bring about progressive transition from capitalism to communism (crucially during
periods of crises) requires the active intervention of human agency - 'men making their
own history' - or what has been called the 'subjective factor'. And this subjective role
Marx assigned to a particular group within society: a revolutionary proletarian movement,
conscious of its historic role, and dedicated to replacing the private ownership of the
means ofproduction with an association of free producers. In other words, between the
growing economic, social and ecological contradictions of the capitalist mode of
production on the one hand, and the transformation of capitalism on the other, there is a
necessary mediation: the development of an active, class conscious proletariat. As
Mandel (1976a:84) emphasised: "Any theory of the collapse [transformation] of
capitalism, therefore, can only present itself as Marxist if it is a theory ofconscious
overthrow of capitalism, that is, a theory of socialist revolution".
It should be borne in mind, however, that the expectation that the capitalist mode of
production will inevitably generate crises, and that these moments of crisis provide the
terrain upon which the conscious transformation of capitalism can take place, is a central
tenet of Marx's theory of historical materialism and of his theory ofproletarian
revolution. Under any other interpretation, revolutionary change is in danger of being
seen as regressing into mere reformism, a tendency against which Marx railed against
time and time again, and which has been shown historically to be incapable of widespread
socio-economic transformation. According to Luxemburg (1937), the theory of capitalist
breakdown [crises] constitutes "the cornerstone of scientific socialism [and] if one
admits ... that capitalist development does not move in the direction of its own ruin, then
socialism ceases to be objectively necessary" (in McLellan, 1979:44).
Marx's theory ofproletarian revolution began to emerge in the early 1840s. In A
Contribution to the Critique ofHegel's Philosophy ofRight. Introduction (1843-44) he
invoked for the first time the proletariat as both subject and protagonist of active
revolution (Colletti, 1975). In the Contribution, Marx proposed the proletariat as the
agent of revolutionary transformation. He posited the proletariat as the 'material weapon'
of revolution and philosophy as its 'intellectual weapon'. For example, he stated: "Just as
philosophy finds its material weapons in the proletariat, so the proletariat finds its
intellectual weapons in philosophy... The head of this emancipation is philosophy, its
heart the proletariat. Philosophy cannot realize itself without the transcendence of the
proletariat, and the proletariat cannot transcend itself without the realization of
philosophy" (Contribution; in Early Writings:257).
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Kolakowski (1978: 127) stated in this regard: "The Introduction to a Critique ofHegel's
Philosophy ofRight is regarded as a crucial text in Marx's intellectual development, as it
is here that he expresses for the first time the idea of a speciftc historical mission of the
proletariat, and the interpretation of revolution not as a violation of history but as a
fulfillment of its innate tendency".
Marx also proposed the proletariat as the 'universal human interest', thus the
emancipation of the proletariat would coincide with the emancipation of all society. In the
past all revolutions had been 'partial' political revolutions. They had merely replaced one
exploiter with another. This was described by Marx as human 'pre-history'. Real history
would begin with the proletarian revolution, which would be social and not merely
political - it would achieve universal emancipation by revolutionising material life, i.e.
socio-economic life. As Marx and Engels stated in the Communist Manifesto: "All
previous historical movements were movements of minorities, or in the interests of
minorities. The proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the
immense majority, in the interests of the immense majority" (PA5).
In that respect Marx talked of a 'radical revolution' which will result in 'universal human
emancipation'. Its basis is that one particular class undertakes, from its 'particular
situation', the universal emancipation of society. This class liberates the 'whole of
society'. Marx stated: "No class ofcivil society can play this role without awakening a
moment of enthusiasm in itself and in the masses: a moment in which this class
fraternizes and fuses with society in general, becomes identifted with it and is
experienced and acknowledged as its universal representative; a moment in which its
claim and rights are truly the rights and claims of society itself and in which it is in reality
the heart and head of society. Only in the name of the universal rights of society can a
particular class lay claim to universal domination" (Contribution; in Early Writings:254).
And what is this class? Marx replied:
"This is our answer. In the formation of a class with radical chains, a class ofcivil
society which is not a class of civil society, a class which is the dissolution of all
classes, a sphere which has a universal character because of its universal suffering and
which lays claim to no particular right because the wrong it suffers is not a particular
wrong but wrong in general; a sphere of society which can no longer lay claim to a
historical title, but merely to a human one, which does not stand in one-sided
opposition to the consequences but in all-sided opposition to the premises of the ...
political system; and finally a sphere which cannot emancipate itself without
emancipating itself from - and thereby emancipating - all the other spheres of society,
which is, in a word, the total loss of humanity and which can therefore redeem itself
only through the total redemption of humanity. This dissolution of society as a
particular class is the proletariat" (Contribution; in Early Writings:256).
For the proletariat to emancipate itself, and thus emancipate all of society, it must first
become conscious of its historical role. According to Marx, a 'radical' revolution will not
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occur spontaneously, nor simply as an anarchic reaction against oppression, although both
of these elements may contribute to it. It must be the action of 'men making their own
history' fully conscious of the task at hand. Thus, Marx placed great importance on the
'awakening' or 'reform' ofproletarian consciousness. The proletariat, as the 'universal
human interest' must become aware of its own consciousness, its own place in history. As
Marx explained in a letter to Ruge (1843): "The reform of consciousness consists entirely
in making the world aware of its own consciousness, in arousing it from its dream of
itself, in explaining its own actions to it ... It will then become plain that the world has
long since dreamed of something of which it needs only to become conscious for it to
possess it in reality" (Early Writings:209).
This is not to suggest that consciousness is raised by offering 'utopian' ideals of the
perfect society, as the utopian socialists in Marx's time had proposed. Rather, the reform
of consciousness would reveal a reality and an historical process which had been
'mystified' or 'inverted' by bourgeois consciousness. It would make explicit an historical
movement which had previously been hidden, but was nevertheless taking place. It would
make conscious that which was previously unconscious but nevertheless real. This
differentiated 'scientific socialism' from the utopian variety. Kolakowski (1978:223)
elaborated:
"It is a demystified consciousness, presenting itself from the outset as awareness of
actual reality, and by the same token a revolutionary consciousness, that is to say a
practical attempt to change the world by violently destroying the political institutions
that protect the existing order. In that consciousness, but not otherwise, historical
inevitability and freedom of action are the same: as we read in the Theses on
Feuerbach, 'The coincidence of the changing of circumstances and of human activity
can be conceived and rationally understood only as revolutionary praxis"'.
As Marx continued in his letter to Ruge (1843), " ...we do not anticipate the world with
our dogmas but instead attempt to discover the new world through the critique of the old"
(Early Writings:207). It was through critique of the existing order that consciousness
would be raised. The task was to 'drag the old world into the full light of day' and thus
'give positive shape to the new one' . As Marx emphatically stated: "Ifwe have no
business with the construction of the future or with organizing it for all times there can be
no doubt about the task confronting us at present: the ruthless criticism of the existing
order, ruthless in that it will shrink neither from its own discoveries nor from conflict
with the powers that be" (Letter to Ruge, 1843; in Early Writings:207).
Critique thus becomes a 'material force' or 'material weapon' in the proletarian struggle.
It becomes a material force through raising a revolutionary class consciousness. Which is
not to imply that human emancipation is won by philosophical argument or persuasion in
place of insurrection. Rather, the necessary insurrection depends upon a revolutionary
class consciousness, which in turn relies upon an awareness of' actual' reality exposed by
critique. As Marx put it: "Clearly the weapon of criticism cannot replace the criticism of
weapons, and material force must be overthrown by material force. But theory also
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becomes a material force once it has gripped the masses" (Contribution; in Early
Writings:251).
Criticism is not simply an end in itself. It becomes a means to an end - and that end is to
raise a universal proletarian consciousness. As Marx stated: " ... criticism is not a passion
of the head but the head ofpassion. It is not a scalpel but a weapon. Its object is its
enemy, which it aims not to refute but to destroy... Criticism is no longer an end in itself,
but simply a means. The essential force that moves it is indignation and its essential task
is denunciation" (Contribution; in Early Writings:247). Once again, however, this does
not involve utopian visions. It is concerned with raising consciousness by exposure of
'actual' reality through the critique of 'inverted' and 'mystified' reality. As Marx
continued:
"This does not mean that we shall confront the world with new doctrinaire principles
and proclaim: Here is the truth, on your knees before it! It means that we shall develop
for the world new principles from the existing principles of the world. We shall not
say: Abandon your struggles, they are mere folly; let us provide you with the true
campaign slogans. Instead we shall simply show the world why it is struggling and
consciousness of this is a thing it must acquire whether it wishes or not" (Letter to
Ruge, 1843; in Early Writings:209).
Not only must proletarian consciousness be raised to enable a revolutionary movement to
develop, the revolution itself will awaken class consciousness. In The German Ideology
Marx and Engels proclaimed: "Both for the production on a mass scale of this
Communist consciousness, and for the success of the cause itself, the alteration of men on
a mass scale is necessary, an alteration which can only take place in a practical
movement, in a revolution; this revolution is necessary, therefore, not only because the
ruling class cannot be overthrown in any other way, but also because the class
overthrowing it can only in a revolution succeed in ridding itself of all the muck of ages
and become fitted to found society anew". Thus: "In revolutionary activity, the changing
of oneself coincides with the changing of circumstances" (in McLellan, 1971:225).
In his short essay, Critical Notes on the Article 'The King ofPrussia and Social Reform'
(1844), Marx outlined the necessity for a socialist revolution, even though essentially
social in content, to have a political form. According to Marx, all revolution - the
overthrow of the existing ruling power and the dissolution of the old order is - a political
act. Without revolution socialism cannot be made possible. It therefore 'requires' this
political act. The proletariat is again invoked as the 'active agent' (Early Writings:420).
And to accomplish this 'political act' the proletariat must organise as a political party. In
the Resolution ofthe London Conference (1871) Marx stated:
"In its struggle against the collective power of the possessing classes the proletariat can
act as a class only by constituting itself as a distinct political party, opposed to all the
old parties formed by the possessing classes. This constitution of the proletariat into a
political party is indispensable to ensure the triumph of the social revolution and of its
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ultimate goal: the abolition ofclasses. The coalition of the forces of the working class,
already achieved by the economic struggle, must also serve, in the hands of this class,
as a lever in its struggle against the political power of its exploiters. As the lords of the
land and of capital always make use of their political privileges to defend and
perpetuate their economic monopolies and to enslave labour, the conquest ofpolitical
power becomes the great duty of the proletariat" (in McLellan, 1971:204).
The Communist Manifesto, perhaps Marx's and Engels' most explicit statement on the
proletariat's role in revolutionary transformation, was written in 1848 as the programme
for the newly formed Communist League. The Manifesto first describes the historical
development of the modern classes. It outlines how as the bourgeoisie, i.e. capital, is
developed, in the same proportion is the proletariat, the modern working class developed.
Society as a whole is more and more splitting into two great hostile camps, into two great
classes, directly facing one another: bourgeoisie and proletariat. With the development of
industry the proletariat not only increases in numbers; it becomes concentrated in greater
masses. Thus, the advance of industry replaces the isolation of the workers, due to
competition, by their revolutionary combination, due to association. The development of
modern industry, therefore, cuts from under its own feet the very foundation on which the
bourgeoisie produces and appropriates products. "What the bourgeoisie, therefore
produces, above all, are its own grave-diggers" (Communist Manifesto:39-46).
It was thus the industrial proletariat that Marx and Engels proposed as the leading force,
the vanguard movement, of the proletariat as a whole. It was the industrial proletariat,
organising at that time into 'giant industrial armies', which would provide the conscious
active revolutionary force, and which would draw in other disparate elements of the
proletariat. Consequently it would be the most advanced industrialised nations that would
first undergo the coming revolution.
Even in Marx's time, however, that did not prove an adequate explanation of or
programme for the complexity of the social formation opposing capital, particularly in
regard to the peasantry still widespread in many industrialising or pre-industrial countries.
It is a matter of historical record, moreover, that successful proletarian revolutions have
occurred in countries where the industrial proletariat was not well advanced (as in Russia)
or practically non-existent (as in China, Cuba, and Indo-China). In Russia the revolution
was a popular uprising consisting of three major elements, workers, the armed forces
(war-weary soldiers and sailors) and part of the peasantry. The revolutions in China,
Cuba, and Indo-China were largely peasant uprisings. Marx did, however, later in his life
admit to the possibility of revolution in Russia. A year before his death he stated: "If the
Russian revolution becomes the signal for a proletarian revolution in the West, so that
both complement each other, then the present Russian system of community ownership of
land could serve as the starting point for a communist development" (Communist
Manifesto, Preface to the Russian Edition of 1882:6).
The Communist Manifesto was written on the eve of the 1848 revolutionary uprisings in
Europe. At the time, Marx and Engels were hopeful that these uprisings would provide
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the catalyst for a genuine proletarian revolution. This, however, proved unrealistic. The
uprisings of 1848 were definitively defeated as proletarian revolutions and, as Engels later
admitted, "the state of economic development on the Continent at that time was not, by a
long way, ripe for the elimination of capitalist production". They merely "prepared and
flattened the ground on which the bourgeois republic could be founded and erected"
(Introduction to The Class Struggles in France; in Blackburn, 1976:12).
According to McLellan (1971), Marx had become convinced of the importance of
economic factors in determining the possibility of revolution. His economic studies led
him to the conclusion that a successful revolution could only be the result of a severe
economic crisis. As Marx put it: "A new revolution is possible only in consequence of a
new crisis. It is, however, just as certain as this crisis" (in McLellan, 1971:226).
Throughout the 1850s he expected the crisis that would provoke a revolution. Later he
took a more long-term view of the economic causes of revolution. In the Grundrisse
(1859) the impression is given that capitalism has a long way to go before it develops all
the productive forces within the capitalist mode ofproduction (McLellan, 1971). As he
stated in The Civil War in France: "The organisation of the revolutionary elements as a
class presupposes the existence of all the productive forces that could be engendered in
the womb of the old society" (in McLellan, 1971:225).
That is a point Marx made often. The transition from one mode of production to another
will not occur until all the productive forces within the preceding mode are fully
developed and the seeds of the new mode of production exist in the womb of the old.
Marx, in the Revelations on the Cologne Communist Trial (1852) intoned the following
warning: "What we say to the workers is: You will have fifteen, twenty, fifty years of
civil war and national struggle and this is not merely to bring about a change in society
but also to change yourselves and prepare yourselves for the exercise ofpolitical power".
As Blackbum (1976:13) pointed out: "Marx's concern to establish the real workings of
the economic and political order was directly associated with his understanding that the
working class would only realise its potential as a revolutionary force in the course of an
extended series of class struggles in which it would develop its political capacity".
The Paris uprising in 1871, in the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War, was a decisive
event in the development of Marx's politics (Blackburn, 1976). The experience of the
Paris Commune - where the workers for the first time held political power - provided
invaluable lessons for future proletarian revolutionary movements. Above all, it had
shown that "the working class cannot take hold of the ready-made state apparatus and
wield it for its own purposes" (Engels, Preface to the English Edition of the Communist
Manifesto: 14).
The state, according to Marx, was not only the public representation of private interests,
i.e. the interests of capital (a position he had expressed in his earlier writings), it was also
an instrument of repression for the protection of capital. In Marx's early writings, the
Critique ofHegel's Doctrine ofthe State (1843) and On the Jewish Question (1843), he
had developed the argument that the modem representative state acts as guarantor of
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private property. As Colletti (1975) pointed out, both texts arrive at the same conclusion-
that the political constitution of modem representative states is in reality the 'constitution
ofprivate property' . In The German Ideology (1846) Marx and Engels stated: "Through
the emancipation ofprivate property from the community, the state has become a separate
entity, beside and outside civil society; but it is nothing more than the form of
organization which the bourgeoisie necessarily adopts both for internal and external
purposes, for the mutual guarantee of their property and interests" (p.80). This is the view
that Marx and Engels summed up in the Communist Manifesto when they stated: "The
executive of the modem state is but a committee for managing the common affairs of the
whole bourgeoisie" (p.33).
The state is also theorised as an organ of force and repression. Marx wrote in this regard:
"The centralized state power, with its ubiquitous organs of standing army, police
bureaucrats, clergy and judicature - organs arranged after the plan of a systematic and
hierarchical division of labour... the state power assumes more and more the character of
the national power ofcapital over labour, of a public force organized for social
enslavement, of an engine of class despotism. After every revolution marking a
progressive phase in the class struggle, the purely repressive character of the state power
stands out in bolder and bolder relief' (Address to the General Council, The Civil War in
France:206-207).
More fundamentally, Marx came to the conclusion that the state was essentially the
negation of humankind. In the Paris Manuscripts he declared the state to be an expression
of human alienation similar to religion, law and morality, and equally based on a
particular mode ofproduction (McLellan, 1971). In his Critique ofHegel's Doctrine of
the State (1843), Marx wrote of the 'abstraction', 'separation' and 'estrangement' of the
modem political state from civil society (i.e. the public from the private). To overcome
the separation of state and civil society requires the abolition of classes, i.e. the
universalising ofproletarian interests. Once accomplished, the separation of state and
society no longer exists because society is an organism of solidarity and homogenous
interests, rather than class interests, and the distinct 'political' sphere of the 'general
interest' vanishes along with the division between governors and governed (Colletti,
1975). As Marx and Engels explained:
"When, in the course of development, class distinctions have disappeared, and all
production has been concentrated in the hands of a vast association of the whole
nation, the public power will lose its political character. Political power, properly so
called, is merely the organised power of one class for oppressing another. If the
proletariat during its contest with the bourgeoisie is compelled, by the force of
circumstances, to organise itself as a class, if, by means of a revolution, it makes itself
the ruling class, and, as such, sweeps away by force the old conditions ofproduction,
then it will, along with these conditions, have swept away the conditions for the
existence of class antagonisms and of classes generally, and will thereby have
abolished its own supremacy as a class. In place of the old bourgeois society, with its
classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free
197
development of each is the condition for the free development of all" (Communist
Manifesto: 58-59).
Thus, the proletarian revolution must overthrow the state and initially replace it with 'a
government of the people by the people', in other words, a 'dictatorship of the
proletariat'. Marx stated in the Critique ofthe Gotha Programme (1875) that freedom
consists in converting the state from an organ superior to society into one completely
subordinate to it and that there will exist a period of revolutionary transformation between
capitalist and communist society and that in this period 'the state can be nothing but the
revolutionary dictatorship of the proletariat' (in McLellan, 1971 :212). However, this
dictatorship itself is only a 'transitional stage' towards the abolition of all classes and thus
the abolition of the state per se (Letter to Weydemeyer; in McLellan, 1971:228).
In 1871 Marx reminded Krugelman ofthe passage in the Eighteenth Brumaire where he
commented on the destruction of the bureaucratic-military machine and described it as
'the precondition of any real popular revolution' (Marx to Krugelman, 12 August 1871; in
McLellan, 1971:211). In 1872 he wrote: "As soon as the goal of the proletarian
movement, the abolition of classes, shall have been reached, the power of the state, whose
function it is to keep the great majority ofproducers beneath the yoke of a small minority
of exploiters, will disappear and government functions will be transformed into simple
administrative functions" (The Alleged Splits in the International; in
McLellan, 1971:211). As Engels summed up in Anti-Diihring: "The society that will
organise production on the basis of a free and equal association of the producers will put
the whole machinery of state where it will then belong: into the Museum of Antiquities,
by the side of the spinning wheel and the bronze axe".
It was also Marx's and Engels' view that a successful revolution - at least in the long run-
will be impossible if confined to one country. In The Class Struggles in France (1850),
Marx criticised the leaders of the proletariat for thinking that 'they would be able to
consummate a proletarian revolution within the national walls of France, side by side with
the remaining bourgeois nations' (in McLellan, 1971:228). In the Communist Manifesto,
Marx and Engels had declared that united action, of the leading countries at least, is one
of the first conditions for the emancipation of the proletariat. The celebrated call
'Proletarians of all countries unite!' had always been the motto of their political activity.
In the Inaugural Address to the International (1864), Marx had pointed out: "Past
experience has shown how disregard of that bond ofbrotherhood which ought to exist
between the workmen of different countries, and incite them to stand firmly by each other
in all their struggles for emancipation, will be chastised by the common discomfiture of
their incoherent efforts" (p.81) .
In summation, we can determine that the transition from the capitalist mode ofproduction
to a post-capitalist socio-economic system requires the active intervention of human
agency - 'men making their own history' . In other words, between the growing social,
economic and ecological contradictions of the capitalist mode ofproduction, on the one
hand, and the transformation of capitalism, on the other, there is a necessary mediation in
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the form of a revolutionary proletarian movement, conscious of its historical role and
dedicated to replacing the private ownership of the means of production with a collective
association of free producers.
However, this revolutionary movement could not occur arbitrarily. It would depend upon
moments of crisis generated by the underlying economic contradictions inherent to the
capitalist mode ofproduction. It is these moments of crises that provide the terrain upon
which revolutionary praxis can take place. The subjective role of human agency operates
under specific objective conditions imposed by underlying economic phenomena.
Moreover, the success of the revolutionary proletarian movement relies upon the
'awakening' or 'reformation' (the development) of a universal class consciousness - an
awareness of the historical process and the proletariat's place in history. This
development of class consciousness is brought about by active struggle including ruthless
criticism of the existing order and political agitation and organisation. It will be extended
in the process of actual revolutionary activity when the proletariat will itselfbe altered by
changing circumstances, so that a mass proletarian consciousness will become a
precondition for building a new society - a classless society.
It was Marx's and Engels' view that the industrial proletariat would be the moving force
for revolutionary change, and that revolution would therefore first occur in the most
industrialised capitalist countries. Furthermore, it would not be confined to one, or even a
few, countries but would engulf the whole capitalist mode ofproduction itself. It would
be ultimately a global phenomenon that would replace one historical epoch with its
successor.
Finally, the emancipation of the proletariat, as the 'universal human interest', will bring
about the emancipation of all ofhumanity. The capitalist mode ofproduction based upon
class exploitation will be transformed into a classless society. In this way, the
estrangement between the private interest and the collective interest (between civil society
and the state) is overcome. Collective and individual interests coincide so that 'the free
development of each is the condition for the free development of all'. Capitalism is thus
the last epoch to be based on class divisions. Human 'pre-history' ends and 'real' history
begins.
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5.5 Gramsci and Hegemony
To further elaborate the transition from capitalism to its succeeding mode of production
and, in particular, the role of the proletariat in this transition, we turn now to the writings of
Antonio Gramsci. An Italian Marxist during the period 1913-1937, Gramsci observed, and
indeed participated in, the tumultuous events surrounding the war of 1914-1919. Having
witnessed the failure of the proletarian movement in the West to seize the moment of crisis
to overthrow the bourgeois state ( in the case of Italy and Germany he observed the
proletarian movement first usurped then persecuted by the forces of fascism), Gramsci set
about studying the reasons for this failure and the implications for future proletarian
revolution in advanced capitalist countries.
The failure of the proletariat during those revolutionary times, particularly during the 'red
years' of 1919-23, he put down to (amongst other things) a lack of an organised challenge
to the dominant class. Although the opportunity presented itself (there was a genuine crisis
of legitimacy of the ruling class), due to both a lack of effective and decisive leadership and
a lack of collective political will on the part of the proletariat, the moment was lost. The
failure occurred "because great masses, previously passive, entered into movement - but
into a chaotic and disorganised movement, without leadership, i.e. without any precise
collective political will ... [and] because the antagonistic forces proved to be incapable of
organising this situation of disorder to their own advantage" (Prison Notebooks:228-229).
The task for the future was to "reconstruct a hegemonic apparatus for these formerly
passive and apolitical elements" (Prison Notebooks:229). Gramsci set about theorising this
hegemonic apparatus. In doing so he took over the concept of hegemony as used by earlier
Marxists such as Plekhonov and Lenin, and reformulated it into a fundamental explanation
of how capitalism reproduces itself. From this he theorised a strategy that the proletarian
movement must adopt if it is to challenge this reproduction. That work marks Gramsci' s
critical contribution to Marxist theory and will be studied in some detail later.
Gramsci's writings can be differentiated into two periods: pre-prison (1915-1926) and
prison (1926-1935). The pre-prison writings, published for the most part in the socialist
press of the time, were characterised by their relationship to then current political struggles.
The Turinese uprising of 1917, which coincided with the general crisis of the armed forces
in Europe and the explosion of the Russian Revolution, was interpreted by Gramsci
through his writings in the socialist press. In 1922 he was sent to the Comintern in Moscow
as a member of the Italian communist delegation. Through direct contact with Bukharin,
Trotsky and Zinoviev he was able to observe and report upon the Russian political scene at
first hand. Gramsci returned home and in the elections of 1924 was elected to the Italian
Parliament. However, on November 8 1926 Gramsci was arrested by Mussolini's Fascists,
put on trial, and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. He spent the next five years at
the Turi penal colony until extreme ill health forced his transfer to a clinic in Formia,
where he remained until 1935. He was later transferred from there to another clinic in
Rome, where he died on April 27 1937 from a cerebral haemorrhage.
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Despite the fascist prosecutor's injunction when sentencing Gramsci, that 'we must stop
this brain from functioning for 20 years', Gramsci never stopped working. The last ten
years of his life in prison were years of intense, almost uninterrupted mental activity
pursued in complete, or almost complete, isolation with the aid of few books and despite
great physical and mental hardship. The result of Gramsci's prison writings (Quaderni del
carcere) were 33 notebooks containing 3000 pages of handwritten notes. The writing was
meticulous, dry, tight and sometimes obscure, but always focused upon the subject under
scrutiny, with no space for sentimentality or self-pity. The notebooks have a disorderly,
fragmentary and unsystematic appearance. Here and there one finds entire essays, but much
of the work consists of notes, projects and sketches of essays intended for future
elaboration (Hoare, 1971).
Given the conditions of Gramsci' s prison life, and the fact that he was forced to work
without the aid of a proper library, such fragmentation seems inevitable. However,
according to Hoare (1971), it is also indicative of Gramsci's method and outlook. For him
the 'philosophy ofpraxis' (the term he used for Marxism, in part to elude his prison
censors) can never be complete. Marxism is a methodology constantly referring back to
fixed principles, but is never speculative and is always materialist. In other words,
theoretical discussion must remain open to all new contributions and be constantly verified
in relation to historical reality and the experiences of the masses.
Although often described as 'the theoretician of the superstructure' , Gramsci as a
materialist never denied the importance of the economic sphere. However, he denounced
'vulgar mechanical materialism' and 'metaphysical materialism', and emphasised time and
again the historical element in historical materialism. By emphasising the historical
element he was accentuating the subjective element of human praxis. The relationship
between the economic base and superstructure to Gramsci was precisely dialectical. He
rejected outright simple mechanical explanations. For example, he described structure and
superstructure as forming an 'historic bloc' determined by a dialectical process. In this
regard he stated: "That is to say the complex, contradictory and discordant ensemble of the
superstructures is the reflection of the ensemble of the social relations ofproduction... This
reasoning is based on the reciprocity between structure and superstructure, a reciprocity
which is nothing other than the real dialectical process" (Prison Notebooks:366).
That statement is crucial to Gramsci' s understanding of the relationship between base and
superstructure, between objective and subjective elements. The relationship is always
dialectical, never mechanical. Moreover, there is no simple differentiation of one sphere
from the other. Each contains elements of the other and these are in continuous
transformation by which elements of one influence (and supersede) elements of the other.
At the same time, he denounced crude mechanistic and fatalistic interpretations, by
qualifying the above statement: "It goes without saying that these principles must first be
developed critically in all their implications, and purged of every residue of mechanicism
and fatalism" (Prison Notebooks: 106-107). Gramsci's dialectical understanding of the
base-superstructure relationship is explicitly revealed when he warns of "an excess of
'economism', or doctrinaire pedantry; [and] an excess of 'ideologism"'. In the first case, he
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argued, there is "an overestimation of mechanical causes, in the second, an exaggeration of
the voluntarist and individual element" (Prison Notebooks: 177-178).
In the broad sweep of human history the economic element is, in the last instance, the
ultimately determining factor. For example, he insisted that any theorising on the
superstructure must be derived from what he termed the 'two fundamental principles of
political science' derived from Marx's 1859 Preface: "1. That no social formation
disappears as long as the productive forces which have developed within it still find room
for further forward movement; 2. That a society does not set itself tasks for whose
solutions the necessary conditions have not already been incubated, etc." (Prison
Notebooks: 106). In 'The Modem Prince', Gramsci referred to Engel's statement that the
economy is only "the mainspring of history in the last analysis" and that this statement
"should be related directly to the passage in the preface to the Critique of Political
Economy which says that it is on the level of ideologies that men become conscious of
conflicts in the world of the economy" (Prison Notebooks: 162).
Thus, following Marx and Engels, Gramsci maintained that material conditions in the
economic base of society are manifested at the superstructurallevel in legal, political,
religious, philosophical, and artistic; that is, ideological forms. The material conditions of a
society thus determine a particular social consciousness that reflects the existing relations
ofproduction and a particular development in the forces ofproduction. As Marx and
Engels explained in the Communist Manifesto: "Does it require deep intuition to
comprehend that man's ideas, views and conceptions, in one word, man's consciousness,
changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in his social relations
and in his social life? What else does the history of ideas prove, than that intellectual
production changes its character in proportion as material production is changed?" (p.55-
56). Moreover, the dominant ideas in society (its social consciousness) are those of the
dominant class. Ideology at the superstructurallevel reflects the dominant social relations
in the economic base. This ideology serves both to legitimise and mystify those class
relations. As Marx and Engels wrote, in The German Ideology:
"The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e. the class which is
the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The
class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same
time over the means ofmental production, so that thereby, generally speaking, the ideas
of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are
nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the
dominant material relationships grasped as ideas; hence of the relationships which make
the one class the ruling one, therefore, the ideas of its dominance... Insofar, therefore, as
they rule as a class and determine the extent and compass of an epoch, it is self-evident
that they do this in its whole range, hence among other things rule also as thinkers, as
producers of ideas, and regulate the production and distribution of the ideas of their age:
thus their ideas are the ruling ideas of the epoch" (p.64).
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In that way, the ruling class presents its own interests as those of society as a whole. The
'particular interests' of the ruling class are depicted as the 'universal interests' of society.
As Marx and Engels stated: "Each new class ... is compelled... to represent its interests as
the common interest of all the members of society, put in an ideal form; it will give its
ideas the form of universality, and represent them as the only rational, universally valid
ones" (The German Ideology:65-66). In this way the ruling class legitimises its ruling
status and its privileged position.
Gramsci combined this concept of ideological dominance with Marx's and Engels' theories
on the state; i.e. as representative of bourgeois interests and as a repressive force protecting
bourgeois interests. He elaborated them into his theory of hegemony, perhaps his most
important contribution to Marxist theory. Marx and Engels had themselves referred to the
concept in The German Ideology. For example, they argued that: "Every new class ...
achieves its hegemony only on a broader basis than that of the class ruling previously,
whereas the opposition of the non-ruling class against the new ruling class later develops
all the more sharply and profoundly" (p.66). However, they did not elaborate on the
concept, other than treating it as ideological dominance. That was the task Gramsci set
himself.
The concept of hegemony had also been used by Marxists such as Plekhanov and Lenin
and re-emerged in various Comitern documents of the 1920s (McLellan, 1979). Gramsci
continued to use the term in the sense that the earlier Marxists had applied it; that is, as a
process by which the proletariat gained leadership over all the elements (in particular the
peasantry) opposed to capitalism. In the Prison Notebooks, however, Gramsci goes beyond
this use of the term to apply it to the way the capitalist system reproduces itself: i.e. how
the bourgeoisie establishes and maintains its dominance over society as a whole. In modem
capitalist societies, Gramsci argued, the dominant class maintains its position not simply
through a special organisation of force or coercion, but by exerting a 'moral and intellectual
leadership', thus enabling it to forge an 'historic bloc' in which economic, social, cultural
and ideological forces combine to present a unified whole - a 'common sense' diffused
throughout society. This bloc represents the basis of consent through which the hegemony
of the dominant class is created and recreated in a web of institutions, social relations,
ideology and cultural forms.
Gramsci talked of "Government with the consent of the governed - but with this consent
organised, and not generic and vague as it is expressed in the instant of elections. The state
does have and request consent, but it also 'educates' this consent, by means of the political
and syndical associations; these, however, are private organisms, left to the private
initiative of the ruling class" (Prison Notebooks:259). He identified two superstructural
levels: civil society (the 'private sphere') and political society (the 'State' or 'public
sphere'): one corresponds to the function of 'hegemony' and the other to 'direct
domination' or 'command'. He stated: "What we can do, for the moment, is to fix two
major superstructural 'levels': the one that can be called 'civil society' - that is the
ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private' - and that of 'political society' or 'the
State'. These two levels correspond, on the one hand, to that function of 'hegemony' which
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the dominant group exercises throughout society and, on the other hand, to that of 'direct
domination' or command exercised through the State and 'juridical' government" (Prison
Notebooks: 12).
It should be noted that Gramsci's positioning of 'civil society' in relation to the structure of
capitalist society is not the same as that ofMarx. Marx used it to denote the sphere of
private economic relations, and thus situated it as part of the economic structure. Gramsci
placed it in the superstructural sphere or, alternately, in a mediating position between the
economic base and the state.
Gramsci further elaborated these functions of 'hegemony' and 'command' as:
1. The 'spontaneous' consent given by the great masses of the population to the general
direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group; this consent is
'historically' caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant
group enjoys because of its position and function in the world ofproduction.
2. The apparatus of state coercive power which 'legally' enforces discipline on those
groups who do not 'consent' either actively or passively. This apparatus is, however,
constituted for the whole of society in anticipation of moments of crisis of command and
direction when spontaneous consent has failed (Prison Notebooks: 12).
The supremacy of a social group manifests itself in two ways: as 'domination' and as
'intellectual and moral leadership' (Prison Notebooks:45). As Gramsci stated: "The
historical unity of the ruling class is realised in the State, and their history is essentially the
history of States and of groups of States. But it would be wrong to think that this unity is
simply juridical and political (though such forms ofunity do have their importance too, and
not in a purely formal sense); the fundamental historical unity, concretely, results from the
organic relations between State or political society and 'civil society' (Prison
Notebooks: 52).
Political society constitutes the state apparatus such as the legislature, the judiciary and law
enforcement agencies, public sector institutions, and all forms ofpolitical organisations.
These systems influence the masses as an external political force, an element of cohesive
force exercised by the ruling classes and therefore an element of subordination to an
external hegemony (Prison Notebooks:420). On the other hand, civil society operates
without 'sanctions' or compulsory 'obligations', but nevertheless exerts a collective
pressure, and obtains objective results in the form of an evolution of customs, ways of
thinking and acting, morality, etc. (Prison Notebooks:242). As Gramsci explained: "The
'normal' exercise of hegemony on the now classical terrain of the parliamentary regime is
characterised by the combination of force and consent, which balance each other
reciprocally, without force predominating excessively over consent. Indeed, the attempt is
always made to ensure that force will appear to be based on the consent of the majority..."
(Prison Notebooks:80).
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Gramsci also talked of the state in a wider sense as comprising both civil society and
political society - the 'State in its integral meaning: dictatorship and hegemony'. In this
sense he appears to be referring to the state in its totality, i.e. as a 'nation-state', as opposed
to the state as the apparatus of government, i.e. as the political state only. For example, he
asked: "But what does that signify if not that by 'State' should be understood not only the
apparatus of government, but also the 'private' apparatus of 'hegemony' or civil society?"
(Prison Notebooks:268).
He went on to discuss "two forms in which the State presents itself in the language and
culture of specific epochs, i.e. as civil society and as political society". Furthermore,
'political society' is "in everyday language the form of State life to which the term of State
is applied and which is commonly understood as the entire State". However, within "the
husk ofpolitical society a complex and well-articulated civil society is constructed in
which the individual can govern himself without his self-government thereby entering into
conflict with political society - but rather becoming its normal continuation, its organic
complement" (Prison Notebooks:268). Thus, Gramsci concluded that: "The general notion
of State includes elements which need to be referred back to the notion of civil society (in
the sense that one might say that State = political society + civil society, in other words
hegemony protected by the armour of coercion)" (Prison Notebooks:263).
Gramsci also referred, on occasion, to hegemony in a wider sense comparable to that of the
nation state, i.e. as hegemony comprising both force and consent: political and cultural
hegemony. Hegemony in this sense means the dominance of the ruling class comprising
both coercive elements and the exercise of hegemony proper, as 'common sense' and
'intellectual and moral leadership' .
Gramsci's theory of hegemony is an extremely powerful and fundamentally crucial
concept. Hegemony involves the whole complex superstructure ofmodem society from its
highest, intellectual elaborations, its institutional arrangements (both public and private),
its culture and customs, its folklore, its social and religious imperatives, down to individual
and family ethics and mores. It is in this sense that Gramsci talked of the 'common sense'
or 'conception of the world' of a particular epoch. He called this the 'philosophy of non-
philosophers', and, in common sense, "it is the 'realistic', materialistic elements which are
predominant" (Prison Notebooks:420). In other words, common sense is that conception of
the world which is uncritically absorbed by the various social and cultural environments in
which the moral individuality of the average person is developed.
Common sense is not a unique conception, identical in time and space. It is, according to
Gramsci, the 'folklore ofphilosophy' and, like folklore, it takes countless different forms.
Its most fundamental characteristic is that it is a conception which, even in the mind of one
individual, is fragmentary, incoherent and inconsequential, in conformity with the social
and cultural position of those masses whose 'philosophy' it is (Prison Notebooks:419).
Moreover, and importantly, it is deliberately fragmentary. Through 'the destruction of any
image of the whole' (Lukacs, 1971) the proletariat is prevented from forming a coherent
critical perspective in relation to the capitalist mode ofproduction, particularly its class
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nature and its historical context. Capitalism is portrayed as classless and a-historical: as
'eternal' and 'natural'. Its material relations of production, its class dominance, and its
repressive apparatus are 'mystified'; they are hidden from view behind a reality that is
coherent only in its fragmentation.
This concept of common sense - the dominant, persuasive, almost unconscious 'conception
of the world' that pervades a particular socio-cultural-historical bloc - is precisely that
'consent' organised by the dominant class to legitimise its position. More than this, it is the
'consent' required by a specific organisation ofproductive methods (i.e. necessitated by the
economic structure). As Gramsci stated: "for though hegemony is ethical-political, it must
also be economic, must necessarily be based on the decisive function exercised by the
leading group in the decisive nucleus of economic activity" (Prison Notebooks: 161).
Furthermore:
"one of its [the state's] most important functions is to raise the great mass of the
population to a particular cultural and moral level, a level (or type) which corresponds to
the needs of the productive forces for development, and hence to the interests of the
ruling classes. The school as a positive educative function, and the courts as a repressive
and negative educative function, are the most important State activities in this sense;
but, in reality, a multitude of other so-called private initiatives and activities tend to the
same end - initiatives and activities which form the apparatus of the political and
cultural hegemony of the ruling classes" (Prison Notebooks:258).
Gramsci emphasised the fact that particular modes ofproduction 'create' superstructural
elements that in turn elaborate specific mores, customs, ethics, and hence behavioural
patterns, required by the production method. As he stated "new methods ofwork are
inseparable from a specific mode of thinking and feeling life" (Prison Notebooks:302).
Gramsci talked, in fact, of the "need to elaborate a new type of man suited to the new type
of work and productive process" (Prison Notebooks:286). In his essay on 'Americanism
and Fordism' Gramsci extended this elaboration, for example, into behavioural mores such
as sexual ethics and drinking customs (e.g. prohibition).
In a wider sense he talked of the struggle between human 'animality' and industrialism. He
stated: "The history of industrialism has always been a continuing struggle ... against the
element of 'animality' in man. It has been an uninterrupted, often painful and bloody
process of subjugating natural (i.e. animal and primitive) instincts to new, more complex
and rigid norms and habits of order, exactitude and precision which can make possible the
increasingly complex forms of collective life which are the necessary consequence of
industrial development" (Prison Notebooks:298). According to Gramsci, human nature
('animality') is not fixed and eternal. It is adapted through coercion combined with
persuasion and consent to 'fit' a particular development in the forces ofproduction. This
adaptation of human 'animality' to particular material conditions of life is all-pervasive,
ranging from the leading ideas in society down to detailed mores and ethics determining
day to day behaviour. In fact, the whole 'culture' of society is 'fitted to the sphere of
production' . As Gramsci argued:
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"From this one can deduce the importance of the 'cultural aspect', even in practical
(collective activity). An historical act can only be performed by 'collective man', and
this presupposes the attainment of a 'cultural-social' unity through which a multiplicity
of dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims, are welded together with a single aim, on
the basis of an equal and common conception of the world ... " (Prison Notebooks:349).
"The bourgeois class poses itself as an organism in continuous movement, capable of
absorbing the entire society, assimilating it to its own cultural and economic level. The
entire function of the State has been transformed; the State has become an 'educator',
etc." (Prison Notebooks:260), "so that its ethnicity or universality could be asserted: all
mankind will be bourgeois" (Prison Notebooks:259).
The diffusion of bourgeois hegemony becomes dominant to the extent that there occurs an
actual 'embourgeoisment' of the proletariat ideologically and culturally (and even
politically) whilst, at the same time, there is an increasing 'proletarianisation' of the
population economically. That is, 'human animality' is increasingly subjugated to the
requirements of capitalist production. The industrial process calls forth a 'new type' of
economic man and woman. A new type of civil society is created appropriate to the
existing mode ofproduction and the requirements of a particular development in the forces
of production. As Gramsci put it: "Culture is fitted to the sphere of production".
This conception of Gramsci's, whereby the 'common sense' of an era is an intimate
reflection of the material relations ofproduction and serves the demands of a specific
development in the forces ofproduction follows Marx's prognosis of an 'inverted reality'.
Marx talked of the reification of human labour and human relations, whereby human
labour is objectified and the relations between humans take on the form of relations
between objects. In conjunction with this, he wrote of the fetishism of commodities and
commodity markets where things (commodities, money, the market, etc.) come to
determine people and the relations between people. Thus, people live their lives according
to the dictates of things, particularly to the dictates of the commodity market. The products
of human labour in the commodity form, and in the commodity market, come to dominate
the producers themselves. There is a fundamental inversion of subject and object, an
inversion that is not ideological but takes place in reality itself.
Similarly, Gramsci talked of the methods ofproduction necessitating a 'new type of man
suited to the production process'; that human mores, customs, culture, values, etc., and
hence human behavioural patterns, are formed in response to economic demands. Once
again, there is an inversion of subject and object - objective economic imperatives dictate
human behaviour, in fact, produce a 'new type of man' . And, as before, this takes place in
reality not simply ideologically. Hence, Gramsci's notion of 'common sense' is more than
a 'mistaken' consciousness; it is consciousness of an actual material inversion. Reality
itself is 'upside-down' . Bourgeois hegemony is thus a reflection, a legitimation, and a
mystification of an actual inverted material existence.
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5.6 The War of Position
Gramsci's theory of hegemony has profound implications for the proletarian struggle in
advanced capitalist countries. In the Prison Notebooks, Gramsci analysed the success of
the proletarian revolution in the East (i.e. Russia) and the failure of the revolutionary
movement in the West in the inter-war period. He concluded that different revolutionary
strategies were required in East and West. In less developed societies the state should be
the object of frontal attack; in more developed societies, with a complex and highly
developed civil society, it is civil society that must be engaged in struggle prior to a
confrontation with the state. For example, he stated:
"In Russia the State was everything, civil society was primordial and gelatinous; in the
West, there was a proper relationship between State and civil society, and when the
State trembled a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed. The State was
only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and
earthworks: more or less numerous from one State to the next..." (Prison
Notebooks:238).
The failures of the revolutionary movements in the West were due to the failure of the
proletarian movement (apart from, and related to, the lack of effective leadership and
organisation) to coherently and successfully participate in the struggle for civil society
before directly confronting the state. As Gramsci surmised: "It seems clear... that there
can, and indeed must, be hegemonic activity even before the rise to power, and that one
should not count only on the material force which power gives in order to exercise an
effective leadership" (Prison Notebooks:59).
Using terms from military studies, Gramsci outlines two different strategies of
revolutionary struggle. The first he termed, 'a war of movement' or 'manoeuvre' - a direct
frontal assault on the enemy's position. The second he termed 'a war ofposition' which
he likened to trench warfare, a protracted struggle for advantage. Gramsci considered that
the war ofposition became more important as capitalism developed, and as civil society
became more complex. In these situations the dominant class extended its hegemony over
the whole superstructure of society, it posited its particular interests as the universal
interests of all classes and thus prevented the emergence of a proletarian consciousness or
collective political will which, in turn, impeded the development of an effective
proletarian political movement. Gramsci termed these the 'long periods' and they
required a different strategy of struggle. In this respect, he stated:
"the internal and international organisational relations of the State become more
complex and massive, and the Forty-Eightist formula of the 'Permanent Revolution' is
expanded and transcended in political science by the formula of 'civil hegemony' ...
war of movement increasingly becomes war ofposition... The massive structures of
the modern democracies, both as State organisations, and as complexes of associations
in civil society, constitute for the art ofpolitics as it were the 'trenches' and the
permanent fortifications of the front in the war ofposition: they render merely 'partial'
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the element of movement which before used to be 'the whole' of war, etc." (Prison
Notebooks:243).
Thus, the war ofposition is theorised as the form ofpolitical struggle during periods of
relatively stable equilibrium between the fundamental classes, during the 'long periods',
during 'normal times', periods of non-revolutionary calm when the hegemony of the
dominant class is widespread and persuasive, when frontal attack, or war of manoeuvre is
not feasible.
As Hoare (1971) pointed out, clearly Gramsci's thesis is open to reformist interpretations,
involving an under-estimation of the role of the overthrow of the state in revolutionary
strategy. But there is no justification for imputing any such illusion to Gramsci himself.
The fact that he concerned himself with the sphere of civil society and hegemony cannot
be taken to indicate a neglect of the moment of political society, of force, of domination,
of the war of manoeuvre. On the contrary, his work both as activist and theoretician
shows that this was not the case. He consistently avoided any undialectical separation of
the 'ethical-political' aspect ofpolitics or theory of hegemony and consent from the
aspect of force and economics. The 'war ofposition' was a preparatory period (albeit a
necessary one) for the subsequent 'war of manoeuvre'. It did not supercede the war of
manoeuvre but was essential for its success. Without it, the great masses remain
disorganised and without an adequate collective political will in moments of crisis.
At times of structural crisis, the war of position gives way to the war ofmanoeuvre and
once again it is feasible, and necessary, to directly confront the state. In this respect
Gramsci distinguished between crises which are 'organic' and those which are
'conjunctural' . He stated:
"It is necessary to distinguish organic movement (relatively permanent) from
movement which may be termed 'conjuntural' (and which appears as occasional,
immediate, almost accidental). Conjunctural phenomena too, depend on organic
movements to be sure, but they do not have any far-reaching historical significance;
they give rise to political criticism of a minor, day-to-day character, which has as its
subject top political leaders and personalities with direct government responsibilities.
Organic phenomena on the other hand give rise to socio-historical criticism, whose
subject is wider social groupings - beyond the public figures and beyond the top
leaders" (Prison Notebooks: 177-178).
Whether a war ofposition, or of manoeuvre, is appropriate depends upon whether the
crisis is organic or conjunctural. The 'dialectical nexus' between the two categories of
movement is however difficult to establish precisely. Structural contradictions may
develop over an extended period. They may express themselves as conjunctural crises,
and it is on the 'terrain of the conjunctural' that the forces of opposition must organise. If
the crisis is organic, if it is 'permanent', if it enters the 'catastrophic phase', it may afford
the opportunity for a war of manoeuvre, a direct confrontation with the state.
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Gramsci made clear, however, that the proletariat has a defined role during this pre-
revolutionary phase. In opposition to political forces which are struggling to conserve and
defend the existing structure, oppositional forces must seek to demonstrate that the
necessary conditions exist to make possible, and hence imperative, 'the accomplishment
of certain historical tasks' (Prison Notebooks: 178). In other words, there is a struggle
over hegemony, a challenge to the dominant hegemony, which is "developed in a series of
ideological, religious, philosophical, political, and juridical polemics, whose concreteness
can be estimated by the extent to which they are convincing, and shift the previously
existing disposition of social forces. The demonstration in the last analysis only succeeds
and is 'true' if it becomes a new reality, if the forces of opposition triumph" (Prison
Notebooks: 178).
Thus, during 'normal times', the proletarian movement must organise opposition to the
dominant hegemony. It must engage in counter-hegemonic activity. It must fight its
skirmishes on an ideological, cultural, political, and juridical terrain, the terrain of the
conjunctural. As the conjunctural becomes organic, bourgeois hegemony becomes
increasingly under challenge. An organic crisis finally results in a rupture between
structure and superstructure, a crisis in hegemony, or 'authority' , of the dominant class.
For example, Gramsci talked of: "the crisis of the ruling class's hegemony, which occurs
either because the ruling class has failed in some major political undertaking for which it
has requested, or forcibly extracted, the consent of the broad masses (war, for example),
or because huge masses ... have passed suddenly from a state ofpolitical passivity to a
certain activity, and put forward demands which taken together.. add up to a revolution. A
'crisis of authority' is spoken of: this is precisely the crisis of hegemony, or general crisis
of the State" (Prison Notebooks:21 0). Furthermore: "If the ruling class has lost its
consensus, i.e. is no longer 'leading' but only 'dominant', exercising coercive force alone,
this means precisely that the great masses have become detached from their traditional
ideologies, and no longer believe what they used to believe previously, etc." (Prison
Notebooks:275-276). As Gramsci stated: "the unity based on traditional ideology is
broken; until this happens, it is impossible for the new forces to arrive at a consciousness
of their own independent personality" (Prison Notebooks: 136).
It seems from this that Gramsci, although advocating counter-hegemonic struggle during
'normal times', does not envisage the full development of a proletarian consciousness or
collective political will (an 'operative awareness ofhistorical necessity') until a crisis of
hegemony occurs and the masses have passed suddenly from a 'state ofpolitical passivity
to a certain activity'. This follows Marx's and Engels' prognosis that the proletariat will
not become fully conscious of its historical role except through practical revolutionary
activity. Hence: 'In revolutionary activity, the changing of oneself coincides with the
changing ofcircumstances' and 'the alteration of men on a mass scale is ... an alteration
which can only take place in a practical movement, in a revolution' (The German
Ideology).
Thus, during a crisis of authority - a crisis of hegemony - the dominant ideology loses its
legitimacy, and the consensus upon which hegemony rests is broken down. The dominant
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class has lost its 'moral and political leadership'. It has ceased, in other words, to present
itself as the universal interest. It is at these moments that the potential for direct
revolutionary activity occurs, in other words, a direct confrontation with the state
becomes possible. However, for this potential to be realised there must be a counter-
hegemonic movement capable of grasping the moment, capable of forging a collective
political will, or a collective consciousness of historical necessity.
It has been asserted that Gramsci stated on occasion that civil society must be conquered
(i.e. the proletariat must already exercise hegemony over civil society) before making a
frontal attack on the state. For example, he stated in 'The Problem of Political
Leadership' that: "A social group can, and indeed must, already exercise 'leadership'
before winning governmental power (this indeed is one of the principle conditions for the
winning of such power)" (Prison Notebooks:59). Such an interpretation runs the risk of
regressing into reformism, something Gramsci was never guilty of. It seems to me, in
light of his other writings, that during crises of hegemony the proletariat's role is to
challenge the dominant hegemony and thus extend its own hegemony, i.e. raise its own
class consciousness, its own collective political will. The 'leadership' Gramsci referred to
above is primarily leadership over the different groupings within the proletariat. Without
such unity, a collective political will, or a consciousness of its historical role, the
proletariat will not succeed in the final war of manoeuvre. That is the 'principle
condition' for winning such power that Gramsci referred to. In this regard, Gramsci spoke
of:
"the most purely political phase [which] marks the decisive passage from the structure
to the complex superstructures; it is the phase in which previously germinated
ideologies become 'party', come into confrontation and conflict, until only one of
them, or at least a single combination of them, tends to prevail, to gain the upper hand,
to propagate itself throughout society - bringing about not only a union of economic
and political aims, but also intellectual and moral unity, posing all the questions
around which the struggle rages not on a corporate but on a 'universal' plane, and thus
creating the hegemony of a fundamental social group over a series of subordinate
groups" (Prison Notebooks: 181-182).
It is in this context that Gramsci talked of a 'united bloc' or 'popular front' or 'national-
popular collective will'. The proletariat must converge its disparate elements in
opposition to the dominant class (and Gramsci was concerned primarily with uniting the
industrial proletariat with the peasantry). The vast masses must raise their collective
consciousness and thus realise their historical role. It can only raise its collective political
will by becoming conscious of its own position in relation to the dominant class, a
position common to all subaltern classes. All the diverse elements constituting the
proletariat must unite in their common opposition to capital. Only in this way can the
proletarian movement challenge the hegemony of the dominant class. If its various
elements remain disparate, they will tend to revert to reformist tactics to advance the
specific interests of the particular group, what Gramsci referred to as their 'corporate
interests' (for example, trade unionism). Only as a united bloc, united by common
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opposition to the dominant class, can the disparate elements become radical, i.e.
revolutionary. Only then will they be in a position to advance their own interest as the
universal interest in opposition to the interest of the bourgeoisie.
During the 'most political phase' the proletariat must organise its diverse elements in
opposition to the dominant class. In other words, organise both its counter-hegemonic
forces (during the war ofposition) and its assault troops (for the war of movement). And
this coordinating role Gramsci assigned to the political party. In the 'Modem Prince'
(Gramsci's name for the communist party) Grarnsci analysed the nature of the political
party, the relation between party, class and state, and the ideological dangers of
economism and spontaneism, against which it must struggle.
As Hoare (1971) pointed out, Gramsci's conception of the revolutionary party is best
encapsulated when he evokes Machiavelli's Centaur (half animal/ halfhuman) as a
symbol of the'dual perspective' which must characterise the revolutionary party. The
party must hold together in a dialectical unity the two levels "of force and of consent,
authority and hegemony, violence and civilization, of the individual moment and of the
universal moment, of agitation and propaganda, of tactics and strategy, etc." (Prison
Notebooks: 128). The 'Modem Prince', by uniting the two perspectives, must organise and
express a 'national-popular collective will' capable of becoming an 'historic bloc'. As
Grarnsci stated: "The modem prince, the myth-prince, cannot be a real person, a concrete
individual. It can only be an organism, a complex element of society in which a collective
will, which has already been recognised and has to some extent asserted itself in action,
begins to take concrete form. History has already provided this organism, and it is the
political party - the first cell in which there come together germs of a collective will
tending to become universal and total" (Prison Notebooks: 129).
This 'collective will' Gramsci described as "operative awareness of historical necessity...
protagonist of a real and effective historical drama" (Prison Notebooks: 130). This is an
extremely important element in historical materialist thought - the coincidence of freedom
of action with historical 'necessity', or historical predispositions for certain actions
(perhaps better thought of as material conditions which enable particular human actions).
As Kolakowski (1978:223) argued: "Socialism is the effect of history in the sense that
history gives birth to the revolutionary consciousness of the proletariat, but it is the effect
of freedom inasmuch as the act of revolution is free, so that, in the revolutionary workers'
movement, historical necessity expresses itself in free action". Scientific socialism,
therefore, is neither an 'arbitrary goal' nor the mere result of history working out in the
manner of a natural law, but is the outcome of the conscious struggle of the proletariat as
a consequence ofpast historical developments. In this sense, it is a coincidence between
historical forces and 'men making their own history' . It is precisely a dialectical relation
between the objective material element and the subjective human element.
The 'positive conditions' for the formation of a collective will are to be sought in the
existence of social groups which have formed as a result of conflicts with capitalist
production, which have attained a certain awareness of their position in relation to the
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economic structure of society and, at least, an elementary understanding of the historical
context within which the conflicts are embedded. These various social groups enter into
movement, but into a movement that is disparate, that has no central organising element.
Whilst the various reactions are related to the same structural dysfunctions in the
capitalist mode ofproduction, there is a lack of collective awareness of this relatedness,
hence, no coordinated reaction. It is the task of the 'Centaur' to organise and direct these
various elements, to mold them into an 'historic bloc' - a counter-hegemonic force
capable of a unified challenge to the dominant group. As Gramsci stated:
"Although every party is the expression of a social group, and of one social group only,
nevertheless in certain given conditions certain parties represent a single social group
precisely in so far as they exercise a balancing and arbitrating function between the
interests of their group and those of other groups, and succeed in securing the
development of the group which they represent with the consent and assistance of the
allied groups - if not out and out with that of groups which are definitely hostile"
(Prison Notebooks: 148).
Also the interests of one social group can splinter into a number ofparties or factions: "It
is observable that in the modem world, in many countries, the organic and fundamental
parties have been compelled by the exigencies of the struggle or for other reasons to split
into fractions - each one of which calls itself a 'party' and even an independent party"
(Prison Notebooks: 148). However, at decisive moments the various groupings come
together to form a 'united bloc'. As Gramsci stated: "The multiplicity which previously
existed was purely 'reformist' in character, that is to say it was concerned with partial
questions. In a certain sense, it was a political division of labour... But each part
presupposed the other, so much that when at the decisive moments - in other words
precisely when fundamental questions were brought into play - the unity was formed, the
bloc came into existence" (Prison Notebooks: 157-158).
For a political party, representative of a united bloc, to exist three fundamental elements
must converge:
1. 'A mass element', composed of ordinary people, whose participation takes the form of
discipline and loyalty, rather than any theoretical or organisational ability. They are the
'ground troops' or 'foot soldiers' of the movement, without whom the party would not
exist. But, neither could it exist with these alone. They are a force only in so far as
there are centralising and organising elements to effectively direct concerted action.
2. 'The principle cohesive element', which centralises nationally and, through strategic
planning, renders effective the complex of forces which left to themselves would
dissipate their revolutionary potential. This element is endowed with great cohesive,
centralising and disciplinary powers together with, what Gramsci termed, 'the power
of innovation'; the ability to theorise and articulate the revolutionary process.
3. 'An intermediate element' , which coordinates the first element with the second and
maintains contact between them, not only physically but also morally and
intellectually. This is the organising element, the administrators and communicators.
213
According to Gramsci, for every party there exist 'fixed proportions' between these three
elements, and the greatest effectiveness is achieved when these 'fixed proportions' are
realised" (Prison Notebooks: 152-153). And, in this essentially political sphere, Gramsci
does not lose sight of the economic element. As he stated: "the solution can be found in
the identification of politics and economics. Politics becomes permanent action and gives
birth to permanent organisations precisely in so far as it identifies itself with economics"
(Prison Notebooks: 139). In this regard, it is the role of the political party to articulate this
critical connection. The successful organisation of the various oppositional groupings
requires a common conception of their relationship to the dominant social group. And this
relationship is fundamentally economic, although often obscured. The political party must
reveal this connection.
In discussing the relationship between economics, classes and the party Gramsci
described the relationship between the 'objective conditions' and the 'subjective
conditions' of an historical event as one of complexity requiring precise analysis. In this
regard, Gramsci distinguished between various 'movements' or 'levels' in the 'relations
of forces':
"1. A relation of social forces which is closely linked to the structure, objective,
independent of human will, and which can be measured with the systems of the exact
or physical sciences. The level of development of the material forces of production
provides a basis for the emergence of the various social classes, each of which
represents a function and has a specific position within production itself... 2. A
subsequent moment in the relation ofpolitical forces; in other words, an evaluation of
the degree of homogeneity, self-awareness, and organisation attained by the various
social classes. This moment can in turn be analysed and differentiated into various
levels, corresponding to the various moments of collective political consciousness as
they have manifested themselves in history up till now... 3. The third moment is that of
the relation of military forces, which from time to time is directly decisive ..." (Prison
Notebooks: 180-182).
Gramsci described historical development as oscillating continuously between the first
and third moment, with the mediation of the second. He explained: "The rupture of the
equilibrium of forces does not occur as a result of direct mechanical causes. It occurs in
the context of conflicts on a higher plane than the immediate world of the economy.
These are the concrete manifestations of the conjunctural fluctuations of the totality of
social relations of force, on whose terrain the passage takes place from the latter to
political relations of force, and finally to the military relation which is decisive" (Prison
Notebooks: 184-185). According to Gramsci: "It may be ruled out that immediate
economic crises of themselves produce fundamental historical events; they can simply
create a terrain more favourable to the dissemination of certain modes of thought, and
certain ways ofposing and resolving questions involving the entire subsequent
development ofnational life" (Prison Notebooks: 184).
214
Thus, crises in the economic base pass to the 'conjunctural', to the superstructure of
society, and it is on the superstructurallevel that these crises play themselves out. The
connection between the structural and superstructurallevels is extremely complex and
often obscured, but in order that oppositional forces organise effectively this connection
must be revealed despite its complexity. The final resolution of the crisis is, however,
more often determined by material force - the 'military relation' - which is, in the final
analysis, decisive.
In summation, it can be seen that although crises in the economic structure of society
result in a crisis of hegemony or authority, these potentially revolutionary moments must
be seized by an organised and coherent proletarian movement if there is to be a successful
challenge to the bourgeois state. The success of the 'war of movement' depends upon an
accompanying 'war ofposition' which precedes, but does not supercede, the ultimate
confrontation with the state. This 'war ofposition' involves a counter-hegemonic struggle
aimed at organising the disparate elements opposed to capital and raising a collective
consciousness, a collective political will that has the potential to become 'historical'
during organic crises, crises of bourgeois authority. In this way, human praxis, or freedom
of action, coincides with historical movement - with historical 'necessity'. The changing
of circumstances coincides with the changing of oneself.
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5.7 The Role of the Intellectuals
The central argument of Gramsci's essay on the formation of intellectuals is that the
notion of 'intellectuals' as a distinct social category independent of class is a myth
(Smith, 1971). Intellectuals are directly or indirectly connected to class interests, either
immediate or past. Intellectuals are not defined by the intrinsic nature of intellectual
activity because this is common to all humankind, but rather by social function. As
Gramsci put it: "The most widespread error of method seems to me that of having looked
for this criteria of distinction in the intrinsic nature of intellectual activities, rather than in
the ensemble of the system of relations in which these activities (and therefore the
intellectual groups who personify them) have their place within the general complex of
social relations" (Prison Notebooks:8).
All humans are potentially intellectuals in the sense of having an intellect and using it, but
not all are intellectuals by social function. As Gramsci stated: "All men are intellectuals,
one could therefore say: but not all men have in society the function of intellectuals ...
This means that, although one can speak of intellectuals, one cannot speak of non-
intellectuals, because non-intellectuals do not exist ... There is no human activity from
which every form of intellectual participation can be excluded: Homo faber cannot be
separated from homo sapiens". Furthermore, "Each man... outside his professional
activity, carries on some form of intellectual activity, that is, he is a 'philosopher', an
artist, a man of taste, he participates in a particular conception of the world, has a
conscious line of moral conduct, and therefore contributes to sustain a conception of the
world or to modify it, that is, to bring into being new modes of thought" (Prison
Notebooks:9).
Intellectuals in the functional sense fall into two categories. Firstly, there are the
'traditional' professional intellectuals, literary, artistic, religious, philosophical and so on,
whose position in society has a certain 'objectiveness' or 'inter-class aura' but conceals
an attachment to various historical class formations (Nowell Smith, 1971). Although they
are portrayed (and portray themselves) as objective and autonomous, the traditional
intellectuals are ultimately representative of class interests (although often obsolete). As
Gramsci stated:
"Since these various categories of traditional intellectuals experience... their
uninterrupted historical continuity and their special qualification, they thus put
themselves forward as autonomous and independent of the dominant social group ...
The whole of idealist philosophy can easily be connected with this position assumed
by the social complex of intellectuals and can be defined as the expression of that
social utopia by which the intellectuals think of themselves as 'independent',
autonomous, endowed with a character of their own, etc." (Prison Notebooks:7-8).
Secondly, there are the 'organic' intellectuals, the thinking and organising element of a
particular fundamental social class. These organic intellectuals are distinguished less by
their profession, which may be any activity related to a particular class, than by their
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function in directing the ideas and aspirations of the class to which they organically
belong (Nowell Smith, 1971). As Gramsci described it:
"Every social group, coming into existence on the original terrain of an essential
function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, organically,
one or more strata of intellectuals which gives it homogeneity and an awareness of its
own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields. The
capitalist entrepreneur creates alongside himself the industrial technician, the specialist
in political economy, the organisers of a new culture, of a new legal system, etc ... It
can be observed that the 'organic' intellectuals which every new class creates
alongside itself and elaborates in the course of its development, are for the most part
'specialisations' of partial aspects of the primitive activity of the new social type
which the new class has brought into prominence" (Prison Notebooks:3-4).
These intellectuals, unlike the traditional intellectuals who tend to possess a certain
historical continuity from one historical epoch to another, are 'organically' linked to the
history of a particular class. They are the direct functionaries of the dominant class or of
an emerging or subordinated class. Thus: "Every new social organism (type of society)
creates a new superstructure whose specialised representatives and standard-bearers (the
intellectuals) can only be conceived as themselves being 'new' intellectuals who have
come out of the new situation and are not a continuation of the preceding intellectual
milieu" (Prison Notebooks:452-453).
During periods when the dominant social group is 'really progressive', and its hegemony
particularly persuasive (an 'historic' or 'ideological bloc'), the dominant stratum of
intellectuals tends to 'subjugate' intellectuals of other social groups and create a system of
'solidarity' between all intellectuals. In other words, it socialises the various intellectual
strata to represent the interests of the dominant social group. And the ruling ideology
becomes so thoroughly diffused that it becomes the 'common sense' of society - it is
accepted (consented to) mostly uncritically and almost unconsciously. Thus, the interests
of the dominant class are represented as the interests of society as a whole, as the
universal interest. Gramsci described the process as follows:
"[T]here does not exist any independent class of intellectuals, but every social group
has its own stratum of intellectuals, or tends to form one; however, the intellectuals of
the historically (and concretely) progressive class, in the given conditions, exercise
such a power of attraction that, in the last analysis, they end up by subjugating the
intellectuals of the other social groups; they thereby create a system of solidarity
between all the intellectuals, with bonds of a psychological nature (vanity, etc.) and
often of a caste character (techno-juridicial, corporate, etc.)" (Prison Notebooks:61).
Gramsci emphasised the role of education in developing and maintaining the dominant
hegemony over intellectuals. He stated: "Scholastic activity, at all its levels, has an
enormous importance (economic as well) for intellectuals of all degrees" (Prison
Notebooks: 103). Furthermore: "The hegemony of a directive centre over the intellectuals
217
asserts itself by two principle routes: 1. A general conception of life, a philosophy, which
offers to its adherents an intellectual 'dignity' ... 2. A scholastic programme, an educative
principle and original pedagogy... from the primary teachers to the university professors"
(Prison Notebooks: 104). The capitalist education system is portrayed as a highly
advanced and complex apparatus for spreading and maintaining bourgeois hegemony
within the intellectual strata who, in turn, secure it through their various activities
amongst the masses.
Thus, as an emerging social class becomes dominant (i.e. creates an historic bloc) it
creates its strata of intellectuals, both 'organic' and 'subjugated', in order to extend and
maintain its hegemony over the masses. These intellectuals serve to articulate the
collective consciousness of the dominant class in the political, socio-cultural and
economic spheres. They are, as Gramsci described them, the 'functionaries of the
superstructure'. He stated: "The relationship between the intellectuals and the world of
production is not as direct as it is with the fundamental social groups but is, in varying
degrees, 'mediated' by the whole fabric of society and by the complex of superstructures,
of which the intellectuals are, precisely, the functionaries" (Prison Notebooks: 12).
Gramsci described these functions as 'organisational' and 'directive'. In this way
intellectuals can be seen as functionaries in both civil society and political society - in the
private and the public sphere. Their roles in civil society are 'organisational' and in
political society 'directive'. Thus, Gramsci stated: "The intellectuals are the dominant
group's 'deputies' exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony and political
government" (Prison Notebooks: 12).This results in a range of intellectual functionaries:
"at the highest level... the creators of the various sciences, philosophy, art, etc. [to] at the
lowest the most humble 'administrators' and divulgators of pre-existing, traditional,
accumulated intellectual wealth" (Prison Notebooks: 13). There is thus in the function of
organising social hegemony and state domination' a particular division of labour' and a
hierarchy of intellectuals from philosophers and scientists to administrators and clerks.
So, the intellectual as functionary in maintaining social hegemony and political direction
is a diverse grouping permeating the extensive superstructure of advanced capitalist
societies. Their role, in civil and political society, is to create and maintain bourgeois
hegemony; in effect, to engender consent armoured by coercion. As Gramsci stated: "In
the modem world the category of intellectuals, understood in this sense, has undergone an
unprecedented expansion. The democratic-bureaucratic system has given rise to a great
mass of functions which are not all justified by the social necessities ofproduction,
though they are justified by the political necessities of the dominant fundamental group"
(Prison Notebooks: 13).
It should not be forgotten that, in the final analysis, hegemony is created and maintained
to legitimise the position of the dominant class, to legitimise particular social relations of
production and, in this way, accommodate specific productive methods (or put another
way, facilitate the development of the forces ofproduction). As Gramsci made clear: "the
task of the intellectuals is to determine and organise the reform of moral and intellectual
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life, in other words to fit culture to the sphere ofproduction" (Prison Notebooks: 453; my
emphasis).
The implications of this highly original schema for the political struggle of the proletarian
movement in advanced capitalist countries are crucial and connect precisely with
Gramsci's conception of the struggle over hegemony. Traditional Marxism (of the Second
International) tended to view the relationship between the workers and intellectuals in
formal and mechanistic terms, with the intellectuals, refugees from the bourgeoisie or
petty-bourgeoisie, providing theory and often leadership for a mass base of non-
intellectual workers and peasants (Nowell Smith, 1971). This division of labour within
the movement was contested by Lenin who declared, in What is to be Done, that in the
revolutionary party all distinction as between workers and intellectuals must be
obliterated (Nowell Smith, 1971). As Nowell Smith (1971) pointed out, Lenin's attitude
to the intellectuals is closely connected to his theory of the vanguard party, and when he
writes about the need for socialist consciousness to be brought to the proletariat from
outside, the agency he foresees for achieving this is not the traditional intelligentsia but
the revolutionary party itself, in which former workers and former bourgeois intellectuals
have been fused into a cohesive unit.
Gramsci developed these ideas in a new way, connecting them to his concept of
hegemony, and positioned the role of intellectuals in wider society, i.e. in both civil and
political society. If social dominance is created and maintained in both civil society
(through hegemony) and political society (through coercion) in all their superstructural
manifestations, then it is at these sites that it can be challenged. And the subjective agents
to carry out this challenge are precisely the intellectuals - the functionaries of the
superstructure. As Gramsci stated: "Every revolution has been preceded by a long process
of intense critical activity, of new cultural insights and the spread of ideas through groups
of men initially resistant to them, wrapped up in the process of solving their own,
immediate economic and political problems, and lacking any bonds of solidarity with
others in the same position" (Pre-Prison Writings:10).
The proletariat, like the bourgeoisie before it, is capable of developing (and indeed must
develop) from within its ranks its own organic intellectuals. The organic intellectuals of
the proletariat are defined on the one hand by their 'organisational' role in civil society
(as 'educators' and 'persuaders') and on the other by their 'directive' political role. In
other words, they are concerned with both political struggle and with hegemonic struggle.
Both are ultimately concerned with raising class consciousness. Gramsci emphasised the
need (and role) of intellectuals as follows:
"Critical [class] self-consciousness means, historically and politically, the creation of
an elite of intellectuals. A human mass does not 'distinguish' itself, does not become
independent in its own right without, in the widest sense, organising itself; and there is
no organisation without intellectuals, that is without organisers and leaders, in other
words, without the theoretical aspect of the theory-practice nexus being distinguished
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concretely by the existence of a group ofpeople'specialised' in conceptual and
philosophical elaboration of ideas" (Prison Notebooks:334).
Gramsci maintained that ideas and opinions are not spontaneously 'born' in each
individual; they have a centre of formation, dissemination and persuasion - a group, or a
single individual even, which develop and articulate them in political and civil society.
This is precisely the role of the intellectuals - disseminators of ideas - persuaders,
educators, organisers and directors, creating and maintaining hegemony in the
superstructural sphere.
One of Gramsci' s main concerns was the creation ofproletarian class consciousness,
particularly during 'normal times' when intellectuals from subaltern classes were
subjugated by the dominant hegemony, and socialised by the bourgeois education system.
To raise class consciousness the proletariat must challenge and 'conquer ideologically'
traditional intellectuals. This is precisely the role of its own organic intellectuals. As
Gramsci stated: "One of the most important characteristics of any group that is
developing towards dominance is its struggle to assimilate and to conquer 'ideologically'
the traditional intellectuals, but this assimilation and conquest is made quicker and more
efficacious the more the group in question succeeds in simultaneously elaborating its own
organic intellectuals" (Prison Notebooks: 10).
Any challenge to the dominant ideology involves reexamination ofphilosophy and its
role in establishing hegemony. In his essay on 'The Study of Philosophy' Gramsci once
again emphasised that philosophy is not simply the abstract activity of a group of
professional intellectuals but a concrete social activity in which, implicitly, all men and
women are engaged (Hoare, 1971). As Gramsci put it:
"It must first be shown that all men are 'philosophers', by defining the limits and
characteristics of the 'spontaneous philosophy' which is proper to everybody. This
philosophy is contained in: 1. language itself, which is a totality ofdetermined notions
and concepts and not just ofwords grammatically devoid ofcontent; 2. 'common
sense' and good sense; 3. popular religion and, therefore, also in the entire system of
beliefs, superstitions, opinions, ways of seeing things and of acting, which are
collectively bundled together under the name of 'folklore'" (Prison Notebooks:323).
As discussed previously, Gramsci used the term 'common sense' to denote the set of
generally held assumptions and beliefs common to any given society - the uncritical and
largely unconscious way ofperceiving and understanding the world that has become
'common' in any given epoch (Hoare, 1971). Furthermore, as Gramsci made clear:
"Common sense is not something rigid and immobile, but is continually transforming
itself, enriching itself, with scientific ideas and with philosophical opinions which have
entered ordinary life. 'Common sense' is the folklore ofphilosophy, and is always half-
way between folklore properly speaking and the philosophy, science, and economics of
the specialists" (Prison Notebooks:326).
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In Gramsci's view, philosophy in general does not in fact exist. Various philosophies or
conceptions of the world exist and an individual makes a choice between them,
deliberately or not. However, there is always a dominant conception of the world,
representing the outlook of the dominant class (although influenced by vestiges ofpast
philosophies and past class interests). He called this a 'conception of the world', a
'philosophy which has become a cultural movement', a 'religion', a 'faith', or even an
'ideology'; in the sense of a conception of the world that is implicitly manifest in art, law
and language even, and in all manifestations of individual and collective life - in short, in
the culture of society. In this way, philosophy acts to preserve 'the ideological unity of the
entire social bloc' and is expressed as the 'common sense' of the age (Prison
Notebooks:328).
The intellectual movement of the proletariat must develop and articulate its own
philosophy. The task of the organic intellectuals, and Gramsci refers specifically to his
own role in the proletarian movement, is to theorise and make coherent the aspirations
and potentialities inherent in proletarian activity. As McLellan (1979) pointed out, the
relationship oforganic intellectuals to their class is thus a dialectical one - they draw
material from proletarian experience and at the same time impart to it a theoretical
consciousness. Thus, proletarian philosophy itself must be seen as a collective activity,
involving not only the dissemination of ideas from above, but also the extension of
critical intellectual activity, in close links with the political practice of the proletarian
movement, among expanding sections of the population. In this way ideas are not only
corrected and made adequate to the situation but become, in the words ofMarx frequently
quoted by Gramsci, a 'material force' (Hoare, 1971).
For philosophy to become a 'material force', intellectuals must first develop a 'critical
awareness'. That is, rather than rely upon a conception of the world 'mechanically
imposed by the external environment' (i.e. by the dominant social groups) intellectuals
must work out 'consciously and critically' their own conception of the world and thus "in
connection with the labours of one's own brain, choose one's sphere of activity, take an
active part in the creation of the history of the world, be one's own guide, refusing to
accept passively and supinely from outside the moulding of one's personality" (Prison
Notebooks:323-324). And, "the starting-point ofcritical elaboration is the consciousness
of what one really is, and is 'knowing thyself as a product of the historical process to
date... " (Prison Notebooks:324).
The transformation ofphilosophy into a social force or material force relies upon the
formation of a 'collective political will', an 'operative awareness ofhistory' or, put more
simply, a revolutionary class consciousness. It is through' a critique of capitalist
civilization' that a unified proletarian consciousness is formed. Philosophy for the
intellectuals of the proletariat thus becomes a 'critico-practical activity'. As Gramsci
stated: "A philosophy of praxis cannot but present itself at the outset in a polemical and
critical guise, as superseding the existing mode of thinking and existing concrete thought
(the existing cultural world)" (Prison Notebooks:330).
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Thus, through a critique of capitalism, the proletariat becomes conscious of its own
historical role and in this way raises its collective political will. To enable such a critique,
the proletariat must know its adversary, it must become conscious of the class structure of
society and its own relationship to the dominant class. As Gramsci put it: "Not only does
the people have no precise consciousness of its own historical identity, it is not even
conscious of the historical identity or the exact limits of its adversary. The lower classes,
historically on the defensive, can only achieve self-awareness via a series ofnegations,
via their consciousness of the identity and class limits of their enemy" (Prison Notebooks:
273).
Criticism, as advocated by Gramsci, has a crucial role in counter-hegemonic activity - it
becomes a 'material weapon' and takes a precise form. First of all, it must be a criticism
of'common sense'; initially in order to demonstrate that' everyone is a philosopher' and
that it is not a question of introducing a new philosophy into people's lives, but of
critically reexamining that already existing (Prison Notebooks: 330-331). The masses
must reexamine their everyday beliefs, values and mores from a critical perspective, but
from a perspective developed within their own practical experience of the world. In this
way, 'common sense' can be exposed for what it is - the ideological, political, and
cultural manifestation of class interest, specifically that of the dominant class. Secondly:
"It must then be a criticism of the philosophy of the intellectuals out of which the history
ofphilosophy developed and which, in so far as it is a phenomenon of individuals (in fact
it develops essentially in the activity of single particularly gifted individuals) can be
considered as marking the 'high points' of the progress made by common sense, or at
least the common sense of the more educated strata of society but through them also of
the people" (Prison Notebooks:331). Philosophy as articulated by the dominant
intellectuals must be challenged - it too must be revealed as ideology serving particular
class interests. It must be stripped of its objective clothing.
The purpose of critique is to raise the consciousness of the proletariat, to make it aware of
its historical role, to raise the proletariat from a state of 'moral and political passivity' to
one of intellectual and political activity, to develop a 'collective political will'. It is
precisely in this way, by mobilising the proletariat, that philosophy or critique becomes a
'material weapon'. Gramsci stated: "Critical understanding of self [in regard to
proletarian consciousness] takes place therefore through a struggle ofpolitical
'hegemonies' and of opposing directions, first in the ethical field and then in that of
politics proper, in order to arrive at the working out at a higher level ofone's own
conception of reality" (Prison Notebooks:333).
Criticism is thus conducted at two levels - that of common sense and at a higher level,
challenging the philosophy of the dominant intellectuals. And it must, of necessity, be
conducted in polemical forms. "Hence the necessity, in an exposition of the philosophy of
praxis, of a polemic with traditional philosophies. Indeed ... the philosophy ofpraxis can
only be conceived in a polemical form and in the form of a perpetual struggle. None the
less, the starting point must always be that common sense which is the spontaneous
philosophy of the multitude and which has to be made ideologically coherent" (Prison
222
Notebooks:421). Radical critique, in addition to raising self-awareness, also serves to
build solidarity amongst oppositional groups. As Gramsci explained:
"Consciousness ofbeing part of a particular hegemonic force (that is to say, political
consciousness) is the first stage towards a further progressive self-consciousness in
which theory and practice will finally be one. Thus the unity of theory and practice is
not just a matter of mechanical fact, but a part of the historical process, whose
elementary and primitive phase is to be found in the sense ofbeing 'different' and
'apart', in an instinctive feeling of independence, and which progresses to the level of
real possession of a single and coherent conception of the world. This is why it must
be stressed that the political development of the concept of hegemony represents a
great philosophical advance as well as a politico-practical one. For it necessarily
supposes an intellectual unity and an ethic in conformity with a conception of reality
that has gone beyond common sense and has become, if only within narrow limits, a
critical conception" (Prison Notebooks:333-334).
As Hoare (1971) pointed out, it is essential to Gramsci's approach that a successful
critique is not performed by simply confronting one philosophy with another. It is not just
the ideas that need to be confronted but the social forces behind them and, more directly,
the ideology these forces have generated and which has become part of the 'common
sense' of the time. Moreover, material reality itself as exemplified in the subject-object
inversion must be exposed to critique. It must be emphasised that it is not simply a 'false'
consciousness that needs to be overcome to affect a transformation of the capitalist mode
ofproduction, but rather real material relations that must be altered.
The critiques of 'common sense' and 'the philosophy of the philosophers' are therefore
complementary aspects of a single ideological struggle. This struggle must be waged, as
Gramsci waged it, 'tirelessly', but its ultimate resolution lies on another terrain - that of
'revolutionary praxis'. Ruthless criticism, as part of the counter-hegemonic strategy
serves to raise proletariat consciousness and in this way collective political will, and it
does this by exposing the enemies positions to a constant barrage of criticism. Its final
culmination is still, however, the 'war of manoeuvre'. Following Marx, the weapon of
critique does not replace the critique of weapons. In the final instance, material force must
be overthrown by material force.
"In this way we arrive also at the equality of, or equation between, philosophy and
politics, thought and action, that is, at a philosophy ofpraxis. Everything is political,
even philosophy or philosophies... and the only 'philosophy' is history in action, that
is, life itself' (Prison Notebooks:357).
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5.8 Transformation
Having established a rationale for a transformative approach to planning (a theoryfor
planning) in Chapter 4 of the thesis, I have been concerned in Chapter 5 with establishing
a theoretical grounding for a practice of radical planning appropriate to contemporary
capitalist society. In other words, having argued why capitalism must be transformed in
Chapter 4, I turned in Chapter 5 to the task of explaining how it can be transformed. In
Chapter 6 I will relate these findings to a proposed practice of transformative planning
and to particular roles radical planners can play in this process.
The analysis of the transformation of the capitalist mode ofproduction was based upon
Marx's (and Engels') materialist interpretation of history. Marx investigated and
explained the underlying dynamics and resultant contradictions of the capitalist mode of
production., but his other great achievement was to situate this mode of production in its
historical context - to show that the dynamics he uncovered were not absolute, eternal
economic laws, applicable to all societies, but were instead historically specific,
applicable to a particular historical period: one of relatively recent origin and one of
eventual demise.
Historical materialism views history as a succession of 'modes ofproduction' or
historical epochs (Asian, ancient, feudal, and capitalist) each distinguished by a
productive capacity (particular forces ofproduction) associated with distinctive forms of
property ownership (relations of production). The forces of production include the means
ofproduction (raw materials, machinery, etc.) plus labour power. In effect, the productive
forces represent the human capacity to transform nature - the social capability to provide
material security and reproductive survival to human society. The relations ofproduction
are constituted by the economic ownership and/or control ofproductive forces: i.e. the
means ofproduction and labour power. They, in turn, represent control over the human
capacity to transform nature - social control over the capacity to provide material well-
being and reproductive survival.
At a certain stage of development, according to the materialist conception of history, the
material forces ofproduction come into conflict with the existing relations of production.
Instead of acting to facilitate the development ofproductive forces, the relations of
production turn into 'fetters' and impede further progress. These underlying material
conflicts or contradictions are expressed on the surface of society, in subjective form, as
class struggle, conflicts over the material interests ofparticular groups within society. It is
through revolutionary class struggle that one mode ofproduction is succeeded by another.
Thus, history is presented as a dialectical process of conflicts in the underlying economic
structure (the base) of society fought out in the realm of superstructure through class
struggle.
Thus, Marx's and Engels' materialist conception of history argues that just as former
modes ofproduction have been replaced, so too will the present system give birth to its
successor. Moreover, to be progressive, this transition, although determined 'in the last
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instance' by objective economic conditions, is realised by human praxis in the form of a
proletarian revolutionary movement; a revolutionary movement transforming the
capitalist mode ofproduction to a sustainable post-capitalist society - a collective society
Marx termed communism.
Marx analysed the capitalist mode ofproduction to reveal its inner motions, relations and
contradictions, its inner dynamics which influence its historical trends, and revealed two
critical dynamics inherent to capitalism: expansion of capital and the concentration and
centralisation of capital. According to Marx, these dynamics contain a fundamental
contradiction. Whilst the enormous productive potential unleashed by capitalism (which
Marx viewed as capitalism's historical value) could potentially satisfy the material needs
of society, the dynamic to concentrate and centralise capital results, perversely, in the
polarisation ofmaterial well-being and continuing impoverishment of a large part of the
population.
These dynamics can be seen as those exhibited by all class societies: i.e. an increase in the
forces ofproduction and an increasing appropriation of the social product by the
controlling class. However, and crucially, what differentiates the capitalist mode of
production from all earlier class societies is that the dynamic to expand production and
the dynamic to concentrate the wealth from expanded production become objective
movements inherent to the system rather than simply subjective imperatives as in former
class societies. As a class system, capitalism not only extracts an increasing surplus from
producers, as all past class societies have done, it is impelled to reinvest that surplus back
into production to produce even greater surpluses. As we have seen in Chapter 4, this is
not governed by subjective preference. Rather, it is a matter of survival for capitalist
firms. It becomes an objective feature of the mode ofproduction. In this way capitalism
sets in motion dynamics that are immanent to the system - that are objectively necessary
for its survival. Thus, the subjective factor (the appropriation of surplus-value from the
producing classes by the exploiting class) becomes an objective feature of the system
(through the necessity to create further surplus-value simply to survive).
Production is not carried out to increase social use-values - to provide society with
material security and reproductive survival (although it serves this function initially) -
rather, it is governed by exchange-value, the extraction of the maximum surplus-value
from the production process, and reinvesting surplus-value back into production to enable
further accumulation. The 'spiraling' accumulation process results in an 'unleashing' of
productive forces - 'production for production's sake' comes onto the scene historically
for the first time. Exchange-value takes absolute precedence over use-value. The system
is governed, as Marx put it, by exchange-value 'gone mad'.
That is the crux of Marx' s immense contribution to political economy. He stripped away
the mystification surrounding capitalist production to reveal its inner objective dynamics
with all their frightening implications. This is precisely why Marx' s analysis is as relevant
today, if not more so, as when first proposed. The objective dynamics Marx uncovered
are not subject to alteration by force of moral argument or bourgeois reformist measures.
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According to this interpretation, they will grind on until the mounting contradictions
result in a social and ecological crisis that can only be resolved by complete
transformation of the socio-economic system itself.
Marx posited the conflict between the forces of production and the relations ofproduction
in the capitalist mode of production to be primarily between the socialisation of the forces
of production and the private appropriation of the social product under the existing
relations ofproduction. It is essentially a socio-economic conflict, and manifests itself in
a whole range of socio-economic maladies. Firstly, as already mentioned, there is the
inherent incapacity to generalise the benefits of increased social production to the
producers themselves: to the proletariat at large. Counterposed to the fabulous increase in
wealth at one pole is continuing and widespread poverty at the other. This is not, as
bourgeois economists would have us believe, the natural state of affairs inherent to
human society and necessary to reward individual effort, but rather a reflection of
subjective imperatives inherent to class society that have become objectified in the
capitalist socio-economic system.
Secondly, capitalism is subject to numerous tendencies which result in periodic economic
crises. Included here are crises of overproductionlunderconsumption, crises brought about
by the tendency for a falling rate ofprofit, rising wage rates, disproportionality, and crises
within the credit system. All result in recurring socio-economic dysfunctions that vary in
magnitude from national crises to global disruptions. Whether these crises will result in a
general crisis that cannot be resolved is a matter of intense debate. Capitalism until now
has shown itself resilient in the face of these recurring economic crises. Moreover, it has
been argued that the long-term expansion of capital, in fact, depends upon periodic crises
to overcome decreasing rates ofprofit and tendencies to over-production. Marx never
predicted the final collapse ofcapitalism by one particular cause, but rather posed a
complex interaction ofphenomena that would contribute to increasing socio-economic
disruption and lead to crisis situations of revolutionary potential.
The capitalist mode ofproduction contains a further contradiction critically important to
an understanding of historical materialism. As has been discussed, increase in social
wealth under capitalism is dependent upon a system ofproduction that results in
fundamental alienation in the producers of that wealth and between producers and other
nature. The actual sources of wealth, labour and nature, are alienated in the very process
ofproducing that wealth. Under capitalism, human labour (like nature) becomes a
commodity to be bought and sold on the market. Human labour, as a free, conscious,
practical activity, the essential, distinguishing human trait (its 'species being' in Marx's
terms) becomes estranged, it is separated from the worker. It becomes a commodity, an
object of commerce, and is subject to the objective laws of commodity production. And
nature, which Marx described as 'man's inorganic body' , is likewise commodified and, as
such, becomes estranged from the producer.
Not only is labour, as a free, conscious, creative activity, estranged from the worker and
objectified as a commodity, it also, in the form of capital (which Marx described as
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'objectified labour' or 'dead labour'), comes to oppose the worker, to subjugate the
workers' interests to those of capital. Thus, the product oflabour itself, in the form of
capital, acts to subjugate the worker to its own demands. Hence, we see that the
producers, in effect, continuously reproduce the conditions of their own subjugation:
accumulated 'dead labour' subjugates living labour.
Over time, this alienation culminates in a fundamental inversion in social production and
consumption. The products of human labour in the commodity form, as in the commodity
market, come to dominate the producers themselves. While human labour and human
relations are reified, commodities in particular and capital in general take on a life of their
own - they become fetishised. Things (commodities, money, the market, etc.) come to
determine people, and people live their lives according to the dictates of things. There is a
fundamental inversion of subject and object. The commodity and the commodity market
no longer exist to serve people, but instead people exist to serve the market, to serve the
needs of capital expansion. This inversion is critically important to understanding
historical materialism's insistence on revolutionary change. A complete transformation of
the socio-economic system is required to overcome this inversion. A 'political' revolution
is insufficient.
Although Marx posited conflict between the forces ofproduction and the relations of
production as social and economic rather than biophysical, this conflict was extended in
the project undertaken in the thesis to encompass ecological conflict; conflict between the
growing forces of production (in the sense of an unsustainable transformation of nature)
and the existing relations ofproduction. This is intended not as a refutation of
contradictions identified by Marx, but as a supplementation to those contradictions
informed by the ecological realities of contemporary capitalism.
It was argued that although Marx and Engels did not propose an ecological conflict as
contributing to the transition from capitalism to communism, they were demonstrably
aware of the biophysical constraints facing the capitalist mode ofproduction and the
destructive potentialities of capitalism in regard to its biophysical environment. They also
posited a fundamental alienation between human society and other nature brought about
by the capitalist mode ofproduction, something which could only be resolved through the
transformation of the socio-economic system. Moreover, whilst recognising the role of
class societies in vastly increasing the material productivity of society, they argued that
with the full development of capitalism this historical role had been rendered obsolete.
The task for future society is to redirect this vast productive capacity to serve socially
(and I would argue, ecologically) rational ends.
As we have seen, the inherent dynamic to expand capital (which becomes an objective
dynamic immanent to the capitalist mode ofproduction) results in a veritable unleashing
of the social forces ofproduction. 'Production for production sake' becomes the
governing factor in the capitalist mode ofproduction. The transformation of nature is
based upon the maximisation of exchange-value rather than the provision of ecologically
sustainable social use-values. It was argued that this continuous expansion in production
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(in essence a continuous and expanding transformation ofnature) will increasingly result
in ecological disruption and prove ultimately unsustainable. It must eventually come into
conflict with the ecological realities of a finite resource base and a finite global
assimilative capacity for residual wastes. The global expansion in productive forces thus
comes to threaten the continued biophysical reproduction of the capitalist system itself.
At the same time, the existing relations ofproduction, the ownership and/or control of the
means ofproduction and labour-power, are intrinsically unable to reconcile the mounting
ecological crisis brought about by the expansion of capital. As already noted, the
concentration and centralisation of capital (itself an objective feature of the capitalist
mode ofproduction) results in the concentration of economic and political power (what
Marx called the 'social power of capital') in a bourgeois elite representing the objective
dictates of capital, i.e. self-expansion. This bourgeois elite, whose subjective interests
represent the objective movements of the socio-economic system, is unable to negate the
expansion ofcapital. Their subjective role is to maximise production - to facilitate the
expansion of capital. For the bourgeoisie to negate the expansion of capital is to deny its
historical role as the personification of capital; the subjective representation of the
objective movements of capital. In this way, the social relations ofproduction are unable
to rationally control the material forces of production, to ensure the continuing material
security and reproductive survival of society. Instead, the conflict between the forces of
production and the relations ofproduction actually threatens (through increasing
ecological and social disruption) the future material well-being and reproductive survival
of humankind.
Marx, in his theory of historical materialism, posited the division of capitalist society into
two opposing classes: the bourgeoisie (owners and/or controllers of the means of
production and employers of wage labour), and the proletariat (owners oflabour power
dependent upon its sale as means of livelihood). It is the proletariat that Marx identified
as the revolutionary force capable of radically transforming the capitalist mode of
production. This would occur through a revolutionary uprising, in moments of crisis,
resulting in the overthrow of the capitalist state and its replacement, initially with a
'dictatorship of the proletariat' and later following the 'withering away' of the state, an
association of free producers.
Thus, the transition from capitalism to communism would not occur spontaneously or
even inevitably because of underlying economic contradictions. The crises generated by
these contradictions have to be consciously utilised by a proletarian movement fully
conscious of its historical role. To bring about a progressive transition from capitalism to
communism (crucially during periods of crisis) requires the active intervention of human
agency - 'man making his own history' - a movement of 'the immense majority in the
interests of the immense majority'. In the absence of an organised proletarian movement
the crisis (or crises) if severe enough, may result in a collapse of the socio-economic
system to the point of a regression into tribalism and social disintegration or,
alternatively, to the imposition of authoritarianism in the form of a fascist or military
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dictatorship. If less severe, capitalism may even reconfigure itself to overcome such
challenges.
According to Marx, it was the industrial proletariat, at that time organising into giant
industrial armies, that would act as the vanguard of the forces opposed to capital.
Consequently, it would be the most advanced industrial nations that would first undergo
the coming revolution. The revolution would spread to less developed countries and lead
to the transformation of the capitalist mode of production at a global level, and thus the
replacement of capitalism as an historical epoch.
However, even in Marx's time this did not provide a satisfactory explanation of, or
prescription for, the revolutionary movement. It is a matter of historical record that the
successful proletarian revolutions occurred in countries where the industrial proletariat
was not well advanced or was practically non-existent. Neither did these revolutionary
movements lead to the global transformation of the capitalist mode ofproduction but
were instead confined within national boundaries and had to coexist with a still dominant
global capitalist system. In addition, within contemporary capitalist countries there is no
indication of a revolutionary consciousness developing amongst the working class,
industrial or otherwise. There is instead an 'embourgeoisment' of the proletariat,
ideologically, culturally and even politically. Thus, the form of the proletarian movement
and its role in the transformation of the capitalist mode ofproduction needs to be re-
theorised in light of historical lessons and contemporary reality.
For an insight into the nature, and role, of the proletarian movement in advanced
capitalist societies the writings of Antonio Gramsci, an Italian Marxist, who analysed the
revolutionary movements during the inter-war period, were examined. Gramsci concluded
that different revolutionary strategies were required between West and East, between
advanced capitalist nations and less developed countries. These strategies were informed
by Gramsci's concept of hegemony, perhaps his single most important contribution to
Marxist theory.
Gramsci adopted the notion of hegemony as it was used by previous Marxists (i.e. as a
process by which the proletariat extended its leadership over all the elements opposed to
capital) and applied it to the way capitalism reproduces itself - how the bourgeoisie
establishes and maintains its dominance over wider society. Gramsci argued that the
dominant class maintains its position, not simply through force and coercion but also by
'educating' the consent of the subordinate classes by exerting a 'moral and intellectual
leadership'. Economic, social, cultural, and ideological influences permeate the whole
complex superstructure of advanced capitalist countries to diffuse a 'common sense', a
common conception of the world based upon, and legitimising, the interests of the
dominant class.
In light of these discoveries, Gramsci differentiated two alternate strategies for the
proletarian struggle. One he termed the 'war of manoeuvre' , a popular uprising
culminating in a direct assault on, and the overthrow of, the state. This was the
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appropriate strategy in the East (e.g. Russia) where the dominant class maintained its
position largely through force and coercion via the state apparatus. The second he
described as the 'war of position', a protracted struggle conducted largely in civil society
for hegemonic dominance. This preceded the 'war of manoeuvre', and was the necessary
strategy for the advanced capitalist countries in the West, where civil society was well
developed and formed additional lines of defense around the state.
Gramsci also outlined the tactics involved in the 'war of position' , the struggle over
hegemony. And in doing so he elaborated a specific role for intellectuals, particularly for
what he termed the 'organic intellectuals' of the proletariat. The strategy of the 'war of
position' and the tactics of counter-hegemonic struggle (including the role of the
intellectuals) provides the contemporary proletarian movement with a powerful
theoretical insight into the strategy appropriate for the present day realities of advanced
capitalism.
Gramsci argued that hegemonic dominance becomes so persuasive in advanced capitalist
societies with highly developed civil societies that it is consented to by the masses largely
uncritically and almost unconsciously. This takes place to the extent that there occurs an
actual 'embourgeoisment' ofthe proletariat which prevents the emergence of an effective
proletarian consciousness. During 'normal times' bourgeois hegemony remains
widespread and secure, effectively beyond challenge; it is accepted precisely as 'common
sense' by the great mass ofpeople. This situation follows Marx's notion of inverted
reality - of the object-subject inversion. The fetish of the commodity becomes so
persuasive that it is accepted as reality by the masses; in effect, the fetish becomes the
reality.
Nevertheless, according to Gramsci, even during normal times the hegemonic dominance
is never complete. There are always tensions, contradictions that expresses themselves as
'conjunctual' conflicts, 'everyday' political, economic and ecological crises that can,
however, be resolved through the bourgeois political process, but not without
controversy. The proletarian movement has a defined role during 'normal times'.
According to Gramsci, it is on the 'terrain of the conjunctual' that the proletariat, through
its intellectuals, must organise the disparate elements opposed to capital and continue to
challenge the dominant hegemony, particularly through a 'critique of capitalist
civilization'; through a series of' ideological, religious, philosophical, political and
juridical polemics'. The 'philosophy ofpraxis' must be a 'practice-critical' movement.
At times of 'organic crises', situations where underlying economic contradictions-
conflicts between the forces ofproduction and the relations ofproduction - pass from the
structure to the superstructure, serious dysfunctions develop: social, economic, political
or ecological disruptions that may result in a 'crisis of hegemony' , a 'crisis of authority'
or 'legitimacy'. At such moments the masses lose confidence in the leadership of the
dominant class, and from a position of former 'passivity' enter into 'movement'. These
are the historical moments of revolutionary potential. To be utilised progressively,
however, the masses must be infused with a revolutionary proletarian consciousness -
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what Gramsci described as a 'national-popular-collective-will'. Once again, it is the task
of the organic intellectuals to organise this movement, to consolidate the disparate
elements and unify them within a counter-hegemony capable of challenging and replacing
that of the dominant group. As Low (1991 :209) put it: '''Conscious leadership', therefore,
meant being able to demonstrate how the specific problems which different movements
of the masses were concerned with were traceable to the same root cause in the economic
structure of capitalism, thus enabling the formation of a broad-based coalition of
interests".
This is precisely the task of the organic intellectuals. The 'corporate interests' of the
disparate elements must be fused, they must be shown to be the collective interests of the
proletariat, of all the groups opposed to capital. In this way, the proletariat in its widest
sense becomes the 'universal interest', the interest of all society. Inparticular, in
contemporary capitalist society, it is proposed that the two strongest elements opposing
capital - the traditional workers movements and the more radical of the emerging
environmental groups - must combine to challenge bourgeois hegemony. There must be,
in short, a 'red/green' coalition opposed to capital, a 'united bloc' that can incorporate
other elements in counter-hegemonic struggle.
This reformulated proletariat, which places less emphasis on the traditional industrial
proletariat and assigns a central role to elements formerly considered petty bourgeois or
even bourgeois, is necessary to account for contemporary reality. The traditional
industrial proletariat is not the emerging force it was in Marx's time. Capitalism has
entered a phase in the development of the forces ofproduction that some call 'post-
industrial', whereby heavy industry has been complemented and in some countries
eclipsed by 'high-tech' light industry and a tremendous growth in so-called service
industries. Nevertheless, the proletariat's economic relationship to capital has not altered,
although its form may be different. Workers in light industry or so-called service
industries are just as dependent upon capital for their means of livelihood as were the
traditional industrial proletariat. Few contemporary workers own or control their own
means ofproduction. In fact, the petty bourgeoisie, economically defined, have all but
disappeared in advanced capitalist countries, as Marx predicted they would. Up to ninety
per cent of the population in advanced Western capitalist countries are wholly dependent,
or almost wholly dependent, on selling their labour-power (manual or intellectual) for
their means of livelihood.
Thus, although there may have occurred an 'embourgeoisement' of the proletariat
culturally and ideologically (and even politically), there has been a vast increase in the
proletariat in an economic sense and this, at the end of the day, is the crucial aspect.
Should capital fail to provide the means of production (through a crisis of some sort) this
pervasive dependency on capital for a means of livelihood will be brought home to the
proletariat in all its terrifying reality. In moments of crisis, the absolute dependency on
capital to provide their means ofproduction will assert itself on the entire proletariat,
including those elements who have lost sight of this crucial connection and have become
detached culturally, ideologically and politically from the proletariat. The universal
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interests of the proletariat, their relationship to capital, will be reestablished and in this
way, in moments of crisis, their common opposition to capital will become apparent.
By combining Marx's and Engels' explanation for historical change with Gramsci's
theories on the transformation of advanced capitalism, and re-analysing them in light of
contemporary ecological realities, we conclude that the transition from capitalism to a
post-capitalist socio-economic system relies upon a counter-hegemonic struggle by a
'popular front' of elements opposed to capital. In the first instance, a coalition between
the traditional forces opposing human exploitation and the more recent movements
opposed to the exploitation of non-human nature, that is the radical 'green' and 'political-
ecology' groups. By aligning the traditional socialist movement with the radical green
groups and organising the coalescence of other disparate elements conflicting with
capital, such as the anti-globalisation factions, indigenous blocs, feminist groups,
movements for national liberation, peace groups, etc. the proletarian movement has the
potential to increasingly challenge the dominant bourgeois hegemony. It has the potential
to become an 'historic bloc'.
This challenge will intensify and may become revolutionary during times of organic
crises - crises of'legitimacy', or 'authority' in the dominant hegemony. It is during such
crises that the forces opposed to capital (the proletariat in its widest sense) can realise an
effective class consciousness in opposition to capital, and in so doing, develop a
'collective political will', a genuine revolutionary potential. At such times, the proletariat
is in a position to move from the 'war ofposition' to the 'war of manoeuvre', to replace
the bourgeois state and proceed to construct a truly classless and ecologically rational
society.
Thus, according to historical materialism, just as former modes ofproduction have been
transformed so too will the present mode ofproduction give birth to its successor.
Moreover, this transition, although determined 'in the last instance' by objective
economic conditions resulting in periods of crisis and revolutionary potential, will be
realised by human praxis in the form of a (reformulated) proletarian revolutionary
movement. However, the productive progress brought about by capitalism eliminates the
feasibility of, and the historical rationale for, further class domination. Thus, capitalism is
posited as the last mode ofproduction based upon the differentiation of society into
classes. It would signal the end of human 'pre-history'.
The future society would be a classless society based upon the common ownership of
property, and government would be the 'administration of things' rather than the
subjugation of people. 'Real history' would thus begin. Human society would pass from
the 'realm of necessity' to the 'realm of freedom'. Society would be regulated by human
need, within recognised ecological constraints, rather than by exchange-value' gone mad',
and its social rationale would take the form of 'from each according to his abilities, to
each according to his need' . Alienation, in all its bourgeois manifestations would be
overcome and society could fulfill its human potential and overcome its estrangement
from nature.
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Chapter 6: Eco-Radical Planning
6.1 Introduction
In Part Two, Chapter 4 of the thesis it was argued that the capitalist mode ofproduction is
ultimately unsustainable because of two intractable dynamics inherent to the socio-
economic system. Firstly, there is an inherent imperative to expand capital. This
manifests itself concretely as a quantitative expansion in the total output of commodities,
a chronic increase in gross product, together with an external expansion of the sphere of
commodity production, i.e. a spatial extension. There occurs as a result of these dynamics
an 'unleashing' of the global capitalist forces ofproduction, an ever-increasing capacity
to transform nature on a global scale. Secondly, there is an immanent movement towards
the concentration and centralisation of capital. This results in the increasing confinement
of the means ofproduction and associated economic and political power in the hands of
ever fewer owners ofcapital, together with an expanding proletariat more or less
dependent on, and subject to, the dictates of capital. There is thus a polarisation in the
relations ofproduction - i.e. the social ownership of the means ofproduction and labour
power - and, hence, economic and political power: the 'social power of capital'.
It was shown how these dynamics were manifestations of deeper, inner processes,
relations and conflicts - the 'inner logic' of the capitalist mode of production. These inner
motions were investigated and are explained by Marx's dialectical analysis of capitalism:
his uncovering and elaboration of the concept of surplus-value, resting upon the abstract
labour theory of value; his consequent explanation of the theory of capital accumulation,
being an accumulation process resulting, in turn, in the double movement of capital -
expansion and concentration Icentralisation - one the quantitative expression of the
capital relation, the other its qualitative counterpart.
It was then described how these dynamics result in two fundamental contradictions - an
external constraint, which was termed the ecological contradiction, and an internal
conflict, which was designated as the social contradiction. Firstly, the chronic quantitative
increase in the production of commodities was posited as contradictory to the ecological
and thermodynamic realities of a finite global resource base and a finite global
assimilative capacity for residual wastes. In other words, there is conflict between
capitalism and its continued biophysical reproduction. Secondly, it was advanced that the
concentration and centralisation of capital, with its associated polarisation of wealth,
economic and political power, is socially unsustainable. That is, the social, economic and
political consequences of this movement are seen as repressive, exploitative and, in the
long term, socially and politically disruptive. There is, in other words, a conflict between
the capitalist mode ofproduction and its social reproduction.
It was postulated that those movements contain a further contradiction: a conflict between
the quantitative expansion ofproductive forces and the qualitative expression of the
relations of production. The concentration and centralisation of capital, and its associated
economic and political power, in the hands of a bourgeois elite representing the objective
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dictates of capital (i.e. self expansion) is intrinsically unable to reconcile the mounting
socio-economic and ecological crises brought about by the expansion of capital.
This was posited as the ultimate contradiction. Capitalism's triumph in increasing
production and concentrating capital creates an impasse that cannot be resolved by
capital. In other words, it cannot be resolved by reform to the capitalist system. It is the
inevitable result of dynamics fundamental to the mode ofproduction. Capital must
expand and it must concentrate. It cannot do otherwise. Just as human emancipation is, by
definition, untenable under an exploitative economic system, so too is steady-state
capitalism an economic impossibility, and sustainable capitalism (in its social and
ecological senses) an oxymoron. However, this final contradiction contains within itself
the seeds of its own dialectical resolution, and it involves transformation of the capitalist
mode ofproduction to a post capitalist socio-economic arrangement, one founded upon
the social and ecological rationalities developing within the existing system.
Thus, reformism is shown in its true light; i.e. as an approach intrinsically unable to deal
with the fundamental contradictions of the capitalist mode of production and their
manifestations: increasing ecological and social degradation. Reformist approaches to the
theory and practice ofplanning are likewise inadequate. The historical role of reformist
planning, in the tradition of Friedmann's 'societal guidance', has been to resolve short-
term contradictions and thus enable the reproduction of the capitalist system on an
expanded scale. Rather than address the underlying contradictions of the capitalist mode
of production, reformist planning perpetuates them.
Chapter 4 thus provides a rationale and a legitimisation for a radical approach to planning
theory and practice. It provides a theory for radical planning, an approach to planning
situated, according to Friedmann, in the tradition of 'social mobilisation'. Ifreformist
planning merely acts as the 'handmaiden' of capital by resolving short-term economic,
social and ecological conflicts to enable the reproduction of capitalism - and in this way
perpetuates the fundamental long-term contradictions - then a radical approach aimed at
finding a lasting solution to these contradictions through the transformation of the
capitalist mode ofproduction can be seen as legitimate.
In Chapter 5 of Part Two, the transformation of capitalism as Marx and Engels theorised
it was examined. Marx's and Engels' theory of historical materialism presents the view
that just as former modes ofproduction have been replaced, so too will the present system
give birth to its successor. Moreover, this transition, although determined 'in the last
instance' by objective economic conditions, is realised by human praxis in the form of a
proletarian revolutionary movement which would transform the capitalist mode of
production to a classless society Marx called communism. Marx's economic
interpretation of history demonstrated that it is the organisation of economic production
which provides the ultimate determinant of human history. The fundamental explanation
of historical change is to be sought in the contradictions arising from the economic
circumstances pertaining to a particular mode ofproduction. These contradictions are
essentially about conflicts between the development of production (the productive forces)
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and the existing relations ofproduction. And these conflicts express themselves in
subjective form as class struggle: conflicts over the economic interests ofparticular
groups within society.
It is through revolutionary class struggle that one mode ofproduction is replaced by
another. The progressive transformation of capitalism likewise relies upon revolutionary
class struggle between an emerging emancipatory proletarian movement and a reactionary
bourgeois class. In other words, between the growing social, economic and ecological
contradictions of the capitalist mode ofproduction on the one hand, and the
transformation to a post-capitalist socio-economic system on the other, there is a
necessary mediation - the development of an active, class conscious proletariat. We saw
that according to traditional Marxist theory the transformation of capitalism will be
brought about by a popular revolutionary uprising led by a rapidly expanding industrial
proletariat fully conscious of its historical task. However, in light of historical
developments, this has proved an incomplete explanation of the revolutionary process.
For an insight into the nature, and role, of the proletarian movement in contemporary
capitalist societies we examined the writings of Gramsci, who analysed the success and
failures of the proletarian revolutionary movements during the inter-war period. Gramsci
concluded that different revolutionary strategies were required between West and East,
between advanced capitalist nations and less developed countries. These strategies were
informed by Gramsci's concept of hegemony, perhaps his single most important
contribution to Marxist theory. Gramsci adopted the notion of hegemony as used by
earlier Marxists (i.e. as a process by which the proletariat extended its leadership over all
the elements opposed to capital) and applied it to the way capitalism reproduces itself, to
how the bourgeoisie establishes and maintains its dominance over wider society. Gramsci
argued that the dominant class maintains its position not simply through force and
coercion but also by 'educating' the consent of the subordinate classes through exerting a
'moral and intellectual leadership' . Economic, social, cultural and ideological influences
permeate the complex superstructure of advanced capitalist countries to diffuse a
'common sense', a common conception of the world based upon, and legitimising, the
interests of the dominant class.
In light of these discoveries, Gramsci outlined two different strategies for the proletarian
struggle. One he termed the 'war ofmanoeuvre', a popular uprising culminating in a
direct assault on, and overthrow of, the state. This was seen as the appropriate strategy in
the East (e.g. Russia). The second he described as the 'war of position', a protracted
struggle conducted largely in civil society for hegemonic dominance. This preceded the
'war of manoeuvre' and was the necessary strategy for advanced capitalist countries in the
West. Gramsci also outlined the tactics involved in the 'war ofposition', the struggle over
hegemony. In so doing he elaborated a specific role for intellectuals, particularly for those
he termed the 'organic intellectuals' of the proletariat. The strategy of the 'war of
position' and the tactics of counter-hegemonic struggle (including the role of the
intellectuals) provides the contemporary proletarian movement with a powerful
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theoretical insight into the strategy appropriate for the present day realities of advanced
capitalism.
By combining Marx's and Engels' explanation of historical change with Gramsci's
theories on the transformation of advanced capitalism, and re-examining the outcome in
light of contemporary ecological and social realities, it was concluded that the transition
from capitalism to a post-capitalist socio-economic system relies upon a counter-
hegemonic struggle undertaken by a 'popular front' of elements opposed to capital; in the
first instance this will be a coalition between traditional socialist movements and the
more recent radical 'green' groupings. This coalition, by drawing together other disparate
elements confronting capital, has the potential to form an 'historic bloc' capable of
challenging the dominant hegemony, crucially during moments of structural crisis.
Chapter 5 of Part Two, therefore, provides a conceptual basis for elaborating a theory and
practice of radical planning. Gramsci's theories on hegemony, the war ofposition, and the
intellectuals' role in counter-hegemonic struggle provide a theoretical foundation for
radical planning. His writings on the role of intellectuals in the struggle against bourgeois
hegemony provide a powerful theory to inform a practice of radical planning in the public
domain of capitalist societies which can contribute to a progressive proletarian
movement. In as much as the proposed theory and practice of radical planning rely upon
recognition of a fundamental ecological contradiction in the capitalist mode of
production, and are actively concerned with the formation of a coalition between
traditional socialist movements and the emerging radical green forces, this theory and
practice of planning was termed 'Eco-Radical Planning'.
In this chapter I will outline a methodology of Eco-Radical Planning. I will first examine
the crucial nexus between theory and practice, a dialectical relationship that is essential to
understanding the 'philosophy ofpraxis' and to operationalising a practice of Eco-Radical
Planning. According to Marxist philosophy, knowledge comprises theory and practice,
and at the same time is both materialist and dialectical. Knowledge starts with material
practice, which leads to perceptual knowledge. This, in turn, is conceptualised
dialectically to produce theory - 'rational knowledge'. Knowledge returns to practice
through the application of theory to practical activities. In this way knowledge remains
materialist and is validated.
Planning, as defined earlier in the thesis, is intrinsically concerned with linking
knowledge to action. Theoryfor planning, theory ofplanning and theory in planning are
all intimately connected to practice, to concrete human activities. Theory for planning
provides planners with a rationale, a philosophical/political legitimisation for planning
action. Theory ofplanning provides the practitioner with a methodology, with procedural
knowledge to inform planning action. And theory in planning provides the substantive
knowledge necessary for a particular field ofplanning endeavour. Knowledge in each
case is intended to inform practice. Radical planning too must be informed and guided by
appropriate theory. In Friedmann's words (1987:389) it must be 'saturated with theory'.
Radical practice must be guided by theory, but theory itself must spring from practice.
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Theory then returns to inform and be vindicated by practice. When divorced from practice
it ceases to be meaningful. And, according to the dictates of Marxism, theory and practice
achieve unity in human praxis, the coming together of intellectual and physical labour -
most completely, according to Marx, in revolutionary praxis.
I next examine planning in the public domain and analyse the role of orthodox planning
in advanced capitalist countries. It will be shown that public planning occupies a strategic
nexus between political society and civil society in the vast superstructure of advanced
capitalist countries. It is precisely this position in the superstructure, and in mediating the
discourse between the spheres ofpolitical and civil society, that enhances planning's role
as both 'director' ofpolitical hegemony and 'organiser' of social consent. It is at this
crucial nexus that orthodox planning, as societal guidance, actively assists the
maintenance of the dominant hegemony through the exercise of coercion and the
organisation of consent. Planners act as 'functionaries of the superstructure' and serve to
articulate the interests of the dominant class. They also ensure the orderly provision of
infrastructure and resolve the immediate conflicts arising from capitalist production. In
that way, they enable the system's continued reproduction on an expanded scale.
Whilst orthodox planners function as 'deputies' of the dominant class, extending and
maintaining bourgeois hegemony and resolving immediate contradictions arising from
capitalist production, radical planners can use the same unique superstructural position to
work precisely in the opposite direction; that is, to challenge the dominant hegemony and
expose the long term contradictions of capitalism. In this sense, radical planners can be
viewed as 'organic intellectuals' of the proletariat. They function as directors and
organisers in the struggle against the dominant hegemony by attempting to raise, and
maintain, an alternative consciousness - a 'conscious awareness of reality' - to oppose the
'common sense' of bourgeois ideology.
With regard to specific roles that radical planners can undertake in their capacity as
organic intellectuals, these are many and varied. We shall see that for radical planners
operating in the state sector and civil society, opportunities exist for an 'anti-coercive'
and a 'counter-hegemonic' role. Rather than propogating notions of the common good
and public interest, radical planners can expose the particular class interests obscured by
such concepts. Radical planners can also expose the inadequacy of orthodox theory and
methodology in regard to resource management and environmental planning and, in this
way, demonstrate the long term contradictions inherent to capitalism and emphasis its
ultimate unsustainability.
Radical planners in civil society can assist oppositional groups and attempt to bring
convergence in these disparate elements so as to form a common oppositional movement
to capital. Radical planners, as intellectuals in the education system, can act as an
important centre for counter-hegemonic activity. They can challenge the coercive function
of statutory planning and confront the ideological position of the leading intellectuals.
They can also desocialise emerging strata ofplanning intellectuals and practitioners. In
this way, radical intellectuals in the education system can produce, and reproduce, a
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counter-hegemony, a 'moral and intellectual leadership' to challenge that of the leading
group.
In all fields ofcounter-hegemonic struggle in respect to planning in the public domain,
similar tactics are involved. Following Gramsci, radical planners act as organisers of
counter-hegemonic struggle in civil society and directors of 'anti-coercive' activity in
political society. In both roles, as organic intellectuals of the proletarian movement,
radical planners act as centres for the formulation and dissemination of ideas, as
persuaders and educators, as constructors of a counter-hegemony - a proletarian
hegemonic influence in the realm ofpublic planning that can converge with other
counter-hegemonic movements.
But, primarily (in the initial phases at least) radical planners in their capacity as
proletarian intellectuals, must engage in 'ruthless criticism of the existing order'.
According to Gramsci, it is through 'hostile' critique', critique of bourgeois 'common
sense' and the 'philosophy ofphilosophers' , the leading ideas of the dominant group, that
a proletarian consciousness is developed: a consciousness ofproletarian identity and its
relation both to the contemporary social groupings and to historical movement. Thus,
radical planning must present itself at the outset in a polemical and critical guise. It must
be a 'critico-practical activity'. Critique, in the practical activity of radical planning
becomes, following Marx and Gramsci, a 'material force', and criticism a 'material
weapon' in the proletarian movement.
Alongside critique, radical planners must develop theoretical expositions to legitimise
and inform a radical approach to planning. In addition to Marxist theory, radical planners
must confront and evaluate other theoretical positions in the planning literature and either
critique or forge linkages with such theory. I will examine briefly recent initiatives in
planning theory to determine whether these hold any potential to inform a theory and
practice of radical planning. Finally, the necessity for developing a 'national popular
front' or 'historic bloc', between the disparate elements opposed to capital (in the first
instance, an alliance between the traditional socialist forces and the emerging radical
green movement) is elaborated. It is this radical 'red/green' alliance that has the potential
to develop into an effective movement opposed to capital that may, in times of crisis,




"The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to
change it" (Marx, Early Writings:423).
Marx's often quoted XI Thesis on Feuerbach is the basis of all of Marx's work. To Marx,
knowledge (like theory) is not simply about interpreting, explaining or predicting events.
When confined to this role, it is merely 'scholastic'. Knowledge, to remain relevant, must
be intimately concerned with bringing about change - with linking knowledge to action.
Knowledge, in this sense, cannot be separated from human praxis. Gramsci thus
described Marxism as 'both science and action' (Prison Notebooks:381) and explained:
"Theory by simple extension becomes practice - in other words, the affirmation of the
necessary connection between the order of ideas and that of action" (Prison
Notebooks: 364).
However, not only must knowledge, to remain relevant, be linked to practice, knowledge
itself is also the product of practice. As Marx expressed, in the I Thesis on Feuerbach:
"The chief defect of all hitherto existing materialism (that of Feuerbach included) is that
the thing, reality, sensuousness, is conceived only in the form of the object or of
contemplation, but not as sensuous human activity, practice, not subjectively" (Early
Writings:421). It is through practical activity, through the sensuous interaction with our
surroundings in the course ofproducing and reproducing our material existence, that we
produce knowledge. As Bukharin (1971: 13) put it: "Theory [knowledge] is accumulated
and condensed practice".
Marx, commenting on the work of Wagner, wrote: "The doctrinaire professor represents
the relations of man and nature from the very outset not as practical relations - i.e., those
founded on action, but as theoretical ... but people never begin under any circumstances
with 'standing in theoretical relationship with objects outside the world'. Like other
animals, they begin by eating, drinking, etc. - i.e., they do not 'stand' in any relationship,
but function actively, with the help of their actions to take possession of certain objects of
the outside world, and in this way satisfy their requirements. (Consequently they begin
with production.)" (in Bukharin, 1971:12-13). Bukharin (1971:13) emphasised the
practical materialist foundation of knowledge: "Lest there should be any
misunderstanding: we entirely adopt the standpoint that sensuality, sensual experience,
etc., having as their source the material world existing outside our consciousness,
constitutes the point of departure and beginning ofcognition".
Moreover, knowledge can only be validated through practice, through concrete human
activities. This is the ultimate test of objective truth. Truth cannot be established by
scholastic philosophising in the realms of abstract thought, but requires confirmation
through sensuous interaction with the surrounding world, practical human activity. As
Marx stated, in the IT Thesis on Feuerbach: "The question whether objective truth can be
attributed to human thinking is not a question of theory but is a practical question. Man
must prove the truth, i.e. the reality and power, the this-sidedness of his thinking in
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practice. The dispute over the reality or non-reality of thinking that is isolated from
practice is a purely scholastic question" (Early Writings:422). And, similarly, in the VIII
Thesis: "All social life is essentially practical. All mysteries which lead theory to
mysticism find their rational solution in human practice and in the comprehension of this
practice" (Early Writings:423).
In validating knowledge through practical activity humans change the world, and by
changing the world they produce new knowledge. Thus, the acts of inquiry and validation
shape as well as discover reality and, hence, knowledge of that reality. Reality is not
merely what 'is', but what we make it. As Lenin stated, "man's consciousness not only
reflects the world, but also creates it" (in Kuusinen, 1961:582). Thus, knowledge is not
passively and objectively received but is actively and subjectively produced. By changing
the world we not only produce new circumstances and new knowledge, we also produce
ourselves, and thereby change ourselves. Moreover, we change both material
circumstances and human consciousness most fundamentally through revolutionary
practice. As Marx put it in the III Thesis on Feuerbach: "The coincidence of the changing
of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can be conceived and rationally
understood only as revolutionary practice" (Early Writings:422).
Thus, knowledge is comprised of theory and practice, and it is produced by a dialectical
movement between the two moments. Theory and practice are two sides of the same coin
called knowledge and knowledge is inseparably composed of these two elements. Theory
(as a sphere of abstract thought) is a way of understanding the world, a framework to
organise facts and experience, and interpret them in a systematic way that allows us to
make sense of the world. Practice, or praxis, refers to the conscious, universal, creative
and self-creative activity through which humans produce and alter their world, and
through this, themselves. As Gramsci stated: "The identification of theory and practice is
a critical act, through which practice is demonstrated rational and necessary, and theory
realistic and rational (Prison Notebooks:365). Bukharin (1971: 15,17 - his emphasis)
elaborated:
"In Marx we find the materialistic (and simultaneously dialectical) teaching of the
unity of theory and practice, of the primacy ofpractice, and of the practical criterion
oftruth in the theory of cognition... The interaction between theory and practice, their
unity, develops on the basis of the primacy ofpractice; (1) Historically: the sciences
'grow' out ofpractice, the 'production of ideas' differentiates out of the 'production of
things'; (2) Sociologically: 'social being determines social consciousness'. The
practice of material labour is the constant force matrise of the whole of social
development; (3) Epistemologically: the practice of influence on the outside world is
the primary 'given quality' ... Practice is an active break-through into reality, egress
beyond the limits of the subject, penetration into the object, the 'humanising' of
nature, its alteration... the objective world is changed through practice, and according
to practice, which includes theory; this means that practice verifies the truth of theory".
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Marx, influenced by Hess (1961), developed the concept ofpraxis as central to his
writings. He used it, in fact, to critique philosophy and to transcend the notion of
philosophy itself, particularly in its speculative form. Philosophy would render itself
redundant to a scientific world outlook in which theory and practice were indissolubly
linked to a redefined notion of human praxis (particularly revolutionary praxis) that had
no need ofphilosophy. Materialist philosophy in its dialectical form became a theory of
social science, and with Engels, a theory of natural science. Idealistic speculation and
metaphysical mystification under the guise of philosophy is replaced by a thoroughly
materialist outlook: not a 'vulgar' or 'mechanical' materialism, but rather a fundamentally
dialectical (scientific) materialism. Gramsci explained: "From the disintegration of
Hegelianism derives the beginning of a new cultural process [Marxism], different in
character from its predecessors, a process in which practical movement and theoretical
thought are united (or are trying to unite through a struggle that is both theoretical and
practical" (Prison Notebooks:404).
As Petrovic (1983b) pointed out, Marx elaborated his concept of praxis most fully in the
Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, and expressed it most pregnantly in the Theses
on Feuerbach, but it was already indicated in his earlier writings. In the Critique of
Hegel's Philosophy ofRight: Introduction, he proclaimed praxis as the goal of 'true'
philosophy (i.e. of the criticism of speculative philosophy) and revolution as the 'true'
praxis. In the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts Marx elaborated his view of
humans as free creative beings ofpraxis, that 'free, conscious activity is the species-
character of the human-being' , and that 'the practical construction of an objective world,
the fashioning of inorganic nature, is the confirmation of man as a conscious species-
being' . As Marx put it:
"For in the first place labour, life activity, productive life itself appears to man only as
a means for the satisfaction of a need, the need to preserve physical existence. But
productive life is species-life. It is life-producing life. The whole character of a
species, its species-character, resides in the nature of its life activity, and free
conscious activity constitutes the species-character of man" (Early Writings:328).
Furthermore, what distinguishes human life from animal life is precisely its conscious,
free life activity. For example: "The animal is immediately one with its life activity. It is
not distinct from that activity; it is that activity. Man makes his life-activity itself an
object of his will and consciousness. He has conscious life activity. It is not a
determination with which he directly merges. Conscious life activity directly
distinguishes man from animal life activity. Only because of that is he a species-being. Or
rather, he is a conscious being, i.e. his own life is an object for him, only because he is a
species-being. Only because of that is his activity free activity" (Early Writings:328). "It
is therefore in his fashioning of the objective that man really proves himself to be a
species-being. Such production is his active species-life. Through it nature appears as his
work and his reality. The object oflabour is therefore the objectification ofthe species-
life of man: for man reproduces himself not only intellectually, in his consciousness, but
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actively and actually, and he can therefore contemplate himself in a world he himself has
created" (Early Writings:329).
Thus, it is through praxis that humans realise their 'species-being', and it is praxis that
constitutes 'true' knowledge. It is through this sense ofpraxis, as self-conscious, free
(unalienated) social labour that theory and practice find their unity. Theory as 'intellectual
labour' and practice as 'manual labour' are both moments ofpraxis, of human 'species-
being' - of true knowledge. As Bukharin (1971: 13 - his emphasis) put it: " ...both theory
and practice are the activity of social man. If we examine theory not as petrified 'systems'
and practice not as finished products ... but in action, we shall have before us two forms
oflabour activity, the bifurcation oflabour into intellectual and physical labour, 'mental
and material', theoretical cognition and practical action". Bukharin (1971: 14 - his
emphasis) continued: " ...we have in every class society divided labour and, consequently,
a contradiction between intellectual and physical labour - i.e., a contradiction between
theory and practice. But like every division of labour, here too it is a living unity of
opposites. Action passes into cognition. Cognition passes into action. Practice drives
forward cognition. Cognition fertilises practice. Both theory and practice are steps in the
joint process of' the reproduction ofsocial life'",
It is the coming together of consciousness (intellectual labour) and practice (physical
labour) that gives humankind its species-being, its distinguishing human species life, in
essence, its knowledge of objective reality. As Bukharin (1971: 14 - his emphasis) put it:
"In this way practice breaks into theory of cognition, theory includes practice, and real
epistemology, i.e., epistemology which bases itself upon the unity (not the identity!) of
theory and practice, includes the practical criterion, which becomes the criterion of the
truthfulness ofcognition". It is the unity of theory and practice, of intellectual and manual
labour, through praxis as conscious, free (unalienated) labour - human species-being - that
provides 'true' knowledge of objective reality and 'true' insight into human (social)
consciousness. It is in this sense that humans pass from the 'realm of necessity' into the
'realm of freedom' . Freedom is not' absolute truth', but truth is absolute freedom, socially
conceived, i.e. emancipation.
Thus, the Marxist approach to knowledge insists upon the dialectical unity of theory and
practice. It is, in short, materialist as well as dialectical and socio-historical at the same
time. It is materialist in that it relies primarily upon sensory perceptions gained through
human interaction with the objective world. However, these are social interactions,
historically specific - the 'ensemble of social relations' in a situation of 'men making their
own history'. They do not provide absolute truths about external nature nor about human
nature - they are the products of historically developing ensembles of social relations. As
Lenin put it: "The standpoint of life, ofpractice, should be first and fundamental in the
theory of knowledge. And it inevitably leads to materialism, brushing aside the endless
fabrications ofprofessorial scholasticism. Of course, we must not forget that the criterion
ofpractice can never, in the nature of things, either confirm or refute any human idea
completely. This criterion also is sufficiently 'indefinite' not to allow human knowledge
to become 'absolute', but at the same time it is sufficiently definite to wage a ruthless
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fight on all varieties of idealism and agnosticism" (Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, in
Selected Works II:205). But this does not deny the existence of objective truth. As Lenin
explained:
"From the standpoint of modem materialism, i.e., Marxism, the limits of
approximation ofour knowledge to the objective, absolute truth are historically
conditional, but the existence of such truth is unconditional, and the fact that we are
approaching nearer to it is also unconditional. The contours of the picture are
historically conditional, but the fact that this picture depicts an objectively existing
model is unconditionaL .. Dialectics - as Hegel in his time explained - contains an
element of relativism, of negation, of scepticism, but it is not reducible to relativism.
The materialist dialectics of Marx and Engels certainly does contain relativism, but it
is not reducible to relativism, that is, it recognises the relativity of all our knowledge,
not in the sense of the denial of objective truth, but in the sense of the historically
conditional nature of the limits of the approximation of our knowledge of this truth"
(Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, in Selected Works 11: 198-199).
Perceptual data, obtained through social, historically specific interaction with the
objective world, must then be ordered, must be theoretically reconstructed to present a
coherent and 'truthful' representation of reality. But ordering this data simply along the
lines of observation presents a 'one-sided' picture, an incomplete reflection of reality. It
presents reality in its obvious external appearance, but does not explain reality and does
not investigate its underlying movements. This requires dialectical abstraction from
surface appearance to uncover the inner relations and motions - the inner contradictions
inherent to reality and which determine its outer appearance. It requires what Marx called
'the power of abstraction' . As Marx emphasised: "All science would be superfluous if
outward appearances and essences of things directly coincided" (Capital 3:956).
Dialectically, phenomena are not viewed separately, or merely as they appear, but rather
as an integrated whole connected by, and dependent upon, inner and deeper relations and
dynamics. Appearance is the outward unfolding of the inner contradictions ofphenomena
which defmes their very nature. Appearance is characterised by the unity of the
contradictions and by their struggle, both of which determine the constant changes
external appearance undergoes. The distinction between appearance and essence involves
a conscious attempt to pierce deeper and deeper through successive layers ofphenomena,
towards inner dynamics which explain why these phenomena evolve in a certain direction
and in certain ways (Mandel, 1976a). In this way the external appearance, which Hegel
described as the 'one-sided, immediate unity' of the opposites beneath its surface, can be
explained by the underlying essence. Without further analysis, the' one-sided, immediate
unity' of appearance can lead to mystification and illusion (Nicolaus, 1973).
Having uncovered the inner 'essence', one is then in a position to understand and explain
the outer appearance in its totality - in its external, relational setting. The dialectic
between essence and totality is essential to understanding the dialectical approach to
knowledge. It is only through abstracting from appearances to get at the essence of
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phenomena that one is in the position ofreconstructing the concrete in its totality, with all
its external connections understood. Empiricism fragments totality, separating phenomena
from their essence and from their external relations. In this way, the separated spheres
become fetishised, they are given a life of their own, a separate existence disconnected
from their essential relationships to other phenomena. Lenin reminded us: "In the theory
of knowledge, as in every other branch of science, we must think dialectically, that is, we
must not regard our knowledge as ready-made and unalterable, but must determine how
knowledge emerges from ignorance, how incomplete, inexact knowledge becomes more
complete and more exact" (Materialism and Empirio-Criticism, in Selected Works
II:167).
Mao Tse-Tung (1967), in his essay On Practice, On the Relation Between Knowledge and
Practice, Between Knowing and Doing, explained the dialectics and materiality of
knowledge. Knowledge begins with experience - with human social interaction and
interaction with the external world, what Mao called 'social practice' - sensuous, practical
social activity. And first and foremost, this social practice is directed towards the material
production and reproduction of human life. As Mao (1967:295) stated: "Man's
knowledge depends mainly on his activity in material production, through which he
comes gradually to understand the phenomena, the properties and the laws of nature, and
the relations between himself and nature; and through his activity in production he also
gradually comes to understand, in varying degrees, certain relations that exist between
man and man ... This is the primary source from which human knowledge develops".
Social practice gives rise to perceptual experience. This is the first stage of cognition, the
stage of sense perception and impressions, the collection of information, observable facts
and events. This perceptual experience arises through activity, through sensuous
interaction with the world, through human practice. Thus, as Mao put it, 'knowledge
begins with experience - this is the materialism of the theory of knowledge' . This
information is then analysed, it is 'chewed over' in the mind, it is conceptualised,
abstracted from, 'worked up' into concepts, then formed into theory which tries to make
sense of, to order, the perceptual experience. However, to get to the 'essence' of the
observable phenomena, it is necessary to conceptualise perceptual experiences
dialectically, not as they appear on the surface as separate, disparate unilateral phenomena
but as a totality determined by the internal relations of things, their internal, as well as
external, connections. As Mao (1967:298) explained:
"Concepts are no longer the phenomena, the separate aspects and the external relations
of things; they grasp the essence, the totality and the internal relations of things ... The
real task ofknowing is, through perception, to arrive at thought, to arrive step by step
at the comprehension of the internal contradictions of objective things, of their laws
and of the internal relations between one process and another, that is, to arrive at
logical knowledge".
By 'logical' knowledge Mao means knowledge produced by dialectical abstraction from
observable phenomena. He emphasised the difference: "To repeat, logical knowledge
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differs from perceptual knowledge in that perceptual knowledge pertains to the separate
aspects, the phenomena and the external relations of things, whereas logical knowledge
takes a big stride forward to reach the totality, the essence and the internal relations of
things and discloses the inner contradictions in the surrounding world. Therefore, logical
knowledge is capable of grasping the development of the surrounding world in its totality,
in the internal relations of all its aspects" (p.298).
This constitutes the second stage ofcognition. According to Mao, this stage of
conception, judgement and inference is the more important stage in the process of
knowing; it is the stage of 'rational knowledge' and comprises 'the dialectics of the
theory of knowledge' . He stated: "The real task of knowing is, through perception, to
arrive at thought, to arrive step by step at the comprehension of the internal contradictions
of objective things, of their laws and of the internal relations between one process and
another, that is, to arrive at logical knowledge" (p.298). Mao holds that each ofthe two
stages in the process of cognition has its own characteristics, with knowledge manifesting
itself as perceptual at the 'lower stage', and logical at the 'higher stage', but that both are
moments in an integrated process of cognition. He explained:
"To think that knowledge can stop at the lower, perceptual stage and that perceptual
knowledge alone is reliable while rational knowledge is not, would be to repeat the
historical error of 'empiricism'. This theory errs in failing to understand that, although
the data ofperception reflects certain realities in the objective world... they are merely
one-sided and superficial, reflecting things incompletely and not reflecting their
essence. Fully to reflect a thing in its totality, to reflect its essence, to reflect its
inherent laws, it is necessary through the exercise of thought to reconstruct the rich
data of sense perception, discarding the dross and selecting the essential, eliminating
the false and retaining the true, proceeding from the one to the other and from the
outside to the inside, in order to form a system of concepts and theories - it is
necessary to make a leap from perceptual to rational knowledge" (p.303).
Thus, as Mao concluded: "Rational knowledge depends upon perceptual knowledge and
perceptual knowledge remains to be developed into rational knowledge - this is the
dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge" (p.303).But the movement ofknowledge
does not end there. Just as important as understanding the objective world, and thus being
able to explain it, is the application of this knowledge to actively change the world.
Marxism emphasises the importance of theory precisely and only because it can guide
action. Thus, knowledge begins with practice, and theoretical knowledge is acquired
through practice and must then return to practice. Mao explained:
"The active function of knowledge manifests itselfnot only in the active leap from
perceptual to rational knowledge, but - and this is more important - it must manifest
itself in the leap from rational knowledge to revolutionary practice. The knowledge
which grasps the laws of the world, must be redirected to the practice of changing the
world, must be applied anew in the practice of production, in the practice of
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revolutionary class struggle and revolutionary national struggle and in the practice of
scientific experiment" (p.304).
Not only must knowledge, to remain relevant and materialist, serve practical ends, it is
through practice alone that knowledge is validated. Theory can only be tested through
practice, through social practical activity. Thus, Marxism holds that social practice alone
is the criterion of the truth of knowledge of the external world. Mao elaborated on the
relation of theory to practice: "This [practice] is the process of testing and developing
theory, the continuation of the whole process of cognition. The problem of whether theory
corresponds to objective reality is not, and cannot be, completely solved in the movement
of knowledge from the perceptual to the rational, mentioned above. The only way to solve
this problem completely is to redirect rational knowledge to social practice, apply theory
to practice and see whether it can achieve the objectives one has in mind" (p.304).
We can see, therefore, that knowledge itself comprises both theory and practice, and, at
the same time, is both materialist and dialectical. Knowledge starts with material practice
and leads to perceptual knowledge. This in turn is conceptualised dialectically to produce
theory - 'rational' knowledge. Knowledge returns to practice through the application of
theory to practical activities. In this way knowledge remains materialist and is vindicated
(i.e. remains relevant). As Mao explained:
"The dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge places practice in the primary
position, holding that human knowledge can in no way be separated from practice and
repudiating all the erroneous theories which deny the importance ofpractice or
separate knowledge from practice. Thus Lenin said, 'Practice is higher than
(theoretical) knowledge, for it has not only the dignity ofuniversality, but also of
immediate actuality'. The Marxist philosophy of dialectical materialism.. , emphasises
the dependence of theory on practice, emphasizes that theory is based on practice and
in turn serves practice. The truth of any knowledge or theory is determined not by
subjective feelings, but by objective results in social practice. Only social practice can
be the criterion of truth. The standpoint ofpractice is the primary and basic standpoint
in the dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge" (p.297).
He concluded with the following advice: "Discover the truth through practice, and again
through practice verify and develop the truth. Start from perceptual knowledge and
actively develop it into rational knowledge; then start from rational knowledge and
actively guide revolutionary practice to change both the subjective and the objective
world. Practice, knowledge, again practice, and again knowledge. This form repeats itself
in endless cycles, and with each cycle the content of practice and knowledge rises to a
higher level. Such is the whole of the dialectical-materialist theory of knowledge, and
such is the dialectical-materialist theory of the unity of knowing and doing" (p.308).
Planning, as we discerned earlier, is precisely concerned with linking knowledge to
action. Theory for planning, theory ofplanning and theory in planning are all intimately
connected to practice, to concrete human activities. Theory for planning provides planners
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with a rationale, a philosophical/political legitimisation for planning action. Theory of
planning provides the practitioner with a methodology, with procedural knowledge to
inform planning action. And theory in planning provides the substantive knowledge
necessary for a particular field ofplanning endeavour. The knowledge in each case is to
inform practice.
Practice, in turn, validates knowledge. Theory is evaluated through practice. At the same
time, practice reflects back, and further informs theory. So practice informs theory, just as
theory informs practice. There is a dialectical movement between the two elements. More
than this, there is a unity of the two moments in human praxis - the coincidence of the
changing of the objective and subjective worlds, the changing ofmaterial circumstances
and the alteration of human consciousness. In other words practice changes the objective
world, and by changing the objective world we change ourselves, and our consciousness.
This change becomes radical at revolutionary moments. As Marx put it: "The coincidence
of the changing of circumstances and of human activity or self-changing can be conceived
and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice" (Early Writings:422).
According to Friedmann (1987) radical planning must be informed and guided by
appropriate theory. It must be 'saturated' with theory. Radical planners must assist in
'mediating theory and practice' in the process of social transformation. Friedmann (1987:
389-391) emphasised the critical relationship between theory and practice when he stated:
"Such theory cannot be arbitrarily invented. It must grow out from and be informed by
long periods of sustained oppositional practice. Based on experience, it combines an
amalgam of analysis, social vision, and hard strategic thinking with the intent to shape
ongoing political practice, even as it continuously absorbs new learning... Because its
usefulness is ultimately determined in practice, critical reflection on practice forms the
basis of its continued renewal". Thus, "Radical practice. " must be guided by
appropriate theory, but theory itselfmust come from practice. Divorced from practice,
it ceases to be meaningful" (p.398).
Friedmann posited' socialleaming' as the epistemology of radical planning. In this way,
according to Friedrnann, knowledge for radical practice comes from practice itself. Social
leaming is 'iterative and recursive'. It 'feeds' on its own practice. What has been learned
from practice constitutes valuable knowledge, especially if the knowledge is also used to
expand and revise theoretical and ideological components oftransformative practice. He
elaborated:
"Social learning... begins and ends with action, that is, purposeful activity. It is a
complex, time-dependent process that involves, in addition to the action itself (which
breaks into the stream of ongoing events to change reality), political strategy and
tactics (which tells us how to overcome resistance), theories of reality (which tell us
what the world is like), and the values that inspire and direct the action. Taken
together, these four elements constitute a form of social practice. It is the essential
wisdom of the social learning tradition that practice and learning are construed as
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correlative processes, so that one process necessarily implies the other. In this scheme,
decisions appear as fleeting moments in the course of an ongoing practice. They are
embedded in a learning process that flows from the attempt to change reality through
practice" (p.181-182).
Eco-Radical Planning is thus concerned with the dialectics of theory and practice and is
aimed at revolutionary change, i.e. the radical alteration of the objective and subjective
worlds. It is precisely a 'philosophy ofpraxis' and, as Gramsci stated: "The philosophy of
praxis ... is a philosophy which is also a politics and a politics which is also a philosophy"
(Prison Notebooks:45). In this sense, Eco-Radical Planning as a theoretical construct
cannot be separated from the practice of radical planning. Its theoretical elements must be
linked to practical activity aimed at changing material circumstances and human
consciousness; otherwise it remains simply scholastic.
For planners, theory provides the essential conceptual framework within which they
operate. It is also the foundation for developing the skills and methodologies needed for
practice. Theory not only structures the world, which is the object of action, but also
explains their actions to the actors themselves. Theory, therefore, is as essential for the
practitioner as practice is to the theorist. Practicing planners provide the arena for
confirming or refuting theory. The practitioner's application of theory is the ultimate test
of its validity and its value. Theory is also necessary for evaluation. Planners need a
framework for judging the success or failure ofplanning efforts. The evaluation of
planning demands a standard of reference, an explanation, or model of the planning
process. In short, evaluation needs the underpinning of theory.
Thus, theory begins with practice and theoretical knowledge is acquired through practice
and worked up into theory. It must then return to practice. The knowledge of the world
must be redirected to changing the world through human praxis. This is the central tenet
of the 'philosophy of praxis'. Knowledge is not simply about interpreting, explaining or
predicting events. Knowledge to remain relevant must be directed to bringing about
change - linking knowledge (theory) to action.
Eco-Radical Planning has a theory for planning, a philosophical/political rationale. This
was discussed in Chapter 4 of the thesis. It has a theory ofplanning, the theoretical basis
for a methodology or procedure of radical practice, as outlined in Chapter 5 of the thesis.
The task now is to link this theory to practice - to definite modes of action aimed at
transformative change. This practice must then reflect back upon and inform further
developments in theory which, in turn, are able to inform an improved future practice of
radical planning.
248
6.3 Planning in the Public Domain
Gramsci adopted the notion of hegemony as used by earlier Marxists (i.e. as a process by
which the proletariat extended its leadership over all the elements opposed to capital) and
applied it to the way the capitalist mode of production reproduces itself - how the
bourgeoisie establishes and maintains its dominance over wider society. Gramsci argued
that the dominant class maintains its position, not simply through force and coercion, but
also 'educates' the consent of the subordinate classes by exerting a 'moral and intellectual
leadership'. Economic, social, cultural, and ideological influences permeate the complex
superstructure of advanced capitalist countries to diffuse a 'common sense', a common
conception of the world based upon, and legitimising, the interests of the dominant class.
Thus, according to Gramsci, the dominant class maintains its position through both
'coercion' and 'consent'. Coercion is exercised in 'political society', constituting what is
generally regarded as the apparatus of state - the executive, the legislature, the judiciary,
the state education system, government departments, local bodies, the armed forces and
the police. As Gramsci stated: "These systems influence the popular masses as an external
political force, an element of cohesive force exercised by the ruling classes and therefore
an element of subordination to an external hegemony" (Prison Notebooks:420). This
follows Marx's theory of the state, which is seen as the 'executive of bourgeois interests'
in combination with its repressive element for ensuring compliance from the subaltern
classes.
On the other hand, consent is procured in 'civil society' through 'moral and intellectual'
leadership, through education and persuasion, through cultural and ideological forms, and
through the dissemination of ideas and philosophies which create a 'common sense' or
'common conception of the world' - a widespread adherence to a common 'socio-
cultural-ethical bloc'. Moreover, as Gramsci explained: "Civil society... operates without
'sanctions' or compulsory 'obligations', but nevertheless exerts a collective pressure and
obtains objective results in the form of an evolution of customs, ways of thinking and
acting, morality, etc." (Prison Notebooks:242).
Although Gramsci differentiated between consent procured in civil society and coercion
exercised in political society, he made it plain that the division is methodological, and
stressed the overlap in actual societies (Sassoon, 1983). He even, on occasion, equated the
state with civil society. For example, he stated: "In actual reality civil society and State
are one and the same" (Prison Notebooks: 160). In advanced capitalist societies the state
and civil society are well developed and interrelated, forming a complex and immense
superstructure, both as state organisations and as complexes of associations in civil
society. Not only do state institutions extend their influence into civil society, some have
a role in constructing social hegemony in addition to the usual role of applying coercion.
In other words, the distinction between social hegemony and political hegemony is often
overlapping. State institutions, for example, such as the education system can act as a
coercive force, and also as an educator, a persuasive element, a procurer of consent, and a
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disseminator of culture and ideology contributing to, and maintaining, the 'common
sense' of society.
Similarly, local government bodies and public sector organisations function as coercive
powers and educators of consent, and disseminators of ideology and culture. In their
statutory role of administrating and enforcing legislation, public sector bureaucracies act
as a coercive force, 'an external political force', a 'director' of government policies.
However, as propagators of culture and ideology, disseminators of ideas, educators,
persuaders, etc. they also act as 'organisers' of consent, as contributors to the 'common
sense' of society. In both instances the function of the state bureaucracy is to legitimise
the interests of the dominant group, and to 'fit culture to the methods of production' to
enable the reproduction of the socio-economic system.
In this way Gramsci followed and extended Marx's view ofbureaucracy. Marx described
the functions of the bureaucracy as projecting and protecting the 'imaginary universality
ofparticular interests' (i.e. presenting private interests as universal interests). This is
precisely the role of public sector planning when it puts forward the notion of the
'common good' or 'public interest' as a legitimisation for furthering private interests.
Marx proposed the bureaucracy as a 'network ofpractical illusions of the illusion of the
state', i.e. the state as private interests universalised (Early Writings:108).
Gramsci elaborated a specific role for intellectuals in this complex superstructure of
advanced capitalist societies. They were precisely the 'functionaries of the superstructure'
and, either as organic intellectuals of the dominant class or when subjugated by the
dominant class, articulate the interests of the dominant group in the political, socio-
cultural and economic spheres. Their roles are both 'organisational' and 'directive'. In
this way they can be seen to be functionaries of civil and political society. Their roles in
civil society are organisational, being primarily concerned with organising consent, and in
political society directive, exerting coercion. Thus, as Grarnsci put it: "The intellectuals
are the dominant group's 'deputies' exercising the subaltern functions of social hegemony
and political government" (Prison Notebooks: 12).
And these roles, organisational as well as directive, are as diverse as the superstructure is
complex. They range from "at the highest level. ., the creators of the various sciences,
philosophies, art, etc.... [to] at the lowest the most humble 'administrators' and divulgers
ofpre-existing, traditional, accumulated intellectual wealth" (Prison Notebooks: 13). So,
the intellectuals as functionaries in organising social hegemony and maintaining political
direction are a diverse grouping, permeating the extensive superstructure of advanced
capitalist societies. As Gramsci put it: "Intellectuals must be understood [as] ... the entire
social stratum which exercises an organisational function in the wide sense - whether in
the field ofproduction, or in that of culture, or in that ofpolitical administration" (Prison
Notebooks:97). We can see, therefore, that intellectuals as deputies of the dominant group
are located throughout the superstructure from the highest level ofpublic office,
academia, state bureaucracy, private associations, and business organisations to the lower
levels of administration and enforcement.
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Given the conception of the state as 'hegemony protected by coercion' we can now
theorise the role ofplanning in the public domain. Planning in the public domain
incorporates state sector planning (central and local government) and planning activities
within civil society that involve the public or the community - 'public planning' as its
commonly known (Friedmann, 1987; Low, 1991). This excludes corporate or business
planning within private business enterprises but includes private consultancies and
organisations that deal with planning legislation that involves a public interest. It is the
realm ofplanning that is generally acknowledged as 'statutory planning' in its widest
sense.
Public sector planning is located within the state bureaucracy, and just as the bureaucracy
in general acts as an element of coercion and an educator of consent, so too does
planning. Statutory planning, as the administration and enforcement of legislation, acts as
a coercive force, as a 'director' of government policies. As policy analysis and in its
regulatory capacity, state sector planning has a political role, a 'dominating function',
legitimising and protecting the interests of the dominant group expressed through
legislation. As Friedmann (1987:387-388) stated: "As far as planning is concerned... this
much is clear... Such planning in the public domain as we have known in the West has
been dominated by the bourgeois state. It was an integral part of the management of civil
society, part ofpolitical pacification."
However, state sector planning also acts to disseminate ideology and culture, functions as
a centre of ideas, an educator and a persuader, and in this way acts as an organiser of
consent. By formulating and propagating notions of the 'common good' or 'public
interest', planning acts to protect the 'imaginary universality of particular interests'. By
presenting private interests as universal interests it helps construct a common conception
of the world, a common sense legitimising and perpetuating the interests of the dominant
class (Beauregard, 1978; Cuthbert, 1997; Harvey, 1996b; Scott and Roweis, 1977).
Planning also has a role in civil society, in private sector institutions, private associations,
consultancies, professional institutions, and in community and environmental groups.
Here the role is largely concerned with organising consent, although for consultancies and
private sector organisations sub-contracting to, or directly lobbying, central and local
government the differentiation between consent and coercion is blurred. Private sector
organisations are often involved in formulating policy and regulatory regimes for
government and in this sense can be seen as acting indirectly in a political role, as a
coercive force; it is likewise for private organisations undertaking regulatory or
enforcement functions delegated by government bodies.
In addition, planning has a role in the education system as a coercive element and
educator, disseminator of ideas and culture, a major force in the construction and
maintenance of social hegemony. Academic institutions, particularly those offering
professional courses in planning education, play an important role here. They are a major
element in the reproduction of the dominant ideology, continuously educating and
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socialising successive generations ofplanners into the dominant ideology (see, for
example, Cuthbert, 1997; Harvey, 1996b; Kiernan, 1983; McLoughlin, 1994).
Planners, in the state sector and civil society can thus be seen as intellectuals in the
Gramscian sense. They are directly involved in political and civil society as functionaries
of the superstructure, or deputies of the dominant group exercising the subaltern function
of social hegemony and political direction. Planners and policy analysts operating in the
public sphere - in central and local government and in other state sector organisations -
form part of the state bureaucracy and as such occupy sites in political society. They have
a coercive function most readily discerned in the preparation, administration and
enforcement of legislation. In this role they are the direct functionaries of the dominant
group and directors of the political functions of the bourgeois state.
However, they also have an important role in procuring consent, in persuasion and
education, in disseminating ideology and culture, in contributing to the' common sense'
of society. An intimate part ofpublic sector planning is concerned with 'encouraging'
public participation in planning procedures, engaging in public consultation, and
disseminating information to the public. These activities are an intricate methodology for
controlling information and manipulating public response to legislation. They are
precisely concerned with procuring consent from the masses, spreading ideology, and
establishing a consensus over a common conception of the world (Castells, 1976, 1977,
1978; Friedmann, 1987; Harvey, 1996b; Kiernan, 1983).
In short, planners in the public sector have a specific role in spreading and maintaining
the hegemony of the dominant class through juridical coercion and the organisation of
consent. These roles are extremely varied and range from leadership functions in the
higher echelons of state bureaucracy (as policy analysts and top advisors to government)
down to simple administrators and enforcers of government legislation.
Planners also operate in civil society, in the private sphere, in private planning
institutions, private sector associations, professional institutions, consultancies, and
within community and environmental groups. Their role can be seen as intellectuals in
civil society, as 'organisers' of consent, as educators and persuaders concerned with
maintaining socio-cultural hegemony. It is in civil society that consent for government
legislation is sought. Planners operating in this realm as representatives ofprivate or
community interests are intimately involved in procuring this consent through mediation,
persuasion, education, and by depoliticising the political nature ofplanning (Cuthbert,
1997; Low, 1991; McLoughlin, 1994; Reade, 1987).
Professional associations and institutes play a major role here. It is precisely through
'professionalism' that the planning process is depoliticised and presented as an objective,
techno-managerial function distinct from political-economic interests. In this way, the
real role ofplanning is mystified and obscured. Its role in protecting the interests of the
dominant class is 'turned upside down' , and it is portrayed as protecting the interests of
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society at large - the 'public interest' or the 'common good' of society (Cuthbert, 1997;
Harvey, 1996b; Low, 1991; Reade, 1987). As Cuthbert (1997:215-216) stated:
"Professions form part of the ideological and social construction of the capitalist
system... Professions, in assisting capital, contribute to the reproduction of class based
society. Under capitalism, the state guarantees the monopoly of each profession over
particular forms of service, and hence over a guaranteed market ... More importantly,
under the aegis of the state, professions expropriate the right to unilaterally define a
whole range of social problems and their resolution in the absence of any referendum
from the public."
Planners play a crucial role in the education system, particularly in tertiary institutions
involved in professional planning courses. As intellectuals, they act as a centre of
diffusion for the leading ideas that contribute to the common sense of society. As
theorists they formulate the philosophy legitimising the interests of the dominant group,
and they work out the methodology for resolving the immediate socio-economic and
ecological conflicts arising from the mode ofproduction. By presenting their work as
'objective' or 'scientific', the leading intellectuals construct a body of theory that
becomes common sense and is accepted largely uncritically, and almost unconsciously by
the masses. It presents the particular as the universal to such a degree that all traces of the
particular are obscured.
The professional planning schools have an important function in socialising and
'professionalising' future planners into the dominant ideology. They extend the dominant
hegemony over a subordinated strata of intellectuals who, in turn, perpetuate this
hegemony amongst the masses. In this way, the dominant hegemony reproduces itself and
extends its influence. The procedures ofpeer review, career-advancement, and
professional ('caste') acceptance foster this process of socialisation and hegemonic
perpetuation (see, for example, Cuthbert, 1997; McLoughlin, 1994; Reade, 1987; Scott
and Roweis, 1977).
McLoughlin (1994) maintained that planning education is largely ideological
indoctrination into the planning profession, and that planning programmes provide
students with little or no education in theoretical analysis and critical understanding of the
world, particularly in relation to the capitalist mode ofproduction. For example, he
stated: "Much of most educational programmes in town planning can be interpreted as
indoctrination and socialisation of the students into becoming 'planners' rather than
trying to engage with them in a critical understanding of how the modem city and region
is socially produced" (p.1114). McLoughlin further argued that 'professional
accreditation' ofplanning programmes in universities assists this indoctrination and
socialisation process.
It can be seen, therefore, that planning in the public domain (in both the state sector and
in private, or civil, society) is intimately involved in constructing and maintaining
political and social hegemony, in legitimising and protecting the interests of the dominant
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class, in short, bourgeois interests or the interests of capital. In this way, public planning
universalises the particular, constructing a common sense, a common conception of the
world, that mystifies or obscures underlying socio-economic relations. Planners operating
in the vast superstructural complex of advanced capitalist societies are uniquely placed to
undertake this role. As intermediaries protecting the so-called public interest or common
good, they occupy a crucial mediating position between political society and civil society,
between the state and the community. It is precisely their position in both the state
apparatus and civil society, and by mediating the discourse between the two, that
enhances their role as directors ofpolitical hegemony and educators of social consent.
Apart from its role in legitimising existing relations ofproduction, planning in the public
domain is directly involved with resolving the immediate socio-economic and ecological
contradictions arising from the capitalist mode ofproduction enabling the reproduction of
the system itself. Public planning is concerned with, amongst other things, resource
management (both in regard to human and natural resources) and environmental
regulation. It is thus concerned with the social reproduction of capitalism together with its
biophysical reproduction. Environmental impact assessment (social and biophysical) is an
important methodology in this respect. By resolving the immediate contradictions (both
socio-economic and ecological) ofcapitalist production, public planning enables the
reproduction of the system and continued accumulation ofcapital on an expanding scale
(Dear and Scott, 1981; Kiernan, 1983). As Cenzatti (1987:441) pointed out:
"The State [and state planning] is seen as a set of institutions whose task is to guarantee
the reproduction of the existing social relations of production and to facilitate a smooth
accumulation process by mediating the conflict between labour and capital and by
regulating the secondary contradictions within the capitalist class".
Planning in the public realm also assists capitalist development through the provision of
infrastructure and by mediating competing and sometimes conflicting land uses. In both
instances its primary role is facilitating capitalist development. Thus, by resolving short
term socio-economic and ecological conflicts, by assisting in the provision of
infrastructure, and by mediating conflicting land uses, planning in the public domain acts
directly as the 'handmaiden' of capital (Albrechts, 1991; Castells, 1976, 1977, 1978). For
example, Castells' (1978) study ofurban planning in Dunkirk identified three functions of
planning in ensuring capital accumulation: as an instrument of rationalisation and
legitimation; as an instrument of negotiation and mediation of the differing demands of
the fractions of capital; and, as a regulator of the pressures and conflicts within the
system. Kiernan (1983:80) commented in this regard: "Planning is seen as performing a
dualistic function of support for the capitalist order: it directly facilitates capitalist
accumulation on the one hand while simultaneously legitimising this process by helping
to conceal and mystify its most pernicious effects on the other hand".
More specifically, he argued that planning carries out its 'accumulation function' in two
ways. First, it facilitates the rationalisation and direct provision of public infrastructure,
which is essential to private profit-making, but is unlikely to be provided by private
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enterprise, either because if its sheer scale or because of its inherent unprofitability.
Second, planning provides a regulatory framework which ensures the overall viability of
the private market in land. The 'legitimation function' ofplanning is performed when it
mitigates the most blatant environmental 'desecrations' which are, according to Kiernan,
the inevitable manifestations of the contradictory accumulation tendencies of capitalism.
Kiernan (1983 :81 - my emphasis) stated: "By preventing the worst abuses planning
obscures the connections between environmental degradation and the logic ofcapitalism,
thereby containing social protest and preserving the integrity of the capitalist system as a
whole".
That point is important. The connection between environmental degradation and the logic
ofcapitalism is today obscured to the point where it goes largely unquestioned. The
expansion of capital, expressed as continuous growth in GDP is rarely questioned in
mainstream economics; indeed is posited not only as desirable but necessary for the
continued functioning of national and global economies. Likewise, the concentration and
centralisation of capital, expressed as polarisation in the distribution ofwealth both
intranationallyand internationally is rarely questioned; indeed, once again, it is posited as
a necessary and/or desirable consequence of our socio-economic system.
Of course there are dissenting views on planning in the public domain to those presented
above. In the main these are based on bourgeois conceptions ofpolitical-economy
offering explanations of the structure and functioning of society in other than class-based
terms. Following from these various explanations of society, the role of public planning is
prescribed in different forms. Low (1991) offered four groupings to what he termed
'assenting theory' for public planning in capitalist societies based upon four distinct but
related political philosophies encompassed within the rubric of liberal representative
democratic theory.
The first he described as the most supportive and closest to the idea ofplanning: the
theory of the 'rational state' as set out in the work ofWeber (1946, 1964, 1968) and
Manheim (1940, 1951). Weber's and Manheim's account ofmodem society was of a
world dominated by formal rationality and that this rationality would be the basis of
comprehensive social and economic planning carried out by a strong state bureaucracy.
This view was transposed to public planning in the form of the rational comprehensive
model of planning proposed by Meyerson and Banfield in 1955 and elaborated by
numerous theorists since (Alexander, 1986; Altshular, 1965a, 1965b; Faludi, 1973a,
1973b; Hudson, 1979; Meyerson and Banfield, 1955; Simon, 1957, 1961).
Under that conception, planning, as part of the state bureaucracy, came to be portrayed as
the preserve of the bureaucrat, the technocrat, the expert, or the specialist serving a
definable public interest or common good. Planning was an objective, rational process
separated from politics and carried out by trained professionals competent in 'scientific'
technique and above all rational decision making. According to Low (1991), following
Weber, the state bureaucracy (including planners) is either above politics (offering
specialist expertise, continuity and, above all, rationality) or beneath politics (serving and
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aiding the people's representatives). As Low (1991:54) put it: "What is essential is the
capacity to exercise rational judgement, which is served by technical skills, expertise and
the detachment of the professional from day-to-day politics".
Secondly, a considerable literature has developed offering pluralist theories of both the
political structure and functioning of society and of the roles ofplanners within such a
society (Bentley, 1935; Dahl, 1956, 1961, 1976, 1982; Dahl and Lindblom, 1953;
Dunleavyand O'Leary, 1987; Lindblom, 1959, 1968, 1977; Truman, 1965). Such views
see society not in terms of class, particularly the Marxist division of society into
bourgeoisie and proletariat, but rather as composed of a large number of interest groups
seeking to protect or enhance their own specific interests. Pluralists regard that
conglomerate of political structures known as the state as emerging from group formation
and competition for influence. Pluralist theory hinges on the belief that freedom to form
and join groups in the pursuit of interests (economic and political) is an indispensable
component of democracy. The fragmentation ofpolitical power acts as a check on the
possibility of the majoritarian state usurping and abusing power (Low, 1991).
Thus, according to pluralist theory, the authority ofplanners is not exclusively drawn
from their bureaucratic position in the legitimate state but also from the political process
that allows and encourages free interaction among many minorities. Planners are viewed
as one among many contending interest groups in the political arena; thus planning comes
to mean the pursuit of the interests ofplanners. The goals ofpolicy vary with the balance
of group pressures; there are multiple' clients'; and, since different groups have different
interpretations of the ends of land use and development, there are also multiple, and
possibly conflicting, criteria of success (Low, 1991).
.In recognising the importance ofpolitical struggle, pluralism enjoins planners to engage
in the political process and, therefore, prescribes a number ofpolitical roles for planners
in the public domain: advocate, negotiator, activist (or entrepreneur) and mediator. In so
far as planners wish to extend their activity beyond the limits of traditional bureaucracy,
they must learn to play these roles effectively. To do so, however, they must be prepared
to confront political decisions, and to make personal judgements based on political
values. Thus, the theory ofpluralism, within assenting theory, provides the basis for a
critique of the rational state and the role ofplanners within it. Rather than objective,
rational, apolitical and professional technocrats or specialists serving a discernible and
accepted notion of the common good or public interest, the planner is portrayed as
negotiating or mediating between the different, and often conflicting, interest groups
involved in land use and development or, alternatively, identifying with and advocating
for individuals or interest groups with similar values to those of the planner (Alinsky,
1969,1971; Davidoff, 1965; Castells, 1976; Mollenkopf, 1983; Peattie, 1968; Rothman,
1974).
Low (1991) went on to identify neo-corporatism and neoliberalism as two philosophical/
political positions that prescribe different roles for the state whilst in different ways
providing critiques of both pluralism and the rational state. Neo-corporatism, as a post-
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war development, recognised an expanded role for the state in terms of its pivotal position
in mediating between the political-economic interests central to capitalist development:
business and organised labour. What was essential to a successful economy was
consensus among the conflicting parties, particularly capital and labour, with the state
provided the means to achieve it. Thus the tripartite structure of state-capital-labour, and
bargaining between the three elements to reach a compromise, was seen as the most
effective arrangement to ensure social harmony and continued capital accumulation.
Neo-corporatism reduced the number of interest groups allowed by pluralism down to
those essential for negotiating a compromise position to enable a non-disruptive
development process. Corporate states sought to limit the number and influence of
representative organisations and granted those they officially recognised a monopoly in
the fora where policies were decided (Schmitter, 1974). Under corporatism, the state was
also seen to have a mayor role in determining economic policy: fostering full
employment, promoting economic growth, preventing inflation, smoothing out business
cycles, regulating working conditions, and providing a social safety net by way of a
universal welfare system.
According to the neo-corporatist view of the political process there is a strong and
widespread conception of the public interest or common good, but one that is determined
by bargaining between the major representative groups recognised by the state. The role,
and status, ofplanning in the public domain is greatly enhanced, but its role is primarily
mediation within the enlarged corporatist structure of government and implementation of
policies agreed upon. This occurs, however, at the expense of democratic input at the
grassroots level and of openness and accountability in the planning process (Low, 1991).
Neoliberalism, although advocating a restricted role for the state in preference to the
operation ofan unregulated market, also demands a strong and coherent state to enforce
the rule oflaw (Hayek, 1944; Buchanan and Tullock, 1965). In the tradition oflaissez-
faire liberalism, the legitimate role of government is seen as minimal and essentially
relates to the provision of a legal framework establishing and enforcing property rights,
the provision ofnational defense and a minimal range of other public goods which the
market may fail to provide, and managing market externalities (King, 1987).
Under neoliberal political theory, the role of planning is much reduced and bureaucratic
intervention in the market much maligned. Whereas the planning role ascribed by
corporatism is that of mediation and implementation, the neoliberal prescription for
public planning is essentially one of establishing markets for goods and services,
wherever possible, and correcting market failure. Planners are thus, according to Low
(1991), prescribed the role of umpire and perhaps policeman presiding over and enforcing
a minimal, but clearly articulated and universally applicable set of rules (see, for example,
Brown, Copeland and Company Ltd, 1987; Copeland, 1987; McArthur and Porter, 1991;
McKinlay, 1986; Moriarty, 1986; Proctor; 1985; Wheeler, 1987a, 1987b).
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Low (1991) also discussed, under what he termed 'dissenting theory', the critical theory
of the Frankfurt School, in particular the work of Habermas, and its influence on politics
and planning theory. Habermas (1975, 1978, 1979, 1984, 1987) sought to integrate two
concerns: social critique and criteria for political action. Out of this developed his theory
of communicative action, which is both a critique of the distortion inherent in most
modern communication and a prescription for an undistorted form of interaction. A
number of scholars have applied Habermas's theory to planning. For example, Forester
(1989, 1993), Healey (1992, 1994, 1997), Hillier (1993), Innes (1995, 1996) and Sager
(1994) have all applied communicative rationality to the planning process. Under this
conception, the planner's role is one of facilitator within the discourse arena, enabling
undistorted communication to occur and consensus between the participants to emerge.
Other commentators have labelled recent developments in social discourse and planning
theory 'post-positivist' or 'postmodern' (Allrnendinger, 2001, 2002; Beauregard, 1991;
Dear, 1986; Goodchild, 1990; Sandercock, 1998; Soja, 1997; Taylor, 1998). Within this
viewpoint, there is a recognition of indeterminacy, variance, diversity, fragmentation, and
complexity in modern social arrangements; a celebration of difference and a suspicion of
foundation and truth in the form of 'meta-narratives'. In this sense, postmodern thought
exhibits a real skepticism towards planning, particularly planning for the common good
or in the public interest, concepts that postmodernists regard with deep suspicion or reject
outright.
We can see that the conceptions ofpublic planning described above, whether they be
class-based, rational, pluralistic, neo-corporatist or neoliberal, coincide with the historical
tradition ofplanning that Friedmann termed 'societal guidance or 'social reform'. The
intent, historically, is to provide assistance and support for continued capitalist
development, to enable the continued expansion of capital through the accumulation
process. They seek within the existing relations of production to alleviate the worst
excesses of industrial capitalism; to mitigate ecological dysfunctions to enable the
biophysical reproduction of the capitalist mode ofproduction; and to ameliorate socio-
economic conflicts to ensure its social reproduction. They also enable the reproduction of
capitalism by assisting in the development and maintenance of capitalist hegemony
through educating consent and acting as a coercive force, thus legitimising and enforcing
the actions of the state.
The prescriptions based on critical theory, particularly that of Habermas, and those
purporting to be postmodern are somewhat more ambiguous. There are elements in these
conceptions that could inform a radical form ofplanning theory and practice, and these
will be examined further in the following section. In the main, however, they seek not the
transformation of capitalism but rather to reform aspects of it and can therefore be
situated within Friedmann's societal guidance or social reform tradition rather than social
mobilisation or transformative planning.
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6.4 Counter-hegemonic Struggle
Gramsci not only theorised the concept of hegemony as the particular way the bourgeoisie
exerted, and maintained, its dominance over the rest of society, he also developed from
this concept a revolutionary strategy for the proletarian movement appropriate to
advanced capitalist societies. If the dominant class maintains its position through the
exercise ofhegemony, largely established in civil society (i.e. social or cultural
hegemony), supported by coercion and force (the later two sometimes referred to as
'political hegemony') in political society, then the proletariat must challenge this
dominance in both spheres. Before attempting a frontal attack on the state, which Gramsci
described as the 'war of manoeuvre', the proletariat must engage in a protracted struggle
for hegemony, a struggle largely (but not solely) conducted in civil society. This Gramsci
described as the 'war ofposition' .
The war ofmanoeuvre, which was the appropriate and successful strategy in less
developed capitalist societies in the East (such as Russia), would have to be preceded in
the advanced capitalist societies of the West with their highly developed civil societies,
by a war ofposition. This was seen as the necessary strategy during 'normal times', or the
'long periods' when bourgeois hegemony was wide-spread and an 'equilibrium'
developed between the antagonistic classes. Gramsci theorised a protracted struggle over
hegemony, between the bourgeoisie and the emerging proletarian movement. Whilst the
bourgeoisie attempted to maintain its hegemonic dominance, the role of the proletariat
was to challenge it, to engage in a strategy of counter-hegemonic activity. This struggle
over hegemony would first take place on the 'terrain of the conjunctural', those periods
when organic crises had not passed from the structure to the superstructure but were
manifested instead in the 'everyday' contradictions of capitalism.
As organic crises worsened they would lead to a rupture between structure and
superstructure, a crisis that Gramsci termed a 'crisis of hegemony' or a 'crisis of
authority' . During such a crisis, the subaltern classes become disaffected with the ruling
ideology, lose faith in the 'moral and intellectual leadership' of the dominant class, and
begin to question the 'common sense' or the 'common conception of the world' that they
had previously accepted uncritically. In short, their consent to the prevailing hegemony is
withdrawn. It is at these crucial times of organic crisis that the dominant class is at its
most vulnerable. It has lost the consent of the masses and must rely increasingly on force
to maintain its position. These are moments of revolutionary potential when the masses
have passed from a 'state of passivity' to a 'state of movement' .
However, for the proletariat to take advantage of these historical moments it must
organise the subaltern classes, the disparate elements constituting the proletariat, into a
hegemonic force of its own. Without extending its own hegemonic influence prior to the
war of movement, the final confrontation with the state is unlikely to eventuate, and if it
does occur it is unlikely to succeed. There exist the very real dangers of a regression into
barbarism if the crisis is absolutely' catastrophic' , or an imposition of authoritarianism
through fascism or some other form of dictatorship, or even some reconfigured system of
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bourgeois dominance. For the transition to be progressive it must be, as Marx and Engels
described it, "the self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the
interests of the immense majority" (Communist Manifesto:45). In other words, the self-
conscious movement of the proletariat as a whole.
Thus, the tactics of the proletarian movement preceding and during a major crisis - a
potential revolutionary crisis - are clearly outlined by Gramsci. Over 'the long periods'
the proletariat would need to conduct its counter-hegemonic struggle on the 'terrain of the
conjunctural'. It must challenge the dominant hegemony and extend its own hegemonic
influence (however difficult) during 'normal times', times of seemingly secure bourgeois
dominance, when 'common sense' is virtually unchallenged. It must attempt to draw
together the disparate elements in common opposition to capital, to forge a hegemonic
bloc capable of challenging the dominant hegemony during 'historical moments'.
Not only does Gramsci supply a strategy for the proletarian movement appropriate to the
realities of contemporary capitalist societies, he also theorises a specific role for
intellectuals as organisers and directors of this revolutionary movement. This is,
according to Gramsci, specifically the role of the 'organic intellectuals' of the proletariat.
These are people who arise within the proletariat and become conscious of their role
within the proletarian movement. They are joined by former bourgeois intellectuals or
intellectuals who were formerly 'subjugated', but who re-establish their links with the
proletariat. It is precisely the role of the organic intellectuals of the proletariat to 'convert'
intellectuals of the dominant as well as the subjugated classes.
As Gramsci made plain: "A human mass does not 'distinguish' itself, does not become
independent in its own right, without in the widest sense organising itself; and there is no
organisation without intellectuals, that is without organisers and leaders, in other words,
without the theoretical aspect of the theory-practice nexus being distinguished concretely
by the existence of a group ofpeople' specialised' in conceptual and philosophical
elaboration of ideas" (Prison Notebooks:3 34). The organic intellectuals are therefore
required to 'direct' and 'organise' the proletarian movement, to give it its 'homogeneity'
and 'an awareness of its own function, not only in the economic, but also in the social and
political fields'.
The proletarian intellectuals are 'created organically' and arise from the proletariat itself
or re-establish links with the proletarian movement. They form an 'organic bond' with the
masses - a dialectical relationship - that draws upon the experiences of proletarian
struggle and, at the same time, imparts to it a theoretical consciousness. The intellectuals
create an 'ideological unity', an 'organic cohesion', between the disparate elements in the
proletariat and between themselves and the masses. This occurs through what Gramsci
termed the 'passage from knowing, to understanding, to feeling', and organic cohesion is
created when 'feeling-passion becomes understanding and thence knowledge'. Without
this the relationship is not 'alive', but merely 'mechanical' and incapable ofbecoming a
'social force'.
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To become a 'social force' the proletariat must first develop a 'national collective
political will'. And to form a collective political will amongst the proletariat, Gramsci
(following Marx) emphasised the importance of raising the consciousness of the
proletarian movement - making it aware of its own existence and its place in history -
what he termed 'an operative awareness of historical necessity'. It is precisely the role of
the intellectuals to construct an 'intellectual-moral bloc' within the proletariat, to forge a
'unified proletarian consciousness' which connects the proletariat 'dialectically to the
laws of history' .
It is through' a critique of capitalist civilization' that a unified proletarian consciousness
is formed. Thus, according to Gramsci, 'a philosophy ofpraxis cannot but present itself at
the outset in a polemical and critical guise'. It must be a 'critico-practical activity'.
Proletarian self-awareness is thus developed through a 'series of negations' and 'via a
consciousness of the identity and class limits of the enemy'. It involves precisely what
Marx termed 'the ruthless criticism of the existing order, ruthless in that it will shrink
neither from its own discoveries nor from conflicts with the powers that be'.
Following Marx, Gramsci described critique as a 'material force', a 'material weapon', in
the proletarian struggle, and it becomes a material force precisely by raising a
revolutionary class consciousness. As Marx explained: "Clearly the weapon of criticism
cannot replace the criticism of weapons, and material force must be overthrown by
material force. But theory also becomes a material force once it has gripped the masses"
(Early Writings:251). Criticism is not simply an end in itself. It becomes a means to an
end - a way to raise a 'universal proletariat consciousness' which leads to a revolutionary
'collective political will'. It becomes 'a weapon whose object is its enemy' which it aims
'not to refute but to destroy' (Marx, Early Writings:247). It is in this sense that Gramsci
talked of 'hostile criticism', and 'socio-historical criticism' whose subject is 'wider
social groupings' and 'fundamental historical movements'.
According to Gramsci, 'socio-historical criticism' must be first of all a 'criticism of
common sense'. Bourgeois common sense must be exposed as the ideological, political
and cultural manifestation of class interest - the particular interests of the dominant class
universalised as the common interest. Secondly, it must be criticism of the 'philosophy of
philosophers'. The philosophy articulated by the dominant intellectuals must be subjected
to 'hostile' critique. It too must be revealed as ideology serving particular class interests.
It must be stripped of its professed objectivity and the particular interests mystified as
universal dragged into the light of day.
And 'ruthless criticism of the existing order' must be supported by the intellectuals' other
functions in the counter-hegemonic struggle: that is, their roles as 'persuaders' and
'educators', 'disseminators of ideas', centres of diffusion for a proletarian philosophy and
culture, establishing a 'moral and intellectual leadership' to challenge that ofthe
dominant class. As Gramsci stated: "Ideas and opinions are not spontaneously 'born' in
each individual brain; they have a centre of formation, of irradiation, of dissemination, of
persuasion - a group ofmen, or a single individual even, which has developed them and
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presented them in the political form of current reality" (Prison Notebooks: 192-193). And
it is specifically the role of the organic intellectual of the proletariat to act a a centre for
the formation and dissemination of ideas, of a proletarian philosophy, a moral and
intellectual leadership. These intellectuals function precisely as 'educators' and
'persuaders' in the dissemination of proletarian philosophy
Within this conception of counter-hegemonic struggle, between an emerging proletarian
movement and the dominant bourgeois class, we can situate a practice of radical planning
that can contribute concretely to the proletarian struggle and participate in the conscious
and progressive transformation of the capitalist mode ofproduction. As we have
observed, planning in the public domain occupies a strategic nexus between the state
apparatus and civil society, and performs a crucial role in establishing and maintaining
the dominant hegemony. It is on this terrain that the particular interests of the dominant
class are universalised as the common interests of society. It is on the same terrain that a
radical planning practice can engage in counter-hegemonic activity. It can, in opposition
to the dominant ideology, 'particularise the universal' - differentiate the interests of the
dominant group from the universal social interests. Rather than legitimise and mystify the
existing relations ofproduction, a practice of radical planning can demystify and
challenge existing bourgeois social relations.
Likewise, it is through statutory planning in the field of resource management and
environmental regulation that socio-economic and ecological conflicts arising from the
capitalist mode ofproduction are resolved over the short term. In opposition to the
dominant ideology, it is precisely in this realm that the long term contradictions of
capitalist production can be expounded and shown as unsustainable. By demonstrating the
ecological contradictions inherent to capitalism, radical planning can attempt to converge
the ecological movement with the proletarian movement to reveal their common
opposition to capital.
We can thus theorise a role for radical planners within the proletarian movement.
Planners who have identified themselves with the proletariat (i.e. who have arisen out of
the proletariat or re-established links with the proletariat) and who have formed an
organic bond with the masses can be viewed as organic intellectuals of the proletarian
movement. They function specifically as organisers and directors in the proletarian
counter-hegemonic struggle. As Low (1991 :211) stated: "If [planners] can 'step outside'
their given social role, if they can recognise the progressive political forces (classes and
class alliances), then they can ... put their power at the disposal of these forces. They can
play a different role in developing an ideology that will inform a new, socialist form of
planning".
Planners in the public domain are strategically situated within the superstructure of
advanced capitalist societies. They occupy sites within political society and civil society,
and they exert an important influence on the discourse between these two spheres. Their
normal role is as functionaries of the dominant class, extending and maintaining
bourgeois hegemony and resolving the immediate contradictions arising from capitalist
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production. However, planners of a radical persuasion can use this crucial nexus in the
superstructure to work in the opposite direction: that is, to challenge bourgeois hegemony
and expose the long term contradictions of the capitalist mode ofproduction.
For example, planners operating in the state sector - either in local government or public
sector organisations - normally act as a coercive force (formulating, administering, and
enforcing government legislation and local body regulatory regimes) and as educators of
consent by disseminating ideology and extending the dominant hegemony. For radical
planners operating in the same sphere, the opportunity exists to a greater or lesser degree
for an 'anti-coercive' function as well as counter-hegemonic activity. The 'anti-coercive'
function is strictly limited and would be of minor effect. There is opportunity to effect
minor changes to legislation and regulatory regimes, and minor alterations in the process
of administering and enforcing legislation. These, however, are strictly reformist
measures and can in no way evolve into fundamental change. Radical planners can, on the
other hand, expose the coercive nature ofplanning legislation and regulatory regimes and
reveal the particular interests that statutory planning can obscure.
A more substantial role is possible in the field of counter-hegemonic activity. State sector
planning acts to disseminate ideology and culture, functions as a centre of ideas, serves as
educator and persuader, and in this way, is an organiser of consent. By formulating and
propagating notions of the 'common good' and 'public interest', planning projects and
maintains the' imaginary universality ofparticular interests' . And by presenting private
interests as universal interests it helps construct a common conception of the world
legitimising and extending the interests of the dominant class. An essential part of public
sector planning is concerned with encouraging public participation in planning
procedures, engaging in public consultation, and disseminating information to the public.
These activities represent intricate mechanisms for the control of information and the
manipulation ofpublic reaction to developmental planning. They are precisely concerned
with procuring consent from the masses.
Radical planners can effectively engage in counter-hegemonic activity in opposition to
these functions. Rather than propagating notions of the common good and the public
interest, thus maintaining the imagined universality ofparticular interests, radical
planners can instead expose 'the particular in the universal' and reveal the particular
interests obscured as the public interest or common good. Public participation procedures,
public consultation, and information dissemination can likewise be exposed as a control
and manipulation methodology designed to obtain consent from the masses and legitimise
the interests of the dominant group.
In the field of resource management and environmental regulation, radical planners can
expose the inadequacy of the existing theory and methodology. By revealing this as
reformist and, as such, capable only of alleviating short-term socio-economic and
ecological conflicts arising from capitalist production, radical planners can demonstrate
the long-term contradictions inherent to the capitalist mode ofproduction and emphasise
its ultimate unsustainability. Instead of'obscuring the connections between
263
environmental degradation and the logic of capitalism' (Kiernan, 1983) radical planners
can assist in revealing them. As Castells (1978:88) stated: "The planner can ... become
the revealer of contradictions, and by this be an agent of social innovation".
Public planners working in civil society are also normally the functionaries of the
dominant class. In private planning organisations, private sector associations, professional
institutes, private consultancies, and within community and environmental organisations,
their role can be seen as that of intellectuals concerned with organising consent, as
disseminators of ideas, educators and persuaders, maintaining social hegemony (Scott and
Roweis, 1977). In addition, they have a coercive role as consultants acting for
government, or undertaking regulatory and enforcement functions delegated by
government.
The role for radical planners in private planning organisations, consultancies, professional
institutions, etc. is limited. Their clients normally have developmental interests, and it is
with the furthering of those interests that planners in this realm are primarily concerned.
There is opportunity for counter hegemonic activity in professional institutions but,
because of their strong caste-like function, these opportunities are likely to be limited.
Despite this, it is an arena for struggle and should be targeted by the radical planner.
However, within community and environmental organisations the situation is
substantially different. There, radical planners can play an important role. Community and
environmental groups are often involved in 'conjunctural' disputes with the dominant
interests. They often stand in opposition to, or in a conflicting position, with the interests
of capital. Here the scope for counter-hegemonic activity is greatly enlarged. Often these
groups are only partially aware of their conflicting interests with capital, and often then in
a confused manner. The planner's role is to clarify this confusion, to make plain the
conflicting interests, to raise the consciousness of the group, and to attempt to link this
consciousness to the collective consciousness of the movement as a whole, i.e. to bring
together the disparate elements opposed to capital in a 'united bloc'.
This counter-hegemonic struggle can take place directly within the group or by
representing and publicising their conflicts through the media. By raising the profile of
these conflicts in the media and linking the underlying dynamics in relation to capital the
radical planner can attempt to link individual disputes into a common movement against
the dominant interest, i.e. unite them in common opposition to capital. Furthermore, these
disputes can be linked to, or combined with, polemics of a more general character
directed against the dominant ideology.
Planners also play a crucial role in the education system, particularly in professional
planning schools situated in the tertiary sector. There the system acts as a coercive
element, as an educator, persuader, and a centre for the dissemination of ideology and
culture - a major force in the construction and extension of the dominant hegemony
(Kiernan, 1983; Harvey, 1996b). As theorists, planning intellectuals construct the
'philosophy ofphilosophers', the leading ideas legitimising the interests of the dominant
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group in the realm ofpublic planning. They also work out the methodology for resolving
the immediate socio-economic and ecological conflicts arising from capitalist production.
In addition, they also have an important function in socialising the future stratum of
intellectuals into the dominant ideology and professional culture. In this way, the
dominant hegemony reproduces itself and extends its influence (Cuthbert, 1997;
McLoughlin, 1994).
Thus, the education system is a crucial site for the formulation, dissemination and
reproduction of the dominant ideology and culture that contribute in the realm ofpublic
planning to bourgeois hegemonic dominance. It is, at the same time, a crucial site for
counter-hegemonic struggle. Just as the education system acts as a coercive force and
centre ofhegemonic construction, so too can radical planning use it as a site for 'anti-
coercive' resistance and a centre for counter-hegemonic activity.
Radical planners, as intellectuals in the education system, are able to challenge the
coercive function of statutory planning and deconstruct the ideological position of the
leading group. As centres of ideas, as educators, and as persuaders, radical planners can
formulate and disseminate a philosophy to counter that of the dominant group. They can
assist in constructing and extending a hegemonic influence that will converge with other
initiatives to contribute to developing a universal proletarian hegemony in opposition to
that of the dominant group. They can also deconstruct the theory and methodology of the
leading philosophy with regard to resource management and environmental planning, and
expose the contradictions inherent in attempting to construct a theory and practice of
sustainable capitalism. They can likewise de-socialise the emerging stratum ofplanning
intellectuals and attempt to convert them to the proletarian cause. In this way, radical
intellectuals in the education system can reproduce a counter-hegemony - a 'moral and
intellectual leadership' to challenge that of the dominant class.
In all fields of counter-hegemonic struggle in respect to planning in the public domain,
similar tactics are involved. Radical planners act as organisers of counter-hegemonic
struggle in civil society and directors of 'anti-coercive' activity in political society. There
is, as we have seen, much overlap between the roles and fields of operation. In both roles,
as organic intellectuals of the proletarian movement radical planners act as centres for the
formulation and dissemination of ideas, as persuaders and educators, as constructors of a
counter-hegemony - a proletarian hegemonic influence in the realm ofpublic planning
that can converge with counter-hegemonic movements elsewhere in the proletariat.
But, primarily (in the initial phases at least) radical planners in their capacity as
proletarian intellectuals, must engage in 'ruthless criticism of the existing order' . As we
have seen, it is through 'hostile' critique - critique of bourgeois common sense and the
'philosophy ofphilosophers', the leading ideas of the dominant group - that a proletarian
consciousness is developed, a consciousness ofproletarian identity and its relation both to
the contemporary social groupings and to historical movement. According to Grarnsci, it
is through a 'critique of capitalist civilisation that a unified proletarian consciousness' is
formed. Thus, 'a philosophy ofpraxis cannot but present itself at the outset in a polemical
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and critical guise'. It must be a 'critico-practical activity'. Likewise, radical planning
must also be a critico-practical activity, it must present itself in a polemical and critical
guise. And critique, in the practical activity of radical planning becomes, following Marx
and Gramsci, a 'material force' and criticism a 'material weapon' in the proletarian
movement. As Friedmann (1987:257-258) emphasised: "Whatever its variant, the starting
point ofplanning in the tradition of social mobilization is a thoroughgoing social
critique... Social criticism is thus the inevitable prelude to radical practice".
In addition to critique, radical planners must develop theoretical expositions to legitimise
and inform a radical approach to planning. This has been precisely the task confronted in
the thesis. Chapter 4 of Part Two of the thesis outlined a theoryfor planning, a
philosophical! political justification for adopting a transformative approach to planning
situated within Friedmann's 'social mobilisation' tradition. Chapters 5 and 6 of Part Two
provided a theory ofplanning, a methodology to inform a practice of radical planning.
The theoretical approach to methodology developed in the thesis relies heavily upon
Gramscian transition theory. It is in this sense innovative but, at the same time,
theoretically isolated in that there has been no substantial and coherent application of
Gramscian theory to a theory or practice of radical planning (at least to the author's
knowledge).
There are, of course, other dissenting theoretical positions that may assist in informing a
transformative approach to planning, including its methodological prescriptions. Radical
planners need to be aware of, scrutinise, and critique or construct linkages with such
theory. The plurality of views emerging in the field ofplanning theory must be confronted
and evaluated by theoreticians of radical planning. Since the demise of'actually existing
communism' in the Eastern Bloc this aspect has become more relevant. It is not sufficient
to rely upon traditional exegeses of Marx' s and Engels' works, nor their earlier
application in communist countries, to inform radical practice in contemporary times.
Marx's and Engels' works must be reinterpreted and applied in ways informed by the
realities ofpresent day capitalism. At the same time, tendencies to reformism and
revisionist strategies must be resisted. Anything short of ultimate revolutionary
transformation cannot claim to be Marxist and, under this interpretation, cannot lead to
radical socio-economic change.
We examined one such theoretical position earlier in the thesis: Friedmann's project of
'social reconstruction'. It was discovered, however, that whilst Friedmann's analysis was
founded upon an historical materialist approach, his prescriptions for change relied upon
idealist and utopian prescriptions. In this way, his theory of social reconstruction
eschewed the Marxist commitment to revolutionary transformation. In addition, in
relation to planning, although outlining a role for 'activist' planners in civil society, his
theory proposed little, if any, opportunity for planners operating in the state apparatus to
contribute to progressive transformative action.
There have been other recent developments in social political theory, and the application
of this theory to planning, that may offer useful insights for a theory and practice of
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transformative planning. For example, the emergence within critical theory of
Habermas's work on communicative action and its application to planning theory is one
such initiative. Some postmodemist approaches to socio-historical development and their
application to planning theory also deserve of scrutiny. There are also the political-
economy approaches, such as those outlined by Fainstein (2000), that may offer insights
to the development of radical planning theory. The following analysis is ofnecessity
brief. It can at best point to aspects of these approaches that may be worthy of further
detailed analysis rather than attempting a comprehensive study at this point in time.
As described in Chapter 3 of the thesis, a number of planning theorists have applied
Habermas's theory of communicative action to planning theory and practice (see, for
example, Forester, 1980, 1989, 1993, 1998, 1999; Healey, 1992, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1997,
1998, 1999; Hillier, 1993; Innes, 1995, 1996; Sager, 1994). These attempts have been
variously named as 'communicative planning' (Forester, 1989), 'dialogical
incrementalism' (Sager, 1994), 'argumentative planning' (Forester, 1993), 'planning
through debate' (Healey, 1992), 'inclusionary discourse' (Healey, 1994) and
'collaborative planning' (Healey, 1997, 1998).
Each relies upon Habermas's 'ideal speech' situation, where communication is no longer
distorted by the effects of power, self-interest or ignorance. Instead agreement is reached
on the basis of reciprocal understanding, shared knowledge, mutual trust and accord. In
addition, the reasoning employed in reaching an 'uncoerced' consensus can escape from
the confines of instrumental reason to include other rationalities based upon the
'lifeworlds' of the participants. In this way, knowledge for action, principles of action,
and ways ofacting are actively constituted by the members of an inter-discursive
community. Thus, according to Low (1991:271), "Habermas's theory provides a
theoretical foundation for a radical pluralism, a pluralism that can already be
implemented under present conditions and as a means of transforming those conditions".
However, Low did not show how present conditions would be transformed by
communicative action, nor is it clear from other theorists how this would occur.
According to Allmendinger (2001) earlier translations of Habermas's ideas into
communicative planning theory suggested that the process itself would challenge, and
transform, the hierarchical power structures within which planning is situated by
establishing a 'bottom-up' view formulated through collective, 'grassroots' decision
making. In this way, 'new relations of collaboration and trust ... [will] shift power bases'
(Healey, 1997:263) or 'the power of the 'better argument' will confront and transform
the power of the state and capital' (Healey, 1996:219). This approach depends upon a
shift in power as a result of collaborative forms of decision making in the planning arena,
or by confronting and transforming the power of the state and capital by 'better
arguments', propositions that are unsupportable, theoretically or empirically.
Other theorists recognised that to achieve any meaning to consensus, and to facilitate
practical planning outcomes, wider institutional, legal and political restructuring would
first be required (Allmendinger, 2001, 2002; Fainstein, 2000). This would require
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recognition of, and confrontation with, existing power relations within capitalist society.
It would also require transformation of these power structures as a pre-condition to
meaningful collaborative action. In this way, communicative planning loses its
transformative potential and becomes solely a methodology for reformist planning
practice, albeit a critical methodology. In fact, this is precisely the intent of many of its
advocates (A1brecht and Lim, 1986).
The greatest potential of Habermas's work within critical theory to inform radical
planning lies precisely in its critical aspects: i.e. as an analytical tool to reveal the
distortions inherent to communication and interaction in capitalist societies, including
land use and development planning, together with illustrating how instrumental reason
dominates contemporary communication and excludes other forms of rationality and
other 'lifeworlds' in the planning process. However, as Low (1991:229) warned,
translating the critical aspects of this theory into prescriptions for contemporary planning
practice is fraught with difficulties: "The danger exists of such prescriptions, like other
formulae for 'public participation', turning into a new ideology ofplanning practice,
legitimising an unequal power structure. Ultimately, a radically different planning
practice is unlikely to emerge until there is radical change in the political organisation of
the economy".
There is, however, potential for the insights gained by research into communicative
rationality and collaborative planning to inform a post-transformative form ofplanning
and decision making. In a society where the means ofproduction are collectively owned
and controlled, where class structures no longer generate fundamental socio-economic
divisions within society, and where power is no longer polarised within that society,
communicative rationality and collaborative planning could serve as a model for a
practical form of collective planning. As Low (1991 :251) argued: "This becomes possible
only where force is absent and hence where power is equal ... People are able to discover
both what they are and what they really want and need, through mutual interaction in
conditions of power equality". Perhaps Bernstein (1978:225) summed it up best when he
stated:
"If one is to fu1fill the promise of developing a critical theory that has practical intent,
then it is not sufficient to recover the idea of self-reflection guided by an emancipatory
interest. It is not sufficient to develop a critique of ideology and contemporary society
which exposes the powerful tendencies to suppress practical discourse and force all
rationality into the form of instrumental reason. It is not sufficient even to show that a
critical theory can serve to further enlightenment and effect a transformation in
political agents. All the preceding is necessary. But, as Habermas so acutely shows, the
very idea ofpractical discourse - of individuals engaged in argumentation directed
toward rational will formation - can easily degenerate into a 'mere' ideal, unless and
until the material conditions required for such discourse are concretely realized and
objectively instituted".
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The greatest potential of 'postmodern' theory to inform a theory and practice of radical
planning would also appear to lie with its critical aspects. Postmodernism is highly
critical of ,totalitising' tendencies in modernist discourses and instead recognises, and
rejoices in, diversity, fragmentation, complexity and divergence. Milroy (1991) identified
four broad characteristics ofpostmodernism: it is deconstructive in questioning
conventional beliefs and who benefits from them; antifoundationalist in dispensing with
universals as bases of truth; nondualistic in refusing the separation between subjectivity
and objectivity; and encouraging ofplurality and difference.
These are characteristics that could help inform a radical approach to socio-historical
change in general and to planning theory and practice in particular. Indeed, as critique,
questioning orthodoxy and seeking enlightenment in alternative approaches,
postmodernism promises much. However, there are also very real dangers encompassed
within what passes for postmodern theory. One, of course, is relativism. By denying the
validity of anyone explanation over another, postmodernism is in danger of degenerating
into a quagmire of ineffectuality (Allmendinger, 2001, 2002). Also, this stance threatens
postmodernism's internal logic and hence its credibility. Ifwe are not to favour one
particular explanation over another, why should we favour the postmodern explanation?
Postmodernism also encompasses conservative or even reactionary tendencies. It has been
criticised as providing both an explanation of, and legitimation for, recent structural
manifestations of global capitalism, i.e. its 'post-fordist' tendencies to diversify and
fragment production, to bypass national regulation through interaction on a global-local
trajectory, and presenting fragmentation and diversity as part of global capitalism's
hegemony (Harvey, 1989; Jameson, 1984). Postmodernism is also critical of any 'meta-
theory' or 'grand narrative' including Marxism. In this sense, the postmodern celebration
of diversity and difference and suspicion of consensus and uniformity merely serves to
fragment effective opposition to the capitalist mode of production, and is thus viewed as
anti-progressive from a Marxist perspective (Best and Kellner, 1991; Eagleton, 1996).
In fact, postmodernism is not usually posited as a transformative approach to socio-
historical analysis nor as a prescription for transformative revolutionary change. Most
initiatives based on postmodern theory do not seek to transform the capitalist mode of
production, or even 'modernism' (however it is described), but rather to explain, and
perhaps reform, manifestations of it (Allmendinger, 2001, 2002). Thus, its potential to
inform a radical approach to planning theory and practice seems, at best, limited.
However, it does provide a framework within which to address the plurality and diversity
of viewpoints on socio-historical change and, consequently, planning theory and practice
that are evident in contemporary times.
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6.5 Eco-Radical Planning
Eco-Radical Planning relies upon a dialectical materialist approach to knowledge.
Knowledge is materialist in that it arises, in the first instance, from social interaction with
the objective world. It relies upon sensory perception gained through practical experience,
through concrete human activities. At the most fundamental level these interactions with
the objective world are concerned with the material production and reproduction of
human life. Thus, sensuality - sensual experience of the material world existing outside
our consciousness - gained in the actual production of life constitutes the beginning of
cognition. Knowledge is thus actively and subjectively produced rather than passively and
objectively received.
Perceptual cognition is 'worked up' dialectically into theoretical constructs, abstractions
dialectically arrived at from empirical data. This is the stage of 'conception, judgement,
and inference', the stage of 'rational knowledge'. Observation of the objective world on
its own is potentially reductionist. It mystifies internal essence and fragments totality.
Thus, empiricism is rejected as 'one-sided' and incomplete. The totality and the essence
of worldly phenomena can only be revealed through dialectical analysis, through the
'power of abstraction'. According to dialectical analysis, it is at the theoretically abstract
level that the stratification, the internal complexity, and differentiation of reality becomes
apparent. Here the 'essential relations' between phenomena are exposed: the 'real'
underlying relations, causal structures and generative mechanisms that determine outward
appearance. In this way, external appearance can be explained by the underlying essence.
Without further analysis, appearance can lead to mystification and illusion.
Thus, theory begins with practice and knowledge is acquired through practical activity
worked up into theory through abstraction. According to the cannons of dialectical
materialism, it must then return to practice. Knowledge of the world must be redirected to
changing the world through social practice. In this way knowledge is vindicated and
rendered relevant: it remains materialist, not merely contemplative but 'active'. This is
the central tenet of the 'philosophy ofpraxis' (of Marxist theory) and of Eco-Radical
Planning as a philosophy ofpraxis. Knowledge and theory are not simply concerned with
interpreting, explaining or predicting events. Knowledge, if it is to remain relevant, must
be directed to actively bringing about progressive social change. In other words,
knowledge must be linked to action.
Planning is inherently concerned with linking knowledge to action. Theoryfor planning,
theory ofplanning, and theory in planning are all inseparably connected to practice.
Theoryfor planning provides planners with a rationale, a philosophical/political
legitimisation for planning action. Theory ofplanning provides the practitioner with
methodology, with procedural knowledge for planning activity. And theory in planning
provides the relevant substantive knowledge for particular fields ofplanning endeavour.
In each case theory exists precisely to inform practical interventions. For planners, theory
provides a conceptual framework within which they can operate. It is also the foundation
for developing the skills and methodologies needed for practice. Practice needs theory not
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only to structure the world, which is the object of action, but also to explain their actions
to the actors themselves. It follows that planners must have an understanding ofplanning
and the planning process that planning theory seeks to provide. Theory is also necessary
for evaluation. Planners need a framework for judging the success or failure ofplanning
efforts. The evaluation ofplanning demands a standard of reference, an explanation, or
model of the planning process and its subjects, participants and context. In short,
evaluation needs the underpinning of theory. The practitioner's application of theory is
the ultimate test of its validity and value. It is in their practice that planners find the arena
for confirming or refuting theory.
Chapter 4 of Part Two of the thesis established a theory for radical planning: a rationale
and legitimisation for a radical approach to planning theory and practice situated within
the tradition Friedmann identified as 'social mobilisation'. A conceptual basis for a theory
ofradical planning was examined in Chapter 5 of the thesis. This was linked to a
proposed practice of radical planning called Eco-Radical Planning in Chapter 6. Eco-
Radical Planning, as a theoretical construct, cannot be separated from a practice of radical
planning. It is necessarily concerned with the dialectics of theory and practice aimed at
transformative change. The theoryfor planning and the conceptual basis for the theory of
planning presented in Chapters 4 and 5 of the thesis must inform a practical methodology
of radical planning, i.e. inform specific planning actions aimed at transformative change.
Based upon Gramsci's theories of hegemony, 'war ofposition' ,and the role of
intellectuals in this process, a practice of radical planning in the public domain was
outlined. It was discerned that public planning occupies a strategic nexus in the vast
superstructural complex of advanced capitalist countries. Planning is situated at a critical
mediating position between political society and civil society, between the state and the
community. It is precisely this position in the state apparatus and civil society, and in
mediating the discourse between the two spheres, that enhances planning's role as both
'director' ofpolitical hegemony and 'organiser' of social hegemony.
It is at this crucial nexus that orthodox planning, as societal guidance, actively assists the
maintenance of the dominant hegemony through the exercise of coercion and the
organisation of consent. Planners can be seen as the 'functionaries of the superstructure'
and they serve to articulate the interests of the dominant class. They are the dominant
group's 'deputies' exercising the subaltern functions of 'organisers' of consent and
'directors' of coercion. Bureaucratic statutory planning, in its role of administering and
enforcing legislation, acts as a coercive force, a 'director' of government policy. State
sector planning also acts to disseminate ideology and culture, functions as a centre of
ideas, an educator and a persuader. In this way, it acts as an organiser of consent. By
formulating and propagating notions of the 'common good' or 'public interest' planning
acts to universalise the particular interests of the dominant group. Ithelps construct a
'common sense' legitimising and perpetuating particular interests by presenting them as
universal.
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Conventional planning in civil society, in private sector institutions, private associations,
consultancies, professional bodies, and in community and environmental groups is
likewise concerned with organising consent and to a lesser degree acting as a coercive
force. And planning in the education system has an important coercive function and a
crucial role as educator, disseminator of ideas and culture: a major force in the
construction and maintenance of social hegemony and the reproduction of 'common
sense'. The education system is a major element in the reproduction of the dominant
ideology ofplanning by educating and professionalising successive generations of
planners within the dominant hegemonic apparatus.
In addition to its role in legitimising and perpetuating the existing relations ofproduction,
and 'fitting culture' to the methods ofproduction, planning in the public domain is
directly involved with resolving the immediate socio-economic and ecological
contradictions arising from the capitalist mode ofproduction and thereby assisting the
reproduction of the system itself. Public planning is concerned with, amongst other
things, resource management (in regard to human and natural resources) and
environmental regulation. It is, thus, concerned with the social reproduction of capitalism
and its biophysical reproduction. By resolving the immediate socio-economic and
ecological conflicts ofcapitalist production, and by legitimising and perpetuating the
existing relations of production, planning in the public domain acts as the 'handmaiden'
of capital.
Whilst orthodox planners function as 'deputies' of the dominant class, extending and
maintaining bourgeois hegemony and resolving immediate contradictions arising from
capitalist production, planners of a radical persuasion can use their superstructural
position to work in the opposite direction; that is, to challenge bourgeois hegemony and
expose the long-term contradictions of the capitalist mode ofproduction. In this sense,
radical planners can be viewed as 'organic intellectuals' of the proletarian movement, the
movement in opposition to capital. They function as directors and organisers in the
proletarian counter-hegemonic struggle. Planning, in this sense, is firmly located within
the tradition of social mobilisation.
For radical planners operating in the state sector, either in local government or in public
sector organisations, opportunity exists (to a greater or lesser extent) for an 'anti-coercive'
function and a counter-hegemonic role. The 'anti-coercive' function is limited and of
minor effect. A more substantial role is possible in the field of counter-hegemonic
activity. Rather than propagating notions of the common good and public interest, thus
maintaining the mystified universality ofparticular interests, radical planners can instead
expose the particular in the universal and reveal interests obscured by the public interest
or the common good. Public participation procedures, public consultation, and
information dissemination can likewise be exposed as a control and manipulation
methodology designed to obtain consent from the masses and legitimise the interests of
the dominant group.
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In the field of resource management and environmental regulation radical planners can
expose the inadequacy of existing theory and methodology. By revealing this as merely
reformist and, as such, capable only of alleviating short-term socio-economic and
ecological conflicts arising from capitalist production, radical planners can demonstrate
the long-term contradictions inherent to the capitalist mode ofproduction and emphasise
its ultimate unsustainability. Radical planners are able to reveal the connections between
environmental degradation and the logic ofcapitalism rather than obscure them.
The role for radical planners in private planning organisations, consultancies and
professional groups is limited. Their clients are normally developmental interests, and it
is with furthering those interests that planners in this realm are primarily concerned.
However, within community and environmental organisations radical planners can play a
meaningful role. Here the scope for counter-hegemonic activity is greatly enlarged. Often
these groups are partially aware of their conflicting interests with capital, although in a
confused manner. The planner's role is to clarify this confusion, to resolve the conflicting
interests, to raise the consciousness of the group, and to attempt to link this consciousness
to the collective consciousness of the proletarian movement as a whole; in other words, to
merge the disparate elements opposed to capital into a 'united bloc'.
Radical planners also have a crucial role in the education system, particularly within
professional planning schools. Whilst the education system is a critical site for the
production and reproduction of the dominant hegemony it is, at the same time, equally
important as a sphere ofcounter-hegemonic struggle. And just as the education system
acts as a coercive force and centre of hegemonic construction so too can radical planning
use it as a site for 'anti-coercive' resistance and a centre for counter-hegemonic activity.
Radical planners, as intellectuals in the education system, can challenge the coercive
function of statutory planning and confront the ideological position of the leading
intellectuals. As the centre of ideas, educators and persuaders, radical planners can
formulate and disseminate a proletarian philosophy to counter that of the dominant group.
They can also deconstruct the theory and methodology of the leading philosophy in
regards to resource management and environmental planning, and expose the
contradictions inherent in attempting to construct a theory and practice of sustainable
capitalism. They can likewise de-socialise emerging strata ofplanning intellectuals and
attempt to convert them to the proletarian cause. In this way, radical intellectuals in the
education system can produce an alternative hegemony: a 'moral and intellectual
leadership' to challenge that of the dominant group. This leadership must be aimed at
forming a unified proletarian movement to oppose the dominant hegemony. The counter-
hegemonic movement relies upon converging the disparate elements opposed to capital
into a unified 'popular bloc'. Their separate interests must be revealed as collective
interests - collective in the sense of having a common opposition to capital.
As Marx foresaw, the proletariat has increased markedly as a proportion of the total
population in advanced capitalist societies. As capital has been concentrated and
centralised so the bourgeoisie has diminished in size, relatively ifnot absolutely. At the
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same time, the petty bourgeoisie have been dispossessed of their means ofproduction and
precipitated into the ranks of the proletariat. The modem proletariat now comprises
between 80-90% of the population of advanced capitalist countries. Capitalist society has
indeed divided into 'two great camps': the bourgeoisie and the proletariat.
At the same time, however, within the proletariat there has emerged a plurality and
diversity of interest groups and political factions. These groupings, their particular
interests and perceptions of themselves, are shaped by political, ideological and cultural
factors as well as, and to some degree independently from, the socio-economic division
manifested in class relations. For example, collectivities based upon religion, ethnicity,
geographic locality, gender, language, nationality, occupation, recreation, professional
association or some other mutual interest all flourish in modem society. As Low
(1991:267) stated: "Marxist political strategies must come to grips with a real plurality of
political actors and interests, a plurality that is not reducible to 'class' or 'class faction'''.
Similarly, radical planning practice must come to grips with the plurality of political
actors and interests. In contrast to Low's position, it is argued in this thesis that such
plurality is reducible, at least in broad outline, to class demarcation, specifically the
distinction between bourgeoisie and proletariat. As Resnick and Wolff (1987) argued,
immanent in plural groupings of interest are structures ofpower, and inherent to
structures ofpower are class relations, particularly regarding ownership of productive
property. According to Resnick and Wolff, Marxist class theory does not claim to provide
a complete description of society. Marx's contribution lay in defining, locating and
connecting the fundamental class divisions to other groupings comprising the social
totality.
However, and crucially, the distinction between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat is not
obliterated by other social groupings; it is merely obscured. For Marx, the essential class
distinction turned on the economic compulsion to sell one's labour power (Mandel,
1978a). This distinction is critical. It confirms that whatever the social grouping or class
faction - middle class, working class, lumpenproletariat - the proletariat as a whole,
comprising all dependent wage and salary earners, are dependent upon capital to provide
their means ofproduction and, hence, their livelihood. They are bound to the dictates of
capital just as surely as was the industrial working class that Marx wrote about in the
nineteenth century.
One point cannot be over-emphasised. It is in the ownership and control of the means of
production that real political and economic power reside. Moreover, it is this political and
economic power that controls the forces ofproduction or, in other words, the human
capacity to transform nature. This is true of any mode ofproduction. In the capitalist
mode ofproduction, ownership and/or control of the means ofproduction and, hence,
control over the forces ofproduction will rest with a bourgeois elite. This bourgeois elite,
as the personification of capital, subjectively represents the objective dictates of capital:
capital expansion, and the concentration and centralisation of capital. It is those dynamics
that are the underlying causes of the socio-economic and ecological dysfunctions
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afflicting global capitalism. Thus, the bourgeoisie, acting alone, cannot resolve the
mounting social and ecological crises. In fact, they perpetuate them.
According to Marxist theory, the resolution of such crises requires ownership and control
of the means ofproduction to be expropriated by society as a whole; that is, the proletariat
as representing society's interests, not merely the interests of capital. Only in this way,
can wider social interests and, according to the argument presented in this thesis, global
ecological interests be advanced. And to advance these interests the plurality of groupings
and political factions comprising the proletariat must be brought together in common
opposition to the interests of capital.
It is the task of radical planning to unite the plurality of interests within the proletariat to
reveal the fundamental class division of capitalist society - between the bourgeoisie
(being the owners and/or controllers of the means of production) and the proletariat
(owners of labour power) - and to consolidate the various groupings that conflict in
various ways with capital. We can include here anti-globalisation elements, anti-war
groups, civil rights movements, feminist factions, environmental organisations,
indigenous rights lobby groups, various social agencies and unemployed rights groups,
church groups, and a host of others. And, of course, included also are the traditional
workers' movements, such as trade unions, public service associations, and employee
organisations. Despite the seemingly disparate interests of such groups there is a common
interest in respect to their relationship to capital.
If the proletariat is to effectively challenge the dominant class then the disparate elements
constituting the proletariat must converge and a 'united front' or 'popular national
movement' must emerge. Disparate elements must become conscious of their
commonality in opposition to capital. The corporate interests of the disparate elements
must be fused, they must be shown to be the collective interests of the proletariat as a
whole, of all the groups opposed to capital. In this way, the proletariat in its widest sense
becomes the 'universal interest' of society. As Marx and Engels emphasised, the
proletarian movement must become "the self-conscious, independent movement of the
immense majority, in the interests of the immense majority" (Communist Manifesto:45).
In advanced capitalist countries the two main elements capable of forging this 'historic
bloc' are the socialist movement itself, the traditional movement of the proletariat, and
the radical green movement, the emerging political force articulating environmental
concerns from a radical perspective (see, for example, Benton, 1996; Dobson, 1990;
Eckersley, 1992; Gorz, 1980; Leff, 1995; Lipietz, 1995; Merchant, 1992; O'Connor,
1994; Pepper, 1993; and the journal Capitalism Nature Socialism).
As observed in Chapter 4 of the thesis, capitalism is characterised by two fundamental
contradictions - one labelled in this thesis the 'ecological contradiction', the other the
'social contradiction'. The latter arises from the dynamic inherent to capitalism to
concentrate and centralise capital resulting in a polarisation of wealth and economic and
political power. Just as wealth, economic and political power accumulate at one pole, so
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too do poverty and disempowennent accumulate at the other. Traditional socialist
movements can be seen as a response to those tendencies comprising the social
contradiction of capital.
The ecological contradiction arises from the dynamic to expand capital - resulting in an
unleashing of the forces of production, an immense capacity to transform nature -
founded upon capitalism's drive to 'produce for production sake' or to maximise
exchange-value rather than to satisfy social use-values. The emerging radical green
movement can be seen as a response to the ecological contradiction ofcapital, a reaction
to capitalism's absolute dependence on expanding economic growth for its very survival.
For example, O'Connor (1994:ix) stated:
"All radical greens, deep ecologists, socialist biocentrics, green anarchists and
socialists, and ecological feminists subscribe to the view that global capitalism is not
sustainable, however' sustainability' is defined. Wide agreement exists that the world
economy is producing greater poles of wealth and poverty and that the weight of
competition, national and regional rivalries, and the accumulation imperative, on the
one hand, and the absence of any rational, overall planning, on the other, mitigate
against 'green capitalism'. Most concur that ecological and economic crises feed on
one another and that both are linked to the growing concentration ofpolitical power
and privilege. Some of us, however, think that the seemingly all-powerful, reified
world of global capital is creating more ecological, economic, social, and political
problems than the world's ruling and political classes will be able to solve. We share
the feeling that a general crisis is over the horizon. This turning point or divide (the
argument goes) will create opportunities, as well as dangers, if the social movements
that are addressing the problem of humankind's relation to nature and to itself are able
to develop politically strategic, as well as tactical, alliances, locally, regionally, and
internationally."
Both of the contradictions identified above are determined by the underlying dynamics
immanent to the capitalist mode ofproduction. Both oppositional movements - the
socialist and radical greens - as reactions to these interdependent contradictions, are
inseparably linked in their opposition to capital through these underlying dynamics, the
common cause of both socio-economic, and ecological dysfunctions. Hence, there exists
the potential for a powerful radical 'red-green' alliance. This coalition may draw in other
disparate groups from within the proletariat to produce a movement united in its
opposition to capital. The formation of such a united front in opposition to capital relies
upon the recognition that capital is the common source of their concerns. As this
recognition develops so too will the 'collective consciousness' of the whole movement
emerge and, in time, a 'collective political will' dedicated to the common aim of
transforming capitalism will become evident.
According to Gramscian transition theory, this challenge will intensify and may become
historical during times of organic crises - crises of legitimacy or authority - when the
dominant group has lost the consent of the masses. It is during such crises that the forces
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opposed to capital (the proletariat in its widest sense) can realise an effective proletarian
class consciousness in opposition to capital and, in so doing, develop a 'collective
political will', a genuine revolutionary potential. At such times the masses, formerly
passive, will enter into movement and the proletariat will switche from the 'war of
position' to the 'war of manoeuvre' and directly confront the bourgeois state.
In all fields of counter-hegemonic struggle in respect to planning in the public domain,
similar tactics are involved. Following Gramsci, radical planners act as organisers of
counter-hegemonic struggle in civil society and directors of 'anti-coercive' activity in
political society. There is as we have seen much overlap between the roles and fields of
operation. In both roles, radical planners act as centres for the formulation and
dissemination of ideas, as persuaders and educators, as constructors of a counter-
hegemony - a proletarian hegemonic influence in the realm ofpublic planning that can
converge with other counter-hegemonic movements.
Above all, radical planners in their capacity as proletarian intellectuals must engage in
'ruthless criticism of the existing order'. As we have seen, it is through 'hostile' critique-
critique of bourgeois common sense and the 'philosophy ofphilosophers' - that a
proletarian consciousness is developed: a consciousness ofproletarian identity and its
relation to contemporary social groupings and to historical movement. According to
Gramsci, it is through a 'critique ofcapitalist civilisation that a unified proletarian
consciousness' is formed. Thus, 'a philosophy ofpraxis cannot but present itself at the
outset in a polemical and critical guise'. It must be a 'critico-practical activity', engaging
in a protracted series of 'ideological, religious, philosophical, political and juridical
polemics'. Likewise, radical planning is a critico-practical activity. It must present itself
in a polemical and critical guise. And critique, in the practical activity of radical planning
becomes, following Marx and Gramsci, a 'material force', and criticism a 'material
weapon' in the proletarian movement.
In addition to critique, radical planners must develop theoretical expositions to legitimise
and inform a radical approach to planning. This has been precisely the intent of this
thesis: to provide a rationale for a radical approach to planning and a methodology of a
radical planning practice. The theoretical position developed here is firmly located within
an historical materialist perspective. It is based largely on the writings of Marx and
Engels, and to lesser extent on Gramsci's work. It is thus clearly positioned within the
tradition ofplanning Friedmann described as social mobilisation or social transformation.
It is not sufficient to rely solely upon traditional exegeses of Marx's and Engels' works,
nor their earlier application in communist countries, to inform radical practice in
contemporary times. Marx's and Engels' works must be reinterpreted and applied in ways
informed by the realities ofpresent day capitalism. This too has been undertaken in the
thesis. For example, the contradiction between the forces ofproduction and the relations
ofproduction as a catalyst for revolutionary transformation was widened from the socio-
economic conflict posited by traditional Marxism to include an ecological dimension: a
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conflict between the increasing and unsustainable transformation of nature and the
intrinsic role of the bourgeoisie as the personification of capital.
It is also necessary for theoreticians of radical planning to confront and evaluate the
plurality of views emerging in the field of planning theory, particularly dissenting
theoretical positions which may help inform a theory and practice of radical planning. The
emergence within critical theory of Habermas' s work on communicative action and its
application to planning theory is one such initiative that has potential to inform a radical
approach to planning, particularly a post-transformative form of collective planning.
Likewise, some postmodern approaches to socio-historical development and their
application to planning theory and practice deserve further scrutiny.
It must be acknowledged, of course, that planners operating in their various spheres,
particularly those working in local government and state sector organisations, could
encounter substantial difficulties in their work environments which will result in greater
or lesser limitations on their counter-hegemonic activity. They are, after all, in positions
that are crucially important for extending and maintaining the dominant hegemony.
Deviations from this role will be strongly resisted and restraint is certain to be applied.
This is a matter for individual planners to resolve. A legitimate concern for many will be
to retain their position, and even succeed in career promotion. This need not render
counter-hegemonic activity impossible or insignificant. Whilst operating under the
dominant hegemony, planners are still in a position to engage in less overt (or even
covert) methods to undermine the dominant ideological position. Individuals, according
to their position in the bureaucratic matrix, will need to assess their own prospects and
learn to tread a fine line between counter-hegemonic activity and retaining their positions
and thus their influence. By subtle, and more direct means, depending on circumstances,
they can attempt to raise the consciousness of colleagues, together with the wider public,
either through direct contact or through written media. In this way they can engage in a
'passive' transformation, an 'organic' or 'molecular' change in ways ofthinking and
dealing with particular issues.
Low (1991:226-227) suggested three steps that practicing planners should take: "First,
become aware of the societal rules that limit the possibility of action and that define and
constrain the role of the planner. These rules must become the target for change. Second,
become aware of the class to which you belong: that is, look to the people, in the widest
sense, who share your values and interests. Third, mobilise for action (in accordance with
those values and interests) with members of your class and all available allies, with all the
power at your disposal, including the power, however circumscribed, that the institution
of urban planning affords".
Planners operating in the education system, and in civil society working with community
and environmental groups, have a wider scope for counter-hegemonic activity, although it
must be admitted that these forms too suffer limitations. Education institutions, as social
constructs of the dominant class, exert strong pressure on intellectuals to conform to the
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dominant hegemony. Career prospects are linked to definite forms of orthodoxy both in
the fields of teaching and in research. Despite the statutory role of universities in New
Zealand to act as 'critic and conscience' of society, there remains strong pressure to
conform to the dominant hegemonic view.
This does not mean, however, that intellectuals who have become conscious of the need
for radical change are rendered impotent. Far from it. Intellectuals in education institutes,
particularly the universities, are in a position, according to the ethics of academic
freedom, to engage in counter-hegemonic activity (of a greater or lesser extent depending
upon circumstances) of the utmost importance. Their influence, both in socialising future
intellectuals and critiquing in their field of expertise, is profound. Within the limitations
imposed by their particular institution they can engage in counter-hegemonic activity of
genuine importance.
Planning intellectuals involved in the community are likewise in an important position to
engage in counter-hegemonic activity. Their limitations are often less severe than those
encountered by planners in the state sector but, once again, this depends upon individual
circumstances. Certain situations will be less conducive to overt activity and some may
even demand a strictly covert approach. Planners need to resolve this problem on an
individual basis. This encompasses both direct contact with community groups and work
through the media.
The crucial point is that Gramsci's theories concerning counter-hegemonic struggle and
the role of organic intellectuals allow planners of a radical persuasion - planners who are
convinced of the ultimate necessity for the transformation of the present mode of
production - to engage in their respective fields of action without debilitating anxiety over
their function in reproducing the very system they consider requires fundamental change.
They have a legitimisation for continuing their role within the superstructure of capitalist
society and a rationale for resisting in what ever way possible the dominant hegemony
and, moreover, engaging in counter-hegemonic activity as opportunities arise that will
contribute over the 'long periods' to progressive change. Such a role will be investigated
in Part Three of the thesis.
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Part Three - Policy Analysis and Counter-Hegemonic Struggle
Chapter 7: Sustainable Management and the RMA
7.1 Introduction
At the start of the thesis planning was defined as 'the application of knowledge to a
deliberate course of action aimed at achieving a particular objective, or set of objectives'. It
was determined that planning theory is inherently concerned with linking knowledge to
action, and achieves this by attempting to answer three questions: 'why plan?' (theory for
planning), 'how to plan?' (theory ofplanning), and 'what makes a good plan?' (theory in
planning). The first is a philosophical/political question, the second a procedural one, and
the third substantive.
In his book, Planning in the Public Domain: From Knowledge to Action, Friedmann
(1987) outlined a comprehensive history ofplanning thought. Within this historical
analysis he linked the substantive and procedural theories of planning with their
philosophical/political sources and underlying rationales: what Reade (1987:ix) has called
'the fundamental socio-philosophical presuppositions ofplanning' . He distinguished two
broad types of planning action in modem times - 'societal guidance' and 'social
mobilisation'. Within the broad parameters of societal guidance he situated three traditions:
social reform, socialleaming, and policy analysis (the former being dominant). Within
social mobilisation he positioned the three major oppositional movements of utopianism,
social anarchism and historical materialism, which he described as the'great counter-
movements to social reform'.
Broadly speaking, societal guidance (or social reform) is concerned with maintaining the
existing capitalist mode of production and its associated relations ofproduction.
Conventional planning in Western capitalist countries is firmly positioned within this
tradition. On the other hand, social mobilisation seeks to transform the capitalist mode of
production. It views the existing socio-economic system, with its underlying property
relations, class divisions, and associated privileges, as socially oppressive, economically
exploitative, and ecologically unsustainable. It proposes radical change to a future mode of
production capable of overcoming these fundamental dysfunctions.
In Chapter 4 of Part Two of the thesis the basis of a theory for radical planning was
established; in other words, a legitimisation and rationale for adopting a radical approach to
planning. The theoretical rationale is founded upon a critique of capitalism based upon
Marx's economic writings, in particular Capital, Theories ofSurplus-Value and
Grundrisse. It is therefore firmly positioned within the planning tradition Friedmann
identified as 'social mobilisation'. It prescribes a transfonnative approach to planning
rather than a reformist approach. As such, it requires a methodology, a procedure for
transfonnative action. In other words, it requires a theory ofradical planning. The
conceptual basis for a theory ofradical planning was presented in Chapter 5 of Part Two of
the thesis, and this was linked to a normative theory of radical planning called Eco-Radical
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Planning in Chapter 6 of Part Two. In so doing, a methodology for a practice of radical
planning was outlined.
According to the cannons of critical social science, Eco-Radical Planning as a theoretical
construct cannot be separated from a practice of radical planning. As a 'philosophy of
praxis' it is necessarily concerned with the dialectics of theory and practice aimed at
transformative change. Thus, the theories for and ofplanning formulated in Part Two of the
thesis must be applied to a concrete practice of radical planning, to inform specific actions
aimed at social change.
Critical social science is an 'engaged' science, one that assumes involvement and activism
on the part of the researcher and theoretician. According to Fay (1987:85): "Besides being
both scientific and critical, critical social science seeks to be practical in the sense of being
a catalyst for fundamental social change". Critical social science "explains social order so
that it becomes the catalyst that leads to the transformation of the social order".
As determined earlier, Eco-Radical Planning relies upon a dialectical materialist approach
to knowledge. Theory begins with practice, and knowledge is acquired through practical
activity worked up into theory through dialectical abstraction. It must then return to
practice. Knowledge of the world must be redirected to changing the world through social
practice. In this way, knowledge is vindicated and rendered relevant - it remains materialist
and not merely contemplative but 'active'. This is the central tenet of the 'philosophy of
praxis' of Marxism and of Eco-Radical Planning as a philosophy ofpraxis. Knowledge and
theory are not simply concerned with interpreting, explaining or predicting events.
Knowledge, if it is to remain relevant must be directed to actively bringing about change,
i.e. must be linked to action. In this way, in Gramsci's words, "Theory by simple extension
becomes practice - in other words, the affirmation of the necessary connection between the
order of ideas and that of action" (Prison Notebooks:364).
In order to realise the dialectic between theory and practice, and based upon the theoretical
prescriptions concerning critique as radical practice, the author in his capacity as a planning
academic and an environmentalist/planner in the community has engaged in a form of
counter-hegemonic activity that can be viewed as indicative of one of the roles that a
practice of radical planning can undertake. This role is prescribed in the theory of radical
planning presented in Part Two as one ofpolitical, socio-economic and environmental
critique (Gramsci's 'hostile criticism') within academia and the ranks of the planning
profession. As previously noted, the education system is a crucial site for hegemonic
struggle. It is here that radical planners can formulate and disseminate a counter-hegemonic
influence to challenge that of the dominant group. The education system thus becomes a
strategic site for 'anti-coercive' resistance and a centre for counter-hegemonic activity. In
addition, radical planning has an important role in the community, either directly within
community or interest groups or by raising their concerns in the media and attempting to
link these concerns to a common cause and thus to a common opposition.
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This task is exemplified by a critique of the resource management legislation in New
Zealand, in particular the interpretation of section 5 - the purpose and principles of the
Resource Management Act - undertaken by the author in the course of his Ph.D. studies.
This critique, presented here, took the form of a series ofpapers and newspaper articles
questioning the prevailing ideology concerning resource management and environmental
regulation. The counter-hegemonic arguments put forward in the articles, following
Gramsci, represent attempts to challenge the 'moral and intellectual leadership' of the
leading social group, the 'common sense' of the times being the dominant contemporary
neoliberal bourgeois ideology. As elements ofpersuasion and education, the elaboration
and dissemination of ideas, they attempt to raise a critical awareness of the political-
economic dynamics underlying resource management and environmental planning. They
represent, in this sense, a practical study ofcounter-hegemonic activity and thus provide at
least a partial application of the theory presented in Part Two.
In a conventional planning sense, the articles can also be looked upon as an empirical study
in policy analysis. "Policy analysis", wrote Dye (1976, 1) "is finding out what governments
do, why they do it, and what difference it makes". In Dye's view, all definitions ofpolicy
analysis "really boil down to the same thing - the description and explanation of the causes
and consequences of government action" (ibid).
Ham and Hill (1984) differentiated between analysis ofpolicy and analysis for policy. They
stated: "The distinction is important in drawing attention to policy analysis as an academic
activity concerned primarily with advancing understanding, and policy analysis as an
applied activity concerned with contributing to the solution of social problems" (p.4). Ham
and Hall (1984:8) pointed out that there are "studies of policy content in which analysts
seek to describe and explain the genesis and development ofparticular policies... The
analyst interested in policy content usually investigates one or more cases in order to trace
how a policy emerged, how it was implemented and what the results were". This represents
what they termed, 'analysis ofpolicy' . However, as Dye (1976: 108) also noted, analysis
may also help policy-makers "to improve the quality of public policy". This represents
'analysis for policy' .
Policy analysis is usually undertaken within the planning tradition of societal guidance. It
seeks to improve public policy within the confines of the existing socio-economic
structure. However, policy analysis can serve another purpose. By critiquing public policy
from a radical perspective, i.e. by critiquing the underlying presuppositions ofpolicy rather
than just the surface manifestations policy analysis can challenge the dominant
assumptions about the socio-economic system, the 'common sense' regarding the basic
structure and functions of society. In this way policy analysis can be subverted to act in
opposition to the prevailing hegemony and can contribute to the construction of a counter-
hegemony to challenge that of the dominant group. It can, in short, serve a radical cause.
This is precisely the objective of the articles presented in Part Three of the thesis. By
critiquing the resource management legislation - its formulation, interpretation and
implementation - these articles attempt to shed new light on the policy process. By
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challenging the prevailing ideology regarding resource management and environmental
policy, and arguing an alternative position, the author, through these articles, sought to
raise critical awareness about the political economy of resource management in this
country. It is through on-going debate (and possible legislative changes) that the purpose of
the legislation will be given more precise operational meaning, and this interpretation will
have a profound effect on resource management and environmental regulation in New
Zealand. The dispute over the interpretation of the Resource Management Act in general,
and section 5 in particular, together with the subsequent debate in the planning literature,
indicate that this significance is realised, and being contested, by various interest groups
within New Zealand.
The published articles provide concrete examples of counter-hegemonic struggle conducted
by the author in his own fields of activity - as an academic planner in a university
institution and as an environmental and political activist/planner in the community. They
cover a period of intense activity and debate in both realms from 1993 to 1999. During this
time New Zealand was governed by National or National/Coalition administrations, which
consolidated and extended the neoliberal reforms of the Fourth Labour Government (1984-
1990). By the end of this period, New Zealand had been subjected to15 years of continuous
New Right restructuring and the dominant neoliberal hegemony was widespread
throughout most state sector and private sector institutions.
It is against this political backdrop that the articles selected as examples of counter-
hegemonic activity can be viewed. The primary aim was to refute neoliberal ideology as the
legitimisation for deregulated capitalism. In addition, they represent a less overt critique of
capitalism per se from a radical perspective. The intention was to repudiate neoliberal
ideology and discredit laissez-faire capitalism, thus raising questions over the legitimacy of
the capitalist mode ofproduction itself, specifically in relation to resource and
environmental management.
In a Gramscian sense, the articles exemplify the practical activity of an organic intellectual
of the proletarian movement; specifically, an intellectual involved in the field of planning
and in community and environmental activism. In that sense they are an example of Eco-
Radical Planning in action. They comprise, of course, only one aspect of Eco-Radical
Planning, that of written critique and the dissemination of ideas: in essence, counter-
hegemonic ideological struggle. This is not to deny the importance of other aspects of
struggle, such as organisation and directive political activities, anti-coercive resistance,
socio-economic, cultural and other forms of counter-hegemonic activity. The articles are,
however, attempts to contribute to a counter-hegemony to challenge that of the dominant
class. Following Gramsci, they are attempts to challenge the 'moral and intellectual
leadership' of the leading social group, the 'common sense' of the times, and the
'philosophy ofphilosophers', being the dominant intellectual ideas. Critique, in its radical
function ofraising proletarian consciousness to inform a 'collective political will',
becomes a 'material force' and criticism a 'material weapon' in the counter-hegemonic
struggle against capital.
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7.2 Reexamining the Role of Statutory Planning in New Zealand
The first article, published in the Australian journal Urban Policy and Research in 1995, is
a general reexamination of the role of statutory planning in New Zealand in light of the
substantial changes imposed on resource management and environmental planning since
1984: the beginning ofneoliberal restructuring in New Zealand. It outlines the review
process relating to planning and examines the major legislative changes introduced in 1991
with the enactment of the Resource Management Act. The reforms to the resource
management and environmental legislation were firmly linked to the wider socio-economic
restructuring taking place in New Zealand at the time. In this way, the resource
management law reform process can be seen as not only a rationalisation of the existing,
often overlapping and conflicting resource legislation but also as a deliberate attempt to
limit the role ofplanning in the public domain, particularly with regard to wider social and
economic concerns that have traditionally been addressed by public planning, but which
were excluded under the neoliberal agenda..
This philosophy is manifest in Treasury briefing papers to the Government (Treasury,
1984, 1987). It is also evident in papers prepared by Treasury officials, in particular
McKinlay (1986), Moriarty (1986) and Proctor (1985), and in a number of papers written
by economic and planning consultants (Copeland, 1987; Wheeler, 1987a, 1987b). It was
further revealed in submissions relating to the review of the Town and Country Planning
Act 1977 (Ream, 1987), notably in one report by Brown, Copeland and Company (1987)
and another by the Economic Development Commission (1987). Taken together, these
reports and papers represented a fundamental challenge to the legitimacy ofplanning as an
intervention in societal affairs. Wheeler (1986: 1) recognised the significance of this
challenge when he wrote:
"Whether planners and the planning profession are aware of it or not, whether it is
openly acknowledged or not, and whether we like it or not, the rather loosely defined
bundle of theory and practice known as planning is presently being challenged in a more
serious manner than has ever happened before in the history ofNew Zealand planning.
For several reasons the nature of this challenge cannot be ignored or dismissed lightly".
Despite the fundamental nature of this challenge, the response at the time by the planning
profession was spasmodic and lacking in rigour. Particularly noticeable was the lack of
critical response from the academy. There were some exceptions, mainly from practicing
planners. For example, Grant (1988a, 1988b) addressed the issues. Syme and Stewart
(1988) critically examined the papers by McKinlay, Moriarty and Proctor, and assessed the
future role of planning. Perhaps the best response to the neoliberal agenda at the time was
that by the Strategic Planning Team of the Auckland City Council's Department of
Planning and Community Development (Auckland City Council, 1987).
The paucity of critical response by the planning profession may be attributed to a number
of causes. It seems likely that a sector of the profession failed to grasp the significance of
the challenge or were seduced by the rhetoric of the time. For example, the refrain 'there is
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no alternative' was often promulgated during this period and seemed to be uncritically
accepted by several in the profession. Secondly, planning was viewed by many in the
profession as primarily an apolitical activity: a technocratic, objective procedure largely
divorced from politics. Thus, there was not the intellectual or philosophical capacity for a
critical response, nor was there the desire to become involved in a political/philosophical
debate (see, for example, Hucker, 1985).
The lack of critical response from the academies and upper echelons of the state sector can
also be seen as indicative of the hegemonic role that Gramscian theory assigns to orthodox
intellectuals. A large number of state sector employees, including academics, acted as
functionaries of the dominant political/economic group, formulating and disseminating the
leading ideas and contributing to the establishment and maintenance of the' common
sense' of the time. Those who did not promulgate the dominant ideology chose mostly to
remain silent. One can reasonably speculate, following Gramsci, that this was due to the
intricate peer-pressures, career advancement concerns, and professional influences that
operate to ensure that leading intellectuals do not challenge the dominant orthodoxy.
The paper goes on to critically examine the ideology underlying these reforms and
discusses the role ofplanning in relation to deregulated capitalism. It is contended that the
free market ideology relegates planning to a peripheral role in society; to merely dealing
with environmental externalities within the context of a deregulated market socio-
economic system. The market, on the other hand, is seen as the most appropriate
mechanism for the allocation ofresources and the determinant of the overall scale of
resource use. The 'heavy hand' of bureaucratic intervention is to be replaced by the
'invisible hand' of the market.
The paper also shows that the resource management legislation is the consequence of a
strong environmental lobby - within the Fourth Labour Government and outside
government (nationally and globally) - concerned with the long term sustainability of
resource use and the environmental effects arising from economic development. The
resulting contradictions arising from attempts to reconcile environmentalism with
neoliberalism in resource management and environmental planning are discussed. Briefly,
it is posited that amelioration of the environmental effects of economic activities and
sustainable use of resources are likely to require more regulation than less.
A prime intent of the article was to politicise planning: to emphasise the fact that planning
is a political activity not simply an objective, technical procedure as is often portrayed by
the planning profession itself and in accredited planning schools. In this way it can be
shown that planning serves particular interests and, in a deregulated market, these interests
are largely the interests of capital. It is argued that attempts by planners to differentiate the
particular interests involved in resource management must include an analysis of the
concept of the 'common good' or 'public interest'. It is through such an analysis that the
political nature ofplanning is brought to the surface (see Grundy, 1993, for further
comment on this subject).
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Since 1984, public planning in New Zealand has been
subject to increasing scrutiny and criticism, both by a
hostile private sector and a libertarian government
sector. During this time, the statutory basis of public
planning has undergone a substantial upheaval in the
fcrm of a review of the Town and Country Planning
Act 1977 and its subsequent replacement by the
Resource Management Act 1991.
This paper critically examines the ideology underlying
these reforms. It argues that the neo-classical
justification for limiting planning's scope is insufficient
and even pernicious. Furthermore, it contends that the
contradictions inherent in attempting to reconcile
market liberalism with environmentalism presents
planners with a critical opportunity to provide a
contemporary rationale for planning as an intervention
in societal affairs.
Keywords
Resource Management Act 1991, statutory planning,
nee-liberalism, the common good.
Introduction
A recent paper in this journal by Memon and Gleeson
(1994) provided an overview of the reforms to the
planning legislation that have occurred in New Zealand
over the past ten years. They relate the planning reforms
to the structural changes taking place in New Zealand's
political economy and to the concurrent reorganisation
of local government. Consequently, they postulate
that the passing of the Resource Management Act 1991
has resulted in the establishment of a "new planning
paradigm" - one primarily aimed at dealing with
biophysical effects of resource use to the virtual
exclusion of socio-economic considerations. For
example, they state:
The Act is seen as a means of addressing
externality problems and related issues.
Socio-economic environmental objectives
are excluded from the scope of the Act...
There appears to have been a retreat from
the broader community development
objectives implicit in the preceding
statutes, such as the Town and Country
Planning legislation (p.89).
Following on from Memon and Gleeson, this paper
will criticallyexarnine the ideology underlying these
reforms, particularly the debate surrounding the
concept of the 'public interest' or 'the common good'.
It will argue that the neo-classical concept of the
common good is dangerously narrow and hence its
justification for limiting planning's scope insufficient
and even pernicious. Furthermore, it will be proposed
that the Resource Management Act is the result of
conflicting and often contradictory agendasIneo-
liberalismand environmentalism) and that the wording
and stated intentions of the Act reflect these inherent
contradictions. It will be demonstrated that the
legislative wording is capable of interpretation to
encompass a much wider ambit than merely dealing
with adverse effects of economic activity on the
biophysical environment. Socio-economic, as well as
ecologicalconcerns, are explicitly or implicitly referred
to in the statute. This, it is proposed, presents planners
with a critical opportunity to provide a meaningful
definition to the notion of the common good or public
interest and thereby contribute to a contemporary
rationale for planning as an intervention in societal
affairs.
The Challenge to Planning
Since 1984, New Zealand has undergone a radical
reorientation of its socio-economic and political
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systems. After half a century of social democratic
consensus, there has been a major shift to a deregulated
freemarket capitalist polity, dominated by a neo-
classical economic libertarian doctrine. Implicit in this
doctrine is a reliance on competitive individualism,
operating in an unrestrained market-place, to bring
about the optimal end state for society.
An integral component of this restructuring has been
a fundamental challenge to the legitimacy of planning
as an intervention in societal affairs. The fundamental
nature of this challenge, and the primacy of its source,
poses an unprecedented threat to the theory and
practice of planning in New Zealand.'
The neo-classical libertarian ideology views
government intervention in societal affairs as both an
intrusion into the voluntary contractual arrangements
between individuals (that is, a coercion by the State on
individual liberty) and as a distortion of the efficient
functioning of the market, and hence the efficient
allocation of resources. As such, it should be resisted.
The legitimate role of government is seen strictly as
minimal, and can be divided into three groups. First,
the provision of a legal framework establishing and
enforcing property rights, contractual agreements, and
a means of conflict resolution between individuals.
Second,the provision of national defence and a minimal
range of other public goods which the market may fail
to produce. And third, correcting market failure
(externalities) arising from the operation of market
processes and which cannot be dealt with by the
market (King, 1987).
This philosophy was manifest in Treasury briefing
papers to the Government (Treasury, 1984;Treasury,
1987). It ~as also evident in papers prepared by
Treasury officials, in particular Proctor (1985),
McKinlay(1986), and Moriarty (1986), and in a number
of papers by economic and planning consultants
(Copeland, 1987; Wheeler, 1987b). It was further
revealed in submissions relating to the review of the
Town and Country Planning Act 1977 (Hearn, 1987),
notably in a report by Brown, Copeland and Company
(1987), and a report by the Economic Development
Commission (1987).
For example, Proctor (1985) argued:
In brief, my conclusion is that the purpose
of district planning is principally to deal
with the imperfections in the market
236 Urban Policy and Research Vol 13 No 4 1995
allocation process, rather than to be a
resource allocation framework in itself
(p.27).
Brown, Copeland and Company (1987)stated the basic
principles to guide regional arid district planning as:
1. Unless a market deficiency can be
identified, regional and district planning
interventions are not justified.
2 Intervention to overcome any identified
market deficiency is only warranted
where the cost of the market deficiency
clearly exceeds the costs, including all
side-effects,of the intervention itself.
3. Regional and district interventionist
measures should be formulated so as to
minimisethe extent to which markets are
negated (p.i).
They added, "the ability of regional and district
planning to achieve macro-economic and social policy
goals is extremely limited" (p.ii).
The same philosophy was epitomised by McArthur
and Porter (1991), when they stated:
Sustainable resource management
depends not on specific policy and
planning procedures within resource
management legislation, but on reforms
to the institutional arrangements within
which market systems operate (p.ll).
Despite the fundamental nature of this challenge, the
response by the planning profession has been both
spasmodic and lacking in rigour.vIt seems likely that
a fair number of the profession have either failed to
grasp the significance of the challenge, or have been
seduced by the rhetoric. Others have seen fit to adopt
and promulgate the ideology themselves. The paucity
of coherent response can perhaps best be understood
by the conceptualview planners have had, and indeed
still have, of their activities. The view that planners'
work is primarily technical, professional and apolitical
has been, as Kiernan (1983) put it, "a cherished and
persistent myth throughout the history of the planning
profession, and is one which continues to benurtured
in our planning schools and professional conferences"
(p.72). .
Politicising Planning
However, planning decisions inherently involve the
allocation of scarceresources between competing ends;
thus, by its very nature, planning is a political activity.
As Hucker (1985) expressed: 11Adequate planning is
not simply a technical exercise but a political activity"
(p.1i). Shirley (1989) issued a direct challenge to
planners to recognise that planning is not a neutral or
value-free activity. He stated that failure to
acknowledge the social and political context of society,
in which the activity of planning takes place, will only
serve to enhance the interests of those groups with the
most resources, power, and status, rather than those
with the least (p.16).
Planning needs to be understood on two levels. First,
at a philosophical level,encompassing the view of
planning as a political intervention in societal affairs,
involving both decisions about resource allocation
and decisions resulting from resource allocation. This
is an ends-oriented perspective. Second, at an
instrumental level, encompassing the formulation of a
procedural methodology to successfully carry out the
interventions. Included here is the procedural theory
ofplanning and the practicality of applying this theory.
This perspective is concerned with the means to achieve
the desired ends. Bately (1987)wrote of:
two dimensions... relevant to planners;
one is substantive, the other
methodological. The substantive
dimension suggests that planners should
be able to address key questions... about
the legitimate and appropriate function
of government. The methodological
dimension involves how theories are
tested against possible planning and
policy circumstances, and how they are
fitted or applied to actual planning
dilemmas and cases (p.235).
Hitherto, in planning education and practice, the
emphasis has been on the second level, to the neglect
of the first It is necessary to redress this imbalance. To
view planning solely at the technical level is to
severely limit its eventual effectiveness, in essence, its
very practicality.On the other hand, to view it solely at
a philosophical level is strictly an academic exercise
and, by itself, achieves little in the way of practical
results. The two perspectives must be reconciled if
planning is to realise its full potential. As stated by
Hucker (1985):
Planners [in New Zealand] have not
grasped the links between political and
economic philosophy and the planning
role.This is because of a marked leaning
towards philosophical illiteracy in their
ranks. As a result, the ability of planners
to articulate goals grounded in a
humanistic vision and a shared
conception of the good society has been
limited. Tasks like these have been
subordinated to questions of technique.
In this way, planning has become an
exercise in technical reason. Planners need
to become philosophically literate and
more skilled in the handling of abstract
concepts.Adequate planning is based on
a philosophical and moral vision that
encompassesends as well as means (p20).
If planning is to be accepted as a political intervention
in societal affairs, it requires a rationale and a
legitimisation. This must be established in an
ideological and philosophical context This, in turn,
requires an ordering of values; a moral and ethical
foundation. Individually, of course, planners must
formulate this for themselves. At a societal level
however, any consensus on rationale presupposes an
agreement on the desired end state. It also presupposes
that the State has a function in attempting to bring
about the desired social outcome. This desired end
state is what is generally referred to in planning
literature as the 'common good' or the 'public interest'.
This notion of the common good or the public interest
is at the very heart of the dialectic over the political
nature of planning. How should the common good be
determined, and should it even be determined?
Accordingto nee-classical ideology, the common good
is incapable of being socially determined in any
satisfactory way, and any attempt to do so is, in fact,
counter productive. The doctrine postulates that the
laissez-jaire ofneo-dassical economics takes better care
of this. What the market deems efficient, in terms of
Pareto optimality, is equated with the common good.
There need be no direction from outside the market
place, except in a minimal sense, in order to correct
market failure. More than this, outside interference is
considered detrimental, because it distorts the correct
functioning of the market.
However, if markets are inefficient, the neo-classical
justification for limiting planning's scope falls apart,
and even if markets are deemed efficient by neo-
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classical criteria, they are, by themselves, incapable of
bringing about society's optimal end state. Neo-classica1
economics, premised as it is on narrow and tenuous
assumptions, is seriously limited, and uncritical use of
neo-classical economics as the rationale for planning
(or more properly not planning) whilst politically
expedient, is socially irresponsible, and intellectually
indefensible.
Markets and Planning
As pointed out by Feldman (1987), the Cambridge
capital debates exposed several flaws in the positive
claim that markets are efficient. For example, if capital
equipment is heterogeneous, market forces alone
cannot determine relative prices, wage rates and profit
rates simultaneously. Pricing must involve non-market
mechanisms, which cannot guarantee efficiency.
Moreover, one of the shibboleths of neo-classical theory
is that lowering interest rates relative to wages causes
firms to use more capital relative to labour. The debates
showed that this was not necessarily true. Feldman
also points to inadequacies in neo-classical equilibrium
theory. Investment decisions before equilibrium are
based on nonequilibriurn prices, therefore so-called
equilibria necessarily involve resource allocations
based on nonequilibrium prices. Other criticisms centre
on the neo-classical theory of the firm and its treatment
of labour. Bowles (1985),for example, shows capitalist
firms are inherently inefficient because they must
devote resources to labour control. Other critics identify
as problems the social determinants of consumer
preferences, or the impossibility of perfect competition
in the modern reality of monopolies and oligopolies.
Even if markets, in certain circumstances, can attain
Pareto op.timal resource allocation this in no way
guarantees an optimal social or environmental
outcome. A Pareto optimal allocation can occur at an
ecologicaIly unsustainable pattern of resource use, just
as it can occur at a socially undesirable pattern of
incomedistribution (Goodland and Ledee.1987).Pareto
optimality is defined independently of both income
distribution and the physical scale of resource use.'
Public policy decision-making which relies exclusively
on market criteria can address only short term allocative
efficiency - not any of the other important factors
which determine human welfare, such as income
distribution, intangible environmental goods, and the
sustainable utilisation of natural resources. As
Eckersley (1992) observed, the market can merely claim
to ensure an optimal allocation of scarce resources (an
efficiencyissue); it cannot perform by itself the task of
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setting an optimal distribution of resources (a social/
ethical issue), nor an optimal scale of resource use (an
ecological/ ethical issue).
Neo-classical economics also fails to deal with many
other issues of central importance to planners. For
example, it ignores social learning by treating tastes as
a given and treating people as isolated individuals
bound together mainly by market forces. By treating
individual behaviour as an expression of an individual's
true preference and by averring that individual
behaviour is all that is necessary to determine the
common good, neo-classical thought eliminates both
interchange among citizens as a way to form opinions,
and mutually agreed upon collective action as a way to
reach common goals (Feldman, 1987). Personal growth
and community find virtually no expression in the
philosophy. In addition. it ignores cultural and political
sources of inequality and usually takes inequality as
given. Similarly, it ignores power, ideology, and other
forms of domination that compromise its conception
of individual choice.Those omissions are fundamental
to the paradigm itself. Individual change through
social interaction vitiates the neo-classical premise of
methodological individualism, makes the neo-classical
conception of democracy purely formal, and shows
the neo-classica1 view ofhuman welfare to be superficial
(Bowles and Gintis, 1986).
Furthermore, as Feldmen (1987) stated:
Neoclassical theory is not innOCUOUs. By
equating the instrumentally rational goals
of profit maximization and meeting a
budget with the substantially rational goal
ofmaximising social welfare, neoclassical
theory causes planners to focus on the
former and ignore the latter... Planning
that uncritically accepts neoclassical
economicsis on shaky intellectual ground;
it is needlessly narrow and unlikely to
improve the quality of urban life ...
Neoclassical theory is politically
expedient, but it often is false and dooms
planning to failure (p.428-429).
The Common Good
If the market is incapable of achieving society's optimal
end state,then the question is raised of how to determine
the ends that truly reflect society's wishes. Should
these be determined strictly by way of directions from
politicians (who are supposed to act for the common
good), or by common interest perceived or sought out
by the planners themselves? My contention is that
both methods are involved; centrally formulated
directions on issues of national importance conceived
by way of the democratic process, together with locally
formulated decisions conceived in a collective,
participatory planning process.
This is the situation that had existed (albeit imperfectly)
in New Zealand since the Great Depression. During
this time, a consensus on the common good had
operated within the institutional confines of the
Keynesian, socialdemocratic, welfare state,based upon
the belief that the State had a duty to ensure, as far as
it could, full employment, equal opportunity, and
equal accessto services considered basic to a dignified
life. Resource allocation and distributional decisions
were based on a supposition of efficiency, within a
wider context of relative equality and social justice.
Detrimental effects on the biophysical environment
resulting from human activity were largely addressed
in an adhoc fashion, as a perceived need arose}
This consensus on the common good in regard to
resource management (admittedly a rather loose and
imprecise one) was embodied in statute in the Town
and Country Planning Act 1977,as "Matters of National
Importance" and "Purposes of regional, district, and
maritime planning." For example, the purposes of
regional, district and maritime planning, as stated in
Section4 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977,
were:
the wise use and management of the
resources, and the direction and control
of the development of a region, district or
area in such a way as will most efficiently
promote and safeguard the health, safety,
convenience, and the economic, cultural,
social and general welfare of the people
and the amenities of every part of the
region, district or area (p.10).
Advocatesof neo-dassica1economic liberalism in New
Zealand have attacked both these statutory purposes
of planning, and the matters of national importance
embodied in the Act, claiming them to be too broad
and arbitrary, too inflexible, and conflicting with, or
supplanting, market allocation mechanisms. For
example, Wheeler (1987)advocated:
the deletion of phrases and words such as
'wise use and management', 'direction
and control of development', and
'managing the development', from
definitions of planning and in explaining
the purposes of planning. Deletion of
these phrases is an important means of
changing the gener-al approach to
planning and expectations of the process
(p.31).
Brown,Copeland and Company (1987) similarlystated:
"a first step may be in the removal or at least
modification of section 3:1 (Matters of National
Importance) which imposes substantial controls on
development" (p.20).
This attack on the statutory purposes of planning was
carried further with the resource management law
reform (RMLR) process that occurred during the late
1980s and early 1990s, resulting in the repeal of the
Town and Country Planning Act 1977 and the
enactment of the Resource Management Act 1991.
This reform process was not only a rationalisation of
existing, admittedly often overlapping and
contradictory, resource legislation, but also a deliberate
move to limit the role of statutory planning in resource
allocationdecision-making. The wider socio-economic
objectives of the former legislation were viewed as
unnecessary and undesirable interventions in the
functioning of the market allocation mechanism, and
were removed.!
The Hon Simon Upton, in his Third Reading Speech in
the House on the Resource Management Bill, said of
the legislation:
The Government's focus is on
externalities... the effects of... activities on
the environment... Given the more liberal
market economy, economic and social
outcomes are in the hands of citizens.
The Billis not designed or intended to be
a comprehensive social planning statute
(New Zealand House of Representatives,
1991).
In essence,as Deputy Secretary for the Environment,
Lindsay Gow, stated, the intent of the RMLR was to
"reject the proposition that such law should be
concerned with the planning and control of economic
and social activity for any other purpose than to ensure
the adverse effects of this activity on the environment
were avoided, remedied, or mitigated" (Gow, 1991
p.l6).
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Sustainable Management
In as much as the RMLR was a rationalisation of the
existing legislation, with an accompanying intent to
limit intervention in favour of market processes, it also
set out to improve environmental outcomes resulting
from resource use, and to promote the sustainable
utilisation of natural and physical resources.This was
in response to a growing international and local
awareness that many existing resource uses were
producing deleterious effects on the environment, and
were ultimately unsustainable.
This growing environmental awareness can be traced
back to the early 1%05 (see Grundy, 1993) but assumed
an international profile at the beginning of the 1970s.
The United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, held in Stockholm in 1972, is recognised
as a watershed event in human relationships with the
environment. It is Widely credited as being the first
forum to:give the concept of ' ecologically sustainable
development' an international politicalfocus(Caldwell,
1984;Caldwell, 1990).In New Zealand the 'Save Lake
Manapouri Campaign' of 1972 signified a distinctly
new phase in national environmental consciousness.
The world's first national green party, the Values
Party, was formed in 1972 and confounded pundits by
winning 2.6%of the national vote in the 1972election
(Rainbow, 1993). From this time on the Labour,
National and Social Credit Parties included specific
policies sympathetic to environmental concerns in
their manifestos (Dixon, Erickson and GUM, 1989).
The 1984 Labour Party environmental policy was
strongly influenced by the WorldConservation Strategy
(IUCN, 1980) and the subsequent New Zealand
Consemaiion Strategy (NZNCC, 1981). Within the
overall aim of achieving sustainable development
through the conservation of living resources, both of
these reports emphasised the following objectives: the
maintenance of essential ecological processes and life
support systems, the preservation of genetic diversity,
the sustainable utilisation of species and ecosystems,
and the needs of future generations.
Perhaps of greater significance for the advancement of
the concept of sustainable development as a policy
issue was the publication in 1987 of the report of the
World Commission on Environment and Development,
Our Common Future (also known as the 'Brundtland
Report'). It was the most explicit internationalstatement
of sustainable development goals yet and called for
governments to adopt "the objective of sustainable
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development as the overriding goal and test of national
policy" (p.363).
Both the 'Brundtland Report' and the 'Conservation
Strategy' were strongly promoted by environmental
interests within and outside the Labour Party and
were influential in the formulation of the resource
management legislation. The subsequent wording of
the.Act strongly reflected both the recommendations
of the WCED and the New Zealand Conservation Strategy.
The Actattempted to integrate all legislation pertaining
to natural and physical resources into one management
regime, and prescribed a single overriding purpose -
sustainable management. As stated in Part IT (purpose
and Principles):
The purpose of this Act is to promote the
sustainable management of natural and
physical resources. In this Act,
"sustainable management" means
managing the use, development, and
protection of natural and physical
resources in a way, or at a rate, which
enables people and communities to
provide for their social, economic, and
cultural wellbeing and for their health
and safety while -
(a)Sustaining the potential of natural and
physical resources (excluding minerals)
to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs
of future generations; and
(b) Safeguarding the life-supporting
capacity ofair, water, soil, and ecosystems;
and
(c) Avoiding, remedying, or mitigating
any adverse effects of activities on the
environment (Section 5).
Following the definition of sustainable management
as its central purpose, the Act lists 'Matters of National
Importance'. These principles relate mainly to the
quality of the natural environment and the recognition
of Maorivalues(Section 6). In addition, the Actspecifies
a number of other matters which need to be taken into
account when exercising functions and powers under
it. These include Kaitiakitanga (guardianship), the
efficient use and development of natural and physical
resources, the intrinsic values of ecosystems, and any
finite characteristics of natural and physical resources
(Section 7). Part II concludes with a recognition of the
need to take into account the principles of the Treaty of
Waitangi in achieving sustainable management
(Section 8).
The passing of the Resource Management Act
represents a clear attempt to embody the concept of
sustainability in legislation. The Act gives statutory
recognition, for the first time, to a number of radical
environmental principles: the sustainable management
of natural and physical resources, the needs of future
generations, and the intrinsic values of ecosystems
including genetic diversity. These accomplishments
were largely the result of intense lobbying by
environmental groups and the commitment to the
legislation by a number of 'green' Labour politicians,
most notably the then Minister for the Environment,
Sir Geoffrey Palmer.
Sustainable management has thus been set down in
statute, in the Resource Management Act 1991, as the
overriding purpose for guiding the use, development
and protection of natural and physical resources. It is
to be, henceforth, the guiding principle to all regional,
district and national planning. In effect, sustainable
management has now become the statutory
embodiment of the common good in regard to the use
of natural and physical resources. It is in this context
that planners must now conceptualise their notions of
the common good or the public interest.
Contradictions
While the intent of the legislators was to limit
intervention in resource allocation decisions, and to
curtail the role of planning in regional and district
affairs in preference to market processes, they have,
ironically, by specifying sustainability as the guiding
statutory purpose for resource use, created the need
for increased intervention and more comprehensive
planning," Issues such as intergenerational equity,
maintenance of genetic diversity, and even the
sustainable utilisation of resources are not ensured by
market processes alone. They are, in fact, often
conflicting. As Daly and Cobb (1989) have pointed
out, the free market has no means of ensuring an
optimal scale of the macro-economy relative to the
ecosystems in which it operates. Such a relationship
is central to ensure ecological sustainability. In
addition, as Eckersley (1992) has remarked, market
rationality is fundamentally incompatible with the
notion of intergenerational equity. Indeed, the goal of
profit maximisation encourages the depletion of both
renewable and non-renewable resources and the
movement of the capital thereby gained into new
ventures, rather than the sustainable or prudent harvest
over time.
The intended removal ofsocio-economicconsiderations
from the legislation is also conflictual with the notion
of sustainability. There has been an increasing
international recognition over the last two decades
that the environmental effects of resource use cannot
be divorced from the socio-cultural-economic fabric of
which they are aJ:1. integral part (Barbier,1987; Grundy,
1993;[acobs and Sadler, 1990; mCN, 1980; UNCED,
1992; WCED,1987).For example, the major theme of
both the WCED report Our Common Future and the
proceedings of the UNCED Conference (1992) Agenda
21, was that the concept of sustainable development
required fully integrated social, economic and
environmental policies to be applied at local, regional
and international levels.Both of these documents have
been endorsed by the New Zealand Government and
promoted by the Ministry for the Environment.
Agenda 21, perhaps the most comprehensive
international statement yet on environmental
protection and remedial strategies, devoted eight
chapters to the social and economic dimensions of
sustainable development. Chapter 8 is of particular
relevance to resource management. It stated the
overall objective of integrating environment and
development in decision-making to be:
to improve or restructure the decision-
making process so that consideration of
socio-economicand environmental issues
is fully integrated... Governments
should... improve the processes of
decision-making so as to achieve the
progressive integration of economic,
social and environmental issues in the
pursuit of development that is
economically efficient, socially equitable
and responsible, and environmentally
sound (p.9S).
Furthermore, in a specific reference to planning and
management systems, it advised:
Governments should review the status
of the planning and management system
and, where necessary, modify and
strengthen procedures so as to facilitate
the integrated consideration of social,
economic and environmental issues
(p.9S).
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These expositions point to major contradictions in the
stance adopted by the New Zealand Government
regarding the resource management legislation. Their
expressed intent of sustainable management as merely
limiting adverse effects of economic activity on the
environment (in essence, dealing with market
externalities) cannot possibly ensure the sustenance of
natural and physical resources for future generations
- a cornerstone of the legislation and, in fact, the
quintessence of sustainability. Intergenerational equity,
like contemporary equity, is a socio-economic and
cultural-political issue and cannot be addressed in
terms of market externalities. To refer to sustainable
management as encompassing only the ecological
aspect of sustainable development, as both politicians
and government officials have done in the past (Gow,
1991; Ministry for the Environment, 1991) is
nonsensical. The concept of sustainable development
grew out of a realisation that development policies and
environmental concerns are inseparable. Its
distinguishing characteristic is the reconciliation of
development (which is by nature a socio-cultural-
economic phenomenon) with the environment. It is a
holistic concept that loses its very meaning if reduced
to its constituent parts.
The resolution of these contradictions will be, in large
part, determined by the interpretation given to
sustainable management by the Planning Tribunal,
the courts, and planners operating under the new
legislation. If the term is not to be emasculated, and
rendered impotent as a planning objective, it must be
given a meaningful and operational definition. The
way it is interpreted and applied will largely determine
the extent and effectiveness of statutory planning with
regard to resource decisions in the future.
The imprecise nature of the statutory definition of
sustainable management, in particular, and of Part IT-
Purposes and Principles, in general, leaves the way
open for a wide-ranging interpretation of the desired
ends the Act is intended to serve.i In addressing this
issue, Bosselmann (1991) stated:
The rules of statute interpretation must
be adhered to, but they allow for some
options. One could either explore the
true intention of the legislator, or clarify
the meaning of a vague legal term by
considering its broader context and the
meaning it has generally. Each of these
options would probably lead to different
conclusions (p.6-7)... The question
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remains, of course, what planners,
decision-makers and the courts will make
of it (p.9).
Interpretation
Whilst the expressed intent of sustainable management
is merely to limit adverse effects of economic activity
on the environment (in essence, to deal with market
externalities) the legislative wording is capable of
interpretation to encompass a much wider ambit,
including socio-economic concerns.
For example, the definition of sustainable management
in Part IT of the Act as:
managing the use, development, and
protection of natural and physical
resources in a way, or at a rate, which
enables people andcommunities toprovide
for their social, economic, and cultural
wellbeing andfor their health andsafety while
(a)Sustaining the potential of natural and
physical resources (excluding minerals)
to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of
futuregenerations; and
(b) Safeguarding the life-supporting
capacityof air, water, soil, and ecosystems;
and
(c) Avoiding, remedying, or mitigating
any adverse effects of activities on the
environment (Section5 - emphasis added),
together with the definition of environment as:
(a)Ecosystemsand their constituent parts,
including people andcommunities; and
(b) All natural and physical resources;
and
(c) Amenityvalues; and
(d) The social, economic, aesthetic, and
cultural conditions which affect the matters
stated in paragraphs (a) to (c) of this
definition or which are affected by those
matters" (Section 2 - emphasis added),
clearly encompass social and economic concerns as
well as biophysical values.
In addition, the definition of 'natural and physical
resources' as "land, water, air, soil, minerals, and
energy, all forms of plants and animals (whether native
to New Zealand or introduced) and all structures",
together with the definition of structures as, "any
building, equipment, device, orotherfacility made bypeople
and which is fixed to the land" (Section 2 - emphasis
added), represents an obvious, albeit limited, reference
to the urban environment.
Sustainable management is thus concerned equally
with the maintenance and enhancement of the social
and economic environment as it is with the protection
of the natural and physical environment. It also
encompasses the urban as well as the non-urban setting.
To argue otherwise is clearly contradictory to the
overriding purposes and principles of the Act espoused
in Part Il, Some commentators have debated the
relative weight given to ecological as opposed to
anthropological values in Part IT (Fisher,1991; Milligan,
1992). For example, Fisher (1991) discusses at some
length what he refers to as the 'management function'
and the 'ecological function'. He asserts that because
the word 'while' connecting the two functions in Section
5, correctly operates as a strong or subordinating
conjunction similar to 'if' or although', the management
function is weaker than the ecological function.Milligan
(1992), on the other hand, favours a temporal meaning
for while, such as 'during the same time thaf,'for so
long as', or 'at the same time as', an interpretation
which. he contends, overcomes the difficulties inherent
in regarding Section5 as a 'weighing section'. Whatever
the outcome of this juridical confrontation, there is no
doubt that socio-economic considerations figure
strongly in any interpretation of Part IT - they are, in
fact, an integral and obligatory constituent for any
meaningful definition of Section 5.
In regard to the issue of economic growth, the definition
of sustainable management as the use, development, and
protection of natural and physical resources, within the
ecological and social constraints imposed by Part IT of
the Act, implies that economic growth must be
subservient to these same constraints. The definition
ofmanagement as the use, development, and protection
of resources indicates an integration of development
and conservation concerns rather than a hierarchical
relationship. Perhaps more importantly, the positioning
of the requirement for the efficient use and development
of natural and physical resources in Section 7 - other
matters to have regard to in achieving the purposes of
the Act - indicates that efficiency is subservient to the
overall purpose: sustainability. Once again, this implies
that economic growth is not a prime intention of
sustainable management. Rather, it must take place
subject to the ecological and social requirements
explicitly stated or implicitly inferred in Sections 5 and
6. This is a far cry from allowing an unrestrained
market to determine the direction and rate of economic
growth.
Of specific relevance to local government planning,
the Second Sched ule includes' as matters that may be
provided for in policy statements and plans:
Any matter relating to the management
of any actual or potential effects of any
use, development, or protection.. on -
(a) The community orany groupwithin the
community (including minorities, children,
anddisabled people);
(b) Other natural and physical resources;
(c) Natural, physical, or cultural heritage
sites and values, including landscape,
land forms, historic places, and waahi iapu
(Second Schedule - emphasis added).
Furthermore, the Fourth Schedule includes as matters
that should be considered when preparing an
assessment of effects on the environment:
(a) Any effect on those in theneighbourhood
and, where relevant, the wider community
including any socio-economic and cultural
effects...[and]
(d) Any effect on natural and physical
resources having aesthetic, recreational,
scientific, spiritual, orcultural, orother special
value for present or future generations
(Fourth Schedule - emphasis added).
Lastly, Part V (Sections 62,67 and 75) requires that the
contents of policy statements and plans include:
(g) The environmental results [including,
one assumes, those on people and
communities] anticipated from
implementation ofthose policies andmethods...
(j) Any other information that the regional
(district) council considers appropriate; and
(k) Such additional matters as may be
appropriate for the purpose offulfilling the
regional (district) council's functions, powers,
andduties under this Act (Section 62, 67,
and 75 - emphasis added).
In summary, P~ V of the Act, together with the
Second and Fourth Schedules, provides explicit
reference to the consideration of socio-economic and
cultural concerns in regional and district planning.
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Also, the very general nature of subdauses (j) and (k)
above provides wide scope for an integrative treatment
of social, economic and ecological concerns.
These preliminary interpretations illustrate the
contradictions and incompatibilities that exist between
the wording of the Act and the expressed intent of
those politicians and government officials responsible
for its passage through Parliament. To equate
sustainable management to simply dealing with market
externalities, or adverse effects on the biophysical
environment from economic activity, is patently
absurd. It emasculates the very notion of sustainability
and renders it incapable of any useful meaning as a
planning objective.
As Banks (l992b) stated:
Any planning for the use, development,
and protection of natural and physical
resources must have a strong social and
economic input... Social and economic
planning cannot, and should not, be
abandoned under the Act, though it must
now be approached in a different manner
(p.S).
Because the Resource Management Act 1991 is
essentially an enabling rather than a prescriptive piece
of legislation, it can be used to provide wide ranging
opportunities for innovative planning. For example,
the opportunities for strong national directives exist
through the provisions for national policy statements
(Section45),national coastal policy statements (Section
57) and the setting of national environmental standards
(Section43).The opportunities for innovative regional
planning exist through the provisions for regional
policy statements (Section 59) and regional plans
(Section 63).And the opportunity for effective urban
and district planning exists through the provisions in
the legislation for district plans (Section 72).
These provisions contained within the Resource
Management Act 1991, together with the provisions
for annual and strategic planning embodied in the
Local Government Amendment Act 1989, provide
considerable opportunity for progressive planning
(both environmental and socio-econor.iic). Whether or
not the legislation is used innovatively will depend on
the willingness of those charged with implementing
its provisions to adopt the opportunities provided
(Banks, 1992a).
244 Urban Policyand Research Vol13 No 4 1995
Conclusion
Although the changes made to the planning legislation
in New Zealand over the last decade represent a
concerted attempt by a neo-classical economic
libertarian ideology to limit planning's role in societal
affairs in preference to market forces, the adoption of
the concept of sustainable management as the guiding
principle to resource use, and hence, to regional and
district planning, has created, paradoxically, an
increased need for intervention. The concept of
sustainable management encompasses social, economic
and ecological concerns that cannot be dealt with by
the market alone, and in some instances are directly
conflicting with market forces.
As this paper has demonstrated, the legislative wording
of the Act is capable of interpretation to encompass a
much wider ambit than merely dealing with adverse
effects of economic activity on the biophysical
environment. Socio-economic, as well as ecological
concerns, are explicitly or implicitly referred to in the
statute. In addition, the procedural provisions
contained within the Resource Management Act 1991,
together with those of the Local Government
Amendment Act 1989, provide considerable scope for
innovative and holistic planning at the national,
regional and local level.
These contradictions present planners with a critical
opportunity to provide a meaningful and operational
definition to sustainable management, and in so doing,
provide a useful and legitimate definition to the often
elusive notion of the common good, or public interest,
that hasplagued planning in the past This,in turn, will
contribute to a rationale and legitimisation for planning
as an intervention in societal affairs, one that is sorely
needed in the present political milieu.
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Endnotes
1. Wheeler (1986) recognised the significance of this challenge
when he wrote: "Whether planners and the planning profession
are aware of it or not, whether it is openly acknowledged or not,
and whether we like it or not, the rather loosely defined bundle
of theory and practice known as planning is presently being
challenged in a more serious manner than has ever happened
before in the history of New Zealand planning. For several
reasons the nature of this challenge cannot be ignored or
dismissed lightly" (p.1).
2. There have been some exceptions. Grant (1988a, 1988b)
addressed the issues. Syme and Stewart (1988) critically
examined the papers by McKinlay, Moriarty and Proctor, and
assessed the future role of planning. Perhaps the best analysis
of, and response to, the neo-classicallibertarian challenge, has
been in a paper by the Strategic Planning Team of the Auckland
City Council's Department of Planning and Community
Development (Auckland City Council, 1987).
3. Pareto optimality as a measure of efficiency relies on several
important and tenuous assumptions - preferencesare presumed
to be given, institutionalconsiderations are presumedexogenous,
and income is presumed to be optimally distributed. As shown by
Bromiey (1989), there are a large number of Pareto optimal
allocations of resources, each associated with a different
distribution of satisfaction across members of society.
Additionally, for every possible distribution of income among
society there is a Pareto optimal allocation. Furthermore,
effidency calCulations depend upon the current structure of
institutional arrangements that determine what is a cost - and for
whom. Bromiey states: "There is no single efficient policy choice
but rather an efficient policy choice for every possible presumed
institutional setup. To select one efficient outcome is also to
select one particular structure of instlMionaJ arrangements and
its corresponding distribution of income. What matters is not
efficiency, but efficiency for whom?"(p.4).
4. Although I talk here of a consensus on the common goOd
operating in New Zealand during the period 1945 - 1984, this
consensus ought to be qualified. From 1945 to the early 19705
both political parties holding office over this period generally
advocated and implemented similar macro-economic policies.
This general agreement over socio-economic objectives began
to break down with the appearance of 'stagflation' in the early
19705. By this time environmental concems resulting from
resource use were further eroding the disintegrating consensus.
In 1984 the implementation of radical neo-Iiberal policies by the
Fourth Labour Government destroyed what was left of the
previous 'historic compromise'.
5. Undsay Gow (1991), Deputy Secretary for the EnVironment,
stated: "An important point to note is the shift in emphasis from
the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 in relation to the social,
economic, and cultural well being of people and communities
and their hea/th and saJety. In my view, the Resource Management
Act accepts that social and economic, and health and safety
objectives can be achieved, but it is not necessarily the role of
central or local government to plan for them... the Resource
Management Act has been developed in a policy environment
where the Govemment wants to get unnecessary govemment
interventions out of peoples lives. The Government saw the
wider socio-economic objectives of ClBTent legislation,particularty
the Town and Country Planning Act, as promoting unnecessary
and poorty targeted interventions which impose high costs to
society" (p.15,1 e).
e. Horsley (1992) madethe following observations: "One of the
paradoxes that has emerged from the restructuring, is that in
striving to eiiminateinherentconflicts and inefficiencies in the old
administrative structures, a new set of incompatible and
contradictory policy objectives have been created... In the
. Resource Management Law RefolD"l process there was a clear
direction towards policy integration within the environmental
policy fields. There was also recognition that as a society New
Zealand hadto movefromcurative to preventative envlronmental
policies. Both these latter policy directions require increased
regUlation and intervention of resource use activities. They are,
at heart, diametrically opposed to the deregulation moves"
(p.3S4).
7. Treasury realised the possibility for a wide interpretation of
Part 11 in general, and sustainable management in particular.
Documentsobtainedby Terra Nova under the Official Information
Act, together with detailed discussions (by Terra Nova) with a
range of officialand other sources, dearty indicate that Treasury
officials attempted to narrow the Bill's ambit by changing key
provisions, in particular the Purposes- Principles statement. It
was especially concemed about the definition of sustainable
management. While accepting that Review Group changes
would narrowthe definition down to more 'environmental' matters,
it was still worried about what factors bodies such as local
authorities would use to make their decisions (Fletcher, Terra
Nova, July 1991, p.16-17).
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7.3 In Search of a Logic: Section 5 of the Resource Management Act
The next article contains the critique of a speech given by the Minister for the Environment
to the Resource Management Law Association Conference in Wellington on October 7
1994 (Upton, 1994). It was published in the New Zealand Law Journal in February 1995.
A response by the Minister was published in the same journal in April 1995, together with
a reply by the author.
The debate between the author and the Minister concerns the interpretation of section 5 of
the Resource Management Act: in essence, the meaning of 'sustainable management', the
statutory purpose of the legislation. Enactment of the Resource Management Act in 1991
represented a comprehensive reform of environmental and resource management
legislation. The Act swept away a long tradition of 'town and country' planning. More than
50 statutes were repealed in whole or part, and almost all law pertaining to the management
of land, air and water was consolidated into the one statute with the overriding purpose,
legislatively defined, of sustainable management.
Because of its centrality in resource management and environmental regulation, section 5 is
profoundly significant and it was inevitable that its interpretation and eventual meaning
would be vigorously contested. The interpretation that evolved would underpin New
Zealand's future regime for resource management and environmental regulation and, given
the pervasive significance of the Resource Management Act in regard to resource
allocation and environmental outcomes, this interpretation is singularly important.
The debate in the articles centres on a struggle between a 'narrow' and an 'holistic'
interpretation of section 5. The narrow interpretation, founded on neoliberal political and
economic ideology and advocated by the Minister for the Environment and the
government, sees sustainable management as primarily (and perhaps exclusively)
concerned with controlling the effects of economic activities on the biophysical
environment. It eschews any consideration of socio-economic effects of resource use,
including equity concerns. It attempts largely to internalise environmental externalities and
posits the deregulated market as the appropriate mechanism for allocating resources and
determining the scale ofmacro-economic activity.
The holistic interpretation advocated by the author is, on the other hand, critical of
neoliberal ideology and insists that decisions on resource allocation, together with the
consideration of social, cultural and economic issues, are imperative if the use of natural
resources is to be sustainable (socially, ecologically and economically) over the long term.
It is argued that the narrow neoliberal interpretation is manifestly incapable of addressing
the complex requirements of section 5 and that the Minister's attempt to reconcile market
liberalism with the wording of the Act is fraught with difficulty, exhibiting the
contradictions and illogicalities inherent to such an attempt (see Gleeson and Grundy,
1997, for further comment on this subject).
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In particular, it is argued that the neoliberal interpretation of section 5 is contrary to other
specifications within the Act, in contradiction to national policy statements on the
environment, and inconsistent with international initiatives to reconcile development
strategies with environmental concerns. With respect to inconsistencies within the
legislation itself, the Minister's insistence on a primarily (or exclusively) biophysical
approach is shown to conflict with the wording of section 5, the statutory definitions of
environment and amenity values, and the requirements of the Second and Fourth Schedules
of the Act, all of which require consideration of social, cultural and economic matters.
The Minister, in his response to the article, admitted inconsistencies in the Second and
Fourth Schedules and put these down to an oversight when redrafting the legislation. In
regard to inconsistencies with the definitions of environment and amenity values, the
Minister, despite his claims to advanced knowledge of the meaning of the legislation, due
to his close involvement in its drafting, subsequently proposed amending those two parts of
the legislation to remove socio-economic and cultural considerations and thus facilitate a
narrowed interpretation of section 5. However, his Government was replaced in office
before the proposed amendment was passed by Parliament and the incoming
Labour/Alliance Coalition Government removed those changes from the proposed
amendment.
It is also interesting to note that those charged with administering the legislation, including
the Courts, continue to include social, cultural and economic considerations in their
deliberations over resource management in general and section 5 in particular. Even in
government initiatives, that there is an increasing recognition of the need to integrate
environmental, socio-cultural and economic considerations in resource management
strategies, policies and decision making (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet,
2003; Frieder, 1997; Knight, 2000; Ministry for the Environment, 2002c; Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Trade and Ministry for the Environment, 2002; Parliamentary
Commissioner for the Environment, 1998b, 2002a). In recent Environment Court decisions
the concept of 'integrating' biophysical, social and economic concerns has been raised,
along the lines I argued for in opposition to the Minister's view (Environment Court,
2003).
The debate over section 5 has been vigorous and, because of its pivotal role in resource
management and environmental regulation in New Zealand, is likely to continue to be
robust. The intent of my contribution was to reveal the ideological underpinnings of the
debate and to show that sustainable management is not simply an environmental concept
but is just as much concerned with social, cultural and economic issues, particularly
concerns over intergenerational and contemporary equity. By examining the underlying
ideological premises of the Minister's interpretation of section 5, neoliberalism as a
political/economic doctrine can be critically scrutinised, its shortcomings exposed, and
alternative positions explored. In other words, the dominant ideology (Gramsci's 'leading
ideas' and 'common sense') can be subjected to 'hostile criticism', and policy analysis can
serve a radical cause.
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RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
In search of a logic:
s 5 of the Resource Management Act
By Kerry lames Grundy, Department of Geography, University of Otago
This article is written by a geographer. It is a critical response to an address by the Minister for
the Environment given in Wellington on 7 October 1994 to the Resource Management Law
Association Conference. The article focuses on the meaning of the term "sustainable
management" in s 5 of the Resource Management Act. The author agrees with the opening part
of the Minister's address in seeing the Act as intended to ensure environmental outcomes, but he
is critical of the remainder of the Minister's speech. He analyses what he sees as misconceptions,
inconsistencies, illogicalities, and contradictions of the attempt in the legislation, and the
Minister's speech, to reconcile market liberalism with environmentalism. The legislative
wording and the very concept of sustainable management, the author maintains, require
increased intervention and more comprehensive planning.
Introduction
The address delivered by the
Minister for the Environment to the
Resource Management Law Asso-
ciation Conference in Wellington on
October 7 has been published by the
Ministry for the Environment in
order to stimulate discussion and
solicit comment. The following
analysis will critically examine the
substance of the Minister's address,
in particular his deliberations on s 5
- the purpose of the Resource
Management Act. The analysis will
reveal the contradictions and illogic-
alities inherent in attempting to
reconcile market liberalism with the
concept of sustainability. It will
show that the Minister's attempts to
marginalise the socio-economic and
cultural effects of resource use are
ideologically driven rather than
based on reason. Furthermore, the
analysis will illustrate that this
approach to s 5 is contrary to other
specifications within the Act,
contradictory to national policy
statements on the environment, and
inconsistent with international
initiatives on reconciling develop-
mental strategies with environ-
mental concerns. For sake of clarity
in presenting my argument I
reproduce below the legislative
wording of s 5:
5. Purpose - (I) The Purpose of
this Act is to promote the
sustainable management of
natural and physical ;esources.
(2) In this Act, "sustainable
management" means managing
the use, development, and
protection of natural and physical
resources in a way, or at a rate,
which enables people and com-
munities to provide for their
social, economic, and cultural
wellbeing and for their health and
safety while -
(a) Sustaining the potential of
natural and physical resources
(excluding minerals) to meet
the reasonably foreseeable
needs of future generations;
and
(b) Safeguarding the life-
supporting capacity for air,
water, soil, and ecosystems;
and
(c) Avoiding, remedying, or
mitigating any adverse effects
of activities on the environ-
ment.
Interpretation
The Minister, in his address,
distinguishes between a "conserva-
tive" and a "progressive" approach
to the interpretation of s 5. He
states:
The conservative position in this
debate is that section 5 is all about
balancing socio-economic aspira-
tions with environmental
outcomes. The progressive view
... is that the purpose of the Act
is to secure a particular environ-
mental ethic [outcome] - sustain-
able management. The debate
turns on whether the word
"while" in section 5(2) invites the
antecedent matters to be balanced
against those that follow; or
whether the matters in sub-
paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) must be
secured whatever the activities
being contemplated (p 3). .
The Minister supports the second
interpretation. For example, he
states: "The definition of sustain-
able management in relation to a
resource makes it clear that there are
three matters which must be
secured. If it can secure them, then
the use will be acceptable" (p 7 -
author's emphasis). Conversely, if it
cannot secure all three it will not be
acceptable. He uses three recent
Planning Tribunal decisions from
Judge Kenderdine to support this
view. The Judge is quoted as saying:
The provisions of s 5(2) (a), (b)
and (c) may be considered
cumulative safeguards which
exist in order to ensure that the
land resource is managed in such
a way, or at such a ~rate which
enables the people of the com-
munity to provide for the various
aspects of their social wellbeing
and for their health and safety.
They are safeguards which must
be met before the Act's purpose
is fulfilled (Foxley Engineering
WI2/94).
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If we find that one of these
safeguards is unlikely to be
achieved then the purpose of the
Act is not fulfilled (Plastic and
Leathergoods W26/94).
The promotion of sustainable
management has to be
determined therefore in the
context of these qualifications
which are to be accorded the
same weight (Shell Oil W8/94).
Now, I must state at the outset that I
agree with this interpretation.
Rather than a balancing of develop-
mental aspirations with environ-
mental outcomes (which is the
historical perspective) it introduces
the progressive notion of an
integration of these concerns.
Development can only proceed if it
is compatible with the environ-
mental outcomes stipulated in sub-
paras (a), (b) and (c). In other words,
people and communities can provide
for their social, economic and
cultural wellbeing and for their
health and safety only by ensuring
that the reasonably foreseeable
needs of the future are met, the
ecological base for their wellbeing is
sustained, and adverse effects of
their activities are avoided,
remedied or mitigated. It represents
an integration of economic, socio-
cultural, and ecological concerns.
This is how it shoud be.
Misconceptions
At this point, however, the
Minister's logic deserts him and
major contradictions and inconsis-
tencies appear in his analysis. Two
fundamental misconceptions are
involved. Firstly, he recognises only
biophysical or ecological impera-
tives in sub-paras (a), (b) and (c).
This is clearly erroneous. He also
argues that any inclusion of socio-
economic or cultural considerations
in (a), (b) or (c) will compromise
biophysical or ecological outcomes.
This too is erroneous. Let me
explain.
With regard to the inclusion of
socio-economic and cultural issues
in sub-paras (a), (b) and (c) let ,us
look first at sub-para (a) - the
requirement to sustain the potential
of natural and physical resources
(excluding minerals) to meet the
reasonably foreseeable needs of
future generations. This is clearly an
equity issue. Intergenerational
equity, like contemporary equity, is
a socio-economic and cultural-
political issue and cannot be
addressed solely by consideration of
biophysical or ecological concerns.
It requires a socio-political judgment
on what is essentially an ethical
issue - the foreseeable needs of
future generations. There can be no
dispute that socio-economic and
cultural concerns are involved in
sub-para (a).
The consideration of such socio-
economic and cultural issues,
however, will in no way com-
promise the biophysical or
ecological imperatives contained in
s 5. They are, in fact, comple-
mentary. Biophysical and ecological
resources, to meet the foreseeable
needs of future generations, must be
managed sustainably. This implies a
non-deterioration of renewable
resources and essential ecological
processes and a non-disruptive
transition from non-renewable
resources to alternatives. It is, in
effect, the quintessence of sustain-
ability.
Let us next examine sub-para (c)
- the requirement to avoid, remedy
or mitigate any adverse effects of
activities on the environment. Here
the Minister insists on considering
only the "physical" effects of
resource use on the biophysical
environment, supposedly for fear of
compromising biophysical or eco-
logical outcomes by introducing "a
balance or trading-off of the
sustainable management of natural
and physical resources" (p 8).
To begin with, the Minister's use
of the term "physical effects" (p 7)
cannot be supported by the legisla-
tive wording. Nowhere in the statute
is the word "physical" used in
conjunction with "effects" - not in
s 5 nor in the definition of effects.
This is purely a fabrication on the
part of the Minister.
Furthermore, the meaning of
environment, as stated in Part IT -
Interpretations and Applications,
clearly and categorically includes
people and communities, amenity
values, and the social, economic,
aesthetic and cultural concerns of
people and communities, irrespect-
ive of what semantic contortioris are
used to argue otherwise. Again, for
sake of clarity, I reproduce below
the statutory definition of en-
vironment:
"Environment" includes:
(a) Ecosystems and their con-
stituent parts, including
people and communities; and
(b) All natural and physical
resources; and
(c) Amenity values; and
(d) The social, economic, aes-
thetic, and cultural conditions
which affect the matters
stated in paragraphs (a) to (c)
of this definition or which are
affected by those matters:
·It is indisputable, therefore, that
s 5(2)(c) requires that adverse
effects on people and communities
and the social, economic, aesthetic
and cultural conditions of people and
communities must be considered
when deciding whether a resource
use is serving the purpose of the Act.
And this is how it should be. The
consideration of such issues is a
necessary precondition to ensure a
socially sustainable outcome. It
provides a means of ensuring that a
resource use is not detrimental to the
community in which it takes place.
For instance, a development that
may be advantageous to a foreign
concern or to a small .group
nationally, but is of no benefit or
even detrimental to the local
community can be avoided. It is
concerned, as it should be, with
contemporary equity. If the purpose
of sustainable management includes
the consideration of inter-
generational equity, as it does under
sub-para (a), it is logically and
ethically inconsistent to deny the
consideration of contemporary
equity.
Furthermore, the inclusion of
such concems enables the applica-
tion of social rationality to resource
decisions. For instance, if the social
effects of resource use are to be
excluded from consideration in
s 5(2)(c), where is the rationale to
deny consent to the location of a
pornography outlet adjacent to a
primary school or an abortion clinic
next to a Catholic Church? There are
no adverse biophysical or ecological
effects upon which to deny such
developments. The only grounds to
do so are by consideration of the
adverse social effects of such
proposals on the community. It is
absurd to deny the validity of such
considerations.
Two recent decisions by the
Planning Tribunal support this
position. In both Shell Oil NZ v
Wellington City Council (W057/92)
and BP Oil NZ Ltd v Auckland City
Council (A 153/92) a ppe a ls
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1 assume that his point is that if this
hypothetical unsustainable activity
is refused consent to continue then
this would have an adverse effect on
people and communities and their
economic and social wellbeing. The
Minister seems to have overlooked
the fact that if the activity is
unsustainable it is ultimately going
to have adverse effects on people
and communities whatever the out-
come of the consent process. It also
seems to have gone unnoticed that
Suppose I am involved in the
unsustainable harvest of a native
crop (which is in public owner-
ship), and suppose 1 make an
application to continue that
harvest. Suppose, too, that from
the proceeds of that unsustainable
harvest I have built a community
of people dependent on it. I
present my application, only to be
told that I must avoid, remedy or
mitigate the adverse effects of my
harvest on the environment
(amongst other things). My
lawyer jumps to his feet and
points out that in his inter-
pretation of the definition of the
word "environment", there are
social and economic conditions
which affect people and com-
munities (as constituent parts of
eco-systems) and that the Act
therefore requires that 1 should
mitigate any adverse effect on my
unsustainable harvest (I take this
to mean "of' my unsustainable
harvest - pp 8, 9).
compromising of biophysical or
ecological outcomes this too is
untenable.· Only adverse effects of
activities can be considered under
s 5(2)(c). There is no way, there-
fore, that the potential beneficial
socio-economic effects of a proposal
can be used as a balance or trade-off
with biophysical or ecological
outcomes.
Even under the hypothetical
circumstances outlined by the
Minister in his example to support
his contentions there need be no
compromising of biophysical or
ecological outcomes if consistent
logic is applied. This is because, in
the Minister's own words, sub-paras
(a), (b) and (c) are "conjunctive".
Let me use the Minister's own
example to illustrate this point. To'
prevent misunderstanding, I
reproduce the full text of his
argument. He states:
(a) any effect on those in the
neighbourhood. and where
relevant, the wider com-
munity including any socio-
economic and cultural effects:
[and]
(d) any effect on natural and
physical resources having
aesthetic, recreational, scien-
tific, historical, spiritual, or
cultural, or other special
value for present or future
generations.
Any matter relating to the
management of any actual or
potential effects of any use,
development, or protection ...
on -
(a) The community or any group
within the community (in-
cluding minorities, children,
and disabled people): [and)
(c) Natural, physical, or cultural
heritage sites and values,
including landscape, land
forms, historic places, and
waahi tapu.
Illogicalities
With regard to the Minister's
contention that the inclusion of such
socio-economic and cultural effects
in s 5(2)(c) will result in a
We know 'from ss 30 and 31 that
policy statements and plans must
serve the purpose of the Act as
defined in s 5. If s 5 excludes
consideration of socio-economic and
cultural effects of resource use then
why include them as matters that
may be provided for in policy
statements and plans? Once again,
the exclusion of these consider-
ations from s 5(c) is clearly
inconsistent with the rest of the Act.
If, as the Minister claims, s 5(2)(c)
excludes the consideration of the
'socio-economic effects of resource
use, then why consider them when
preparing an assessment of effects
on the environment? This surely
lacks any consistent rationality.
Furthermore, the Second Sched-
ule lists as matters that may be
provided for in policy statements
and plans:
Inconsistencies
In addition, if the cultural effects of a
resource use are not to be
considered in achieving the purpose
of sustainable management how can
the matters in s 6(e) - the relation-
ship of Maori and their culture and
traditions with their ancestral lands,
water, sites, waahi tapu, and other
taonga - be provided for? How can
s 8 - the principles of the Treaty of
Waitanzi - be reconciled with the
exclusion of the cultural effects of
resource use from s 5(c)? For
example, there may be no 'bio-
physical or ecological rationale to
deny sebdivision of a Maori burial
site. Such a development could only
be denied by consideration of
adverse cultural effects of the
proposal.
If s 5(2)(c) is to consider only
adverse biophysical and ecological
effects of resource use, how can
particular regard be directed to the
maintenance and enhancement of
amenity values and the recognition
and protection of the heritage values
of sites, buildings, places or areas,
as required in s 7? These are socio-
cultural issues and require the
consideration of socio-cultural
effects of resource use if they are to
be provided for in the purpose of the
Act. Once again, to deny such
considerations is absurd.
Not only is the exclusion of socio-
economic or cultural considerations
from s 5(c) perverse from an
operational perspective and contrary
with the other sections in Part Il, it is
also inconsistent with the rest of the
Act.
For example, how can the exclus-
ion of the consideration of social,
challenging the refusal of resource economic and cultural effects from
consents for the establishment of s 5(2)(c) be reconciled with the
service stations in residential areas-requirement in .the Fourth Schedule
were dismissed because of the to consider, when preparing an
adverse effects these proposals assessmen t of effects on the
would have on the amenitv values of environment:
the neighbourhoods. Th~ decisions
were based on the definition of the
environment enabling consideration
of adverse effects of resource use on
amenity values and the requirement
under s 7(c) to have particular
regard to the maintenance and
enhancement of amenity values.
Clearly, these decisions were based
on consideration of socio-economic
effects of land use on people and
communities not on the effects of
the proposals on the natural or
ecological environment.
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existing uses are considered as of
right under ss 10 and lOa. Even so,
leaving aside these considerations,
the argument still fails to stand up to
scrutiny.
For an activity to take place it
must, as the Minister himself
stresses in his address, satisfy all
three requirements in sub-paras (a),
(b) and (c). As the Minister states:
whilst any regime has to accept
that people have to be able to
provide for their social, economic
and cultural wellbeing (in other
words to get on with their lives)
they must do so in a way that is
consistent with all the matters
referred to in section 5(2) (a) and
(b) and (c). They are conjunctive
(p 6 - author's emphasis).
Clearly, if consent is not forth-
coming for the hypothetical activity
it does not satisfy one or more of the
sub-paragraphs, presumably in this
instance if it is unsustainable, sub-
para (a). Therefore, it cannot
proceed and the adverse effects of
this decision on the socio-economic
or cultural conditions of people and
communities cannot be weighed
against, or used to compromise the
biophysical or ecological impera-
tives contained in (a), (b) and (c).
This would be true of any existing
activity re-applying for consent.
Unless the resource use satisfies all
three requirements in (a), (b) and (c)
it will not proceed.
The rationale" for resource use is
to provide for people's social,
economic and cultural wellbeing.
Yet this must be achieved by
ensuring the outcomes specified in
(a), (b) and (c). The requirement for
the avoidance, remedying or
mitigation of adverse socio-
economic and cultural effects on
people and communities resulting
from resource use is logically
consistent with the provision of their
social, economic and cultural
wellbeing. In addition, as previously
shown, if (a), (b) and (c) are
conjunctive (or in the words of Judge
Kenderdine, cumulative) the
consideration of these matters
cannot be used to compromise the
biophysical or ecological require-
ments in s 5. There is no "meaning-
less circularity" involved in this
interpretation and requires no
"politicisation of the Judiciary" as
claimed by the Minister. It is. in
fact, straightforward and requires
only the consistent application of
logic.
Contradictions
If there is a genuine, holistic
approach to the resource manage-
ment legislation that includes the
integrative consideration of social,
cultural, economic and ecological
concerns there is no logical difficulty
with interpreting s 5. There need
not be problems of balancing or
compromising biophysical or eco-
logical outcomes.
It is when attempts are made, on
ideological grounds, to exclude
socio-economic and cultural con-
siderations from resource use that
illogicalities and contradictions
occur. This is because it is funda-
mentally irrational to do so. Social,
cultural and economic concerns are
intimately part of any resource use.
Indeed, social, economic and
cultural factors are involved in the
very definition of a particular feature
of the environment as a resource.
This perception has been
supported by an increasing inter-
national recognition, over the last
two decades, that the environmental
effects of resource use cannot be
divorced from the socio-cultural-
economic fabric of which they are an
integral part. For example, the
major theme of both the WCED
report "Our Common Future" (1987)
and the proceedings of the UNCED
Conference (1992) "Agenda 21"
was that the concept of sustainable
development required fully
integrated social, economic and
environmental policies to be applied
at local, regional, national and
international levels. Both of these
documents have been endorsed by
the New Zealand Government and
promoted by the Ministry for the
Environment.
"Agenda 21", perhaps the most
comprehensive international
statement yet on environmental
protection and remedial strategies,
devoted eight chapters to the social
and economic dimensions of sustain-
able development. Chapter 8 is of
particular relevance to public
planning. It stated the overall
objective of integrating en-
vironmental and development in
decision-making to be: "to improve
or restructure the decision-making
process so that consideration of
socio-economic and environmental
issues is fully integrated .. ". It
went on to say:
Governments should ..
improve the processes of
decision-making so as to achieve
the progressive integration of
economic, social and environ-
mental issues in the pursuit of
development that is economically
efficient, socially equitable and
responsible, and environmentally
sound (p 94).
Furthermore, in a specific reference
to planning and management sys-
tems it advised:
Governments should review the
status of the planning and
management system and, where
necessary, modify and strengthen
procedures so as to facilitate the
integrated consideration of
social, economic and environ-
mental issues (p 95).
These expositions point to major
contradictions in the stance adopted
by the Minister for the Environment
in his address regarding the resource
management legislation. Moreover,
his stance on the resource manage-
ment legislation is, paradoxically, at
odds with his own Ministry's
"Environment 20 I0 Strategy". This
document devotes substantial
rhetoric to the need to fully integrate
environmental, economic and social
concerns in development strategies.
For example, in the "Foreword",
signed by the Minister himself, it
states:
The strategy is linked to the
Government's "Path to 2010". It
promotes integration of environ-
mental, economic and social
policies and strategies . . . The
1992 Rio "Earth Summit"
highlighted the need to fuse
economic, social and environ-
mental policies at local, national
and international levels (p 3).
Furthermore, the Strategy has, as
the first priority on its Environ-
mental Management Agenda,
the integration of environmental,
social and economic factors into
the mainstream of decision-
making in all sectors, at all levels
(p 48).
These policy statements are
irreconcilable with statements made
by the Minister in regard to the
Resource Management Act. For
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example, he states in his address:
"The Act is not designed as a social
planning statute". It is "first and
foremost an environmental statute"
(p 2). He goes on to say:
We must not ignore the fact that
the definition [of the environ-
ment] is an "inclusive" one and
that social and economic
conditions are only part of the
environment where they affect,
or are affected by, the other
components of the environment
(ie resources, ecosystems etc)
[whatever this means]. Social and
economic conditions on their own
are not part of the environment
and it is therefore, incorrect to say
that section 5(2)(c) requires
adverse effects on social and
economic conditions to be con-
sidered (p 8).
These semantic distortions are a far
cry from the "integration of environ-
mental, social and economic factors
into the mainstream of decision-
making in all sectors, at all levels"
advocated in the "Environment 2010
Strategy".
Conclusion
The Minister's address exhibits the
contradictions and illogicalities
inherent in attempting to reconcile
market liberalism with environ-
mentalism. The fundamental
difficulty he encounters is that whilst
the political intent (underpinned by
nee-liberal ideology) of the resource
management legislation is to limit
intervention in resource allocation
decisions and to curtail the role of
planning in regional and district
affairs in preference to market
processes, the legislative wording in
general and the concept of sustain-
able management in particular,
paradoxically, requires increased
intervention and more com-
prehensive planning (Grundy ,
1993).
Issues such as intergenerational
equity, maintenance of genetic
diversity, the intrinsic values of
ecosystems and even the sustainable
utilisation of resources are not
ensured by market processes alone.
They are, in fact, often conflicting.
As Daly and Cobb (1989) have
pointed out, the free market has no
means of ensuring an optimal scale
of the macro-economy relative to
the ecosystems in which it operates,
which is central to ensuring
ecological s ustainab il ity , In
addition, as Eckersley (1992) has
remarked, market rationality is
fundamentally incompatible with
the notion of intergenerational
equity. Indeed, the goal of profit
maximisation encourages the
liquidation or depletion of both
renewable and non-renewable
resources, and the movement of the
capital thereby gained into new
ventures, rather than the sustainable
or prudent harvest over time.
Similarly, contemporary equity
and market rationality are anti-
thetical. Recent studies by the
Economist (1994) show growing
disparities between rich and poor
within those countries that have
most strongly promoted market
liberalism (eg the United States,
. Britain and New Zealand). The
study found, furthermore, that
societies with greater inequalities
experience more ill health, social
stress and crime. Neo-Iiberal
attempts to remove equity
considerations from resource
decisions are not only contributing to
this contemporary social malaise,
but are also antagonistic to the
concept of sustainability promoted
internationally, which properly
recognises that equity must be a
concern of resource use if
development is to be, in the long
term, sustainable (WCED, 1987;
UNCED, 1992).
. A meaningful and operational
definition of sustainable manage-
ment in line with the concept of
sustainable development that has
evolved globally will require a much
more sophisticated and innovative
approach to resource management
than that dictated by nee-liberalism.
The application of nineteenth
century economic theory to twenti-
eth century environmental problems
is fraught with difficulties, as the
Minister's address aptly illustrates.
If the illogicalities and contradict-
ions inherent in such an approach are
to be avoided, the intellectual
constraints of nee-liberalism must
be abandoned and a more holistic
and integrative approach initiated -
one informed by the new ecological
and social realities of the twentieth
century.
The Minister states in his address
to the Resource Management Law
Association Conference:
I'm . .. concerned with those
who choose to use part of one
sentence in the definition of
"environment" to redefine totally
the meaning of sustainable
management [I assume here he
means the inclusion of people and
communities and their social,
economic' and cultural con-
ditions]. Such attempts at
statutory deconstruction defy
logic, the ordinary meanings of
words, and the ethic of the Act as
a whole (p 4).
I put it to the Minister, that his stance
not only defies logic, the ordinary
meanings of words and the ethic of
the Act, but is also at odds with the
growing volume of international
proclamations on the concept of
sustainability and even, paradoxic-
ally, with the contents of his own
Ministry's Environment Strategy.
If, as the Minister concludes in his
address, "perfection in environ-
mental matters is the preserve of the
manic and the obsessed" (p 10) then
perhaps imperfection in logic is the
preserve of the politician and the
policy maker. D
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Correspondence
re Section 5 of the Resource
Management Act: [1995] NZLJ 40
Dear Sir.
I note that you have published an
article by Kerry James Grundy in
your February 1995 issue. Mr
Grundy had previously sent it to me
for comment. I consider Mr Grundy
to be seriously wrong and make the
following comments.
Sadly: I haven't the time to write
a detailed critique which is a pity as
there is much to reply to and some
material I would endorse. Let me
confine myself to a couple of points.
In the first place, it seems to me
that the argument, engaging as it is,
proceeds from a wholly inaccurate
premise: Mr Grundy has chosen to
interpret s 5 in a way that can't be
supported by the plain words of the
section. In the last paragraph of the
section headed "Interpretation", it is
stated that:
. . . people and communities can
provide for their social, economic
and cultural well-being and for
their health and safety only by
ensuring (my emphasis) that the
reasonably foreseeable needs of
the future are met, the ecological
base for their well-being is
sustained, and adverse effects of
their activities are avoided,
remedied or mitigated.
But s 5 does not spell out how "well-
being" is to be achieved or' what it is;
it does not implant an ethic that well-
being is only achieved when there is
an integration of economic, socio-
cultural and ecological concerns
(however attractive that may be). In
short "while" simply does not
translate into "only by ensuring".
It mav be that that is what the Act
should say - Mr Grundy's advocacy
suggests there is an interesting
article waiting to be written promot-
ing this ethic. But Parliament hasn't
go-ne that far. It didn't claim to have
knowledge about what well-being
was in a holistic sense or any other
sense. It simply acknowledged that
human beings are concerned with
the pursuit Zlr their well-being in a
subjective sense, and said that in so
124
doing people should see to it that
certain positive attributes should be
sustained and safeguarded and
certain negative eff;cts avoided,
remedied 0'[ mitigated. Hence, Mr
Grundy's argument on p 5 that
unsustainable activity could never
by definition contribute to the well-
being of people and communities
fails.
Please don't mistake me; the
argument is very attractive and one
that would appeal to many people.
But it asserts a knowledge of
sustainability and well-being that
simply isn't provided for in s 5.
Whether the Act should assert a
knowledge of well-being in an
holistic sense is a profound question.
I would simply observe here that to
take that step and replace "while"
with words like "only by ensuring"
would invoke a claim to knowledge
of the Good (in a philosophical
sense) which is light years away
from the value pluralism that
pervades so much of our social
thinking.
. The Act pursues a more cautious,
less robust formula. It says that
whatever people and communities
conceive their well-being to be they
shouldn't pursue it in a way that
prejudices the matters set out in
paras (a), (b) and Cc) of subs (2).
You may be perplexed by the
definitive way in which I state this.
After all if a statutory code like the
Resource Management Act is given
life through interpretations that
tribunals and Courts impose why
should the Minister for the
Environment have a privileged view
of the meaning of a particular
section?
The answer is that, despite the
curious artefactual nature of statutes
in our legal system, Judges and
others are supposed when the words
on the face of that statute are less
than clear, to frame their inter-
pretation in terms of what Parlia-
ment intended. And in this instance,
I am perhaps uniquely aware of what
was intended. That is because the
drafting of s 5 is largely mine. I
chaired the Cabinet Committee that
settled the final form of the bill and
maintained a close oversight of its
metamorphosis through the Select
Committee. I was well aware of the
"holistic" view Mr Grundy was
arguing for as one policy alternative;
and equally aware of the "balancing"
view espoused by the development
lobby. We consciously chose to
impose a biophysical type of test
because of a pragmatic view that
there was a better chance of getting
agreement on sustainability in those
terms than the broader terms Mr
Grundy argued for.
That is the policy fact of the
matter. It is open to challenge and
debate - and I sense that Mr Grundy
may wish to open that debate. But he
would be better advised to tackle
that philosophical issue head on than
try to extract that view from a
reading of the section that can't
support it and was explicitly
considered and rejected by those
who drafted it.
With respect, the paper makes
some pretty heavy references to
"nee-liberal ideology" and the like.
Mr Grundy's own viewpoint is as
ideologically saturated as anyone's
and I don't think this sort of labelling
is very useful. Neither is the critique
enhanced by repeated claims that my
viewpoint is "illogical". He may dis-
agree with my premises as I may his,
but that isn't a ground for querying
the logic of our respective. con-
clusions.
As a general observation, I would
have to say that Mr Grundy is putting
up a bit of a straw man in discerning
reliance on market rationality at the
bottom of my thinking. If I was as
enamoured of free markets as
implied I would scarcely have gone
along with the approach of the
Resource Management Act. It is
heavily bureaucratic and seeks to
inject precisely the sorts of values
that highly disaggrcgared systems of
market exchange will frequently
undervalue. (I would observe in
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passing. that markets are social
constructs and always subject to
social limitation and control - in the
case of the Resource Management
Act, very heavy control.)
Finally. a point with which I
agree. Mr Grundy correctly notes
that the Fourth Schedule of the Act
requires those preparing environ-
mental assessments to consider
socio-economic and cultural effects
which certainly does seem some-
what at odds with the view of s 5 that
I have advanced. It is. The fact is that
the schedule was not amended in
line with the changes made to the
purpose section. As a matter of
statutory construction the Courts are
bound to limit their reading of the
schedules by the overriding consid-
erations of the purpose section, but I
would happily concede the incon-
sistency in drafting that has emerged
from the Bill's gestation.
Mr Grundy clearly has a different
view of what the Act should say and I
respect that. Could I suggest he
advance that cause on its merits
rather than try to detect it where it
cannot be located.
Hon Simon Upton
Minister for the Environment
Reply to the Minister for the Environment from Kerry lames Grundy
Still searching for a logic
The following comments constitute
a brief reply to the Minister for the
Environment's response to my
article published in the February
issue of the New Zealand Law
Journal.
Firstly, I would like to thank the
Minister for taking the time to
comment on the article. However, I
must say I find his response perplex-
ing, His main criticism is that my
argument "proceeds from a wholly
inaccurate premise": that I have
"chosen to interpret s 5 in a way that
can't be supported by the plain
words of that section". He goes on to
say that s 5 "does not implant an
ethic that well-being is only
achieved when there is an. inte-
gration of economic, socio-cultural
and ecological concerns". This I
assume to be the premise he refers
to. He supports his contentions by
my use of the words "only by ensur-
ing" in place of "while" in my
interpretation of s 5.
To begin with, my argument does
not proceed from the premise that
well-being is only achieved when
there is an integration of economic,
socio-cultural and ecological con-
cerns. My argument proceeds from a
logical interpretation of the wording
of s 5 in relation to the other sections
in Part II and to other requirements
in the Act, particularly the Second
and Fourth Schedules. An integrat-
ive consideration of economic,
socio-cultural and ecological
concerns follows from this interpret-
ation and is further supported, as
described in my article, by inter-
national proclamations on develop-
ment-environment strategies and
national policy statements on the
same. In short, s 5 does implant an
ethic that well-being is better
achieved when there is an inte-
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gration of economic, socio-cultural
and ecological concerns. However,
this is not a premise but rather a
result of interpretation and analysis.
Even so, the Minister's assertion
that this "ethic" is wholly inaccurate
is surprising given the Govern-
ment's endorsement of the Brundt-
land Report and Agenda 21, both of
which promote the integration of
social, economic and environmental
policies at local, regional, national
and international levels. It is even
more perplexing given the emphasis
on the integration of social, econ-
omic and environmental concerns
advocated in the Government's
Environment 2010 Strategy. For
example, the Strategy "promotes
[the] integration of environmental,
economic and social policies and
strategies" (p 3) and lists as its first
priority on its management agenda
"the integration of environmental,
social and economic factors into the
mainstream of decision-making in
all sectors at all levels" (p 48). If I
had proceeded from this premise it
remains obscure to me why it would
be described by the Minister as'
wholly inaccurate, given the above
statements.
As for the use of the words "only
by ensuring" as a substitute for
"while" in s 5, I am at a complete
loss as to how this determines well-
being in a holistic sense or any other
sense. In fact, it merely states that
the achievement of well-being
(whatever this involves) must b~
consistent with the matters referred
to in subparas (a), (b) and (c) of s 5, a
position supported by the Minister
himself. For example, the Minister
in his address states: while "people
have to be able to provide for their
social. economic and cultural well-
being. . they must do so ill a way
that is consistent with all the matters
referred to in s 5(2)(a), (b) and (c)"
(p 6). Furthermore, I detect no
difference between my use of only
by ensuring and the Minister's use of
must be secured. For example, the
Minister states: "The definition of
sustainable management in relation
to a resource makes it clear that
there are three matters which must
be secured. If it can secure them,
then the use will be acceptable"
(p 7). Replace only by ensuring in
my definition with must be secured
and you end up with the same
meaning. By his own rationale, the
Minister's interpretation of s 5 is
also' beginning from a wholly
inaccurate premise.
In regard to the Minister's
aversion to my querying the logic of
his interpretation of s 5; my
response is simply that the very act
of interpretation requires the
application of logic and, hence, a
disagreement over interpretation
must of necessity frequently involve
a questioning of logic. The Minister
should not be so sensitive to
disagreements on this nature.
The Minister criticises mv
comments regarding the influence of
nee-liberal ideology on the formu-
lation of the resource management
legislation. The Minister knows full
well the influence this ideology had
and still has on the legislation. The
resource management law reform
process was not only a rational-
isation of existing. admittedly often
overlapping and contradictory.
resource legislation, but also a
deliberate m~ve to limit the role of
statutory planning in resource
allocation decision-making. The
wider socio-economic objectives of




By D F Dugdale, of Auckland
The Attorney-General has pro-
claimed a new method of making
appointments to judicial offices
within his gift. Nominations it seems
are to be s~licited from such sources
as the Ministry of Women's Affairs
and organisations representing
Maori.
But why stop there? There is one
gathers a society of gay and lesbian
lawvers. There is the St Thomas
Mo;'e Society, a papist cell which
despite being named for an English
Chancellor has a membership more
Irish and Croatian than recusant.
There are the Conveyancers for
Christ, whose motto is "In my
father's house there are many
mansions". Somewhere out there
there is bound to be an organisation
called Mothers Against Enjoying
Yourself which will want to have its
sav, Then there is the Business
Round Table, and the Matamata
South Croquet Club, and the New
Zealand Federation of Cactus and
Succulent Fanciers. The possibili-
ties are endless.
What the Attorney seems to have
continued from p 125
the former legislation were viewed
as unnecessary and undesirable
interventions in the functioning of
the market allocation mechanism
and were removed. This is clearly an
ideological position.
The influence of neo-liberal
ideology on the resource manage-
ment legislation was specifically
discussed by the Deputy Secretary
for the Environment at the time,
Lindsay Gow, in an address to a
Conference in Dunedin in 1991 ,
entitled 'Resource Management
Law Reform in the Context Of Other
Reforms'. He states:
The major reforms which are
represented in the Resource
Management Act should not be
seen in isolation. They are part of
the fundamental and on-going
reforms of New Zealand's public
sector and economy that WG!';
initiated by the Government in
1994. An essential element of
these reforms is deregulation ..
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established is a system identical for
all practical purposes to the way in
which the honours list is presently
chosen, a mixture of tokenism, the
influence of pressure groups, and
political expediency.
It is 'said that there is a need for
representation on the bench of
persons responsive to the view-
points of all the various sectors of
New Zealand society. Well yes,
why do we not appoint some finan-
cially straitened Judges to ensure
that insolvency cases are handled
with sensitivity? And in fairness to
those charged with or convicted of
criminal offences should we not
appoint more Judges with psycho-
pathic or anti-social tendencies?
What is of course lost sight of in
all this is that a Judge has ~exacting
responsibilities the proper perform-
ance of which demands among other
qualities legal knowledge and
experience and a good mind. It is no
more sensible for a New Zealand
litigant to have his or her cause
det~rmined by a Judge appointed on
the urging of the Ministry' of
the Resource Management Act
has been developed in a policy
environment where the Govern-
ment wants to get unnecessary
government intervention out of
people's lives. The Government
saw the wider socio-economic
objectives of current legislation,
particularly the Town and
Country Planning Act, as promot-
ing unnecessary and poorly
targeted intervention which
impose high costs to society ...
In my view, the Resource Man-
agement Act accepts that social
and economic and health and
safety objectives can be
achieved, but it is not necessarily
the role of central or local
government to plan for them
(pp 13, 15, 17).
It is well documented that the
structural changes made to the
political economy of New Zealand
since 1984 are founded on neo-
liberal ideology. By Lindsay Gow's
admission the resource management
law reforms were "part of the
Women's Affairs than it would be
for a New Zealand traveller to be a
passenger on an airliner whose pilot
had been selected by the same
process. Who would care to be
operated on by a surgeon who owed
his opportunity to wield his scalpel
not to his abilities but to some fuzzy
feeling that in fairness to our Treaty
partners he should be given a go?
Practising lawyers, taking the
view that to do otherwise would
harm the institutions of the law, have
in the past resolutely refrained from
the public criticism of individual
judicial appointments, and have
preferred instead to soldier on with
gritted teeth. "A dog's obeyed in
office." It is a tradition of which the
current Attorney-General has been a
greater beneficiary than even G W R
Palmer.
But Mr East needs to understand
that this tradition is one that can be
stretched to breaking point. Perhaps
what we really need is an examin-
ation not of how Judges are selected
but of how Attorneys-General are
chosen. 0
fundamental and ongoing reforms of
New Zealand's public sector and
economy ... initiated ... in
1984". They are an integral compon-
ent of this overall restructuring and
influenced by the same ideology. To
deny the part played by this ideology
is to obscure the fundamental issues
that are at stake in the interpretation
of this legislation.
Finally, the Minister's reply was
disappointing in that he did not
address the two fundamental mis-
conceptions I charged him with in
his address to the Resource Manage-
ment Law Association Conference.
These were, one - his recognition
solely of biophysical or ecological
imperatives in subparas (a), (b) or (c)
of s 5; and, two - his contention that
any inclusion of socio-economic or
cultural considerations in (a), (b) or
(c) would compromise biophysical
or ecological outcomes. This was the
foundation of my original analysis of
his address to the Conference and
constituted the basis for my
interpretation of s 5. 0
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7.4 Rural Land Use and the RMA
This article is a critique of an address given by the Minister for the Environment to the
New Zealand Planning Institute Conference in Taupo on May 26 1995 (Upton, 1995c). It
was published in Planning Quarterly, the journal of the New Zealand Planning Institute, in
December 1995. A response by the Minister was published in the same journal in March
1996.
The debate between the author and the Minister once again centred on the interpretation of
section 5 of the Resource Management Act, with the Minister in his address promoting the
neoliberal 'effects-based' interpretation. He chastised council planners for their continued
use of land use zoning and associated subdivision controls in the regulation of rural land
use. The Minister argued that the market should allocate land to whichever use it deems
most efficient (i.e. most profitable) and that the role ofplanning should be restricted to
controlling the biophysical environmental effects resulting from such land uses.
In my article, I criticised this interpretation and sought to establish that such a narrowly-
focused, effects-based interpretation could not in any substantial way address the complex
requirements of sustainable management as defined in section 5. Moreover, it was argued
that the neoliberal interpretation threatened to diminish the very concept of sustainability
contained within the legislation and render it devoid of any useful meaning as either an
intellectual construct or an object of public policy.
It was proposed that the concept of sustainable management, as expressed in the resource
management legislation, requires consideration of the allocation of resources both
contemporaneously and over time, and that the market is often incapable of achieving such
allocations to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations or to safeguard
the life-supporting capacity of ecological processes as required under section 5. In addition,
it was argued that the market cannot determine the overall scale of resource use to ensure
the same requirements. More than this, the free market was posited as directly conflicting
with the requirements of intergenerational equity and ecological sustainability, just as it
contributes to contemporary inequity.
It was further argued that it was administratively confusing to those required to work with
the legislation to have a Minister charged with its implementation advocating a conflicting
interpretation to that of the legislative wording. The Minister's persistent and erroneous
representation of sustainable management as merely, or even primarily, focusing on
controlling the adverse effects of resource use on the biophysical environment is posited as
ideologically derived rather than the result of correct interpretation of the legislation.
Moreover, it is alleged that such an interpretation denies the quintessential meaning of
sustainability which is just as much (if not more so) concerned with the long term
sustainability of resource use as it is with the amelioration of adverse effects on the
biophysical environment resulting from contemporary use.
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Subsequent to the publication of these articles, the New Zealand Society of Soil Science
(NZSSS) entered the debate over the regulation of rural land. The author was asked by the
Past President of the Society to contribute an article to their publication, New Zealand Soil
News, in which a special feature on the 'High Class Soils Debate' was to be included in a
forthcoming edition. The editorial of that edition (Campbell, 1997:39) included the
following: '''Some countries have oi1. .. NEW ZEALAND HAS SOIL!' proudly proclaims
the poster still attached to the west wall of our Soil Science and Chemistry laboratory. New
Zealand, however, has limited areas of high class soils, and there is growing debate as to
whether or not these soils should be reserved for primary production. This debate continues
on page 47, and the Editor welcomes your views on this important topic".
The 'High Class Soils Debate' section included articles by Basher (1997), Doak (1997),
Grundy (1997b) and Webb et al. (1997), all discussing the use and protection of high class
soils in New Zealand. Basher (1997:47), the Past President of the NZSSS, introduced the
debate in his article entitled 'Management of High Class Soils Under the Resource
Management Act: The Role of the New Zealand Society of Soil Science'. He stated:
"Last year the New Zealand Society of Soil Science approached the Minister for the
Environment because of concerns that competition for land with high class soils was
leading to undesirable environmental outcomes under the RMA, particularly in the peri-
urban area where high class soils can be permanently lost to housing ... We were
particularly concerned by the Minister's statement to the NZ Planning Institute
Conference (Upton, 1995) that 'efficient resource allocation is best achieved through
price signals' .. , NZSSS suggested the Minister's faith in market signals to achieve
efficient resource allocation is misplaced and will most likely lead to conversion of
some of our most highly productive soils to non-agricultural uses ... "
The Past President went on to comment directly on my debate with the Minister: "The
Minister appeared to argue that the requirements of section S(c) of RMA (to avoid, remedy
or mitigate adverse effects) override those of sections Sea) and 5(b). The alternative view
(e.g. Grundy, 1995) is that sections Sea) and 5(b) provide a mechanism for resource
allocation to meet the needs of future generations and to safeguard the life-supporting
capacity of ecosystems ... Whatever mechanism is used, we believe that the piecemeal loss
of high class soils could cumulatively have a large impact on the total area of high class
soils and is an effect that should be managed".
The above discourse illustrates the dynamics of counter-hegemonic struggle, and the
potential for convergence of interest groups in opposition to the dominant hegemony. The
concerns of the NZSSS, as with other interest/environmental groups that the author has
been involved with, whilst opposed to aspects of the prevailing ideology, are often unclear
as to the underlying dynamics and causes of their concerns. The author's involvement was
primarily focused on revealing the political/economic underpinnings of the dominant
position and thus clarifying the common concerns and opposition of the various groups to
the prevailing ideology. In this way, the intent was to contribute to a counter-hegemony to








UNIVERSITY OF OTAGO, DUNEDIN
The author and the Minister for the
Environment at odds again.
The Minister for the Environment,
Simon Upton, delivered what can only be
described as an extraordinary speech to the
New Zealand Planning Institute Conference
in Taupo on May 26 1995. In his address,
entitled "The Problems of Rural Subdivi-
sion", the Minister beratejdistrrct and
regional councils, the Planning Tribunal,
and professional planners alike for their
continued reliance under the Resource Man-
agement Act (RMA) on zoning procedures
and associated subdivision controls in the
regulation of rural land use. This he
described as "contrary to the philosophy of
the Act" and a refusal to "relinquish the
[planning] tools that governed another age"
(Upton, 1995, ppI2,18). He characterised
the former controls as too prescriptive, too
inflexible. imposing high costs on develop-
ers, and as a distortion to the efficient func-
tioning of the market and hence the efficient
allocation of resources. He also saw them as
an unnecessary infringement by the state on
the rights of individual property owners to
develop their land as they see fit.
He preferred that the allocation of rural
land be left to the market with the proviso
that the adverse effects of development on
the biophysical environment be adequately
managed within the framework of the
RMA. In so doing, he persistently repre-
sented the purpose of the RMA - sustainable
management - as being primarily concerned
with managing the adverse effects of
resource use on the biophysical environ-
ment within the auspices of a market driven
allocation system. For example, he said:
"The Resource Management Act regime
requires those who exercise powers under
the Act to focus on the effects of resource
use on the environment ... People are
assumed to be able to make their own
choices about the use of resources. Councils
are there to see that the effects of those
choices are consistent with sustainable man-
agement ... Efficient resource allocation is
best achieved through price signals - price
sigrials which include the costs of remedy-
ing environment impacts - not some third
party view of what the world should look
like" (Up ton 1995, pp2,5, 11).
At the conclusion of his address, the Min-
ister said: "The thrust of this speech may
appear to be remarkably laissez-faire. It is
with respect to resource allocation. It is most
definitely not laissez-faire with respect to
environment standards" (Upton 1995,
pp17,18). This statement, I suggest, encapsu-
lates the Minister's position regarding the
resource management legislation. It is, how-
ever, based on a fundamental misconception
(or misrepresentation) regarding the legisla-
tion. This is, that sustainable management, as
defined in the RMA, is concerned only with
managing environmental effects and eschews
any consideration of resource allocation.
INTERPRETATION OF
SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT
Sustainable management, as defined in
section 5 of the Act, contains three requi-
sites. They are:
"(a) .Sustaining the potential of natural
and physical resources (excluding minerals)
to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of
future generations; and
(b) Safeguarding the life-supporting
capacity of air; water, soil and ecosystems;
and
(c) Avoiding, remedying, or mitigating
any adverse effects of activities on the envi-
ronment."
They represent three distinct but cumula-
tive imperatives that must be secured if a
resource use is to be considered sustainable.
Recent Planning Tribunal decisions support
this view. For example, Judge Kenderine .
has held that:
"The provisions of section 5(2) (a), (b)
and (c) may be considered cumulative safe-
guards which exist in order to ensure that
the land resource is managed in such a way,
or at such a rate which enables the people of
the community to provide for the various
aspects of their social wellbeing and for
their health and safety. They are safeguards
which must be met before the Act's purpose
is fulfilled (Foxley Engineering Ltd .v
Wellington CC W 12/94).
If we find that one of these safeguards is
unlikely to be achieved then the purpose of
the Act is not fulfilled (Plastic and Leather-
goods Co Ltd v Horowhenua DC W26/94).
The promotion of sustainable manage-
ment has to be determined therefore in the
context of these qualifications which are to.
be accorded the same weight (Shell Oil NZ
lsd v Auckland CC W8/94).
Taken together, these three requisites
constitute the constraints within which
development must take place so as to enable
sustainable management. The Minister's
insistence that the RMA is about:
"focus[ing] on the effects of resource use on
the environment" (Upton 1995, p2) is,
therefore, ill-funded. The RMA is equally
concerned with meeting the resource needs
of future generations (intergenerational
equity) and safeguarding the life-supporting
capacity of air, water, soil and ecosystems
(ecological sustainability).
These requisites, however, receive rare
mention. from the Minister. This is hardly
surprising given that the requirement to sus-
tain the potential of natural and physical
resources to meet the reasonably foreseeable
needs of future generations has very little to
do with managing environmental effects and
r~ther a lot to do with resource allocation
decisions - an imperative that does not fit
well with the Minister's position. In addition,
the maintenance of ecological wellbeing by
safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of
air, water, soil and ecosystems is as much
concerned with decisions regarding the scale
of economic development as. it is with the
environmental effects of individual consent
applications. This too represents an impera-
tive that does not sit well with the Minister.
Firstly, with respect to the imperative to
meet the reasonably foreseeable resource
needs of future generations, the Minister's
insistence that sustainable management is
about focusing on the effects of develop-
ment on the biophysical environment is
clearly inadequate. The requirement to
avoid, remedy, or mitigate any adverse
effects of activities on the environment in no
substantial way addresses the imperative to
sustain the potential of natural and physical
resources to meet the reasonahly foreseeable
needs of future generations. These are quite
different requirements and necessitate dis-
tinct approaches for their fulfilment. Meet-
ing the reasonably foreseeable resource
needs of future generations requires the con-
sideration of how resources are to be used
and to what extent they are to be used. These
are primarily questions of allocation and
scale, not environmental effect. They require
a socio-political judgement on what is essen-






Secondly, with respect to safeguarding
the life-supporting capacity of air, water,
soil and ecosystems this requirement is not
exclusively determined by the management
of environmental effects of individual con-
sent applications. It requires a wider, more
holistic view of the development process
and requires both the consideration of
resource allocation and the scale of use. A
determination of the optimal. scale of
resource use often over disparate spatial and
temporal scales is essential if economic
development is not to overwhelm its eco-
logical base. This is, in the final analysis,
determined by ecological constraints.
THE MARKET AND SUSTAINABLE
MANAGEMENT
Given that the above two requisites for
sustainable management require the consid-
eration of allocation and scale, the Minis-
ter's advancement of the market as the most
appropriate mechanism for the allocation of
resources and as the arbiter of the scale of
resource use must be examined.
Upon scrutiny, it can be seen that his faith
in the market has more to do with ideological
bias than with empirical analysis. In fact,
empirical analysis will show that the best the
market can claim to achieve is short-term
allocative efficiency (and even this is open to
debate); it cannot perform by itself the task
of setting an optimal scale of resource use
(an ecological issue) nor an optimal alloca-
tion over time (an eqnity issue).
Even if we assume, hypothetically, that
markets can attain efficiency as determined
by neo-classical Pareto optimality this in no
way guarantees an optimal environmental
outcome. A Pareto optimal allocation! can
occur at an ecologically unsustainable scale
of resource use, just as it can occur at an
inequitable distribution of benefits both con-
temporarily and over time (Goodland and'
Ledec, 1987). Pareto optimality is defined
independently of both present and future
equity and the physical scale of resource use.
Public policy decision-making which relies
exclusively on market criteria can address
only short-term allocative efficiency - not
any of the other requisites for determining
the sustainable management of resources,
such as intergenerational equity, the sustain-
able utilisation of natural resources, and the
maintenance of ecological wellbeing.
In fact, issues such as intergenerational
equity, maintenance of genetic diversity, the
intrinsic values of ecosystems an even the
sustainable utilisation of resources are often
directly conflicting with market forces. As
Daly and Cobb (1989) have pointed out, the
free market has no means of ensuring an
optimal scale of the macro-economy rela-
tive to the ecosystems in which it operates
which is central to ensuring ecological sus-
tainability. In fact, the inherent imperative
of capitalism for the reinvestment of accu-
mulated surplus capital, tends to ensure that
the macro-economy will inevitably exceed
its ecological support over the long term.
In addition, as Eckersley (1992) has
remarked, market rationality is fundamen-
tally incompatible with the notion of inter-
generational equity. Indeed, the goal of
profit rnaximisation encourages the liquida-
tion or depletion of both renewable and
non-renewable resources, and the move-
ment of the capital thereby gained into new
ventures, rather than the sustainable or pru-
dent harvest over time. C1ark (1974) has
shown that if the return on capital invested
in a sustainable harvest of a resource over
time is less than the return to be gained by
depleting the resource and investing the
profits elsewhere, then according to market
rationality, this is the proper course of
action. This is antithetical to both the con-
cept of ecological sustainability and that of
intergenerational equity.
RURAL LAND USE
On the rural-urban periphery, for example,'
market allocations can be seen 10 be directly
opposed to the requirements of sustainable
management. Two factors, one historical and
the other economic, intersect to ensure this.
Many of New Zealand's urban settle-
ments were originally established on, or near
to, areas where there were existing devel-
oped and farmed soils. As these settlements
expanded increasing pressure was placed on
the subdivision of adjoining, often highly
productive, agricultural land for residential
and industrial use. Consequently, the expan-
sion of urban areas into their rural hinterland
has resulted in significant losses of high
quality soils available for agricultural use.
Continued, unregulated expansion, likewise
threatens further substantial losses.
. Secondly, studies have shown that on the
,.:rrban-rural fringe, the combined pressures
of decreased building costs associated with
flat land, proximity to existing services, and
speculative property market imperatives
almost inevitably result in the conversion of
often highly productive agricultural land to
residential or industrial uses (Johnson,
1974: Thorn, 1974).
These market driven tendencies are anti-
thetical to the requirement to sustain the
potential of natural and physical resources
to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of
future generations. When one considers the
extremely limited spatial extent of these
soils (ie, only 3% of New Zealand's total
land area is comprised of Class I agricultur-
al land - that deemed to possess negligible
limits to arable use) it is not difficult to
envisage, even with moderate population
increase, the potential value of this finite
resource to future generations both for food
production and employment opportunities
(Ministry of Works and Development,
1979).These tendencies are also antithetical
to the requirement for safeguarding the life-
supporting capacity of the land resource.
For instance, more fertile soil possesses a
greater capacity to support life (particularly
human life) than does soil of lesser fertility.
In the past, the regulation of rural land
was achieved through the provisions of a dis-
trict scheme usually by the use of prescrip-
tive zoning and associated subdivision con-
trols.Most district schemes divided land into
land use zones based on the separation of
what were seen as conflicting activities. For
example, residential, industrial, commercial
and differing types of rural zones were nor-
mally differentiated. Highly productive agri-
cultural land was commonly zoned separate-
ly and reservedprimarily for agricultural use.
In addition,the principle of protecting highly
productive land from inappropriate develop-
ment through prescriptive zoning and subdi-
vision control was well supported by case
law established by Planning Tribunal deci-
sions (McMillan JD v Silverpeaks CC
C43/85;Auckland RC v Waitemata CC and
LendisHeavyEquipmentAOO9/87).
Under the RMA, district and regional
councils have continued to advocate the
protection of high quality agricultural land
from inappropriate development. This is
supported by a study conducted by Hook
(1994) which compared a number of new
district plans formulated under the RMA
with their predecessor district schemes
under the Town and Country Planning Act
1977. Hook found that in all instances the
new district plans afforded as much impor-
tance, if not more, to the protection of high
quality agricultural land as did the previous
district schemes. Furthermore, the method-
ology proposed to achieve this protection
relied almost wholly on zoning procedures
and subdivision control similar to those
used under the old legislation.
The reasons given by district councils for
the continued protection of highly produc-
tive agricultural land included: safeguarding
the life-supporting capacity of the resource,
maintaining flexibility for future land uses,
providing for the efficient use and develop-
ment of the resource, and the recognition of
the finite characteristics of the resource.
This stance is further supported by emerging
case law established by Planning Tribunal
decisions under the RMA. The tribunal has
continued to support the protection of high
quality agricultural land as avalid purpose
of planning and has applied various aspects
of Part IT of the Act as justification for this
protection. For example. in two recent
appeals to the tribunal. refusals for subdivi-




the grounds that the subdivisionof rural land
containing high quality soils would be con-
trary to the purposes and principles of the
Act, in particular the requirement to meet
the reasonably foreseeable needs of future
generations. Nor would it, maintained the
tribunal, constitute an efficientuse of natural
and physical resources as required under
section 7(b) (Pickmere RH and Others v
Franklin DC A046I93; Peters AB and RL v
Franklin DC A049193).
These findings indicate that local bodies,
supported by Planning Tribunal decisions,
acknowledge the necessityof protectinghigh
quality agricultural land under the require-
ments of the RMA, and that intervention in
the market is necessary to ensure this. The
chosen methodology, prescriptivezoningand
subdivision control, in the absence of ade-
quate alternatives is seen, both by the coun-
cils and the tribunal, to be the most appropri-
ate mechanism to address the imperatives
laid down by the RMA. This is in direct con-
trast with the Minister's exhortationto "relin-
quish the tools that governedanotherage".
That is not to say that this methodology
cannot be improved upon. The difficulties
in setting and enforcing subdivision con-
trols, such as "minimum size" allotments
and "economic units", are well known. This
is, however, a question of technique rather
than an indictment of zoning and subdivi-
sion controls as such. If alternative method-
ologies, such as the market, do not address
the imperatives contained in the RMA, there.
is no option but to rely upon past method-
ologies that at least have the potential to sat-
isfy these fundamental requirements.
CONCLUSIONS
The conclusions obtained from the above
analysis are directly conflicting with the
views set forth by the Minister for the Envi-
ronment in his address to the New Zealand
Planning Institute Conference. One is left
wondering why this is so? Why are the
interpretations of Part IT advanced by com-
mentators, such as myself, district and
regional councils, professional planners
working under the legislation, and even the
Planning Tribunal itself, so at odds with the
views of the Minister, the very person who
oversaw the legislation into Parliament and
who is responsible for its administration?
I suggest, as I have done elsewhere
(Grundy, 1995), that the answer to this
question lies in the ideological and political
philosophy of the Minister and his govern-
ment. The neo-liberal view that the market
is the best determinant of economic, social
and ecological wellbeing is at the very heart
of the problem.
In regard to the resource management
legislation, attempts at reconciling market
liberalism with the concept of sustainability
are inherently contradictory. This is because
the two processes are, essentially, incom-
patible. The fundamental difficulty encoun-
tered is that while the political intent
(underpined by neo-liberal ideology) of the
resource management legislation is to limit
intervention in resource allocation decisions
and to curtail the role of planning in region-
al and district affairs in preference to mar-
ket processes, the legislative wording in
general and the concept of sustainable man-
agement in particular, paradoxically,
requires increased intervention and more
comprehensive planning.
The Minister's persistent and erroneous
representation of sustainable management as
merely focusing on the adverse effects of
resource use on the biophysical environment
within the auspices of a market driven allo-
cation system is indicative of this inherent
contradiction. This view of sustainable man-
agement is clearly ideologically derived, and
it is manifestly incapable of addressing the
complex requirements of sustainable man-
agement as defined in the RMA.
More than this, I venture to suggest, it is
pernicious. By effectively denying the rele-
vance of intergenerational equity and eco-
logical sustainability in his interpretation of
sustainable management, the Minister's
approach threatens to emasculate the very
concept of sustainability and render it
devoid of any useful meaning, either as an
intellectual construct or as an objective of
public policy.
Sustainability, as recognised in the wider
literature (and defined in the RMA) is a
concept centred on three fundamental
imperatives:
(I) The long-term sustenance of ecologi-
cal, life-supporting processes (a biocentric
imperative); and
(2) The long-term sustenance of
resources to meet human needs (an anthro-
pocentric imperative); and
(3) The long-term sustenance of environ-
mental quality, both socio-economic and
biophysical (a biocentric and/or anthro-
pocentric imperative).
The Minister's approach does not in any
substantial way address either of the first
two imperatives and only partially address-
es the third. In fact, by equating the concept
of sustainability to merely dealing with
market externalities (adverse effects of
activities on the biophysical environment)
it, effectively, marginalises these fundamen-
tal imperatives.
The Minister is, in reality, redefining the
concept to suit his ideology. This is unaccept-
able, intellectually and pragmatically. Rather,
to maintain credibility as the Minister in
charge of the legislation, he should either
recognise the limitations of his ideology and
seek a more widely informed approach or,
failing this, amend the legislation to suit his
ideological position (ie, so that it does simply
deal with market externalities).
While it is, no doubt, politically expedient
to espouse a commitment to the principle of
sustainability, it is intellectually indefensible
and environmentally irresponsible to, at the
same time, effectively deny its quintessential
meaning. Moreover, it is interpretively con-
fusing to those required to work under the
legislation to have a Minister charged with is
administration advocating a conflicting inter-
pretation to that of the legislative wording.
This is a sure recipe for policy paralysis and
continued environmental degradation and
unsustainable resource use.
FOOTNOTES
(I) A Pareto optimum is defined as a
state of the economy in which all economic
resources are allocated and used "efficient-
ly", such that it is impossible to make any-
one economically better off without making
someone else economically worse off.
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Section 5 ofthe RMA continues to exercise the
minds ofour academics and politicians.
Mr Kerry James Grundy has
published what can only be
described as a further extraordi-
nary article on the Resource Man-
agementAct (Planning Quarterly,
December 1995). In it, he has
described my view on section 5 of
the Act as "extraordinary", ''perni--
cious", "ideologically-derived",
"politically expedient", and "intel-
lectually indefensible". All this,
.and more, from the measured per-
spective of a geographer in search
of the truth. .
I am tempted to detect a larger
than normal measure of political
argumentation in Mr Grundy's
rather shrill commentary. There
seems to me to be no need to
question the intellectual integrity
of those with whom one dis-
agrees. But that is a matter of
taste about which, the less said,
the better.
As to substance, however,
there is an important issue which
demands a response. At the heart
of Mr Grundy's critique is the
objection that I have represented
section 5 as being solely con-
cerned with "the effects of devel-
opment on the biophysical envi-
ronment" to the exclusion of the
matters referred to in clauses (a)
and (b) of section 5(2).
It may be that Mr Grundy has
linked my references to effects-
based legislation with the use of
the word "effects" in section
5(2)(c) and assumed that I have
tried to narrow the purposes
clause to just this part of it
(although the thrust of his article
belies such an innocent interpreta-
tion). But for the record. let me be
quite clear: I have never focused
exclusively on section 5(2)(c) to
the exclusion of those matters
concerning future generations and
the life-supporting capacity of air,
water, soil and ecosystems.
I have explicitly endorsed the
view of Judge Kenderdine in Fox-
ley Engineering that Mr Grundy
so warmly embraces. Of course
all three parts of section 5(2) must
be read cumulatively. My Stace
Hammond Grace lecture covers
this ground exhaustively.
But in arguing that the legisla-
tion is effects-based I have been
maintaining, as did Sir Geoffrey
Palmer before me, that it involves
a change in mindset from the
Town and Country Planning and
Waterand Soil Conservation Acts
which it replaced. Contrary to Mr
Grundy's tedious assertions, I
approach the Act as a lawyer, not
a political economist The old leg-
islation had much to say about
maintaining the productive
potential of land and soils as
though production had a privi-
leged place in the scheme of
things. (It did, of course, in a
world of land development subsi-
dies and state-sponsored native
forest clearance).
The new legislation, by con-
trast, avoids this bias. Compare
the matters of national importance
in section 6 with the matters of
national importance under the old
legislation and you will quickly
understand why I summarise the
shift in the emphasis as being one
that jettisons providing for uses,
and deals instead with the effects
of uses. You don't have to be
much of a specialist in statutory
interpretation to pick up the
change in emphasis.
With respect to land. the Act
has much less to do with allocat-
ing resources between competing
uses (or activities) than previous-
ly. There will, of course, be
allocative consequences between
users flowing from the decisions
of those exercising powers under
the Act But that is a second order
outcome. The primary focus of
those powers is the effects of
uses, not the desirability of partic-
ular uses per se. Mr Grundy, how-
ever, is determined to discover a
more robust allocative principle at
the heart of the Act He advances
this claim under two heads.
The first is based on section
5(2)(b). Safeguarding the life-sup-
porting capacity of air, water, soil
and ecosystems, he asserts, "is as
much concerned with decisions
regarding the scale of economic
development as it is with the envi-
ronmental effects of individual
consent applications". This is an
unremarkable conclusion. Clearly,
there will be limits to the extent
that resources can be used whilst
maintaining their life-supporting
capacity. As long as the level of
resource utilisation is well below
those limits, there will be few
problems and no need for com-
plex allocation mechanisms.
But once the limit is reached,
new users can only tap the
resource at the expense of existing
users. At that point an alIocative
mechanism is needed to adjudi-
cate between competing users. It
can be a bureaucratic allocation
mechanism or it can be transfer-
able rights sold to the highest bid-
der. But any such mechanism
must operate within the agreed
limits that will safeguard the mat-
ters spelt out in section 5(2)(b).
Mr Grundy mistakenly belie
eves that the need for allocative
mechanisms is evidence that the
Act is concerned not just with
managing the environmental
effects of resource use but with
what resources should be used, by
whom and for what But on that,
the Act is silent.
He will search in vain for
guidance on whose particular uses
should be promoted or limited.
The Act, as drafted, is deliberately
silent on that matter. People are
assumed to know their own best
interests. But they are not
assumed to be the guardians of the
common environmental good -.
hence the need for limits to secure
sustainability.
MrGrundy is confusing mech-
anism with purpose. The scale of
proposed developments - or all
development in aggregate - is
only relevant to the extent that it
pushes resource use to the agreed
limits of sustainability. Defining
those limits involves (to use his
language) a socio-political judge-
ment That judgment (delegated to
regional and district councils) will
ultimately be grounded in an
understanding of the bio-physical
effects of excessive resource use
on sustainability.
Mr Grundy's second - and on
the face of it stronger - claim is
based on section 5(2)(a). This
deals with "sustaining the poten-
tial of natural and physical
resources (excluding minerals) to
meet the reasonably foreseeable
needs of future generations". This,
Mr Grundy asserts, is unmistak-
ably an allocative principle, and
one which he defines as requiring
inter-generationalequity. Certain~
ly, to the extent that it requires
those exercising powers under the
Act to think about the needs of
future generations, it involves a
departure from the bio-physical,
effects-based requirements of sec-
tion 5(2)(b) and 5(2)(c).
But it is worth noting the lan-
guage used. There is no require-
ment to define the needs of future
generations,much less provide for
them. It is a requirement to sustain
the potential of resources to meet
(that famous legal formula) the
reasonably foreseeable needs of
those who come after us. It is, in a
weak sense, an allocative princi-
ple. But it is couched in very
abstract and under-defined terms.
It was put there to encapsulate the
idea of keeping options open and
acting with caution when irre-
versible consequences were enter-
tained. To elevate this provision
to an "imperative" of "inter-gen-
erational equity" is to impose an
intellectual construct that, howev-
er appealing to Mr Grundy, is far
more self important and weighty
than its authors (myself included)
ever envisaged.
Mr Grundy raises the provi-
sion (as have many planners and
lawyers seeking to protect the
interestsof farmers) in the context
of soil valuable for food produc-
tion. I too have addressed his sub-
ject in the very speech Mr Grundy
2
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found so "extraordinary". In sum-
mary. I came to the view that this
was not a maner that needed to be
planned for. In large part, my rea-
soning was derived from a belief
that we have very limited ability
to forecast the furure demands of
food producers or the technolo-
gies they will deploy. What is
valuable soil today may be less
valuable tomorrow. 1don't take a
position of extreme scepticism.
There will be instances of
resource scarcity that compel a
cautious approach. But they are, I
suspect, far fewer than some
would claim.
The judicial weight to be given
to section 5(2)(a) will ultimately
reflect the present generation's
values and priorities. Like it or
not, we are trapped in the present.
And Mr Grundy is right to discern
an ethical debate here. But it is
another thing entirely to construct
a charter for the wholesale plan-
ning and control of uses on the
basis of some privileged view of
what activities should or
shouldn' t be able to be undertak-
en. The overwhelming weight of
section 5. in contrast to earlier leg-
islation. is to concentrate on the
effects of resource use on the
receiving environment (including
the extent to which those effects
may reduce the potential of
resources to meet future needs).
My observations arethose of a
lawyer who has followed the evo-
lution of statute law in this area
over 20 years. With the assistance
of Tony Randerson's working
party, I wrote section 5 in its final
form, and I think I am in a good
position to know what was and
what wasn't intended.
In my view, it is Mr Grundy
who is foisting his ideological
baggage onto the Act in an
attempt to re-write it. Anyone
who has to explain section 5(2)
in terms of "three fundamental
principles", described variously
as bio-centric, anthropocentric
and a mix of both, is clearly in
the business of erecting intellec-
tual superstructures. If we had
wanted to talk about inter-gener-
ational equity, we would have.
Wedidn·t.
It is Mr Grundy's obsession
with ideology that undoes him. It
is very easy to win debates if you
set up straw men as targets. If r
had ever maintained that "the
market is the best determinant of
economic, social and ecological
well-being" then I would deserve
some of Mr Grundy's charges.
But I haven't. Mr Grundy seems
to be unaware that there are no
such things as totally free markets
(just as there are no perfectly
competitive markets), or that mar-
kets are themselves socially con-
structed phenomena which
depend on all sorts of rules, regu-
lations and conventions for their
smooth operation.
Clearly, in passing the
Resource Management Act, the
New Zealand Parliament has
come to the view that "the mar-
ket' (whatever that may mean)
was not the best way of securing
ecological well-being.
Hence the massive. costly
and democratically-based edi-
fice that we have created to trun-
cate property rights in the inter-
ests of sustainability. I have no
doubt that the allocative conse-
quences will be very significant.
But at least we are now in the
business of mitigating the
impacts of resource use on
ecosystems rather than redistrib-
uting resources between
whichever group of resource
users happens to have grasped
the levers of power.
Yes, I concede an element
of redistribution between gen-
erations, but that is a far cry
from determining that farms.
houses or factories Should or
shouldn't appear here or there
because one group wants to
preserve its lifestyle or industry
at the uncompensated expense
of someone else. !ill!
7.5 Sustainable Management and the Market
The following article is a response to a paper by W.A. Robertson (1993), the Director
General of the Department of Survey and Land Information, published in the British
journal Land Use Policy. The article (eo-written with a colleague, Dr B. Gleeson)
appeared in the same journal in 1996, along with a reply from Robertson. The original
paper portrayed the resource management law reform process that occurred in New
Zealand during the later half of the 1980s as a benign, essentially orderly reformation of the
planning legislation in line with the overall socio-economic restructuring that was taking
place at the time. He described the Resource Management Act as a 'progressive attempt' to
accommodate sustainable development and market forces in planning legislation.
In their response, the authors questioned the claim to 'progress' that the attempted
reconciliation of sustainable development and market forces was purported to represent.
Rather, it was argued that the Resource Management Act is, in fact, the product of largely
contradictory socio-political agendas (neoliberalism and environmentalism) and that the
development, enactment and administration of the new legislation exhibits this inherent
conflict. Rather than representing 'progress', it is suggested, the attempted accommodation
between sustainability and market forces is more likely to result in regressive ecological
and social outcomes.
It was proposed that another worrying feature of the new legislation is its anti-urban
character. Unlike the earlier Town and Country Planning Act, in which the city appeared as
a distinct rhetorical artifact, the new resource management legislation clearly eschews an
explicitly urban focus. In essence, the 'urban' is present in the legislation only to the extent
that it represents a spatial concentration of externalities that must be managed in order to
ensure sustainability, however that is determined. Overall, the effect is to diminish the city
as a complex socio-political locus of human relations and reduce planning's ability to
conceive its object as a multifaceted socio-political reality.
Two examples were used to support those contentions. Firstly, the dilemma posed by the
allocation of high class soils between competing land uses was used to illustrate the
conflict between market mechanisms and the sustainable use of resources. Secondly, an
analysis of section 94 (the non-notification procedures in the Act) illustrated the potentially
regressive socio-economic outcomes inherent in a more flexible, market-orientated
approach to developmental decisions.
The analysis revealed fundamental contradictions in the legislation. Whilst the political
intent (underpinned by neoliberal ideology) of the legislation is to limit intervention in
resource allocation decisions and to curtail the role of state planning in preference to
market processes, paradoxically the general wording of the legislation, and the concept of
sustainable management in particular, requires increased intervention and more
comprehensive planning. We concluded that these contradictions may well lead to future
political and administrative instability in the implementation of the legislation.
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This prediction has indeed proved correct. For example, as described in more detail in
Section 7.8 of this thesis, continued uncertainty over the meaning of section 5 of the Act
(sustainable management, as the overriding purpose) is a feature of the legislation's 12 year
history. Despite a significant accumulation of case law, intense lobbying by various interest
groups, the positions taken by different political parties, proposed and enacted amendments
to the legislation, and considerable debate in the resource management literature, there
remains fundamental disagreement as to the meaning of sustainable management even
though that is the purpose of the Act. In the author's opinion, this has seriously affected the
potential of the Act to fully address social, economic and environmental sustainability
issues.
In addition, there remains some confusion over the desirability or, indeed, necessity to
protect highly productive land under the resource management legislation. Whilst some
local authorities do not provide protection in their district plans (for example, the
Whangarei District Council) it appears that the practice ofprotecting highly productive
land from inappropriate development through prescriptive zoning and subdivision controls
remains widespread in local authority land use planning and continues to be supported by
the Courts. It is interesting to note in this regard that the Whangarei District Council
intends to reintroduce provisions to its district plan to protect highly productive farmland
from subdivision and development that threaten its productive potential.
The administration of section 94 of the Act (notification provisions) has also proved
problematical. On the one hand, as shown in the annual surveys of local authorities carried
out by the Ministry for the Environment, its effect has been to dramatically reduce
notification of development proposals - presently running at about 5% of total resource
consent applications compared to over 20% under the previous Town and Country
planning Act - and hence reduce opportunity for public input on developmental decisions
(Grundy, 1997a). On the other hand, development interests have complained of
'environmental extortion' by affected parties demanding payment for approval to proposed
developments. In addition, the Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment (1998b)
identified potential regressive environmental outcomes resulting from side agreements to
avoid notification.
Lastly, with respect to the absence of an explicit urban focus in the Resource Management
Act, as identified in our article in Land Use Policy, this deficiency has increasingly been
identified and commented upon in planning circles (Bachels and Page, 2000; Gow, 2000;
Hobbs, 2000; Royal Society ofNew Zealand, 1999; Urban Design Forum NZ, 2003).
Recent policy analysis and proposals for policy change have been undertaken in a range of
forums, including the Ministry for the Environment (2002a, 2002b, 2003a, 2003b) and the
Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment (l998a, 2002b). The recent emergence
of an Urban Design Forum is one such initiative aimed at addressing the lack of an urban
focus in the resource management legislation. One of the proposals from the Urban Design
Forum is for legislative amendment to explicitly include urban concerns in the Resource
Management Act (Urban Design Forum NZ, 2003).
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The politics of planning reform in
New Zealand
K J Grundy and B J Gleeson
The new resource management regime in New Zealand has been
trumpeted as a 'progressive' reform of planning legislation.' Robert-
son's recent article in this journal exemplifies this stance. Robertson
portrays the resource management law reform process that occurred in
New Zealand during the later half of the 1980s as a benign, essentially
orderly reformulation of the planning legislation in line with the overall
socio-economic restructuring ('rationalization') that occurred during
this time. For example, he concludes his analysis by stating:
The development, enactment and administration of the Resource Management
Act in New Zealand has been a progressive attempt to introduce legislation in
keeping with a worldwide emphasis on a move towards planning systems which
accommodate sustained development and market forces.?
For Robertson, progress in planning will be achieved if environmental
management absorbs both market forces and the objective of sustain-
able development as organizing principles.
Our intention in this paper is to scrutinize the claim to progress in
planning that the new resource management legislation in New Zealand
is supposed to represent. More specifically. we take issue with the view
that a move towards a planning system that attempts to accommodate
sustainable development and market forces is necessarily progressive. It
will be proposed that the Resource Management Act 1991 (hereafter
the RMA or the Act) is. in fact. the product of contradictory political
economic agendas (neo-liberalism and environmentalism) and that the
development, enactment and administration of the new legislation
exhibit this inherent conflict.
Furthermore. it will be argued that whilst the Act may have some
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claim to progress in so far as the intended sustainable management of
natural and physical resources is concerned. this will more likely be
achieved by regulation rather than market processes. Thus. our first
objection to Robertson's portrayal of the legislation is that the new
Act's claim to promote biophysical sustainability is likely to be com-
promised by a concomitant reliance upon market processes to achieve
this aim. .
Unlike certain business and political interests that helped shape the
new legislation, we see social considerations. such as equity in resource
use. as critical concerns ofresource management. As we shall show, the
new legislation reduces the emphasis on social equity in planning and
shifts the policy stress to both biophysical sustainability and economic
efficiency. We will argue that the pursuit of these latter two objectives
within the new planning framework may well result in regressive
socio-economic outcomes from resource development. In this social
sense. Robertson's emphasis on the progressive nature of the new'
legislation must be challenged.
Two examples will be used to support these contentions. Firstly, the
dilemma posed by the allocation of highly productive agricultural soils
amongst competing uses will illustrate the conflict between market
mechanisms and the aim of biophysical sustainability. Secondly, an
analysis of section 94, the non-notification procedures in the Act, will
illustrate the potentially regressive socio-economic outcomes inherent in
a purportedly more flexible. market-oriented approach to development
decisions.
We conclude by arguing that. although the new legislation does
indeed represent a laudable attempt at addressing biophysical environ-
mental problems in an integrated manner, as well as an innovative
attempt at introducing the notion of sustainability into resource man-
agement legislation, its neo-liberal underpinnings seriously threaten to
dilute, or even distort, the very meaning of sustainability and render it
ineffective as a planning objective. The neo-liberal attempts to remove
socio-economic considerations from resource management decisions
and the failure to recognize the urban environment as a locus of
complex socio-economic and cultural interactions raise the possibility of
regressive socio-economic outcomes.
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The resource management law reform process
Since 1984, New Zealand has undergone a radical reorientation of its
socio-economic and political systems. After half a century of social
democratic consensus, there has been a major shift to a deregulated
capitalist polity, dominated by a neo-classical economic doctrine. Impli-
cit in this doctrine is a reliance on competitive individualism, operating
in an unrestrained marketplace to bring about the optimal end-state for
society."
The neo-classical ideology views government intervention as an
intrusion into the voluntary contractual arrangements between indi-
viduals (that is, a coercion by the state on individual liberty) and as a
distortion of the functioning of the market, and hence the efficient
allocation of resources. The legitimate role of government is seen
strictly as minimal and can be divided into three areas:
• the provision of a legal framework establishing property rights.
"King, D S The New Right: Politics, Mar-
kets and Citizenship MacMillan, London
(1987)
5Kelsey, J Rolling Back the State Bridget
Williams Books, Wellington (1993)
6Memon, P A Keeping New Zealand
Green: Recent Environmental Reforms
University of OIago Press, Dunedin (1993)
7Grundy op cit Ref 3
8Gow, L J A 'Resource management law
reform in the context of other reforms' in
Morgan, R K, Memon, P A, Miller, M A
(eds) Implementing the Resource Man-
agement Act-Gonference Proceedings
Environmental Policy and Management
Research Centre, University of Otago,
Dunedin (1991) 13-18
·Upton, S Third reading debate on the
Resource Management Bill' Debates 516,
New Zealand House of Representatives,
Wellington (1991) 3019
Sustainable mallagemelll and the market: K J Grundy and B J Gleeson
contractual agreements and a means of conflict resolution between
individuals:
It the provision of national defence and a minimal range of other public
goods that the market may fail to produce: and
.. correcting market failure (externalities) arising from the operation of
market processes which cannot be dealt with by the market. 4
The relentless pursuit of this ideology since 198-l has resulted in major
structural changes to the political economy of New Zealand. These
include large-scale private sector deregulation of both productive and
financial institutions and massive restructuring in the public sector.
including corporatization and privatization of public assets. There has
been an accompanying move away from the public provision of social
services, a 'dismantling' of the welfare state and an implied shift of
responsibility for social well-being to the individual.' Underlying this
reform was a stated desire to improve economic efficiency in order to
enhance economic growth. Economic considerations received primacy
in government policy-making, a fact reflected by the influence exerted
by the Treasury during this period." New Zealand was, over this period,
transformed from a protected. highly regulated mixed economy to a
fully integrated, competitive member of the global free market commun-
ity.
The resource management law reform process that occurred during
the late 1980s and early 1990s, resulting in the repeal of the Town and
Country Planning Act 1977 and the enactment of the RMA 1991, was
not only a rationalization of existing. admittedly often overlapping and
contradictory resource legislaton, but also a deliberate move to limit the
role of statutory planning in resource allocation decisions. In line with
the overall process of economic restructuring that was taking place, the
wider socio-economic objectives of the former legislation were viewed
as unnecessary interventions in the functioning of the market and were
removed." For example, in 1991. Lindsay Gow, Deputy Secretary for
the Environment, stated:
An important point to note is the shift in emphasis from the Town and Country
Planning Act 1977 in relation to the social. economic and cultural well-being of
people and communities and their health and safety. In my view, the Resource
Management Act accepts that social and economic and health and safety
objectives can be achieved. but it is not necessarily the role of central or local
government to plan for them.... The Resource Management Act has been
developed in a policy environment where the Government wants to get
unnecessary government interventions out of people's lives. The Government
saw the wide socio-economic objectives of current legislation, particularly the
Town and Country Planning Act. as promoting unnecessary and poorly targeted
interventions which impose high costs to society."
The focus of the new legislation was to be on controlling externalities
arising from economic activities rather than the regulation of activities
themselves. Simon Upton. Minister for the Environment, in his Third
Reading Speech in the House on the Resource Management Bill, said of
the legislation:
... the Government has moved to underscore the shift in focus from planning
for activities to regulating their effects.... We run a much more liberal market
economy these days. Economic and social outcomes are in the hands of citizens
to a much greater extent than they previously have been. The Government's
focus is now on externalities-the effects of those activities on the receiving
environment. ...~
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In as much as the resource management law reform was a rationaliza-
tion of the existing legislation, with an accompanying intent to limit
intervention in favour of market processes. it also set out to improve
environmental outcomes resulting from resource use and to promote the
sustainable utilization of natural and physical resources. This was in
response to a growing international and local awareness that many
existing resource uses were producing deleterious effects on the en-
vironment and were ultimately unsustainable.
This growing environmental awareness can be traced back to the early
1960s but assumed an international profile at the beginning of the
1970s. IO The United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
held in Stockholm in 1972, is recognized as a watershed event in human
relationships with the environment. It is widely credited as being the
first forum to give the concept of 'ecologically sustainable development'
an international political fOCUS. 11 In New Zealand the 'Save the Lake
Manapouri Campaign' of 1972 signified a distinctly new phase in
national environmental consciousness. The world's first national green
party, the Values Party, was formed 1972 and confounded pundits by
winning 2.6% of the national vote in the 1972 election. 12 From this time
on, the Labour, National and Social Credit Parties included specific
policies sympathetic to environmental concerns in their manifestos. 13
The 1984 Labour Party environmental policy was strongly influenced
by the World Conservation Strategy'" and the subsequent New Zealand
Conservation Strategy. 15 Within the overall aim of achieving sustainable
development through the conservation of living resources, both of these
reports emphasized the following objectives: the maintenance of essen-
tial ecological processes and life support systems, the preservation of
genetic diversity, the sustainabile utilization of species and ecosystems
and the needs of future generations.
Perhaps of greater significance for the advancement of the concept of
sustainable development as a policy issue was the publication in 1987 of
the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development
(WCED) Our Common Future, sometimes known as the Brundtland
Report. It was the most explicit international statement of sustainable
development goals yet and called for governments to adopt 'the
objective of sustainable development as the overriding goal and test of
national policy'. 16
Both the Brundtland Report and Conservation Strategy were strongly
promoted by environmental interests within and outside the Labour
Party and were influential in the formulation of the resource manage-
ment legislation. The subsequent wording of the Act strongly reflected
both the recommendations of the WCED and the New Zealand
Conservation Strategy.
The Act attempted to integrate all legislation pertaining to natural
and physical resources into one management regime and prescribed a
single overriding purpose-sustainable management. As stated in Part
If (Purpose and Principles):
The purpose of this Act is to promote the sustainable management of natural
and physical resources. In this Act. 'sustainable management' means managing
the use, development. and protection of natural and physical resources in a way.
or at a rate, which enables people and communities to provide for their social,
economic. and cultural wellbeing and for their health and safety while-
(a) Sustaining the potential of natural and physical resources (excluding miner-
als) to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations; and
17Daly, H E and Cobb, J B. For the Com-
mon Good: Restructuring the Economy
towards Community, the Environment and
a Sustainable Future Beacon Press. Bos-
ton (1989)
18Eckersley, R 'Green versus ecosocialist
economic programme: the market rules
OK?' Political Studies 1982 XL 316-333
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(b) Safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air. water, soil. and ecosystems;
and
(c) Avoiding, remedying. or mitigating any adverse effects of activities on the
environment (section 5).
Following the definition of sustainable management as its central
purpose, the Act listed 'Matters of National Importance'. These princi-
ples related primarily to the quality of the natural environment and the
recognition of Maori values. In addition, the Act specified a number of
other matters that need to be taken into account when exercising
functions and powers under it. These include Kaitiakitanga (guardian-
ship), the efficient use and development of natural and physical
resources, the intrinsic values of ecosystems, and any finite characteris-
tics of natural and physical resources (section 7). Part II concluded with
a recognition of the need to take into account the principles of the
Treaty of Waitangi in achieving sustainable management (section 8).
Thus, the enactment of the RMA represented a clear attempt to'
embody the concept of sustainability in legislation. The Act gives
statutory recognition, for the first time, to a number of radical environ-
mental principles: the sustainable management of natural and physical
resources, the needs of future generations, and the intrinsic values of
ecosystems including genetic diversity. In addition, important legislative
definitions were provided for both intrinsic value and the meaning of
environment. These accomplishments were largely the result of intense
lobbying by environmental groups and the commitment to the legisla-
tion by a number of 'green' Labour politicians, most notably the then
Minister for the Environment, Sir Geoffrey Palmer.
Contradictions
Whilst the expressed political intent (underpinned by neo-liberal ideol-
ogy of the new legislation was to limit intervention in resource allocation
decisions and to curtail the role of planning in regional and district
affairs in preference to market processes, the legislative wording
remains, to a large degree, the result of effective environmental
lobbying and genuine environmental commitment from some members
of the Fourth Labour Government. Despite peer group review by the
incoming National Government in 1990 and the subsequent narrowing
down of Part 1I, the legislation remains dominated by the single,
overriding purpose-sustainable management, as defined in section 5.
This has resulted in major contradictions between the stated intent of
the legislation and its legislative wording, particularly its definition of
sustainable management. Ironically, by specifying sustainability as the
guiding statutory purpose for resource management the need for
increased intervention and more comprehensive planning has been
created. Issues such as intergenerational equity, maintenance of genetic
diversity, the intrinsic values of ecosystems, and even the sustainable
utilization of resources are not ensured by market processes alone. Such
social and environmental needs, in fact, often conflict with market
mechanisms. As Daly and Cobb have pointed out, the free market has
no means of ensuring an optimal scale of the macro-economy relative to
the ecosystems in which it operates, which is central to ensure ecological
sustainability.!" In addition, as Eckersley has remarked, market
rationality is fundamentally incompatible with the notion of in-
tergenerational equity. IX Indeed, the goal of profit maximization en-
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courages the liquidation or depletion of both renewable and non-
renewable resources. and the movement of the capital thereby gained
into new ventures. rather than the sustainable or prudent harvest over
time. Furthermore. the intrinsic value of ecosystems. by definition. is
incapable of being incorporated satisfactorily into market transactions.
The intended removal of socio-economic considerations from the
legislation is also conflictual with the notion of sustainability as it has
evolved globally. There has been an increasing international recogni-
tion, over the last two decades. that the environmental effects of
resource use cannot be divorced from the socio-cultural-economic
fabric of which they are an integral part.!" For example, the major
theme of both the WCED report Our Common Future and the
proceedings of the UNCED Conference Agenda 21 was that the concept
of sustainable development required fully integrated social. economic
and environmental policies to be applied at local, regional. national and
international levels.j" Both of these documents have been endorsed by
the New Zealand government and promoted by the Ministry for the
Environment.
Agenda 21, perhaps the most comprehensive international statement
yet on environmental protection and remedial strategies. devoted eight
chapters to the social and economic dimensions of sustainable develop-
ment. Chapter 8 is of particular relevance to resource management. It
stated the overall objective of integrating environment and develop-
ment in decision-making to be: 'to improve or restructure the decision-
making process so that consideration of socio-economic and environ-
mental issues is fully integrated.... ' It went on to say:
Governments should ... improve the processes of decision-making so as to
achieve the progressive integration of economic. social and environmental issues
in the pursuit of development that is economically efficient, socially equitable
and responsible, and environmentally sound.r '
Furthermore, in a specific reference to planning and management
systems, Agenda 21 advised:
Governments should review the status of the planning and management system
and, where necessary, modify and strengthen procedures so as to facilitate the
integrated consideration of social, economic and environmental issues.F
By contrast, the Minister for the Environment. Simon Upton, stated at
the time of the resource management legislation's enactment (July 1991)
that:
Unlike the current law [the Town and Country Planning Act 1977], the Bill is
not designed or intended to be a comprehensive socio-planning statute. It has
only one purpose-to promote the sustainable management of natural and
physical resources.
The Minister went on to lambast the previous planning legislation for
encouraging 'almost limitless intervention for a host of environmental
and socio-economic reasons'. He assured parliament that the new
legislation should be seen as 'legitimising intervention only to achieve its
purpose', which was 'only to achieve sustainability of natural
resources. ,23
The foregoing analysis has identified major contradictions in the
stance adopted by the New Zealand government and the Ministry for
the Environment regarding the resource management legislation. Their
expressed intent of sustainable management as merely limiting adverse
24Gow oo cit Ref 8; Ministry for the En-
vironment Resource Management In-
formation Sheet No 6 Ministry for the En-
vironment, Wellington (1991)
25Memon, P A and Gleeson, B J 'Towards
a new planning paradigm? Reflections on
New Zealand's Resource Management
Act' Environment and Planning B: Plan-
ning and Design 1995 22 109-124
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effects of economic activity on the biophysical environment (in essence.
dealing with market externalities) cannot possibly ensure the sustenance
of natural and physical resources for future generations-a cornerstone
of the legislation and. in fact. the quintessence of sustainability.
Intergenerational equity, like contemporary equity, is a socio-economic
and cultural-political issue and cannot be addressed in terms of market
externalities. To refer to sustainable management as encompassing only
the ecological aspect of sustainable development, as both New Zealand
politicians and government officials have done in the past. is
nonsensical. 2-1 The concept of sustainable development grew out of a
realization that development policies and environmental concerns are
inseparable. Its distinguishing characteristic is the reconciliation of
development (which is by nature a socio-cultural-economic phe-
nomenon) with the environment. It is a wholistic concept that loses its
very meaning if reduced to its constituent parts.
One aspect of the Act that signals a worrying foreclosure on any
concern for socio-cultural well-being is the legislation's anti-urban
character. Indeed, the "urban environment' survives only as an implied
landscape in the new legislation. The Act nowhere uses any identifiably
urban terms, such as 'town', 'city', or even 'settled area'. Unlike the
earlier town and country planning legislation, in which the city appears
as a distinct rhetorical artefact, the new resource management
framework clearly eschews an explicitly urban focus. The Act's purpose,
as stated in section 5. is to 'promote the sustainable management of
natural and physical resources'. One must assume that the city is a
'physical resource', which must be sustainably managed, albeit within a
planning framework that emphasizes the (built and natural) environ-
ment as a biophysical phenomenon.
In essence. the 'urban' is present in the new Act only to the extent
that it represents a spatial concentration of externalities that must be
managed in order to ensure sustainability. The focus is very much on
externalities ('effects') arising from resource use, with the 'environment'
seemingly conceived as a material surface upon which these are
inscribed. Overall. the effect is to diminish the city asa complex
socio-political locus of human relations.
Why should this dramatic circumscription of the city as a rhetorical
object of planning be of concern? Certainly, the reduced emphasis given
to urban matters in the Act contradicts the concrete reality of contem-
porary New Zealand whose population is one of the world's most highly
urbanized (in 1991, some 85% of the nation's population resided in
urban areas). We see this juridical manoeuvre as signalling the decline
of planning as a state activity concerned with a complex and. in New
Zealand, highly urban, social reality. By dispensing with an 'urban
problematic' in favour of an externality management charter, the new
legislation potentially reduces planning's ability to conceive its object
(contemporary New Zealand) as a multifaceted socio-political reality.P
One outcome of this is surely a reduced capacity for planning to embody
a concern for social equity in resource use. Indeed, as we will shortly
explain. the liberalization of certain established development controls in
the new Act (non-notification provisions) threatens to exacerbate
resource inequity in New Zealand's urban areas.
These inherent contradictions are now further explored by the use of
two examples. Firstly. the conflicts that arise between sustainable
management and market allocation mechanisms will be illustrated by
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looking at the allocation of high quality agricultural soils amongst
competing uses, Secondly. an analysis of section 94-the non-
notification procedures in the Act-will illustrate the potentially regres-
sive socio-economic outcomes inherent in a purportedly more flexible
market orientated approach to development decisions,
Sustainable management and market allocation: the case of
soils
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Whilst the expressed intent of the RMA is to remove 'unwarranted
interventions' in resource allocation decisions in favour of market
processes, and to herald 'an advance' from prescriptive, zonal-type
planning procedures to a more flexible. effects-based regime, it also sets
out to promote the sustainable management of natural and physical
resources, But are these aims compatible? Will market allocation
mechanisms achieve the sustainable management of natural and physi-
cal resources? By going beyond the neo-liberal rhetoric and examining
the legislation with regard to particular resources (in this case, the
allocation of high class agricultural soils amongst competing uses) it
would appear not.
The need to protect high-quality soils for their food producing
potential has long been recognized as a valid purpose of land use
planning in New Zealand." Many of New Zealand's urban settlements
were originally established on, or near to, areas with easily developed
and farmed soils (Figure 1). As these settlements expanded, particularly
after the Second World War, increasing pressure was placed on the
subdivision of adjoining. often highly productive, agricultural land for
residential and industrial use. Consequently, the expansion of urban
areas into their surrounding rural hinterland has resulted in significant
losses of high-quality soils available for agricultural use. 27
Historically. this has been viewed as a matter of concern for two main
reasons: the total area of high-quality soils is small and region ally
variable (Figure 1); and these soils have been viewed as important
resources both for the production of horticultural crops for the domestic
market and increasingly for production for the export market.
This latter concern assumes greater significance given New Zealand's
traditional reliance on exports of agricultural products for earning
overseas exchange.
Under the previous legislation, the Town and Country Planning Act
1977, high quality soils received specific mention as being worthy of
protection from inappropriate development (ie industrial or urban
encroachment). For example, section 3 of the Act declared 'the
avoidance of encroachment of urban development on, and the protec-
tion of, land having a high actual or potential value for the production of
food' to be a matter of national importance and 'should be provided for
in the preparation. implementation. and administration of regional and
district plans" In addition. the 'wise use and management of New
Zealand's resources ... the prevention of sporadic subdivision and
urban development in rural areas [and) the avoidance of unnecessary
expansion of urban areas into rural areas' were also declared to be
matters of national importance and to be likewise provided for. Thus,
through these provisions. the Town and Country Planning Act clearly
placed a significant emphasis on the need for rural land resources.
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Figure 1. New Zealand's main urban








28The full text of section 3(1) of the Town
and Country Planning Act 1977 is as fol-
lows: '3. Matters of importance-(1) In the
preparation, implementation, and adminis-
tration of regional, district, and maritime
schemes, and in administering the provi-
sions of Part 11 of this Act, the following
matters which are declared to be of nation-
al importance shall in particular be recog-
nised and provided for: (a) The conserva-
tion, protection, and enhancement of the
physical. cultural. and social environment:
(b) The wise use and management of New
Zealand's resources: (c) The preservation
of the natural character of the coastal
environment and the margins of lakes and
rivers and the protection of them from
unnecessary subdivision and develop-
ment: (d) The avoidance of encroachment
of urban development on and the protec-
tion of land having a high actual or poten-
tial value for the production of food: (e) The
prevention of sporadic subdivision and
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including high-quality soils, to be protected from inappropriate
development. 2H
This was achieved through the provisions of a district scheme usually
by the use of zoning ordinances and associated subdivision controls.
Most district schemes divided land into zones based on the separation of
what were seen as conflicting activities. For example. residential,
industrial, commercial and various types of rural zones were normally
differentiated. High-quality soils were commonly zoned separately and
reserved primarily for agricultural use. In addition, the principle of
protecting high-quality soils from inappropriate development through
prescriptive zoning and subdivision control was well supported by case
law established by Planning Tribunal decisions.:"
The stated intent. underlined by nee-liberal ideology. of the RMA
envisages a move away from the prescriptive, zonal-type regulation of
activities predominant under the previous legislation to a more flexible,
effects-based market allocation mechanism, The former zoning ordi-
nances and subdivision controls were seen as too prescriptive. too
inflexible, imposing high costs on developers. and as a distortion to the
20S
Sustainable management and the market: K J Grundv and B J Gleeson
continued from page 205
uroan development in rural areas: (f) The
avoidance of unnecessary expansion of
urban areas into rural areas in oradjoining
cities: (g) The relationship of the Maori
people andtheir culture andtraditions with
their ancestral land' (emphasis added).
29See. for example, McMillan DJ v Silver-
peaks County Council (decision C43/B5);
Auckland Regional Council v Waitemata
City Council and Lendish Heavy Equip-
ment Lld (decision A009/B7).
3OSee. for example: Brown. Copland and
Company Lld District and Regional Plan-
ning in New Zealand-Objectives, Per-
formance and Alternatives Report pre-
pared for the Department of Trade and
Industry and the Treasury, Wellington
(1987); Economic Development Commis-
sion Town and Country Planing Reform
Economic Development Commission,
Wellington (1987)
3'Section 31,for example, states as func-
tions of territorial authorities: '(a) The
establishment, implementation, andreview
0; objectives, policies, and methods to
achieve integrated management of the
effects oftheuse,development, or protec-
tion of land and associated natural and
physical resources of the district: (b) The
control of any actual orpotential effects of
the use, development, or protection of
land, inclUding for the purpose ofthe avoi-
danceor mitigation ofnatural hazardsand
the prevention ormitigation of any adverse
effects of the storage, use, disposal, or
transportation of hazardous substances:
(c) The control of subdivision of land: (d)
Tne control of the emission of noise and
the mitigation of the effects of noise: (e)
The control of any actual or potential
effects ofactivities inrelation to thesurface
ofwater in rivers and lakes: (f) Any other
functions specified in this Act' (emphasis
added). This is supported by Part 11 of the
Second Schedule (matters that may be
provided for in policy statements and
plans), which includes, as matters related
todistricts, a similar requirement toconsid-
er the effects of activities rather than the
control of activities per se.
"'i3ow op cit Ref B; Upton op cit Ref 24
33Ministry for the Environment Resource
Management: Guidelines for District Plans
Ministry for the Environment, Wellington
(1991)6
34See, for example: Johnson, R WM'Eco-
nomic aspects of rural-urban land use'
New Zealand Agricultural Science 19948
(4) 202-206; Thom, 0 A'Public works and
productive land' New Zealand Agricultural
Science 1974 8 (4) 207-211
35The full text ofsection 7 is as follows: '7.
Other matters-In achieving the purpose
ofthis Act, all persons exercising functions
andpowers under it, in relation to manag-
ing the use, development, and protection
of natural and physical resources, shall
have particular regard to-la) Kiatiakitan-
ga: (b) The efficient use and development
of natural and physical resources: (c) The
continued on page 207
206
efficient functioning of the market and hence the efficient allocation of
resources. 311 They were also seen as an unnecessary infringement by the
state on the rights of individual property owners to develop their land as
they saw fit. Far better to rely on the 'invisible hand' of the market to act
as arbiter in the allocation of resources rather than the heavy hand of
bureaucratic intervention.
This philosophy is manifest in the new legislation by the exclusion of
the specific requirements for the protection of high-quality soils that had
existed in the previous legislation. together with the legislative wording
of the RMA emphasizing the consideration of effects of activities rather
than the direction or control of activities themselves (see section 5). This
is supported by the empowering provisions of the Act relating to district
plan preparation. which again reiterate the importance of controlling
effects rather than activities.:"
In addition, statements by politicians and government officials further
underline this point. 32 For example, the Ministry for the Environment.
in a published guideline for district plans, states:
The Act provides a new framework for resource management. It places
emphasis on effects and results rather than on the control of specificactivities.
The emphasis has been moved fromplanningcontrols which, in the past. sought
to direct development activities. The principle now is that regulations must be
focused and people should beableto do what they want. provided any damaging
effects on the environment are avoidedor minimisedto levelsdetermined bythe
community ... the focus of the Act is on controlling the adverse effects of
resource use in a district to achieve sustainablemanagement. The purpose is not
to promote any particular resource use. or to advocate one sectoral interest aver
another. 33 .
In other words, the market will determine the spatial distribution of
activities with the proviso that environmental externalities are ade-
quately dealt with. In this instance, the market will determine to what
use these soils will be put so long as the effects on the environment are
deemed acceptable. If it is more profitable to subdivide highly product-
ive agricultural land for residential or industrial use, then this is the
proper (ie more 'efficient') course of action. Studies have shown that on
the urban-rural fringe the combined pressures of decreased building
costs associated with flat land. proximity to existing services and
speculative property market imperatives almost inevitably result in the
conversion of productive agricultural land to residential or industrial
uses. 34
At the same time, however, the RMA requires that natural and
physical resources be managed sustainably. Indeed, the overriding
purpose of the Act is to promote the sustainable managment of natural
and physical resources. The definition of sustainable management
includes the requirement that the utilization of natural and physical
resources (excluding minerals) must sustain the potential of those same
resources 'to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future genera-
tion'. It also requires that the life-supporting capacity of air, water, soils
and ecosystems be secured (see section 5), Furthermore, section 7
(other matters) specifically states that when exercising functions and
powers under the Act particular regard must be made to 'any finite
characteristics of natural and physical resources' and to the 'efficient use
and development of natural and physical resources'r"
When one considers the extremely limited spatial extent of these soils
(ie only 3% of New Zealand's total land area is comprised of class I
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maintenanceand enhancement of amenity
values: (d) Intrinsic values of ecosystems:
(e) Recognitionand protection of the herit-
age values of sites, buildings, places, or
areas: (I) Maintenance and enhancement
of the quality of the environment: (g) Any
finite characteristics of natural and physic-
al resources: (h) The protection of the
habitat of trout and salmon' (emphasis
added).
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agricultural land-that deemed to possess negligible limits to arable
use). it is not difficult to envisage. even with moderate population
increase, the potential value of this finite resource to future generations
both for food production and employment opportunities." For exam-
ple. a recent study by Philpott has shown that in the decade 1983-1993
agricultural production has increased in New Zealand by 4.4% pa and
that this increase was almost entirely due to an' upsurge in horticultural
production. Furthermore, when he modelled future trends in horticultu-
ral production together with the establishment of associated processing
industries, Philpott calculated that jobs in horticulture could increase by
48 000 and total employment by 220 000.37
If in the meantime, however, the market has dictated the siting of
residential or industrial development on these soils their potential value
for agricultural use is, in effect, lost to all future generations. It would
also seem apparent that the life-supporting capacity of soils would be
severely compromised by industrial and residential development. Furth-
ermore, it could be argued that the conversion of high-quality soils for
non-agricultural uses constitutes an inefficient use of natural and
physical resources and that particular regard is not being made to the
finite nature of high-quality soils.
Thus, it would appear, in the case of high-class soils, that there exists
a major contradiction between the stated aims of the new legislation.
Rather than bringing about the sustainable management of natural and
physical resources as defined in the Act, the much heralded market
allocation mechanisms would seem to encourage the very opposite.
Market pressures operating in the rural hinterland of urban centres
(often the location of highly productive agricultural land for reasons
discussed earlier) would inevitably result over time in the conversion of
this land to other uses, both industrial and residential. This has
happened in the past, such as the urbanization of the market garden
soils of the Hutt Valley." is happening now on the North Taieri Plains
of Otago.i" and would increasingly occur in the future if the allocation
of such resources were left to the free play of market forces. The
resultant loss of this valuable resource would seem to be in direct
contradiction to the requirements of sustainable management as defined
in the RMA as the overriding purpose of resource management.
Furthermore, it would appear that the most effective method of
protecting these limited resources from inappropriate development
would be by prescriptive zoning and subdivision control through the
provisions of the district plan, the very method maligned by neo-liberal
ideology. This is supported by a study conducted by Hook that
compared a number of new district plans formulated under the RMA
with their precedessor district schemes under the Town and Country
Planning Act 1977. Hook found that in all instances he looked at the
new district plans afforded as much importance; if not more, to the
protection of high-quality soils as did the previous district schemes.
Furthermore, the methodology proposed to achieve this protection
relied almost wholly on zoning procedures and subdivision controls
similar to those used under the old legislation.?"
The reasons given by district councils for the continued protection of
highly productive agricultural land included: the safeguarding of the
life-supporting capacity of the resource, maintaining flexibility for
future land uses. providing for the efficient use and development of the
soils and the recognition of their finite characteristics. This stance is
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further supported by emerging case law established by Planning Tribun-
al decisions under the Rt-!A. The Tribunal has continued to support the
protection of high-quality soils as a valid purpose of planning and has
applied various aspects of Part II of the Act as justification for this
protection. For example. in two recent appeals to the Tribunal, refusals
for subdivision consents in rural zones were upheld on the grounds that
the subdivision of rural land containing high-quality soils would be
contrary to the purposes and principles of the Act, in particular the
requirement to meet the reasonably foreseeable needs of future genera-
tions. Nor would it, maintained the Tribunal, constitute an efficient use
of natural and physical resources as required under section 7.4 1
These findings indicate that territorial local bodies, supported by
Planning Tribunal decisions, acknowledge the necessity of protecting
high-quality soils under the requirements of the RMA and that interven-
tion in the market is necessary to ensure this. This, it would seem, is a
far cry from the progressive accommodation of sustainable development
and market forces trumpeted by Robertson.F
4'5ee, for example, Pickmere RH and
Others v Franklin District Council (A046/
93) and Peters AB and RL v Franklin
District Council (A049/93).
42Robertson op cif Ref 1
43Collins, D 'The innovations-how are
they working?' Proceedings of the Re-
source Management Law Conference Re-
source Management Law Association, Au-
ckland (1993)
44New Zealand Business Roundtable op
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Non-notification and the purchase of consents
A major 'innovation' of the new resource management legislation is the
liberalization of consent notification procedures in planning re-
gulation.P Like most Western countries, New Zealand's planning
regulation has long hinged upon the public notification of development
proposals that were thought likely to have spillover effects. Under the
previous town and country planning regime, it was common practice for
planning authorities to notify publicly a significant proportion of permit
applications. Precise data on the extent of notification under the old
planning regime is not available for most councils. However, those data
that are available, together with the expressed frustration of business
interests with public notification, suggest that the practice was
cornmon.t" Auckland City Council, for example, notified about 22% of
applications under the old legislation, which probably represents a
lower than average figure. given that a number of other authorities
continue, within the new regime, to notify 'most' development
proposals.P
. The new resource management legislation contains a provision,
section 94, which deliberately seeks to reduce the extent of public
notification of consent proposals. The non-notification of resource
consents is premised on the demand for efficiency in the planning
consent process. Section 9-l allows developers to gain written approval
for their consent applications from persons 'who may be adversely
affected' by their proposal. These written approvals are assumed to
provide testimony to a council that a development has been accepted by
a community and that consideration of the relevant consent application
should therefore proceed without public notification. This saves 'social'
costs and time (to the developer, the council and, ultimately, the
community) by obviating the need for notification. Non-notification
also serves the interests of the developer by preventing the wider
community from knowing about a resource proposal that may be
unpopular.
Any consent application may avoid notification if the council is
satisfied that certain criteria prescribed in section 94 are met. There are
46Lawn, K Planning Administration Mana-
ger, Christchurch City Council. personal
communication 15 August 1994
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two tests, effectively: the adverse effect must be minor; and written
approval has been obtained from all those whom the council thinks will
be adversely affected, unless it considers it unreasonable in the cir-
cumstances to obtain the written approval of every such person,
By rendering written approval. the potentially affected party surren-
ders their right to object to a proposal at the initial consent considera-
tion stage. Subsection 4 of section 94 states that the council shall take no
account of the effect on people who have rendered written approval
when it considers whether the impact of a proposal will be minor or not.
The process the planner must observe in considering whether a
consent must be notified or not is as follows, First, she/he must consider
whether the applicant has reasonably attempted to gain the approval of
all the potentially affected parties. Then, she/he should determine
whether the impact will be minor or not. excluding the potential impacts
on parties who have given written consent. In summary, a two-stage
test: first, written approval must have been obtained from all potentially
affected parties whom may be reasonably consulted; and second, the
impact of the proposal must be minor, exclusive of the 'approved
impacts'.
Subsection 5 gives the council the reserve power to require notifica-
tion, in spite of other provisions, if it feels inclined to do so, even where
non-notification is required by the relevant plan.
What rights does the individual surrender in rendering written
approval under section 94? At least two consequences can be identified
for those rendering written approval: they cannot have the effects of a
proposal on them considered when the council decides whether the
overall impact of the proposal is minor in determining whether to notify
or not; and they cannot have the impacts of the proposal on them
considered when the council determines whether or not to approve the
resource consent application (section 104), unless they have withdrawn
their approval through a submission made under section 96 of the Act.
In respect of the latter consequence, it must be noted that such
submissions can only be made for notified applications (section 104).
Therefore, if a person renders their approval for an application that is
subsequently treated as non-notifiable. then they have surrendered their
right to comment on the consent application altogether.
Section 94 has certainly had the effect of reducing the proportion of
consents that are publicly notified by many New Zealand councils. For
example, one major consent authority. Christchurch City Council, has
reduced the proportion of proposals notified by half. 46 Auckland City
Council now only notifies 8-9% of consent applications, as against 22%
before the introduction of the new Act.-I7
Section 94 seems also to have fostered the growth of a development
'compensation market' in manv major New Zealand urban areas. The
origin of this is the fact that the manner in which written approval for a
consent proposal is obtained can be no concern of the consent-issuing
authority (a council). The purchasing of neighbours' written approvals
as a means to satisfy the provisions of section 94, and therefore achieve
non-notification, seems to be a growing phenomenon in New Zealand.:"
In such instances, developers offer financial incentives to potentially
adversely affected parties to gain their written approval of a proposal.
This amounts to the purchase of approval and the process may be
described as a 'compensation market" where the sellers are potentially
'adversely affected' parties, the buyers are resource applicants, and the
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commodity is 'written approval'. The emergence of this practice seems
to signal the commodification of planning's regulatory keystone, the
resource consent.
A recent (1994) survey of the nation's 20 largest (defined by popula-
tion) district councils has found that compensation markets have been
established in many New Zealand urban areas. ~y Of the 18 councils that
responded to the survey. eight reported that some form of compensa-
tion market for resource consents was operating within their jurisdic-
tions. A further six councils indicated that they suspected the existence
of such markets in their areas.i"
Whilst the Act may have established compensation as an inevitability.
the system may nonetheless have socially regressive effects and might
therefore be worsening social injustice in New Zealand. Listed below
are some of the potential social equity implications of the compensation
markets established by section 94.
• Empowerment for knowledgeable property owners who might bar-
gain from powerful positions as 'adversely affected' parties for
compensation. The consent applicant may be willing to trade signifi-
cant amounts of money for 'written approval'.
• Alternatively. neighbours may not always be fully aware of the
consequence of their sale of written approval; namely, that in
rendering assent they effectively surrender their right to comment on
the consent application.
• Payments may be made to property owners. rather than property
occupiers, meaning that those people who will suffer environmental
disamenity remain uncompensated.
• 'Intergenerational' inequity: compensation is a one-off payment that
does not compensate for long-term impacts in terms of environmental
amenity loss. Only the present property owner receives the com-
pensation. Subsequent owners may receive a form of compensation
through reduced property values (which will lower land prices to
them), but they will not be compensated for amenity loss.
Cl) Developers may be encouraged to prey on economically deprived
areas and communities that may be vulnerable to market compensa-
tion for environmental disamenity. Hence, certain communities may
become the repositories of 'locally unwanted land uses'.
The last inequity has already been observed in the US, where develop-
ers have frequently used compensation as a device for siting unwanted
facilities, such as waste treatment centres.j ' The concentration of
unwanted land uses in poor communities seems to have been endorsed
by a growing economics literature that suggests that compensation of
affected local communities might be a way of resolving, or even
avoiding. conflicts over the siting of locally unwanted land uses, such as
homes for disabled people. Many different compensation strategies
have been suggested, ranging from a simple monetary recompense of
affected individuals, to the auctioning of locally unwanted land uses
between communities. with the lowest bidder 'winning' the facility.52
The above list of equity implications is hardly exhaustive but is
sufficient to emphasize the need for great caution by councils in
exercising the use of section 94 of the Act. Such a need, of course, is
premised on the supposition that social equity remains a concern for
planning. As indicated earlier. the Act provides little support for such a
supposition and implies rather that planning should act merely as a
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safeguard for a narrowly conceived 'environmental sustainability' that
places little emphasis on social concerns.
Conclusion
The new resource management legislation in New Zealand is certainlv
innovative in its attempts to addr~ss biophysical environmental prob-
lems in an integrated manner and to introduce the concept of sustuina-
bility into statutory procedures. However. we challenge the claim that
this legislation represents a progressive reconciliation of market liberal-
ism and the principle of sustainable development. As we have shown.
the RMA 1991 is an unstable hybrid of the contradictory agendas of
market liberalism and environmentalism. In substantiating this point.
our analysis of the development. enactment and administration of the
new legislation revealed this inherent political economic contradiction.
The political intent (underpined by neo-liberal ideology) of the
legislation is to limit intervention in resource allocation decisions and to
curtail the role of planning in regional and district affairs in preference
to market processes. Paradoxically. however, the general wording of the
legislation. and the concept of sustainable management in particular,
requires increased intervention and more comprehensive planning by
the state in the interests of the common (environmental and social)
good. We see this paradox as a fundamental contradiction of the new
resource management legislation. which may well lead to political and
administrative instability in the implementation of the Act.
We have used two examples to illustrate the potential conflicts
involved in the supposedly 'progressive accommodation' of these two
imperatives. One addressed the use of market processes to achieve
sustainability and found them wanting. The other addressed the poten-
tially regressive socio-economic outcomes inherent in the legislation.
These two represent only the tip of the iceberg. Many more conflicts
and ambiguities are likley to surface in future years.
If sustainable management is not to be distorted and rendered
ineffective as a planning objective, a meaningful and operational
definition of this principle is required that is in line with the concept of
sustainable development that has evolved globally. This will necessitate a
much more sophisticated approach to resource management than that
dictated by nee-liberalism. The application of 19th century economic
theory to 20th century environmental problems is fraught with contra-
dictions. If the conflicts inherent in such an approach are to be avoided,
the intellectual constraints of neo-liberalisrn must be abandoned for a
more holistic and integrative approach, one informed by the new




1.0"'/ o« Pnlic», vet. I.'.No. J. pp. 21.'-215. llJ<ih
Copyrigh: © 1'1'16 Puhlishcd hy Elscvicr Science Lid




market in New Zealand
W A Robertson
This article is a comment on the preced-
ing article, 'Sustainable management
and the market: the politics of planning
reform in New Zealand'. Whilst acknow-
ledging that Grundy and Gleeson raise
a valid debate about the effectiveness
of mechanisms for administering limits
to market freedom, this comment seeks
to highlight the potential of New Zea-
land's Resource Management Act to
integrate economic and environmental
priorities and to provide an early enabl-
ing alternative for sustainable manage-
ment. Copyright © 1996 Published by
Elsevier Science Ltd
The author is Director General of the De-
partment of Survey and Land Information,
Private Box 170. Wellington, New Zealand.
'Grundy and Gleeson 'Sustainable man-
agement and the market: the politics of
planningreform in New Zealand' Land Use
Policy 1996 13 (3) 197-211.
The Grundy/Gleeson paper on plan-
ning reform in New Ze::alanul raises
several issues, including the philoso-
phy of planned intervention and its
effectiveness versus the degree to
which the market economy needs con-
straint to ensure an acceptable aggre-
gate outcome. On these fundamental
issues there is room for a wide variety
of approaches along the continuum.
ranging from the extremes of fully
centralized control to unfettered
laisscz-jairc market dominance,
New Zealand has had experience in
significantly different areas of the in-
tervention market and spectrum.
Although currently there is a domi-
nance of the principles of a fully
market-driven economy. we have also
considerable experience in the recent
past of the workings of a highly reg-
ulatcd and centralized economic struc-
ture. Thus. just as the limits of the
market to produce satisfactory results
are evident. so too are the fallacies of
intervention based on centralized and
one-way best assumptions.
The Grundy/Gleeson paper raises a
valid debute about the effectiveness of
mechanisms for administering limits to
market freedom and the mechanisms
that can provide restraint to mitigate
adverse effects of market liberaliza-
tion. The debate is. however. only
starting. as although we have a con-
sideruble depth in regulatory experi-
ence. the experience from the
approach in the Resource Manage-
ment Act 19lJ1 (RMA IlJlJI) is at an
early stage. Our thinking needs a basis
of critical analysis and sound action
research derived from the learning
that will come through the irnple-
mentation and development of the
RMA.
Claims that regulation will be more
effective than reliance on market
forces are overconfident in light of
past New Zealand experience. The
shift in New Zealand to a much freer
market economy was not just ideolo-
gical but was fuelled by widespread
dissatisfaction with the restrictiveness
and ineffectiveness of regulation and
intervention in a quickly changing en-
vironrnent. We:: had many examples of
how conventional assumptions and
well-meant interventions were found
wanting and outweighed by negative
effects and distortions.
The RMA focuses particularly on
bio-physical sustainability and is much
narrower than the earlier Town and
Country Planning Legislation. The
quotes in the Grundy/Gleeson paper
'adequately indicate that intention of
the RMA and its non-uniform and
non-prescriptive approach. However.
there is considerable legislative inde-
terrninance in the Act. which leaves
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opportunity in the future for relevant
elaboration through amendments or
rulings.
The message that I sed to make is
that the RMA is a progressive and
innovative alternative to the uniform
regulatory approach of the past. The
fact that the scope of the Act has been
limited in relation to the earlier Town
and Country Planning Legislation is
not necessarily a criticism. Our experi-
ence with the later legislation raises
serious questions about the ability to
achieve desirable aggregate results
from predetermined assumptions and
detailed regulation. How appropriate
is it for physical planning to purport
through Town and Country Planning
Legislation to effectively achieve
objectives of social equity?
Concerns about the ability of mar-
ket mechanisms to provide satisfac-
tory community outcomes are valid.
but experience suggests that any effec-
tive intervention must be well based
and sharply focused. The benefits of
intervention need to he demonstrably
superior to the results that will other-
wise occur through market interac-
tion.
The concept of the economic unit is
but one example of the legion of nega-
tive or contradictory interventions
that are widely evident from the past.
An economic unit was a pastoral farm-
ing block that could provide a reason-
able living in New Zealand. Although
this varied in size by geographical
location. it was extensive hy nature
and related to conventional New Zea-
land farming practice.
This concept was embodied in the
instruments of the 1953 and 1977
Town and Country Planning Acts.
Any analysis of the effect of this well-
meant intervention to protect pastor-
alism will show that it was highly
counterproductive. In the 1960s and
1970s, when New Zealand should
have been responding to the new ex-
porting environment resulting from
the development of the European
Common Market, this particular inter-
vention was holding it back. More
intense and more productive alterna-
tive land uses were restricted, and
non-traditional uses such as forestry
were actively obstructed,
The first example used by Grundyl
Glceson again highlights the fallacy of
well-meant intervention. The protec-
tion of productive soils was specified
in the regulations of the Town and
Country Planning Act 1953 as well as
in the Town and Country Planning
Act 1977 itself, as referred to by
Grundy/Gleeson. Thus, throughout
the post-war period of urban expan-
sion in New Zealand, there has been
regulation to protect productive soils.
In my view, this has been largely
ineffective in national terms and must
challenge the validity of interventions
based on conventional assumptions of
this generalized form. In any case: it is
not reasonable to blame the RMA
since 1991 for the lack of effectiveness
when there are almost 40 years of
regulatory failure.
, The second example by Grundyl
Gleeson of notifications under S.94
illustrates a difficulty in this section's
application, This needs attention
through either improving the practice
of notification or changes to the leg-
islation. The point is well made, and
improvements to the practice, or
maybe the legislation. are required.
However, legislative indetermination
is an inevitable consequence of
pioneering. the principles of sustain-
able managcment in legislation of this
type.
The problems and contradictions
seen by Grundy/Gleeson in the RMA
are a reflection of the duality identi-
fied in the Brundtland Report and
addressed in Agenda 21 of UNCED.
Legislation to implement the, interna-
tional agreement on Agenda 21 will
inevitably have to incorporate econo-
mic and environmental principles.
That the RMA has attempted this in a
more focused way than the earlier
Town and Country Planning Legisla-
tion is a realistic acceptance of the
complexity of the issue. No doubt
more sophisticated mechanisms will
develop through time. However, it is
more appropriate that these be de-
veloped through the rubbing with the
face of hard experience than through
predetermined regulation based on
conventional wisdoms,
The RMA 1991 should be seen as
early pioneering legislation embody-
ing the principles of integration of
economic and environmental priori-
ties <IS espoused in Agenda 21. It
provides a great opportunity for learn-
ing while doing. The indetermination
so concerning Grundy and Gleeson
can be steadily resolved as application
of the legislation reveals issues and
needs. The Grundy/Gleeson paper is a
useful contribution to the learning
Comment: W A Robertson
need to advance the working of sus-
tamable development. Nevertheless,
we should recognize the innovative
role of the RMA 1991 in providing an
early enabling alternative for sustain-
able management to the more sectoral
and restrictive format for planning
that it replaces in New Zealand.
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7.6 Sustainable Management: A Sustainable Ethic?
The fmal paper is an extended version of an address given by the author to the New
Zealand Resource Management Law Association Conference in Christchurch in October
1995. It was published in the British journal Sustainable Development in 1997.
In that paper the author analysed the concept of sustainability as it has evolved in the
international literature, together with its incorporation as sustainable management in New
Zealand's resource management legislation. The analysis sought to discover ethical
principles contained within the concept. It was argued that sustainability, and sustainable
management do indeed contain a number of ethical considerations, and that these ethical
components serve to extend moral consideration to the natural environment (an
environmental ethic) and to future generations (an intergenerational ethic). In this respect,
they represent a radical departure from traditional Westem ethical considerations.
It was further argued that the extension of moral considerations to the natural environment
and future generations may involve the sacrifice of short-term preference satisfaction and,
in this sense, may circumscribe prevailing egocentric (ethical egoism) and humanistic
(utilitarian) ethical principles. Thus, the advancement of self interest and the promotion of
the greatest good for the greatest number may be sacrificed, when necessary, in the interest
of provision of environmental goods and/or benefit for future generations. It was proposed
that the environmental ethics contained within the concept of sustainability and sustainable
management could be anthropocentric, ecocentricl biocentric, or a mixture of both. In
addition, in a spectrum of environmental ethics running from 'shallow' to 'deep', the
concept of sustainability and sustainable management most likely lie in an intermediate
position.
It was revealed that ethical considerations relating to the natural environment and future
generations were not being realised in the implementation ofNew Zealand's resource
management legislation due to the narrow 'effects-based' interpretation of sustainable
management advocated by the Ministry for the Environment. There is, it was argued, a
fundamental conflict between the ethical considerations contained within the concept of
sustainability and the imperatives of market liberalism. More specifically, the egocentric
and utilitarian ethical foundations of neoliberalism (i.e. the maximisation of economic
well-being through the pursuit of self-interest, expressed in microeconomic terms as the
maximisation ofprofit and, in macroeconomic terms, the maximisation of economic
growth) are incompatible with the environmental and intergenerational ethics identified in
the concepts of sustainability and sustainable management.
In particular, it was argued that an unregulated market has no means of ensuring an optimal
scale of the macroeconomy relative to the ecosystems in which it operates that is central to
ensuring ecological sustainability. The dynamic inherent to capitalism to reinvest
accumulated capital works to ensure that the macroeconomy will, if not constrained,
inevitably exceed its ecological support over the long term. In addition, market rationality
is fundamentally incompatible with the notion of intergenerational equity. Indeed, the goal
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ofprofit maximisation encourages the depletion of renewable as well as nonrenewable
resources, and leads to the movement of the capital thereby gained into new ventures rather
than sustainable harvest over time. This is antithetical to both ecological sustainability and
intergenerational equity.
It was concluded that a meaningful definition of sustainable management, in line with the
concept of sustainability as it has evolved globally and capable of encompassing the ethical
considerations identified as being fundamental to this concept, requires a much more
sophisticated and innovative approach to resource management than that dictated by
neoliberalism. The application of laissez faire economic theory to twentieth century
environmental problems, it was argued, is fraught with difficulties. If the limits of such an
approach are to be overcome, the intellectual and ethical constraints of neoliberalism may
need to be abandoned and a more holistic and integrative approach initiated - one informed
by the new ecological, social and economic realities of the late twentieth century.
The primary intent of this article was to establish theoretical links with the deep ecology
and radical green movements. There has been substantial debate in the philosophy
literature, and within the environmental movement, over the need for a new ecological or
environmental ethic to inform human-nature relationships. At the same time, there has been
a growing discourse in resource management circles concerning the concept of sustainable
development and its intergenerational obligations, expressed in its most widely known
form as 'development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability
of future generations to meet their own needs' (WeED, 1987).
It is increasingly recognised that the two discourses are linked, and that the concept of
sustainability is dependent upon a reordering of values and a reorientation and extension of
ethical concerns involving environmental and intergenerational ethical considerations. It is
also becoming apparent that the concerns of both discourses have a common socio-
economic basis, and that this basis is revealed and explained through an analysis and
understanding of the dynamics of capitalism. By emphasising the common causes of
anxiety to both interest groups, and their basis in the underlying dynamics of the capitalist
mode ofproduction, it is possible to construct a counter-hegemonic resistance to
deregulated capitalism and raise questions over the dynamics of the capitalist mode of
production itself.
In this way, the concerns of seemingly disparate groups can be linked and the potential for
a common opposition to the prevailing dominant hegemony realised. By analysing the
concept of sustainable development (and sustainable management) - which by definition
encompasses social, economic and ecological considerations - a wide range of interest
groups and activists can be brought together and their various concerns and anxieties
exposed to critical scrutiny. Where possible, counter-hegemonic alliances can be formed
that may, over time, contribute to a growing oppositional movement to global capitalist
hegemony.
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There has been no lack of rhetoric
promoting the new resource management
legislation in New Zealand as innovative
and world leading. At the same time, there
appears to be (particularly in government
circles) a marked reluctance to fully
operationalize the complex concepts
embodied in the Resource Management
Act 1991. There has been a deliberate
withdrawal from confronting some of the
more radical and progressive notions
contained within the Act in favour of a
narrowly circumscribed, effects-based
interpretation of the legislation founded on
neoliberal ideology. © 1997 John Wiley &
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INTRODUCTION
There has been substantial debate in the phi-losophy literature over the need for a newecological or environmental ethic to inform
human-nature relationships (Devall and Sessions,
1989;Eckersley,1992a; Fox, 1990;Naess, 1989;Nash,
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1989). At the same time, there has been a growing
dialogue in resource management circles concerning
the emerging concept of sustainable development
(Barbier, 1987; Lele, 1991; Mitlin, 1992; Redclift,
1987; Reid, 1995). It is becoming increasingly
recognized that the two discourses are linked, and
that the concept of sustainability is dependent upon
a reordering of values and a reorientation and
extension of ethical concerns (Engel, 1990; Grundy,
1993; Lele and Norgaard 1996;Naess, 1988).
New Zealand's new resource management legis-
lation provides an informative example of the
interaction between these two discourses.
Attempting to operationalize the concept of sus-
tainability through legislative procedures has
necessitated a reexamination of contemporary ethi-
cal premises concerning human-nature relation-
ships and intergenerational concerns. The New
Zealand case is made even more cogent in today's
global political economy by the wholesale adoption
by recent New Zealand governments of neoliberal
ideology which rests upon its own narrowly
defined ethical premises and largely seeks to corn-
modify human-nature relationships.
This paper seeks to examine these issues. It does
so by addressing the following questions:
.. What does the concept of sustainability mean?
.. Can this concept be considered an ethic?
.. Is this ethic embodied in the Resource Manage
ment Act as 'sustainable management'?
.. If so, is it being operationalized via the planning
procedures prescribed in the resource manage
ment legislation?
The analysis suggests that the concept of sus-
tainability consists of three fundamental impera-
tives, that these imperatives indeed contain a
number of ethical considerations, and that these
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT
ethical considerations are likewise embodied in the
Resource Management Act. However, it concludes
that these imperatives, together with their asso-
ciated ethical components, are not being realized in
the implementation of the legislation. This is pri-
marily due to a narrow, ideologically driven inter-
pretation of sustainable management advocated by
the Minister for the Environment and his govern-
ment. This interpretation is founded on new right
political and economic philosophy. The ethics con-
tained within this ideology are incompatible with,
and in some cases directly opposed to, the ethics
contained within the concept of sustainability.
THE RESOURCE MANAGEMENT ACT
New Zealand's Resource Management Act (here-
after the RMA or the Act) was enacted in October
1991. It represented a comprehensive reform of
existing planning and resource legislation. The
RMA, in effect, swept away entirely a long estab-
lished tradition of 'town and country planning'
which New Zealand had inherited from its coloni-
zer, Britain. More than 50 statutes were repealed in
whole or part, and all law pertaining to the man-
agement of land, air and water was integrated into
one statute with the OVerriding purpose, legisla-
tively defined, of sustainable management.'
These fundamental changes were driven by, and
reflect, ideological premises which are quite differ-
ent to those which underpinned the previous
planning legislation. The decade of political, eco-
nomic and social upheaval which followed the
election of the fourth Labour Government in 1984
saw New Zealand transformed from a welfare-cor-
poratist state (indeed, a paradigmatic form) to a
neoliberal, postwelfare society. The RMA is deeply
embedded in this radical political economic
restructuring. Hence, the new Act embodies values
and goals for planning radically different to those of
the former legislation.
For example, the former town and country plan-
ning framework sought explicit direction of the
spatial pattern of rural and urban land uses. By
contrast, the new regime established by the
Resource Management Act seeks only the control of
the environmental effects of resource use, rather
than the regulation of uses per se. (The Act therefore
reflects what is sometimes called a 'performance
approach' to development control in some planning
circles.) The focus of the new legislation is to be on
controlling externalities arising from economic
activities rather than the regulation of activities
themselves. The stated intent, underpinned by
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neoliberal ideology, of the RMA envisages a move
away from the prescriptive, zonal type regulation of
land uses predominant under the previous legisla-
tion to a more flexible, effects-based market alloca-
tion process. For example, the Ministry for the
Environment (1991) in a published guide for district
plans, stated:
The Act provides a new framework for
resource management. It places emphasis
on effects and results rather than the control
of specific activities. The emphasis has been
moved from planning controls which, in the
past, sought to direct activities. The princi-
ple now is that regulations must be focused
and people should be able to do what they
want, provided any damaging effects on
the environment are avoided or minimized
to levels determined by the community...
the focus of the Act is on controlling the
adverse effects of resource use in a district
to achieve sustainable management. The
purpose is not to promote any particular
resource use, or to advocate one sectoral
interest over another. (p.S)
So, the Act can be viewed as a product of neo-
liberal economic analysis which focused on the
problem of controlling environmental externalities
in the context of clearly specified property rights
arrangements. As pointed out by Memon and
Gleeson (1995) the Treasury (at this time dominated
by neoliberal economists) exerted considerable
influence during the reform process. The Treasury's
overriding objective throughout the exercise was to
limit the scope of the proposed Act and resist any
prioritizing of environmental regulation in planning
(or any public policy). Planning intervention, in
general, and regulation, in particular, 'were to be
kept to a minimum and the market given as free a
rein as possible. Where intervention in the market
was required it should be by way of economic
instruments, such as tradeable development and
water rights and tradeable pollution permits which
could be incorporated into market processes.
At the same time, New Zealand's growing
environmental movement played an influential role
during the resource management law reform pro-
cess. Environmentalists sought both an expanded
environmental mandate for planning and the
explicit inclusion of ecological values in the new
legislation. The environmental movement had been
gathering strength since 1972 when the world's first
green party, the Values Party, was formed and
confounded pundits by winning 5% of the national
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vote in the 1975 elections (Rainbow, 1993). Envir-
onmental groups were influenced by, and strongly
advocated for, the principles of sustainability
espoused by the World Conservation Strategy auCN,
1980) and the report of the World Commission on
Environment and Development, Our Common
Future (WCED, 1987). Both the WCED report and
the Conservation Strategy were strongly promoted
by environmental interests within and outside the
Labour Party and were influential in the formula-
tion of the resource management legislation. The
subsequent wording of the Act reflectsboth of these
documents (Grundy and Gleeson, 1996).
For example, Section 5 of the Act establishes the
principle of sustainable management as its goal and
purpose. Although derived from the concept of
sustainable development advocated in the lUCN's
Conservation Strategy (1980) and the WCED's
Brundtland Report (1987) the RMA's purpose is
rather more limited. In the Act, sustainable man-
agement refers explicitly to the control of biophy-
sical resources and the built environment, and
attempts to limit planning intervention in the social
and economic affairs of New Zealand society
(although, as argued elsewhere, there are opportu-
nities, indeed requirements, in the legislation for the
consideration of socio-economic concerns (Grundy,
1995b).
Following the definition of sustainable manage-
ment as its central purpose, the Act lists Matters of
National Importance (Section 6). These principles
relate primarily to the quality of the natural envir-
onment and the recognition of Maori values''. In
addition, the Act specifies a number of other mat-
ters which need to be taken into account when
exercising functions and powers under it (Section7).
These include Kaitiakitanga (guardianship), the
efficient use and development of natural and phy-
sical resources, the intrinsic values of ecosystems,
and any finite characteristics of natural and physical
resources'. Part IT concludes with a recognition of
the need to take into account the principles of the
Treaty of Waitangi in achieving sustainable man-
agement (Section 8).
Thus, the enactment of the RMA represents a
clear attempt to embody the concept of sustain-
ability in legislation: The Act gives statutory
recognition, for the first time, to a number of radical
environmental principles: the sustainable manage-
ment of natural and physical resources, the needs of
future generations, and the intrinsic values of eco-
systems including genetic diversity. In addition,
important legislative definitions are provided for
both intrinsic value and for the environment. These
accomplishments were largely the result of intense
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lobbying by environmental groups and the com-
mitment to the legislation by a number of green
Labour politicians, notably the then Minister for the
Environment, Sir Geoffrey Palmer.
As argued elsewhere (Grundy, 1995b; Grundy
and Gleeson, 1996) the legislation can be best
understood as an uneasy compromise between
these two quite distinct, and in many instances,
contradictory sociopolitical forces: the neoliberal
new right and the environmental movement.
Although the expressed political intent (under-
pinned by neoliberal ideology) of the new legisla-
tion was to limit intervention in resource allocation
decisions and to curtail the role of planning in
regional and district affairs in preference to market
processes, the legislative wording remains, to a
large degree, the result of effective lobbying by
environmental interests and genuine environmental
commitment from some members of the fourth
Labour Government. This has resulted in major
contradictions between the stated intent of the leg-
islation and its legislative wording, particularly its
definition of sustainable management. Ironically,by
specifying sustainability as the guiding statutory
purpose for resource management, the need for
increased intervention and more comprehensive
planning has been created. Issues such as inter-
generational equity, maintenance of genetic diver-
sity, the intrinsic values of ecosystems, and even the
sustainable utilization of resources are not ensured
by market processes alone. Such social and envir-
onmental needs, in fact, often conflict with market
dynamics, as discussed later.
CONCEPT OF SUSTAINABILITY
Sustainability, in its modern environmental usage,
has evolved since the 1960s. Its roots, in the global
sphere, can be traced back to an intergovernment
conference of experts convened in Paris in 1968.
This became known as the Biosphere Conference,
and in its final report declared that, although some
of the changes in the environment had been taking
place over an extended time period, they appeared
to have reached a critical threshold and were pro-
ducing concern and a popular demand for correc-
tion. The report's recommendations introduced the
notion of sustainability by emphasizing human
interdependence with the biosphere and the need
for rational use and conservation of the resources of
the biosphere (Caldwell, 1984).
The United Nation's conference on the human
environment, held in Stockholm in 1972, has been
described as a watershed event in human relation-
SUST. DEV. VOL. 5: 119-129, 1997
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 121
ships with the earth. The conference epigram, Only
one Earth, symbolized a change in human percep-
tions that would become a new factor in the
development of ethics, and in the evaluation of
alternatives in policies affecting the environment. It
is widely credited as being the first forum to give
the concept of 'ecologically sustainable develop-
ment' an international political focus (Caldwell,
1990).
The International Union for the Conservation of
Nature (IUCN) published The World Conservation
Strategy in 1980. It represented a further step in the
elucidation of the concept of sustainability. In its
forward, it stated:
H1.Ul1an beings, in their quest for economic
development '" must come to terms with
the reality of resource limitation and the
carrying capacities of ecosystems, and must
take account of the needs of future genera-
.tions.
Within the overall aim of achieving ecological
sustainability through the conservation of living
resources, the strategy emphasized three main
objectives:
(1) the maintenance of essential ecological pro-
cesses and life-support systems;
(2) the preservation of genetic diversity;
(3) the sustainable utilization of species and
ecosystems.
Perhaps of greater significance for the advance-
ment of the concept of sustainability as a policy
objective was the publication in 1987 of the report of
the World Commission on Environment and
Development (WCED) entitled Our Common Future.
The report, through the promotion of sustainable
development, emphasizes the inseparability of
environment and development.
It defined sustainable development as 'develop-
ment that meets the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to
meet their own needs'. To this end, it proposed the
following principles for environmental protection
and sustainable development
Fundamental human right. All human beings
have the fundamental right to an environment (both
social and biophysical) adequate for their health
and well-being.
Intergenerational equity. States shall conserve and
use the environment and natural resources for the
benefit of present and future generations.
Conservation and sustainable use. States shall
maintain ecosystems and ecological processes
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essential for the functioning of the biosphere, shall
preserve biological diversity, and shall observe the
principle of optimum sustainable yield in the use of
living natural resources and ecosystems.
The United Nation's Conference on Environment
and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro
in 1992 (the so-called Earth Summit) issued Agenda
21, representing perhaps the most comprehensive
international statement yet on environmental pro-
tection and sustainability strategies.
Agenda 21, elaborating further on the concept of
sustainable development, emphasized its socio-
economic-environmental dimensions (Section 1),
the importance of conservation and sustainable
resource management (Section 2), and the pressing
need for new institutional arrangements to ensure
environmental protection and sustainable develop-
ment (Section 3). Furthermore, the Statement of
Principles on Forest Management, the Convention
on Biological Diversity, and the Convention on
Climate Change all reiterated the importance of
interdependent ecological systems in sustaining the
life-support processes of the biosphere.
From these global forums, and the considerable
debate that surrounded them, it can be discerned
that sustainability, in its contemporary environ-
mental sense, has evolved into a concept centred on
three fundamental imperatives:
(1) the long-term sustenance of ecological life-
supporting processes;
(2) the long-term sustenance of resources to meet
human needs;
(3) the long-term sustenance of environmental
quality, both socio-economic and biophysical.
It is a concept that arose from a widespread
consensus that human-induced changes in natural
life-support systems, together with human utiliza-
tion of natural resources, are proceeding at a non-
sustainable rate. This was coupled with increasing
concerns over deteriorating environmental quality,
both social and physical. The concept itself repre-
sents an attempt to rationalize human relationships
with the environment in light of these concerns
(Grundy, 1993).
ETHIC OF SUSTAINABILITY
Can we call this concept of sustainability an ethic?
The term ethic (or ethics) signifies both:
(A) an ethical system, relating to morals especially
as concerning human conduct - in other words,
an advocated morality comprising a normative
ethic;
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(B) the science or study of some or all such systems,
analytic or descriptive - in other words, a the
ory of morality comprising a meta-ethic or
descriptive ethic.
The present discussion is limited largely to the
former meaning. That is not to imply that the meta-
ethical implications are unimportant. They are of
utmost importance in the development of an ethic
of sustainability, as they are in the field of envir-
onmental ethics generally. However, meaningful
insight into the ethical standing of the concept, in
this particular context, can be achieved by examin-
ing it as an advocated morality.
If we define a normative ethic as a set of moral
principles guiding human conduct, and if we accept
that sustainability contains a number of funda-
mental imperatives concerning human conduct,
then we can rightly term it an ethic, if these
imperatives can be shown to rest on moral princi-
ples.
Moral principles may be of two types:
(1) teleological, where a concept of the good is set
forth, and right actions are those that promote
that good (Le. are a means to an end);
(2) deontological, which begin with right (or duty)
and set forth a view about what one should or
should not do, and the achievement of the
good will be either a consequence of such
actions or incidental (or even irrelevant) to
them (Hospers, 1990).
The concept of sustainability sets forth three
desirable outcomes (expressions of the good). They
imply a distinction between right and wrong
behaviours to achieve those outcomes. It can be
argued, therefore, that the concept rests upon moral
principles; that is, the distinction between right and
wrong behaviour to bring about an identified good.
These principles are teleological rather than deon-
tological, although the two are of course related (for
example, what ideals you believe are good will
make a difference to what acts you consider right).
In this instance, it is the distinction between right
and wrong human conduct towards the environ-
ment (including ecological processes) and towards
future generations. This represents a marked
departure from traditional Western ethical con-
siderations; that is, proper conduct between
humans and God, between individual people, and
between individuals and society. It is extending
moral considerations both to the natural world (an
environmental ethic) and to future generations (an
intergenerational ethic).
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Both of these issues have been the subject of
intense debate in the philosophy literature, which
prompts brief comment on the following points.
(1) The extension of moral consideration to the
natural environment and to future generations
relies upon the assumption that moral rela-
tionships do not have to involve two moral
agents (Le.both capable of exercising reflection
and rational choice on the basis of principles).
There has always been a difficulty with this, for
example, in regards to infants or the insane.
(2) The difficulties of the deontological approach,
that is the setting of rights and obligations in
regard to the natural environment (living and
nonliving) and to future generations, is partly
overcome by adopting the teleological
approach. If we agree on a desired outcome (an
exposition of the good) actions that promote
that good are of themselves morally right
(subject to other ethical considerations of
course) and do not of necessity rely upon a
deontological justification.
(3) The environmental ethic may be an anthropo-
centric or an ecocentric/biocentric ethic. That
is, the environment may be seen to have only
instrumental value or it may have intrinsic
value. Instrumental value is value-accorded
nature based on human value (the use value of
nature to humans). Intrinsic value is a value of
nature itself, independent of use value to
humans.
This leads to a spectrum of environmental ethics.
Typical is the distinction outlined by Sylvan and
Bennett (1994). They divide environmental ethics
into three levels: shallow, intermediate, and deep.
Shallow environmentalism is anthropocentric. Few
constraints are imposed upon the treatment of the
environment providing that treatment does not
interfere with the interests of other humans. By
contrast, however, with nonenvironmental ethics it
does take a long term view of environmental issues
and it does consider future generations.
Intermediate positions can be distinguished as
rejecting the notion that humans and human pro-
jects are the sole items of value; however, serious
human concerns always come first. These positions
acknowledge the value in their own right of at least
some animals, ecosystems, forests and other parts of
the environment as well as the environment as a
whole, in addition to their value for human pur-
poses. Deep positions, however, are characterized
by the rejection of the notion that humans and
human projects are the sole items of value, and
further by the rejection of the notion that humans
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and human projects are always more valuable than
the nonhuman world.
There is, of course, a contrasting position that
is not an environmental ethic. The contrasting
position is the short-term unrestrained, exploitative
approach that takes little or no account of
the environment ethically, and typically assumes
that humans have the right to manipulate
the environment as they see fit. This is the dominant
or prevailing ethic in the Western world, and
has been described by some ecophilosophers
as human chauvinism (Routley and Routley,
1995).
The extension of moral consideration to the nat-
ural environment and to future generations may
involve the sacrifice of short-term preference satis-
faction and, in this sense, may circumscribe both
prevailing egocentric (ethical egoism) and huma-
nistic (utilitarian) ethical principles. Thus, both the
advancement of self-interest and the promotion of
the greatest good (happiness) for the greatest
number, may be sacrificed on occasion in the
interests of environmental goods and for the good
of future generations.
Each of these issues raise substantial debate.
However, suffice for present purposes to assume
that we can rightly assert that the concept of sus-
tainability, as generally accepted in its modern
environmental usage, does indeed contain an ethic,
or more properly a number of ethical considera-
tions. These ethical considerations relate to the
natural environment and to future generations as
well as to contemporary social concerns. They are
most likely to be of the intermediate level in relation
to the classification outlined above.
SUSTAINABLE MANAGEMENT
Is this ethic (or ethics) embodied in the Resource
Management Act 1991, in particular in the legisla-
tive definition of sustainable management? at
should be remembered that sustainable manage-
ment is the overarching purpose of the legislation. It
governs all decisions, policies and plans, and all
environmental standards formulated under the
auspices of the Act).
Part IT,Section 5 of the Act, states as its purpose:
(l) The purpose of this Act is to promote the
sustainable management of natural and physical
resources.
(2) In this Act, "sustainable management" means
managing the use, development, and protection of
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natural and physical resources in a way, or at a rate,
which enables people and communities to provide
for their social, economic, and cultural well-being
and for their health and safety while:
(a) Sustaining the potential of natural and physical
resources (excluding minerals) to meet the reason-
ably foreseeable needs of future generations; and
(b) Safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of
air, water, soil, and ecosystems; and
(c) Avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any
adverse effects of activities on the environment.
It can be seen from this that sustainable
management is composed of two parts. The
first part, what Fisher (1991) termed the 'manage-
ment function', is founded on conventional utili-
tarian ethics. Its object is the social, economic and
cultural well-being and the health and safety of
people and communities. The second part, what
Fisher called the 'ecological function', qualifies these
traditional utilitarian concerns. It contains a number
of constraints within which this utilitarian ethic
must function. These constraints represent three
distinct but cumulative requisites that must be
secured if a resource use is to be considered
sustainable.
Recent Planning Tribunal decisions support this
view". For example, Judge Kenderine has held that:
"The provisions of s 5(2) (a), (b) and (c) may
be considered cumulative safeguards which
exist in order to ensure that the land
resource is managed in such a way, or at
such a rate which enables the people of the
community to provide for the various
aspects of their social well-being and for
their health and safety. They are safeguards
which must be met before the Act's purpose
is fulfilled (Foxley Engineering Ltd v Well-
ington CC W12/94).
If we find that one of these safeguards is
unlikely to be achieved then the purpose of
the Act is not fulfilled (plastic and Lea-
thergoods Co Ltd v Horowhenua DC W26/
94).
The promotion of sustainable management
has to be determined therefore in the con-
text of these qualifications which are to be
accorded the same weight (Shell Oil NZ Ltd
v Auckland CC W8/94).
As noted, these qualifications constitute the con-
straints within which development must take place
so as to enable sustainable management. They also,
in a philosophical sense, represent a number of
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desired outcomes. They are desired outcomes that
will be promoted by appropriate behaviour. In other
words, they can be considered as ethical goods
subject to determination by moral principles.
Looked at individually, we can see that they
coincide with the imperatives identified earlier as
fundamental to the concept of sustainability.
For example, the imperative for the long-term
sustenance of resources to meet human needs is
contained in Section 5(2) (a). This requisite is con-
cerned with intergenerational equity. Moreover, it is
equity between human generations. It is therefore
anthropocentric. It is concerned with the distinction
between right and wrong conduct regarding the
needs of future generations. It is without doubt an
ethical consideration. It is, in effect, extending moral
consideration to future generations.
Secondly, the imperative concerning the long-
term sustenance of ecological life-supporting pro-
cesses. is contained in Section 5(2) (b). This is con-
cerned with ecological sustainability. Viewed as an
ethical good, it extends moral consideration to
ecological processes.
If, in regard to life-supporting processes, we
mean all life and not just human life, it suggests an
ecocentric ethic. This extends moral consideration to
ecological life-supporting processes independent of
human interests. In this sense, it represents a radical
departure from traditional Western ethical con-
siderations. This position is supported by the
requirement in Section 7 (d) to have particular
regard to the intrinsic values of ecosystems in
achieving the purpose of the Act. Intrinsic values
are defined in Part I as:
those aspects of ecosystems and their con-
stituent parts which have value in their
own right including-
(a) Their biological and genetic diversity;
and
(b) The essential characteristics that deter
mine an ecosystem's integrity, form,
functioning, and resilience.
Finally, the imperative for the long tern: sust~
nance of environmental quality is con tamed m
Section 5(2) (c} in conjunction with. ~e ~tatutory
definition of environment. This definition includes:
(a) Ecosystems and their constitue.r:t parts,
including people and conunumties; and
(b) All natural and physical resources; and
(c) Amenity values; and .
(d) The social, economic, aesthetic, and
cultural conditions which affect the
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matters stated in paragraphs (a) to (c) of
this definition or which are affected by
those matters.
Here we have an ethic (or ethics) that could be
either anthropocentric, ecocentric, or both. When
referring to the socio-€Conomicenvironment it
represents an anthropocentric ethic. That is, it is
centred on human concerns. However, when refer-
ring to the biophysical environment, it could
represent either an anthropocentric or an ecocentric
ethic. If we are avoiding, remedying or mitigating
adverse effects on the environment so as to mini-
mize adverse effects on human welfare it is clearly
anthropocentric. If we are doing so because the
environment has value in itself (which the inclusion
of ecosystems in the definition of environment
could imply) then it would represent an ecocentric
ethic. There is no substantive guide to this in the
legislative wording, however.
Section 6, which largely promotes protection and
preservation of the natural environment, once
again, gives little indication as to whether this is
desirable exclusively for human benefit or possibly
for values intrinsic to the nonhuman world. What is
certain, however, is that Section 5(2) (c) contains an
environmental ethic. It extends moral consideration
to the biophysical environment, in addition to the
socio-economic environment, whether these be for
anthropocentric or ecocentric reasons.
So, although the first part of Section 5 represents
traditional utilitarianism, the second part may well
circumscribe that utilitarian ethic by extending
ethical consideration to the environment and to
future generations. From this we can see that the
statutory definition of sustainable management
does indeed contain ethical considerations, and
these considerations are essentiallv those identified
earlier in the concept of sustainability,
FROM THEORY TO PRA.XIS
Finally, we turn to the question as to whether these
ethical considerations, identified both in the concept
of sustainability and in the definition of sustainable
management, are being realized in the imple-
mentation of the resource management legislation.
The Minister for the Environment and his Min-
~try have persistently advocated an effects-based
:nterpretation of sustainable management. Accord-
mg to this view, the focus of the new legislation is to
be on controlling externalities arising from eco-
nomic activities within the auspices of a liberal
market-driven allocation system: For example, in
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his Third Reading in the House on the Resource
Management Bill, the Minister stated:
The Government has moved to underscore
the shift in focus from planning for activ-
ities to regulating their effects . .. We run a
much more liberal market economy these
days ... The Government's focus is now on
externalities - the effects of those activities
on the receiving environment ... (Upton,
1991, p. 3019)
In a recent address to the New Zealand Planning
Institute Conference, the Minister similarly stated:
The Resource Management Act regime
requires those who exercise powers under
the Act to focus on the effects of resource
use on the environment ... People are
assumed to be able to make their own
choices about the use of resources. Councils
are there to see that the effects of those
choices are consistent with sustainable
management ... Efficient resource alloca-
tion is best achieved through price signals -
price signals which include the costs of
remedying environmental impacts
(Upton, 1995, pp. 2, 5)
He concluded his speech with: "The thrust of this
speech may appear to be remarkably laissez-faire. It
is with respect to resource allocation. It is most
definitely not laissez-faire with respect to environ-
mental standards." (Upton, 1995, pp. 17-18).
Thus, according to neoliberal doctrine, sustain-
able management is primarily concerned with con-
trolling the adverse effects of resource use on the
biophysical environment, while relying on the
invisible hand of the market to allocate resources
and to determine the macro scale of economic
activity.
However, Section 5 of the Resource Management
Act contains three requisites so as to enable sus-
tainable management:
(1) Sustaining the potential of natural and physical
resources (excluding minerals) to meet the
reasonably foreseeable needs of future genera-
tions.·
(2) Safeguarding the life-supporting capacity of air,
water, soil and ecosystems.
(3) Avoiding, remedying, or mitigating any
adverse effects of activities on the environment.
They represent three distinct but cumulative
imperatives that must be secured if a resource use is
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to be considered sustainable, a view that is well
supported by Planning Tribunal decisions.
The Minister's insistence that the Resource Man-
agement Act is about 'focuslingl on the effects of
resource use on the environment' is, therefore, ill-
founded. The Act is equally concerned with meeting
the resource needs· of future generations (inter-
generational equity) and safeguarding the life-sup-
porting capacity of air, water, soil and ecosystems
(ecological sustainability),
First, with respect to the imperative to meet the
reasonably foreseeable needs of future generations,
the Minister's insistence that sustainable manage-
ment is about focusing on the effects of develop-
ment on the biophysical environment is clearly
inadequate. The requirement to avoid, remedy, or
mitigate any adverse effects of activities on the
environment in no substantial way addresses the
imperative to sustain the potential of natural and
physical resources to meet the reasonably foresee-
able needs of future generations. These are quite
different requirements and necessitate distinct
approaches for their fulfilment. Meeting the rea-
sonably foreseeable resource needs of future gen-
erations requires the consideration of how resources
are to be used and to what extent they are to be
used. These are primarily questions of allocation
and scale, not environmental effect.
Second, with respect to safeguarding the life-
supporting capacity of air, water, soil and ecosys-
tems this requirement is not exclusively determined
by controlling the environmental effects of indivi-
dual consent applications. It requires a wider, more
holistic view of the development process and
requires both the consideration of resource alloca-
tion and their scale of use. A determination of the
optimal scale of the macroeconomy is essential if
economic development is not to overwhelm its
ecological base. This is, in the final analysis, deter-
mined by ecological constraints.
Given that the above two requisites for sustain-
able management require the consideration of allo-
cation and scale, the Minister's advancement of the
market as the most appropriate mechanism for the
allocation of resources and as the arbiter of the scale
of resource use must be examined. Analysis shows
that the best the market can claim to achieve is short
term allocative efficiency (and even this is open to
debate): it cannot perform by itself the task of set-
ting an optimal scale of resource use (an ecological
issue) nor an optimal allocation over time (an equity
issuer',
As Daly and Cobb (1989) have pointed out, the
free market has no means of ensuring an optimal
scale of the macroeconomy relative to the ecosys-
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tems in which it operates which is central to
ensuring ecological sustainability. The inherent
dynamic of capitalism for the reinvestment of
accumulated surplus capital, works to ensure that
the macroeconomy, if unrestrained, will inevitably
exceed its ecological support over the long term.
In addition, as Eckersley (1992b) has remarked,
market rationality is fundamentally incompatible
with the notion of intergenerational equity. Indeed,
the goal of profit maximization encourages the
liquidation or depletion of both renewable and
nonrenewable resources, and the movement of the
capital thereby gained into new ventures, rather
than the sustainable or prudent harvest over time.
Clark (1974) has shown that if the return on capital
invested in a sustainable harvest of a resource over
time is less than the return to be gained by depleting
the resource and investing the profits elsewhere,
then according to market rationality, this is the
proper course of action. This is antithetical to both
the notion of ecological sustainability and that of
intergenerational equity.
There is, in fact, a fundamental conflict between
the ethical considerations contained within the
concept of sustainability and the imperatives of
neoclassical economic liberalism. More specifically,
the egocentric and utilitarian ethical foundations of
neoliberalism (i.e, the maximization of economic
well-being through the pursuit of self-interest;
expressed in macroeconomic terms as the max-
imization of economic growth and 'in micro-
economic terms as the maximization of profit) are
incompatible with the environmental and inter-
generational ethics identified in the concept of sus-
tainability.
It can be seen from this analysis that the neo-
liberal effects-based interpretation of sustainable
management advanced by the Minister for the
Environment and his Ministry is manifestly incap-
able of addressing the complex requirements of
sustainable management as defined in the Resource
Management Act. Furthermore, it is equally incap-
able of incorporating the ethical considerations
identified in the concept of sustainability and
embodied in the legislative definition of sustainable
management.
CONCLUSION
As outlined at the start of this paper, sustainability,
as recognized in the wider literature (and defined in
the Resource Management Act) is a concept centred
on three fundamental imperatives:
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(1) The long-term sustenance of ecological life-
supporting processes.
(2) The long-term sustenance of resources to meet
human needs.
(3) The long-term sustenance of environmental
quality, both socio-economic and biophysical.
These imperatives contain a number of ethical
considerations. These ethical components serve to
extend moral consideration both to the biophysical
environment (including ecological processes) and to
future generations. In this regard, they represent a
radical departure from traditional Western ethical
considerations.
However, these ethics are not being realized in
the implementation of the legislation. This is largely
due to a narrow, effects-based interpretation of
sustainable management founded on neoliberal
ideology. The neoliberal approach to the Resource
Management Act does not substantially address
(nor is it, in fact, capable of doing so) either of the
first two requisites of sustainability and only par-
tially addresses the third. The ethical considerations
contained in these imperatives, therefore, largely go
unrecognized. By equating the concept of sustain-
ability to merely dealing with market externalities
(adverse effects on the biophysical environment)
this view effectively marginalizes these ethical
considerations.
Moreover, by effectively denying the relevance of
intergenerational equity and ecological sustain-
ability in its interpretation of sustainable manage-
ment, the neoliberal approach threatens to
emasculate the very concept of sustainability and
render it devoid of any useful meaning as an
intellectual construct, a system of ethics, or as an
object of public policy.
As argued elsewhere (Grundy, 1995a) a mean-
ingful and operational definition of sustainable
management in line with the concept of sustain-
ability that has evolved globally and capable of
encompassing the ethical considerations identified
as being fundamental to this concept, will require a
much more sophisticated and innovative approach
to resource management than that dictated by
neoliberalism. The application of nineteenth-een-
tury economic theory to twentieth-century envir-
onmental problems is fraught with difficulties. If the
limitations of such an approach are to be overcome,
the intellectual and ethical constraints of neoliber-
alism must be abandoned and a more holistic and
integrative approach initiated - one informed by the
new ecological, social and ethical realities of the
twentieth century.
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ENDNOTES
An earlier version of this paper was presented to the
New Zealand Resource Management Law Associa-
tion Conference in Christchurch, October 1995.
(1) The principal statutes repealed included
the Town and Country Planning Act 1977, the
Rivers Control and Soil Erosion Act 1941,
the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, the
Harbours Act 1950, the Geothermal Energy
Amendment Act 1937, the Dean Air Act 1972
and the Noise Control Act 1982.
(2) The full text of section 6 is as follows:
86. Matters of national importance-In
achieving the purpose of this Act, all per-
sons exercising functions and powers under
© 1997 John Wuey & Sons. Ltd. and ERP Environment.
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it, in relation to managing the use, devel-
opment, and protection of natural and
physical resources, shall recognise and
provide for the following matters of
national importance:
(a) The preservation of the natural char-
acter of the coastal environment (including
the coastal marine area), wetlands, and
lakes and rivers and their margins, and the
protction of them from inappropriate sub-
division, use, and development:
(b) The protection of outstanding natural
features and landscapes from inappropriate
subdivision, use, and development
(c) The protection of areas of significant
indigenous vegetation and significant
habitats of indigenous fauna:
(d) The maintenance and enhancement of
pubic access to and along the coastal mar-
ine area, lakes, and rivers:
(e) The relationship of Maori and their cul-
ture and traditions with their ancestral lands,
water, sites, waahi tapu, and other taonga."
(3) The full text of section 7 is as follows:
"7. Other matters-In achieving the pur-
pose of this Act, all persons exercising
functions and powers under it, in relation to
managing the use, development, and pro-
tection of natural and physical resources
shall have particular regard to-
(a) Kaitiakitanga:
(b) The efficient use and development of
natural and physical resources:
(c) The maintenance and enhancement of
amenity values:
:r 1997 John WHey & Sons, Ltd. and ERP Environment.
(d) Intrinsic values of ecosystems:
(e) Recognition and protection of the heri-
tage values of sites, buildings, places, or
areas:
(f) Maintenance and enhancement of the
quality of the environment:
(g) Any finite characteristics of natural and
physical resources:
(h) The protection of the habitat of trout
and salmon."
(4) The planning Tribunal is a judicial body which
hears appeals, makes enquiries, and issues
enforcement orders under the Act. It is made
up of 5 Planning Judges and up to 10 Planning
Commissioners. The Tribunal has the power of
a District Court and its decisions can only be .
reviewed on matters of law. In effect, it is this
body that determines, by way of precedent, the
interpretation and administration of the legis-
lation, particularly those matters of a con-
tentious nature.
(5) Short-term allocative efficiency, as determined
by neo-classical Pareto optimality in no way
guarantees an optimal environmental outcome.
A Pareto optimum is defined as a state of the
economy in which all economic resources are
allocated and used 'efficientlv', such that it is
impossible to make anyone economicallybetter
off without making someone else economically
worse off. Pareto optimality is defined inde-
pendently of both present anf future equity and
the physical scale of resource use. Thus, a Par-
eto optimal allocation can occur at an ecologi-
cally sustainable scale of resource use, just as it
can occur at an inequitable distribution of
benefits both contemporarily and over time
(Goodland and Ledec, 1987).
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7.7 From the Left - Newspaper Columns
The two newspaper articles, dated 14-12-98 and 28-12-98 are examples ofa column the
author wrote for the Otago Daily Times, the major daily newspaper in the Otago region.
They comprise critiques ofproposed amendments to the Resource Management Act. These
amendments resulted from a review process initiated by the Minister for the Environment
allegedly in response to claims (largely unsubstantiated) by business and farming interests
of over-regulation and increased compliance costs imposed by the statutory planning
process established after the enactment of the Resource Management Act in 1991.
The review process took the form of a 'thinkpiece' written by a well-known neoliberal
critic of the Act (McShane, 1998) in conjunction with a report from a Ministerial Reference
Group (Reference Group, 1998) purporting to represent' a wide cross section of
perspectives' but reflecting the views ofprivate consultants and lawyers. Environmental
interests, community groups, and academics were noticeably absent from the appointed
review bodies. Consequently, environmental outcomes, the sustainability of resource use,
and the enhancement of public participation in resource management procedures hardly
rated mention in any of the discussions by the review groups. The primary concerns were
facilitating development, decreasing regulation on economic activity, lowering costs on
business, and decreasing public infringement on private property rights.
The review process, and the subsequent amendments proposed by the Minister, can be seen
to be a deliberate attempt by neoliberal interests to limit the role of statutory planning in the
allocation of resources, decrease regulatory control on economic activity (including
environmental regulation), strengthen private property rights in opposition to public
interests, and reduce compliance costs on development. In short, to replace the 'heavy
hand' of bureaucratic control with the 'invisible hand' of the free market.
These changes, if implemented, would have inevitably affected the interpretation and
administration of the resource management legislation, particularly the sustainability and
environmental imperatives contained within Part II (the Act's purpose and principles). The
concept of sustainable management, being the overriding purpose of the Act, would have
been much more narrowly defined, and environmental protection reduced. The proposed
changes would have also reduced the opportunity for public participation in resource
management procedures and thus diminished community control over local development
and community advocacy for environmental concerns.
The intent of the newspaper articles was to make explicit the contradictions between
environmentalism and neoliberalism contained within the resource management legislation
and to demonstrate that these contradictions were being addressed through legislative
amendment. In effect the innovative and progressive environmental and democratic
principles embodied in the Resource Management Act were being subverted in the interests
of deregulated capitalism. In this way the underlying threat to environmental and
community interests could be exposed to critical scrutiny.
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The proposed amendments did not enjoy wide support in the many submissions on the
review process. Most of those making submissions believed the Act did not require radical
change. Most concerns related to how the legislation was being administered rather than
the substantive and procedural content of the Act itself. Many who made submissions were
concerned that the proposed changes would reduce the ability of the legislation to ensure
better environmental outcomes, improved sustainable resource use and enhanced public
participation (Ministry for the Environment, 1998). In addition, a number ofinterest
groups, government bodies (central and local) and political parties expressed concerns over
the proposed amendments. For example, the Parliamentary Commissioner for the
Environment (Otago Daily Times, 28 December, 1998) commented:
"The current process of RMA review... is inadequate. There has been little time to
consider options that would enhance the Act so it can contribute to the goal of
sustainable management of the environment... The consequences of any change to the
Act on the quality of environmental outcomes do not appear to be part of the current
debate ... There is little demonstration of government commitment to enhancing
environmental management and the overall sustainability of resource use".
The Labour Party accused the Government of 'gutting' the Act. The Green Party described
it as a 'full frontal attack on environmental protection'. Action for Community and the
Environment, a coalition of groups formed to oppose the changes, stated: " The
proposals ... contain fundamental changes to the Act which present a serious risk to
environmental protection and threaten to seriously undermine public rights" (Otago Daily
Times, 28 December, 1998).
Diverse interests were opposed to aspects of the proposed amendments. Those interests
comprised stakeholders united by their concern over sustainable resource use,
environmental protection, and/or public participation in resource management procedures.
The intent of my newspaper articles was to reveal the socio-economic imperatives founded
on neoliberal ideology underlying the proposed changes and, in this way, attempt to expose
a common basis for the opposition to the amendments. By linking the various aspects of
concern to a common cause the potential is established for a counter-hegemonic alliance in
opposition to the dominant neoliberal ideology.
It should be noted that the proposed amendments were not passed into law prior to the
National Government being replaced by a Labour/Alliance Coalition in 1999. The new
Government re-examined the proposed changes and, largely on the insistence of the Green
Party, removed some of the more extreme proposals. However, the main thrust of the
amendment passed in 2003 remained committed to lowering compliance costs for business.
There was little emphasis placed on ensuring sustainable management of resources,
improving environmental outcomes, and enhancing public participation in resource
management procedures, although there were new provisions included to better manage
historic and cultural heritage, and the biodiversity of natural heritage.
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Public participation in process may be threatened
Fears RMA is set to lose its teeth
The Resource Management Act, when
first introduced in 1991, was trumpeted
as "innovative" and "world-leading"
environmental legislation. And so it
was. It was possibly the first time that
the concept of "sustainability" had
been embodied in national legislation
as the main statutory purpose govern-
ing resource use. The sustainability of
natural and physical resources and the
needs of future generations were
henceforth to be a necessary, and
indeed prime, consideration in con-
temporary decisions concerning the
use of such resources.
The legislation also contained a
number of other radical environmental
principles, such as the life-supporting
capacity of ecosystems, the intrinsic
value of ecosystems including genetic
diversity and the finite characteristics
of natural and physical resources. In
addition, it called for resource users to
focus on the environmental effects of
their activities, with the intent of
avoiding, mitigating, or remedying the
adverse effects of these activities.
The legislation possessed, in other
words, 'a strong environmental ethic,
with an associated commitment to sus-
tainability and intergenerational
equity in the use of natural and physi-
cal resources.
The Act's other main intent, pro-
claimed loudly at the time (but hardly
heard above a whisper these days), was
to increase community involvement in
resource management procedures. The
rationale was that because the major
costs and benefits of development
accrue at the local level, this is where
decisions over resource use should be
made - locally, with substantial input
by the community affected.
As Lindsay Gow, Secretary for the
Environment at the time, was to pro-
claim: "Our planning operates on the
premise that communities ought to
have the ability to make choices and to
be very clear about the fact that they
have to live with those choices ... If
people who make the decisions have to
live with the results, the decisions are
much more meaningful to them." Like-
wise, the Ministry for the Environ-
ment, upon enactment of the
legislation trumpeted: "Greater public
involvement in policy and decision
making is one of the improvements
brought about by the Resource Man-
agement Act."
These noble intentions - sustain-
able resource use, increased environ-
mental protection, intergenerational
equity in resource allocation and
increased public (community) partici-
pation in resource management, were
the result of intense lobbying by envi-
ronmental interests coupled with a
commitment to environmental con-
cerns by a number of "green" politi-
cians in the fourth Labour government
(notably Sir Geoffrey Palmer). How-
ever, they were always in for a rough
ride.
They were always going to conflict
with the contemporary dominant polit-
ical economic ideology centred in
Treasury and radiating outwards, like
a malignant cancer, to all other
spheres of socio-economic activity in
this country - that of neo-l iheralism,
or free-market "Iaissez-faire" capital-
ism.
Predictably, 'this has resulted -in.
serious contradictions between the
environmental and resource manage-
ment principles contained within the
legislation and the neo-liberal eco-
, nomic agenda. While free-market capi-
talism demands less government
intervention in the economy, less regu-
lation of economic activities, closely
prescribed private property rights and
contractual arrangements (and hence
less public infringement on property
rights), and, in general, a retreat from
statutory planning in favour of market
processes, the legislative intent and
wording of the Resource Management
Act demands, in many respects, the
exact opposite.
Ironically, by specifying sustain-
ability as the guiding purpose for
resource management, coupled with a
strong commitment to alleviating
adverse environmental effects from
economic activity, the need for
increased intervention, increased reg-
ulation, and more comprehensive plan-
ning has been created. Issues such as
intergenerational equity, maintenance
of genetic diversity, the intrinsic val-
ues of ecosystems, and even the sus-
tainable utilisation of resources are
not ensured by market processes. They,
in fact, more often than not directly
conflict with the dynamics of a deregu-
lated market.
Likewise, the extensive public par-
ticipation procedures embodied in the
Act, to enable community involvement
in developmental decisions, were
always going to conflict with the sys-
tem of property rights and contractual
arrangements envisaged by neo-Iiberal
ideology. The costs involved in ensur-
ing local democratic participation in,
and democratic accountability over,
resource management decisions are
similarly antithetical to the almost
pathological concern over lowering
administration and transaction costs
encompassed in neo-Iiberal ideology.
These underlying contradictions,
have been developing since the legisla-
tion was first enacted and have now
erupted to the surface by way of a major
review of the resource management
legislation and proposals for a substan-
tial amendment to the Act. (Readers
may be forgiven for being totally
unaware' of these occurrences due to
the paucity of any serious analysis or
discussion in the public media).
The review and proposed amend-
ments constitute a major threat to the
environmental integrity of the Act and
to the commitment topublie parttcipa-
tion embodied in the 'legislation. The
intent of the changes is to reduce regu-
lation on economic activity and to
allow the market to operate more
freely. The heavy hand of bureaucratic
intervention is to be replaced with the
"invisible hand" of the market.
In addition, the proposed changes
represent a concerted attempt to
diminish opportunities for public par-
ticipation in resource management
procedures. Resource management
decisions are to be removed from the
community and turned over to the mar-
ket. Future community involvement in
resource management procedures and
democratic accountability over
resource decisions can be expected to
be severely marginalised.
It can be seen, therefore, that the
contradictions between environmen-
talism, democracy and neo-Iiberalism
are being resolved - the environmen-
tal and democratic principles within
the Resource Management Act are to
be curtailed in deference to the
demands ofderegulated capitalism. As
seems inevitable in New Zealand these
days: the market rules, OK!
My next column will examine the
specific amendments proposed to the
Resource Management Act.
• Kerry Grundy is a university tutor
and researcher. T ,'" t'1 r-:o ! - c: --,:
Environment a low priority
The Resource Management Act, New
Zealand's principle environmental
statute, has undergone a major
review over the past year. The result
is a proposal for a substantial
amendment to the legislation to be
enacted early next year.
The review, initiated by the Minis-
ter for the Environment, took the
form of a so-called "think piece",
written by a well-known critic of the
Act, in conjunction with a report
from a ministerial reference group
purporting to represent "a wide
cross-section of perspective" but
consisting mainly of private consul-
tants and lawyers.
Wider environmental interests,
community groups and academics
were noticeable by their absence
from the appointed review bodies.
Consequently, environmental out-
comes, the sustainability of resource
use, or the enhancement of public
participation in resource manage-
ment procedures hardly rated a men-
tion in any of the discussions by the
review groups. The overwhelming
concern was to facilitate develop-
ment, decrease regulation on eco-
nomic activity, lower costs on
business and, ironically, decrease
the opportunities for community
involvement in the processes of the
Act.
The Parliamentary Commissioner
for the Environment (Parliament's
environmental "watch-dog") has
commented: "The current process of
RMA review ... is inadequate. There
has been little time to consider
options that would enhance the Act
so it can contribute to the goal of sus-
tainable management of the environ-
ment ... The consequences of any
changes to the Act on the quality of
environmental outcomes do not
appear to be part of the current
debate."
The Labour Party has accused the
Government of "gutting" the Act. The
Green Party described it as a "full
frontal attack on environmental pro-
tection". Action for Community and
the Environment, a coalition of
groups formed to oppose the chan-
ges, stated: "The proposals ... con-
tain fundamental changes to the Act
which present a serious risk to envi-
ronmental protection and threaten
to seriously undermine puhlic
rights."
The review recommendations and
the subsequent amendments indi-
cated by the minister will inevitably
affect the way the legislation is inter-
preted and applied. The concept of
sustainable management is likely to
be much more narrowly defined and
environmental protection is likely to
be compromised. The changes will
also profoundly affect public partici-
pation in resource management pro-
cedures and thus the ahility of
communities to exercise control over
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development in their area and advo-
cate environmental protection.
Which is precisely the intent.
Despite the rhetoric about the sus-
tainable management of resources
and enhancing community input into
resource management procedures,
the underlying intent is to turn these
decisions over to the market.
For example, the proposed chan-
ges to the definition of environment
(to remove social and economic con-
siderations) will diminish the ability
of citizens to adjudicate on the
adverse social or economic effects of
development on their communities.
These effects are to be much more
narrowly defined. Adverse effects of
development are to be confined
largely to the biophysical environ-
ment.
This proposal contravenes all
international guidelines on sustain-
able development. Even more
extraordinary, the removal of social
and economic concerns from the
definition of environment is in com-
plete contradiction to the Govern-
ment's own Environment 2010
Strategy, which devotes substantial
rhetoric to the need to fully integrate
environmental, economic and social
concerns in development strategies.
Other changes are mainly proce-
dural but no less important. Propos-
als to allow the private sector rather
than council staff to process consent
applications means consultants paid
by the applicants will determine the
adequacy of assessments of environ-
mental effects and decide whether
applications should be notified (and
thus open to public scrutiny).
Appointed commissioners, most
likely by the minister, will decide all
consent applications rather than
elected councillors or commission-
ers as is the case now. And their deci-
sion will be final. It is proposed that
there will be no subsequent appeal
rights to the Environment Court to
hear the case anew (although this
has come under considerable criti-
cism).
The combined effect of these pro-
cedural changes will be to substan-
tially reduce community input into
resource management procedures
and thus community control over
economic development.
At present, about 5% of all consent
applications are publicly notified,
down from 10% five years ago and up
to 20% before the RMA was intro-
duced. Public involvement in deve l-
opmental decisions has already been
severely curtailed despite the rheto-
ric about increased participation
under the RMA. Under the new pro-
posals, it will reduce even further -
some predict to less than 1%. We
might as well forget about public
involvement altogether, which is
pretty much the intent anyway.
In addition, local democratic
accountability over developmental
decisions will be removed.
Appointed commissioners are not
accountable to the local community
whereas elected councillors are. It is
argued these changes will improve
decisions made on consent applica-
tions. Yet when _we examine the
statistics on decision-making this
argument seems spurious. The
National Resource Consent Data-
base for regional councils shows that
less than 1% of decisions were
appealed in 1996-1998, and of that
1%, council decisions were upheld in
95% of cases. Although no-one would
claim council decisions are infalli-
ble,- these figures certainly don't
indicate a problem that requires a
radical solution.
Neither can it be shown that intro-
ducing contestability into consent
processing will improve procedures
or lower costs. Most applications
(around 80%) are already processed
within the time frame prescribed
under the Act. Moreover, it has been
argued costs will actually increase
under the new regime rather than
reduce.
Tbe administration of new legisla-
tion as substantial as the RMA was
never going to be easy. Councils, on
the whole, have performed well
under extremely difficult circum-
stances, not helped by the lack of
policy statements from central gov-
ernment which could have clarified
some contentious issues.
Finally, it should be noted the
proposed amendments did not enjoy
wide support from the large number
of submissions on the review pro-
cess. Most of those making submis-
sions believed the Act did not
require radical change. Most con-
cerns related to how the legislation
was being administered, rather than
the substantive and procedural con-
tent of the Act itself. Many making
submissions were concerned the
proposed changes would reduce the
ability of the Act to ensure environ-
mental outcomes, improve sustain-
able resource use and enhance
public participation.
As the Parliamentary Commis-
sioner for the Environment con-
cluded: "There is little
demonstration of government com-
mitment to enhancing environmen-
tal management and the overall
sustainability of resource use."
• Kerry Grllndy is a university
tutor and researcher.
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7.8 Radical Policy Analysis
Part Three of the thesis opened with a series ofpapers and newspaper articles written by
the author in the course ofhis Ph.D. studies critiquing the formulation, interpretation and
implementation of the resource management legislation in New Zealand. In particular,
they focus on the interpretation and implementation of section 5 of the Resource
Management Act - the purpose and principles of the Act. These articles are examples of
counter-hegemonic struggle undertaken by the author as an academic planner in a
university institution and environmental activist/planner in the community. They are
indicative of the role that radical planning can undertake. This role is prescribed in the
theory of radical planning as one of 'hostile critique' within academia and the ranks of the
planning profession.
As noted, the education system is a crucial site for hegemonic struggle. It is here that
radical planners can formulate and disseminate a challenge to the dominant group. The
education system thus becomes a strategic site for 'anti-coercive' resistance and a centre
for counter-hegemonic activity. The counter-hegemonic arguments put forward in the
articles, following Gramsci, represent attempts to challenge the 'moral and intellectual
leadership' of the leading social group, the 'common sense' of the times, the dominant
contemporary neoliberal ideology. As elements ofpersuasion and education, as well as
the elaboration and dissemination of ideas, they attempt to raise a critical awareness of
the political-economic dynamics underlying resource management and environmental
planning in New Zealand. They represent, in this sense, a study of counter-hegemonic
activity and provide a practical application of the theory presented in Part Two.
The articles are concrete attempts to move from the theory developed in Part Two of the
thesis to practical planning activity. They illustrate in practical terms the dialectic
between theory and practice that a philosophy ofpraxis demands. In line with the dictates
of critical social science, they also represent attempts at changing social reality through
social practice. As observed earlier, critical social science is not only concerned with
describing social reality, it is intimately committed to changing that reality. It is
committed to social practice as well as social analysis. A philosophy ofpraxis can thus be
seen as 'science and action'.
In the conventional planning sense, the articles can be viewed as a form of policy
analysis, being the description and explanation of the causes and consequences of
government action (Dye, 1976). Policy analysis in planning is usually undertaken within
the tradition of societal guidance. It seeks to improve public policy within the existing
socio-economic structure. However, policy analysis can serve another purpose. By
critiquing public policy from a radical perspective - i.e. by critiquing the underlying
presuppositions ofpolicy rather than its surface manifestations - policy analysis can
challenge the dominant assumptions about the socio-economic system, the 'common
sense' regarding the basic structure and functions of society. In this way policy analysis
can act in opposition to the prevailing orthodoxy; in short, to serve a radical cause.
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That was the objective of the articles presented in Part Three of the thesis. By critiquing
the resource management legislation - its formulation, interpretation and implementation -
these articles aim to shed new light on the policy process. And, by challenging the
prevailing ideology regarding resource management and environmental regulation, and
arguing an alternative position, the author sought to raise critical awareness about the
political economy of resource management in New Zealand. Through such an approach
the political economy ofcapitalism (particularly neoliberalism) in its wider aspects can be
subjected to scrutiny.
The resource management legislation - its formulation, interpretation and implementation
- was revealed as intensely political by serving particular interests whilst circumscribing
others. Planning, by formulating and implementing policy, was shown to be a political
activity rather than the objective, technocratic exercise as is often portrayed. At every step
in the process of formulating, interpreting and implementing policy, political decisions
are involved, although these are often obscured and presented as value-free and
'scientific'. The intensely political nature of the public policy process can thus be made
explicit through radical policy analysis, and particular interests presented as universal - as
the 'common good' or the 'public interest' - can be exposed.
Policy analysis can also be seen as a form of discourse analysis. Discourses are
frameworks which "embrace particular combinations of narratives, concepts, ideologies
and signifying practices, each relevant to a particular realm of social action" (Barnes and
Duncan, 1992:8). They are, in Foucault's (1972:31) words, "sets of regularities which
constrain and enable social action, individual expectations and the questions which can be
asked by people under a particular discourse". The debate over section 5 of the Resource
Management Act can thus be viewed as a particular discourse concerned with resource
management and environmental regulation in New Zealand. It encompasses differing
ideologies and 'signifying practices' relevant to specific social actions, in this case
planning in the public domain. By deconstructing this discourse those ideologies and
signifying practices can be made explicit.
The articles presented in Part Three, and the accompanying commentary, reveal that
because of its pivotal role in resource management, and in determining environmental
outcomes, section 5 of the Resource Management Act is profoundly significant and its
meaning is inevitably subject to ongoing dispute. These alternative meanings are currently
being contested in various judicial (Environment Court) and quasi-judicial (council)
settings. It is through this ongoing debate, together with possible legislative amendments,
that sustainable management will ultimately be given more explicit meaning.
The Resource Management Act has been in place for over ten years and experience with
the legislation is accumulating. There are growing bodies of literature and case law on the
interpretation of section 5. Continuing uncertainty over the meaning of sustainable
management is, however, a notable feature of the Act's first twelve years of operation. As
Milligan (1995) commented, sustainable management has thus far been subjected to little
in the way ofdetailed conceptual analysis outside the courts, nor even much judicial
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analysis in court. Phillipson (1994:91) has, in fact, chastised the Environment Court for
its lack ofjudicial analysis, or what he terms'quality litigation' . He alleged: "The
Tribunal [Environment Court] in particular has shown a marked reluctance to delve more
deeply into the legislation and tackle the key questions and definitional problems which
must be addressed".
On the other hand, it has been argued in some quarters that section 5 should not be
subject to strict and precise definition. The High Court (1994:86), for example, observed
that section 5 is intended to allow the application ofpolicy in a broad and general way. It
stated: "This part of the Act [section 5] expresses in ordinary words of wide meaning the
overall purpose and principles of the Act. It is not, I think, a part of the Act which should
be subjected to strict rules and principles of statutory construction which aim to extract a
precise and unique meaning from the words used. There is a deliberate openess about the
language, its meanings and its connotations which I think is intended to allow the
application ofpolicy in a general and broad way".
It has also been argued that it is verging on the impossible to arrive at a strict and precise
interpretation of section 5. The Environment Court (1995:20) observed that: "Notable
though the Resource Management Act is for the aspirations and principles embodied in it,
their very generality seems to have led in the drafting to an accumulation ofwords
verging in places on turgidity". Harris (1993:67-68) has chastised Parliament for this
imprecision. He stated: "Even the most thorough analysis of section 5 is unlikely to lead
to a confident clarity of understanding. Parliament has deliberately left the wording
indeterminate. The Court, more particularly the Court of Appeal, is being left to give a
more definitive content to the purpose of the Act. Parliament should not have abdicated
its law-making responsibility in this way".
Despite these varying views on the desirability, or indeed the possibility, ofprecise
definition, the interpretation of section 5 has been, and will continue to be, subject to
vigorous debate. First, as worded in the legislation, the purpose of the Act is to promote
the sustainable management ofnatural and physical resources. As Wheen (1995) pointed
out, the word 'promote' allows differing interpretations. To some, the word promote
implies a "positive statement requiring action to be taken" (Fisher, 1991b: 11). To others it
signifies that "sustainable management is an ideal, or goal, that the Act aspires to, but that
its achievement is not mandatory at all costs" (Harris, 1993:59). The Minister for the
Environment (Upton, 1995a:2), in a fascinating account of the genesis of section 5,
supported that view when he stated:
"In describing the Act's purpose as the promotion of the sustainable management of
natural and physical resources, section 5 spells out the end that is sought. The use of
the word promote is significant in this regard. The section does not describe a
particular, defined outcome... Rather it describes a goal which mayor may not be
achieved... but whose promotion will be encouraged through the application of the
Act's provisions".
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This implies that section 5 ought not to be given a precise and final definition, but rather
that sustainable management should be seen as an objective, or a process perhaps, that
defies precise elucidation and will alter over time with changing circumstances. I agree
with such a view. Change is endemic to all environmental systems and processes, social
as well as biophysical. To insist on a precise interpretation of sustainable management
that is incapable of responding to changing social and ecological circumstances would be
unlikely, over the long term, to achieve its objective. This does not mean, however, that
the broad principles of sustainability cannot and must not be established. Indeed, debates
over the interpretation of section 5 have thus far concerned the establishment of broad,
but no less important, parameters concerning the interpretation and application of the
concept of sustainable management.
The first major debate occurred early in the term of the Act and was over a 'bottom line'
versus a 'balancing' approach to section 5. It was raised initially by Fisher (1991a; 1991b)
and centred on the interpretation of the word 'while' in section 5. Fisher argued that
sustainable management is composed of two parts. The first, which proceeds the word
'while', he termed the 'management function'. Its object is the immediate social,
economic, and cultural well being and the health and safety of present-day people and
communities. It is founded on conventional humanist utilitarian ethics. Fisher (1991b:50)
described it as follows: "The reference to 'people and communities' restricts the activity
of management to the achievement of human purposes. An anthropocentric function ...
Thus, environmental and ecological considerations form no part of the objectives to be
achieved by engaging in this activity of managing the use, development, and protection of
resources".
The second part of sustainable management, termed by Fisher the 'ecological function',
succeeds the word 'while', and outlines in paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) considerations that
must be observed when managing the use, development, and protection of resources.
These considerations encompass intergenerational, ecological and environmental
concerns. As Fisher (1991b:50) stated: "Notwithstanding the ambiguities in paragraphs
(a), (b) and (c) they clearly contemplate long term considerations some of which are
ecocentric and others which are anthropocentric". He continued: "The critical question for
the meaning and application of the definition of 'sustainable management' is the meaning
of the word 'while' which links the first stated management function and the second
stated ecological function" (p.51). Fisher went on to discuss two possible meanings of
that word. He argued that if 'while' is treated as a coordinating conjunction (such as
'and') then the Act prescribes a balance to be achieved between the first function and the
second function. On the other hand, if 'while' is a subordinating conjunction (similar to
'if) then the ecological function has priority over the management function. In this sense
the management function is ancillary.
Rightly, Fisher emphasised that this issue goes to the very heart of the policy direction of
the legislation. He argued that a strictly grammatical approach ('while' as a subordinating
conjunction) affords to ecological and environmental sustainability a primary role in the
definition of sustainable management, or what some commentators have called an
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'environmental bottom line' . On the face of it, Fisher argued, this is what the definition
means. This can be contrasted to the more traditional approach of the previous planning
legislation, the Town and Country Planning Act, which attempted to balance social and
economic concerns with environmental considerations, with the result that the former
almost always took precedence over the later.
There has been much subsequent debate over this issue (for example, see Grant, 1995;
Grundy, 1995a; 1995b; 1997b; Harris, 1993; Kerkin, 1993; McLean, 1992; Milligan,
1992; Pardy, 1997; Randerson, 1991, 1997; Upton, 1994; 1995a; 1995b, 1996). Most
commentators, including myself, support the interpretation that sees the ecological
function as a set of requisites (or constraints) that must be secured (or observed) if the
management function is to be considered sustainable. This interpretation was also
advocated by the Minister for the Environment at the time. For example, in an address to
the Resource Management Law Association Conference (Upton, 1994) the Minister
favoured what he described as a 'progressive' (bottomline) approach over a
'conservative' (balancing) interpretation of section 5.
There have also been a number ofjudicial and extra-judicial pronouncements on section 5
in regard to this debate. For the most part, they favour the progressive interpretation. For
example, the Environment Court (1994a:40) made the following observations: "The
provisions of section 5(2) (a), (b) and (c) may be considered cumulative safeguards which
exist in order to ensure that the land resource is managed in such a way, or such a rate,
which enables the people of the community to provide for the various aspects of their
social well-being and their health and safety. They are safeguards which must be met
before the Act's purpose is fulfilled" (my emphasis). As Wheen (1995) has pointed out, a
similar approach was adopted by the Board of Enquiry into the Proposed New Zealand
Coastal Policy Statement (1993:10), when it stated: "We have concluded that (a), (b) and
(c) are three specific objectives (or constraints) which must be pursued (or applied) while
people and communities are being enabled to provide for [their social, economic and
cultural wellbeing]. The requirements of (a), (b) and (c) are cumulative; all must be
observed".
There appears to be a significant measure of agreement that the broad structure of section
5 does not demand the balancing of contemporary social, economic, and cultural well
being against the intergenerational, ecological, or environmental concerns outlined in the
latter part of the section. Rather, those concerns qualify the traditional utilitarian
imperatives contained within the first part. They represent a number of constraints within
which this utilitarian ethic must function. As Grant (1995:7) put it: "It seems now to be
accepted that the word 'while' which links the subparagraphs to the opening part of the
subsection is not intended merely to express a general desire for contemporaneity, but to
require that the three specific objectives or constraints must all be pursued while people
and communities are being enabled to provide for their well-being: to put it another way,
their enablement must not render incapable offulfillment the objectives specified in the
three subparagraphs".
300
The controversies over the interpretation of section 5 have since turned to the
interpretation and application of subparagraphs (a), (b) and (c), comprising Fisher's
ecological function, and the debate has taken on a distinctly political and ideological hue.
I term this debate the 'narrow' versus the 'holistic' interpretation.
The narrow interpretation, founded on neoliberal political and economic ideology and
championed by the then Minister for the Environment and his government, sees
sustainable management as primarily (perhaps exclusively) concerned with controlling
the effects of economic activities on the biophysical environment. It eschews any
consideration of socio-economic effects of resource use (including equity concerns) and
itt attempts largely to internalise (by bringing into the ambit of the market) environmental
externalities. It also trumpets the deregulated market as the appropriate mechanism for
allocating resources and determining the scale of macro-economic activity. That view of
the legislation should be seen in the overall context of the radical restructuring that has
occurred in New Zealand since the early 1980s. The decade or more ofpolitical,
economic and social upheaval which followed the election of the Fourth Labour
Government in 1984 saw New Zealand transformed from a welfare-corporatist state to a
neoliberal, postwelfare society (Kelsey, 1993; 1995). The Resource Management Act is
deeply embedded in this radical political economic restructuring (see Gleeson and
Grundy, 1997; Grundy, 1995b; Grundy and Gleeson, 1996; Memon and Gleeson, 1995).
The focus of the new legislation is seen to be on controlling externalities arising from
economic activities rather than the control of activities themselves (i.e. regulating
resource allocation). As the Minister for the Environment (Upton, 1991:3019) said of the
legislation: "the Government has moved to underscore the shift in focus from planning
for activities to regulating their effects ... We run a much more liberal market economy
these days. Economic and social outcomes are in the hands of citizens to a much greater
extent than they previously have been. The Government's focus is now on externalities -
the effects of those activities on the receiving environment" Planning intervention in
general, and regulation in particular, are to be kept to a minimum, and the market given as
free a rein as possible. In other words, bureaucratic intervention would be replaced by
market forces.
I have argued extensively that this conservative interpretation of sustainable management
is manifestly incapable of addressing the complex requirements of section 5 (Grundy,
1995a; 1995c; 1995d; 1997b; 1997c). The focus on biophysical environmental effects,
for example, does not in any substantial way address either of the first two objectives of
sustainable management set down in subparagraphs (a) and (b), and only partially
addresses the third (subparagraph (c)). The needs of future generations and the
maintenance of ecological life support processes involve questions of resource allocation
and the scale of resource use, roles assigned exclusively to the market by neoliberal
ideology. In fact, by equating sustainable management to merely dealing with market
externalities (adverse effects of activities on the biophysical environment) this
interpretation effectively marginalises these fundamental imperatives, in reality, the
quintessence of sustainability (Grundy, 1995c). Public policy decision making which
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relies exclusively on market criteria can address only short-term allocative efficiency, not
any of the other requisites for determining the sustainable management of resources such
as intergenerational equity, the sustainable utilisation of natural resources, and the
maintenance of ecological well being.
Furthermore, the neoliberal insistence on excluding socio-economic and cultural concerns
from resource management reveals further contradictions. It conflicts with international
statements on the concept of sustainability and, paradoxically, is inconsistent with
national policy statements on reconciling social, economic and environmental policy
initiatives. For example, the Government's Environment 2010 Strategy (Ministry for the
Environment, 1994) devotes substantial space to the need to fully integrate
environmental, economic and social concerns in development strategies. It stated: "The
strategy is linked to the Government's Path to 2010. It promotes the integration of
environmental, economic and social policies and strategies ... The 1992 Rio 'Earth
Summit' highlighted the need to fuse economic, social and environmental policies at
local, national and international levels" (p.3). Furthermore, the Strategy has, as the first
priority on its Environmental Management Agenda: "the integration of environmental,
social and economic factors into the mainstream of decision-making in all sectors, at all
levels" (PA8). Those statements are in direct conflict with neoliberal attempts to remove
socio-economic considerations from section 5 of the RMA.
An holistic interpretation, on the other hand, views social, economic and cultural
concerns (including issues of equity) as intimately part of any serious attempt to
operationalise the concept of sustainable management. This line of thought draws upon
increasing international recognition that social, cultural, economic and ecological
concerns are interdependent and that it is fundamentally irrational to separate them.
Indeed, the distinguishing characteristic of sustainable development as it has evolved
globally is that social, cultural, economic and ecological concerns are intimately linked
and should not be separated analytically or in policy initiatives. The major theme of the
WCED report, Our Common Future, and Agenda 21, the policy statement from the
UNCED Conference (1992), is that the concept of sustainable development requires fully
integrated social, economic and environmental policies at local, regional and international
levels. Agenda 21, perhaps the most comprehensive international statement yet on
environmental protection and remedial strategies, stated the overall objective of
integrating environment and development in decision-making to be:
"to improve or restructure the decision-making process so that consideration of socio-
economic and environmental issues is fully integrated... Governments should...
improve the processes of decision-making so as to achieve the progressive integration
of economic, social and environmental issues in the pursuit of development that is
economically efficient, socially equitable and responsible, and environmentally sound"
(p.95).
Further, in a specific reference to planning and management systems, it advised:
"Governments should review the status of the planning and management system and,
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where necessary, modify and strengthen procedures so as to facilitate the integrated
consideration of social, economic and environmental issues" (p.95).
The holistic interpretation also incorporates concerns over resource allocation and the
scale of economic activity into its defmition of sustainable management. It questions the
ability of the deregulated market to ensure the sustainable management of resources. In
fact, it posits the liberalised market as a cause ofunsustainable resource use and
environmental degradation, rather than a solution (Grundy and Gleeson, 1996). It
recognises a fundamental contradiction between the egocentric and utilitarian ethical
foundations of neo-liberalism (and its economic expression: the maximisation ofprofit,
and the maximisation of economic growth) and the intergenerational and environmental
ethics identified in the concept of sustainability (Grundy, 1997c).
In essence, the holistic interpretation recognises that intergenerational concerns and
ecological integrity require consideration of resource allocation and the overall scale of
economic activity in addition to consideration of environmental effects, both socio-
economic and biophysical. This holistic, or inclusive, interpretation of section 5, it is
argued, is better able to address the complex requirements of sustainable management as
defined in the resource management legislation.
During the writing of this thesis, the Resource Management Act came under renewed
attack from the New Right. In response to criticism from business and farming interests
alleging increased costs imposed upon them by the Act, the Minister for the Environment
initiated a major review of the legislation as a precursor to subsequent amendments.
Although the review recommendations and the amendments indicated by the Minister
were mainly procedural, they would have inevitably affected the way Part II (in general)
and section 5 (in particular) would be interpreted and applied. The intent of the proposed
procedural changes was to reduce regulation on economic activity and to allow the market
to operate more freely. Development interests would have increasingly dominated
contests over the meaning of sustainable management, whilst community and
environmental concerns would have been further marginalised.
Other proposed changes represented a concerted effort to circumscribe opportunities for
public participation. Resource management decisions were to be removed from the
community and turned over to the market. Proposed changes to allow private sector
consent processing and appointed commissioners to hear consent applications would have
further eroded local community control and democratic accountability over resource
management decisions. This would have inevitably affected the interpretation and
implementation of section 5.
Predictably, the review group attacked the inclusion of socio-economic and cultural
considerations in Part II of the Act. It argued for a much more narrowly focused planning
process, concentrating almost exclusively on controlling the biophysical environmental
effects of resource use. The group recommended amendment of the definition of
environment and amenity values to achieve this, and the Minister indicated that he
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intended to follow these recommendations. The proposed amendment to the definition of
environment and amenity values to facilitate a narrower approach to section 5 found little
support in the large number of submissions received on the review group's
recommendations (Ministry for the Environment, 1998). Most submitters believed the
purpose and principles of the Act to be sound and did not require radical change. Further,
there was very little support for the Act to be solely concerned with biophysical effects.
Many submissions expressed resistance to removing social and economic considerations
from the concept of sustainable management, and most submitters did not consider
changes were necessary to the definition of environment or amenity values.
With the election of the Labour/Alliance Coalition Government in 1999, the proposed
amendments to the Resource Management Act have been re-examined and the more
extreme measures removed. For example, the proposed changes to the definition of
environment and amenity values were discarded, along with the proposals to allow
private sector consent processing and appointed commissioners to hear consent
applications. However, the main thrust of the amendments passed in 2003 remained
committed to lowering compliance costs to business. There is little emphasis on ensuring
sustainable management of resources or improving environmental outcomes, although, to
be fair, there are new provisions to better manage historic and cultural heritage and
endemic biodiversity.
Analysis of the debate about the resource management legislation reveals two very
different views ofplanning, each situated within the parameters of the two broad planning
traditions identified earlier in the thesis: societal guidance (reformism) and social
mobilisation (transformation). The New Zealand Government, in its interpretation of the
Resource Management Act, has advocated a 'narrowed' view of planning underpinned by
a neoliberal ideology associated with deregulated capitalism. This view presents planning
as a rational, depoliticised process undertaken by professional planning experts. It
restricts planning to attempts to internalise wherever possible environmental externalities
within the ambit of a deregulated (laissez-faire) market system. Allocation of resources
and determination of the macro-scale of the economy are largely left to the market, while
planning is relegated to attempting to mitigate environmental disbenefits and providing
institutional and infrastructural support to development. Wider social, cultural, and
economic considerations are seen to be external to this 'effects-based' planning system.
This view ofplanning is firmly situated within the tradition of societal guidance. It
implicitly accepts the logic of capitalism (in fact, serves to reinforce it) and merely
attempts to resolve its short-term environmental effects.
The alternate 'holistic' interpretation that I advance in this thesis is founded upon a
radically different vision of planning. This view ofplanning requires a critical
reexamination of the political and socio-economic presuppositions underpinning
neoliberal capitalism in light of the ecological and social contradictions developing within
the present mode ofproduction. The resolution of those contradictions, it is argued, will
require a deliberate re-appraisal of both the allocation of resources and the scale of
resource use to ensure ecological sustainability. It will also involve examination of the
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broader social, cultural and economic impacts of capitalist production: for example, the
distributional costs and benefits of resource use; social equity concerns resulting from
capital concentration; the spatial dysfunctions ofuneven development; and the socio-
economic concerns resulting from capital expansion; along with the fundamental class
structure, exploitation, and alienation inherent to the capitalist mode ofproduction itself.
If the market (and by implication the capitalist mode ofproduction) proves incapable of
allocating resources and determining the macro-scale of the economy to ensure the long-
term biophysical reproduction of the existing socio-economic system, then an alternative
must be sought. In other words, if capitalism cannot address the ecological contradiction
brought about by the inherent dynamic to expand capital, then the search for an
alternative mode ofproduction becomes necessary. In addition, if the capitalist mode of
production cannot address the fundamental socio-economic dysfunctions currently
afflicting society, then an alternative economic system must be sought. In other words, if
capitalism cannot address the social contradiction brought about by the inherent dynamic
to concentrate and centralise capital, as argued in this thesis, then an alternative is
required.
This alternative mode ofproduction must be able to address the socio-economic and
ecological contradictions developing within the present system, thus ensuring long-term
sustainability of the human appropriation of nature and long-term stability of the social
relations ofproduction. This, it is argued, will necessitate a radical reorientation of the
present political economy and transformation of the capitalist mode ofproduction to one




The thesis investigated the theory and practice ofplanning in Western capitalist societies.
Specifically, it examined the tradition of radical planning within the context of
conventional planning theory. Its objectives were to evaluate the historical influence of
radical planning thought on conventional planning theory and practice, and, secondly, to
assess the relevance of radical planning to contemporary capitalist societies. Initially this
was accomplished through an analysis of the history of radical planning thought,
particularly the theories of a small number of influential planning theorists from the turn
of the nineteenth century up to the present. The contemporary relevance of radical
planning was examined through a critical evaluation ofFriedmann's theory of
transformative planning and by offering an alternative to Friedmann based upon a Marxist
critique of capitalism and Gramscian transition theory. This normative theory is then
presented as practice in the form of a critique of the resource management legislation
undertaken by the author in the course ofhis Ph.D. studies. In this way the normative
theory is linked to practice, and the dialectic between theory and practice is realised.
The thesis evaluated three propositions:
1. That radical planning thought, although often obscured, possesses a rich history and
has had a profound and lasting influence on modem planning theory and practice.
2. That radical planning theory has a positive role to play in contemporary (and future)
planning aimed at the transformation of the capitalist mode ofproduction.
3. That this theory can be applied to a practice of radical planning that can contribute to
a progressive challenge to the dominant capitalist hegemony.
The methods used to evaluate those propositions were:
1. An historical analysis of radical planning thought and its influence on conventional
planning theory and practice.
2. A critical appraisal of Friedmann's theory of social transformation and its relevance to
contemporary society.
3. The formulation of a theory for, and of, radical planning applicable to advanced
capitalist societies.
4. The application of this theory to practice through a critique of the formulation,
interpretation and implementation of the resource management legislation in New
Zealand.
In short, the intent of the thesis was to make an original and meaningful contribution to
planning theory and practice by evaluating the influence ofpast radical approaches on
conventional planning, and by proposing a progressive future role for radical planning in
advanced capitalist countries. It builds upon a rich and varied intellectual tradition in the
planning literature, but a tradition that is infrequently acknowledged. By examining past
radical approaches to planning, and building upon these to advocate a possible future
direction, the thesis extends knowledge in a particular field of inquiry and contributes
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new knowledge to an existing body of intellectual labour - the theory and practice of
planning.
In particular, the thesis makes two contributions to radical planning theory. First, in
respect to theory for planning, the thesis undertakes a fundamental and comprehensive
critique of the capitalist mode ofproduction. This critique is based upon Marx's
economic writings and, in this sense, follows Marx's analysis of the social and economic
contradictions inherent to capitalism which threaten its socio-economic reproduction.
Whilst acknowledging the continued relevance of these socio-economic contradictions,
the thesis extends this analysis, and prescriptions for radical change, to encompass an
ecological contradiction of capitalism that threatens its biophysical reproduction. This is a
departure from orthodox Marxism, and one that attempts to reinterpret Marx in the light
of contemporary realities facing present day capitalism.
The extension of Marxist theory to encompass an ecological dimension is a relatively
recent, but increasingly productive, field of intellectual labour. My research follows this
trend, but also contributes new theoretical material. In particular, my analysis of the
conflict between the forces ofproduction (as an unsustainable transformation of nature)
and relations ofproduction (as the concentration and centralisation of capital, and hence
economic and political power) resulting in an impasse that cannot be resolved by
capitalism has not, as far as I am aware, been previously undertaken. In this regard this
analysis makes an original contribution to Marxist theory and to the theory of radical
planning.
Secondly, in regard to the theory ofplanning - the methodology ofplanning - the
application of Gramscian transition theory to a normative theory of planning has not, as
far as I am aware, been previously attempted in a systematic fashion. Thus, this effort can
be regarded as an original contribution to the theory and practice ofplanning. Most
previous studies concerning planning from a radical perspective have been in the form of
negative critique, and have offered little in the way of a positive role for planning.
Friedmann's theory oftransformative planning, although one of the very few to advance a
progressive role for planning in contemporary capitalist societies, limited this role to civil
society. He did not see a role for radical planners in political society, i.e. the state sector.
By using Gramscian theory, I could prescribe a role for radical planners in the state
apparatus as well as in civil society, an extension of Friedmann' s earlier efforts.
In addition to its theoretical contributions, the thesis also presents theory as practice in the
form of a critique of the resource management legislation in New Zealand undertaken by
the author in the course of his Ph.D. studies. In this way the theory developed in the thesis
is linked to a concrete practice of radical planning and the dialectic between theory and
practice is realised. The critique of the formulation, interpretation and implementation of
the resource management legislation presented in the thesis also constitutes an original
contribution to planning theory and practice in New Zealand. This critique was
undertaken at a time when the most serious challenge to planning in New Zealand's
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history was occurring. Yet, despite the serious nature of the challenge, there was
surprisingly little critical response from the planning profession.
The lack of critical response from the profession would seem to support the main
contentions presented in the thesis regarding the role of conventional planning. Firstly,
that planning was, and is, viewed by many in the profession as primarily an apolitical
activity; a technocratic, objective procedure largely divorced from politics. And,
secondly, the lack of critical response from the academies and upper echelons of the state
sector can be seen as supporting the hegemonic role that Gramscian theory assigns to
orthodox intellectuals: that is, acting as functionaries of the dominant economic group. A
large number of academics and civil servants supported the neoliberal agenda. They acted
precisely as the deputies of the dominant group disseminating the leading ideas and
contributing to the establishment and maintenance of the neoliberal 'common sense'.
Those academics and state sector intellectuals who did not promulgate the ideology
themselves, mostly chose to remain silent. This would suggest, following Gramsci, that
this is due to the intricate peer pressures, concerns about career advancement, and
professional influences that operate to ensure that the leading intellectuals do not
challenge the ideas of the dominant economic and political group: the dominant political-
economic orthodoxy. Thus, being one of the few substantial critical responses to the
neoliberal challenge, my critique of the resource management legislation is both original
and contributes to the field of knowledge concerning resource management and
environmental planning in New Zealand, particularly from a radical policy analysis
position.
As explained in the introduction, the thesis was not primarily concerned with evaluating
testable hypotheses as positivist science demands. The thesis, following the methods of
critical social science, was largely concerned with the dialectical analysis of reality, with
discovering and exposing underlying relations and dynamics of socio-historical
phenomena together with their accompanying contradictions that determine external
appearances. The propositions advanced in the thesis are thus evaluated through a critical
analysis that seeks to penetrate the 'veil of appearances' to discover the inner 'essence' of
things, the internal web of relations that is the 'real' basis of external appearance. This is
fundamentally different from the approach of nondialectical social science, which is not
concerned with essence at all, indeed, which does not recognise the concept. A positivist
science limits itself to empirical problems which can be stated in testable (refutable)
form. Dialectics does not deny the relevance or validity of empirical investigation, but
seeks to expand the concept of science beyond that of positivism.
The dialectical view of social science therefore poses an interpretive task quite different
from that of modern positivism. Positivist science penetrates phenomena to arrive at
truths in the form of 'laws' or patterns, but the task is one of sifting through random
disturbances to discover regularities (not essences) concealed within phenomena. The
dialectical approach, on the other hand, attempts to discover underlying essences (in the
form of internal relations and contradictions) and not mere regularities. It does so by
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penetrating the systematic disturbances imposed on phenomena and usually presented as
surface reality. These disturbances (appearances), be they ideological, political, social or
economic, affect our vision in ways of which we are mainly unaware. The task of
dialectical science, accordingly, is to make explicit the presence and nature of systematic
misperceptions so that we can discern essence where we might otherwise be deceived by
appearances.
Moreover, in line with the stance of critical science as an 'engaged science', the thesis is
concerned with changing social reality, with linking theory to practice. It is committed to
social practice as well as social analysis. Following Gramsci, it is both 'science and
action'. Marxist social science is not concerned solely with exposing illusion and delusion
about reality by revealing the essence underlying appearance. It is intimately committed to
changing reality. If its analytical power lies in revealing socio-economic and ecological
contradictions mysified by external appearance, its emancipatory potential rests upon its
commitment to radical socio-economic change. It insists upon a dialectical unity between
theory and practice, between knowledge and action. The purpose of engaged social
science is not merely to explain the world but to change it.
In Part One of this thesis, past radical approaches to planning theory and practice,
together with their historical roots, were analysed. It was discovered that planning has a
rich heritage of radical thought, although this heritage frequently goes unacknowledged
by the planning profession. Indeed, the founding fathers of modem urban and regional
planning at the turn of the last century, although lauded for their innovative spatial design
prescriptions and planning methodology, advocated the radical transformation of
Victorian capitalism. A number of influential planning theorists since then have likewise
advocated radical transformative approaches to planning. Four of these earlier bodies of
theory, along with Friedmann's recent theory of transformative planning, were examined.
Ebenezer Howard and Patrick Geddes were influenced by utopian socialist and anarchist
philosophy, and this philosophy informed their visions of the good society and methods
for achieving their visions. Two later influential figures were examined, Frank Lloyd
Wright and Le Cobusier, both of whom advanced utopian visions of future societies, one
based upon extreme decentralisation and the other on hierarchical centralisation. An
analysis of Friedmann's recent theory oftransformative planning and its relevance to
contemporary capitalism followed. It was found that Friedmann was influenced by
various intellectual traditions, including utopianism, anarchism and historical
materialism. It was determined that in each case the intent of the planning interventions
proposed by those planning theorists was to radically transform the capitalist mode of
production. Physical design, spatial arrangement and methodology were but practical
manifestations of a proposed fundamental change in the underlying socio-economic
system.
Although advocating a radical transformation of the capitalist mode ofproduction, it was
ascertained that the early theorists all relied upon utopian and anarchist traditions of
thought, both in their analyses of existing society and in their prescriptions for change.
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Their analyses of the existing mode ofproduction centred principally on a moral critique
of capitalist society in conjunction with technological and environmental determinism.
Humans, and hence society, were seen to be perfectible given the right environmental
circumstances, the correct application of technology, and a proper ethical stance. For
these early theorists, it was moral persuasion, force of example, and cooperative action
which would lead to social transformation to a 'higher' stage of human development.
They advocated an evolutionary transformation of capitalism relying upon the 'politics of
disengagement' to establish alternative communities within the existing structure of
capitalism that would show the way to their future society. Although Friedmann started
from an historical materialist critique of capitalism, he too regressed into utopian and
anarchist tendencies in his prescriptions for transformative change.
Whilst each approach to radical planning advanced by these earlier theorists can be
viewed as a response to particular historical crises in the capitalist mode ofproduction,
lack of an adequate socio-historical materialist analysis can in part explain the failure of
their proposals to predict, or inspire, widespread social reconstruction. In particular, the
lack of an historical materialist approach to the underlying dynamics and contradictions
of capitalism, and to fundamental social change, led to idealist interpretations of history,
existing society and subsequent utopian prescriptions for radical change. For them it was
human consciousness informed by ideal visions of the future and motivated by moral
critique that would lead to the necessary material changes in society.
All earlier theories for radical planning proposed by these theorists were, it was
suggested, inadequate. Their rationale, their underlying socio-philosophical
presuppositions for planning action, although opposed to capitalism and thus firmly
located within the tradition of social mobilisation, lacked a rigorous socio-historical and
materialist perspective. This, in turn, led to inadequate theories ofplanning; ineffectual
procedures and methodologies for transformative action. In essence, they all relied upon
idealist visions of an evolutionary transformation of the capitalist mode ofproduction
through increasing disengagement from capitalist society. They were, in other words,
profoundly utopian and essentially voluntarist. Instead of leading to the transformation of
capitalist society, the radical socio-political philosophies of the early theorists were
subsequently discarded.
However, their spatial designs and methodology have had a profound and lasting
influence on conventional planning theory and practice. Ironically, these elements of their
prescriptions were incorporated into reformist planning approaches designed to support
the very system that they had originally intended to transform. Howard's Garden City
concept had an enormous effect on orthodox planning and was introduced throughout the
world in various forms ranging from entire new towns to garden suburbs. Geddes'
regional planning (elaborated by Mumford and others) founded on regional surveys was
appropriated widely to serve reformist planning approaches. His 'survey before plan'
prescription served as the basis ofplanning methodology until after the Second World
War. Frank Lloyd Wright's vision of the individually-owned family homestead was
manifest in the detached suburban bungalow on its own plot of land that spread out from
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cities throughout the Western world following the Second World War. Le Corbusier's
'streets in the sky' likewise appeared in all major inner cities as corporate office towers or
inner city housing developments.
Although Friedmann made a worthy attempt at advancing a theory and practice of radical
planning applicable to contemporary capitalist societies, his theory of social
reconstruction was assessed as having a number of shortcomings. Friedmann started from
an historical materialist position in his analysis of capitalist society. However, his
exposition lacked an adequate analysis of the underlying dynamics inherent to the
capitalist mode of production, and almost completely ignored the relationship between the
forces ofproduction and the relations ofproduction that is essential to understanding the
contradictions afflicting contemporary capitalism, together with its historical trajectory.
This also led Friedmann to incorrect interpretations of, and prescriptions for, the
transformation process.
Friedmann's prescriptions for transformative action depart from the historical materialist
approach, and regress into revisionist strategies founded upon utopian and anarchist
traditions of thought. He envisaged the transformative process as essentially one of 'de-
linking' increasing spheres of life from capitalist domination (politically and
economically). This strategy relies upon a 'politics of disengagement' rather than a
'confrontational politics' and advocates an evolutionary transition from capitalism as
opposed to a revolutionary transformation. Friedmann's theory essentially regresses into
utopianism and eschews historical materialism's commitment to revolutionary class
struggle.
Friedmann's role for radical planners in his theory of social reconstruction inevitably
depends upon his evolutionist strategy and the politics of disengagement he relies upon.
Planners under this conception are mainly limited to activities within civil society; to
working with community groups and oppositional movements in order to facilitate and
coordinate 'selective de-linking' from capitalist society and the establishment of
alternative ways of life within the existing structure of capitalism. In line with his politics
of disengagement and his evolutionary strategy, Friedmann saw little scope for radical
planners within political society, especially within the state apparatus. The role of radical
planning was almost exclusively confined to civil society, to activity within the mobilised
community. This relegates planning outside the sphere of civil society to simply
supporting the state and hence capitalist interests. This conception confines the entire
realm ofplanning activity within the state sector to impotence from a radical perspective.
The author of this thesis agrees with Friedmann that there is a role for radical planning in
contemporary capitalist society and that this role will become increasingly important in
the future as the contradictions of capitalism intensify. Just as the beginning of the
twentieth century witnessed the advancement of planning as a method for transforming
capitalist society, so does the start of the twentieth-first century cry out for a progressive
and radical vision of planning. Whilst the concerns of the late nineteenth century and
early twentieth century centred largely on the social and immediate environmental
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dysfunctions of capitalism, the beginning of the twentieth-first century is facing a crisis of
a different magnitude - a global social and ecological crisis. Reformist approaches to
planning, it is argued (in agreement with Friedmann), are insufficient to address this
crisis, and a radical approach aimed once again at the transformation of the capitalist
mode ofproduction is required.
In Part Two of the thesis an attempt was made to develop a theory and practice of radical
planning to contribute to this transformation. Theoretically a rationale was proposed for
radical planning as a practical activity in advanced Western capitalist society and
procedurally a methodology was advanced to carry out these interventions. A theory for
radical planning and a theory ofradical planning were outlined. The theoretical rationale
was founded on a critique of capitalism based upon Marx's economic writings. These
were explored in Chapter 4 of Part Two. It was revealed that capitalism is dependent upon
two fundamental dynamics immanent to the system: the expansion of capital and the
concentration! centralisation of capital. These dynamics, it was argued, lead to intractable
contradictions in regard to the biophysical and socio-economic reproduction of the
capitalist mode ofproduction. They also contain within themselves a further critical
contradiction - a conflict between the forces ofproduction and the existing relations of
production.
From a historical materialist perspective, it is this conflict, manifest as increasing
ecological and socio-economic dysfunctions, that will lead to a revolutionary crisis - a
crisis of hegemony or a legitimation crisis. The resolution of this crisis relies upon class
struggle between a progressive proletarian movement and an increasingly reactionary
bourgeoisie. It is this revolutionary moment, and its associated class conflict, that has the
potential to lead to a radical transformation of the capitalist mode of production.
However, for the transformation to be progressive it must be a movement of the
'immense majority in the interests of the immense majority'. It must be a progressive
proletarian movement directly opposed to capital. The alternative remains a regression to
barbarism or some form of authoritarianism.
The nature of this transformative movement was analysed in Chapter 5 of Part Two.
Marx's and Engels' materialist interpretation ofhistory, together with their theories on
class conflict leading to the revolutionary transformation of one historical mode of
production to another, were examined. It was conceded that Marx' sand Engels'
explanation for the transition from capitalism to its succeeding mode of production was
not based upon an ecological contradiction as proposed in the thesis. However, by
examining Marx's and Engels' views on nature and the relationship between human
society and other nature it was argued that the proposed ecological contradiction
threatening the biophysical reproduction of the capitalist mode ofproduction was a valid
and appropriate extension of Marx's conception of the conflict between the forces of
production and the existing relations ofproduction in light of contemporary reality.
In addition, the reformulation of the proletariat to include the radical green movement
along with the traditional socialist elements, and to de-emphasis the role of the industrial
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proletariat, is considered a valid and necessary adjustment to Marx's conception of the
proletariat in order to accommodate contemporary trends. However, it was stressed that
the economic relationship to capital (which is the crucial aspect) is not at all altered by the
reformation of the proletariat along these lines.
For an insight into the nature, and role, of the proletarian movement in contemporary
capitalist society we turned to the writings of Antonio Gramsci who outlined a strategy of
transformative action appropriate to the advanced capitalist nations of the West. It was
argued that Gramsci's writings on hegemony, 'war ofposition' and the role of
intellectuals in the struggle over hegemony provided the theoretical substance for the
contemporary proletarian movement. These theories also provided the conceptual basis
for a theory ofradical planning - the methodology and procedural prescriptions aimed at
transformative planning practice. This theory was used to inform a normative practice of
radical planning outlined in Chapter 6 of Part Two of the thesis. Because it was based
upon the ecological contradiction inherent to the capitalist mode ofproduction as part of
its rationale (as part of its theoryfor planning) and relied upon a revolutionary alliance
between the radical green movement and the traditional forces of socialist action to bring
about transformative change (as part of its theory ofplanning), this theory and practice of
radical planning was termed Eco-Radical Planning.
Particular fields of action for radical planners in the superstructure of advanced capitalist
countries were distinguished. It was argued that the critical position ofpublic planning -
i.e. at the nexus between political and civil society - enabled a strategic role for radical
planners. Whilst orthodox planners function as 'deputies' of the dominant class,
extending and maintaining bourgeois hegemony and resolving immediate contradictions
in the capitalist mode of production, planners of a radical persuasion can use their critical
superstructural position to work in the opposite direction. That is, to challenge bourgeois
hegemony and expose the long term contradictions of capitalism.
It was suggested that for radical planners operating in the state sector, either in local
government or public sector organisations, opportunity exists for an 'anti-coercive'
function and 'counter-hegemonic' activity. Planners of a radical persuation, thus, have a
legitimate role within political society and within the state apparatus itself. It was also
argued that within civil society, by working with community and environmental groups,
radical planners can play a decisive role in constructing a counter-hegemonic movement
in opposition to capital. This role is both organisational and directive.
Radical planners also have a crucial role within the education system. Just as the
education system acts as a coercive force and centre of hegemonic dominance, so too can
radical planning use it as a site for 'anti-coercive' resistance and a centre of counter-
hegemonic activity. As disseminators of ideas, educators and persuaders, radical planners
within the education system can formulate and extend a proletarian ideology to counter
the prevailing 'common sense'. They can construct and reproduce a counter-hegemony - a
'moral and intellectual leadership' - to challenge that of the dominant group. This
leadership must be aimed at forming a unified proletarian movement to oppose the
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dominant hegemony. It must work towards raising a common consciousness amongst the
various groupings opposed to capital.
It was proposed that in order to effectively challenge the dominant class (critically in
moments of crisis) the disparate elements constituting the proletariat in its widest sense
must converge; a 'united front' or 'popular bloc' must emerge. The various groupings
must become conscious of their commonality in opposition to capital. The 'corporate'
interests of the separate groups must be fused, they must be shown to be the collective
interests of the proletariat as a whole. In this way, the proletariat, in its widest sense,
becomes the 'universal' interest, the interest of all society. The proletariat must become
the 'self-conscious, independent movement of the immense majority, in the interests of
the immense majority' .
In advanced capitalist countries, as the ecological and social contradictions 'mature', the
two main elements capable of forging this 'historic bloc' are posited as the traditional
socialist movement and the emerging radical green groups. It was argued that because of
the related ecological and social contradictions of capitalism there exists the potential for
a powerful radical 'red-green' alliance. This coalition may then draw in other disparate
elements within the proletariat to form a counter-hegemonic force capable of challenging
the dominant bourgeois hegemony. This challenge will intensify and may become
historical during times of organic crises - crises of legitimacy or authority - moments of
revolutionary potential when the dominant group has lost the consent of the masses.
In all fields of counter-hegemonic struggle in respect to planning in the public domain it
was postulated that similar tactics are involved. Radical planners must act as organisers of
counter-hegemonic struggle and directors of 'anti-coercive' activity. In both roles, as
organic intellectuals, radical planners act as centres for the formulation and dissemination
of ideas, as persuaders and educators, as constructors of a counter-hegemony - a
proletarian hegemonic influence in the realm ofpublic planning that can converge with
counter-hegemonic activity elsewhere within the proletariat.
Initially, radical planners in their capacity as organic intellectuals must engage in 'ruthless
criticism of the existing order'. As we have seen, it is through 'hostile' critique of both
bourgeois 'common sense' and the 'philosophy ofphilosophers', the leading ideas of the
dominant group, that a unified proletarian consciousness is developed - a consciousness
ofproletarian identity and its relation both to contemporary social groupings and to
historical movement. Thus, 'a philosophy ofpraxis cannot but present itself at the outset
in a polemical and critical guise'. It must be a 'critico-practical activity', engaging in a
protracted series of 'ideological, religious, philosophical, political and juridical polemics'.
Proletarian self-awareness is thus developed through a 'series of negations' and 'via a
consciousness of the identity and class limits of the enemy' .
Likewise, radical planning must be a critico-practica1 activity; it must present itself in a
polemical and critical guise. And critique, in the practical activity of radical planning
becomes, following Marx and Gramsci, a 'material force', and criticism a 'material
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weapon' in the proletarian movement. Criticism is therefore not simply an end in itself. It
becomes a means to an end - to raise a universal proletarian consciousness - which leads
to a revolutionary 'collective political will'.
Part Two concluded that there is a role for radical planners in the public sphere of modem
capitalist societies. Marx's critique of capitalism provides the necessary rationale.
Capitalism, it is argued, is ultimately unsustainable. Reformist approaches to planning are
thus inadequate. Hence, a powerful theory for radical planning action is needed. In
addition, Marx's and Engels' writings on historical materialism and revolutionary class
struggle provided the theoretical basis for the proletarian movement in opposition to
capital. More specifically, the writings of Gramsci furnished the theoretical substance for
the concrete activity of radical planning. His writings on the role of intellectuals in the
struggle over hegemony provide a strong conceptual base for radical planners operating in
the vast superstructural complexes of advanced capitalist countries. In this way, a strong
theory ofplanning appropriate to contemporary capitalism was outlined.
To be effective, to be more than merely 'scholastic', these theories for and ofradical
planning must be firmly linked to practice. It was ascertained that the historical
materialist approach to knowledge insists upon the dialectical unity of theory and
practice. Knowledge is acquired through practical activity and is worked up into theory
through abstraction. It must then return to practice. Knowledge of the world must be
redirected to changing the world through social practice. In this way knowledge is
vindicated and rendered relevant - it remains materialist, not merely contemplative but
'active'. This is the central tenet of the 'philosophy ofpraxis', of historical materialism. It
is also the central tenet of Eco-Radical Planning as a philosophy ofpraxis. Knowledge,
like theory, is not simply concerned with interpreting, explaining or predicting events.
Knowledge, to remain relevant, must be directed to actively bringing about change -
linking knowledge to action.
Planning, as described in the thesis, is intrinsically concerned with linking knowledge to
action. The working definition ofplanning, outlined at the beginning of the thesis,
described planning as 'the application of knowledge to a deliberate course of action
aimed at achieving a particular object, or set of objects'. It is the application of knowledge
to action that is the defining characteristic ofplanning. Moreover, planning action is
necessarily linked to theory. Theory for planning provides planners with a rationale, a
philosophical/political legitimisation for planning action. Theory ofplanning provides the
practitioner with methodology, with procedural knowledge for planning activity. And
theory in planning provides the relevant substantive knowledge for particular fields of
planning endeavour. In each case the theory exists precisely to inform practice.
Practice, in turn, validates knowledge, and theory is evaluated through practice. At the
same time, practice reflects back and informs theory. So practice informs theory just as
theory informs practice. There is a dialectical movement between the two elements. Thus,
in accord with a 'philosophy ofpraxis', the theoryfor planning and the theory ofplanning
presented in Part Two of the thesis must be applied to a practice of radical planning - to
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inform specific actions aimed at transformative change. The normative practice of Eco-
Radical Planning outlined in Chapter 6 of Part Two must be actualised and put into
practice. In this way, the theory it rests upon, its knowledge base, can be realised; it can
be vindicated and rendered relevant. At the same time, this theory can be evaluated and
practice can reflect back and inform further development in theory. Thus, the dialectic
between theory and practice can be realised in practical activity.
In order to make explicit this dialectic between theory and practice, and based upon the
theoretical prescriptions concerning critique as radical practice, articles written by the
author in the course of his Ph.D. studies are presented and discussed in Part Three of the
thesis. These articles comprised a substantial critique of the resource management
legislation in New Zealand, in particular the interpretation of section 5 - the purpose and
principles of the Resource Management Act 1991. They include a debate between the
author and the Minister for the Environment over the 'correct' interpretation of
sustainable management, the purpose ofresource management and environmental
regulation outlined in the legislation. In essence, the author questioned the Government's
interpretation of sustainable management based upon neoliberal political and economic
philosophy.
By questioning the prevailing ideology concerning resource management and
environmental regulation, the arguments put forward in the articles, following Gramsci,
represent attempts to challenge the 'moral and intellectual leadership' of the leading
social group, the 'common sense' of the times, the dominant contemporary neoliberal
bourgeois ideology. As elements ofpersuasion and education, the elaboration and
dissemination of ideas, they attempt to raise a critical awareness of the political-economic
dynamics underlying resource management and environmental planning. In so doing, they
attempt to bring into question the wider implications of neoliberal deregulated capitalism.
They represent, in this sense, a practical study of counter-hegemonic activity. They
constitute a form ofcounter-hegemonic activity that can be viewed as indicative of one of
the roles that a practice of radical planning can undertake. This role is prescribed in the
theory of radical planning presented in Part Two as one ofpolitical, socio-economic and
environmental critique (Gramsci's 'hostile criticism') within academia and the ranks of
the planning profession. As we have noted, the education system is a crucial site for
hegemonic struggle. It is here that radical planners can formulate and disseminate a
counter-hegemonic influence to challenge that of the dominant group. The education
system thus becomes a strategic site for 'anti-coercive' resistance and a centre for
counter-hegemonic activity.
In the conventional planning sense, the articles can also be looked upon as an empirical
study in policy analysis. Policy analysis is usually undertaken within the planning
tradition of societal guidance. It seeks merely to improve public policy within the
confines of the existing socio-economic structure. However, policy analysis can serve
another purpose. By critiquing public policy from a radical perspective, i.e. by critiquing
the underlying presuppositions ofpolicy rather than just the surface manifestations policy
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analysis can challenge the dominant assumptions about the socio-economic system, the
'common sense' regarding the basic structure and functions of society. In this way policy
analysis can be subverted to act in opposition to the prevailing hegemony and can
contribute to the construction of a counter-hegemony to challenge that of the dominant
group.
This was precisely the objective of the articles presented in Part Three of the thesis. By
critiquing the resource management legislation - its formulation, interpretation and
implementation - these articles attempt to shed new light on the policy process. And by
challenging the prevailing ideology regarding resource management and environmental
policy, and arguing an alternative position, the author, through these articles, sought to
raise critical awareness about the political economy of resource management in this
country. Through such an analysis the political economy of neoliberalism in its wider
implications can be brought under scrutiny.
The resource management legislation, its formulation, interpretation and implementation,
is revealed as intensely political serving particular interests whilst circumscribing others.
Planning, in both formulating and implementing policy, is shown to be indisputably a
political activity rather than the objective, technocratic exercise it is often portrayed as. At
every step in the process of formulating, interpreting and implementing policy, political
decisions are involved although these are often obscured and presented as value-free and
'scientific'. The intensely political nature of the public policy process can thus be made
explicit through radical policy analysis, and the particular interests presented as universal,
as the 'common good' or the 'public interest', can be exposed.
Policy analysis, it was argued, can be looked upon as a form of discourse analysis. The
debate over section 5 of the Resource Management Act can thus be viewed as a particular
discourse concerned with resource management and environmental regulation in New
Zealand. This discourse encompasses differing ideologies and 'signifying practices'
relevant to specific social actions, in this case, planning in the public domain. By
deconstructing this discourse these ideologies and signifying practices can be made
explicit. The articles presented in the appendices, upon analysis, reveal the debates over
differing ideologies and signifying practices that have occurred, and are still occurring,
over the interpretation of section 5.
The analysis of the debate over the resource management legislation reveals two very
different views ofplanning, each situated within the parameters of the two broad planning
traditions identified earlier in the thesis: societal guidance (reformism) and social
mobilisation (transformation). These differing views ofplanning are founded on
particular political/philosophical rationales for planning action, what Reade (1987)
termed the' fundamental socio-philosophical presuppositions ofplanning'. These
fundamental socio-philosophical presuppositions of planning can be linked to underlying
economic social relations ofproduction, in short, to class relations. In this way, they can
be seen as part of the superstructure of the material base of society - its social relations
and forces ofproduction.
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The New Zealand Government, in its interpretation of the Resource Management Act, has
advocated a 'narrowed' view ofplanning underpinned by a neoliberal ideology associated
with deregulated capitalism. This view, in the main, presents planning as a rational,
depoliticised process undertaken by professional planning experts, and restricts planning
to attempting to internalise (wherever possible) environmental externalities within the
ambit of a deregulated (laissez-faire) market system. The allocation of resources and the
determination of the macro-scale of the economy are largely left to the market, while
planning is relegated to merely attempting to mitigate immediate environmental
disbenefits and providing institutional and infrastructural support to development. Wider
social, cultural, and economic considerations are seen to be external to this 'effects-based'
planning system. This view ofplanning is firmly situated within the tradition of societal
guidance. It implicitly accepts the logic of capitalism (in fact, serves to reinforce it) and
merely attempts to resolve its short-term environmental and socio-economic
contradictions.
The alternate 'holistic' interpretation advanced by the author is founded upon a radically
different vision ofplanning. This view of planning requires a critical reexamination of the
political and socio-economic presuppositions underpinning neoliberal capitalism in light
of the ecological and social contradictions developing within the present mode of
production. Resolution of these contradictions, it is argued, will require a deliberate
reappraisal of the purposes of economic development. It will require deliberation on both
the allocation of resources and the scale of resource use to ensure ecological
sustainability. It will also involve an examination of the broader social, cultural and
economic impacts of capitalist production. For example, the distributional costs and
benefits of resource use, social equity concerns resulting from capital concentration, the
spatial dysfunctions of uneven development, and the socio-economic and cultural
concerns of capital expansion, along with the fundamental class structure, exploitation,
and alienation inherent to the capitalist mode ofproduction.
If the market is incapable of allocating resources and determining the macro-scale of the
economy to ensure the long-term biophysical reproduction of the existing socio-economic
system, then an alternative system must be sought. If capitalism cannot address the
ecological contradiction brought about by the inherent dynamic to expand capital then an
alternative mode ofproduction becomes a necessity. And if the capitalist mode of
production cannot address the fundamental socio-economic dysfunctions afflicting
society, once again an alternative economic system must be sought. This alternative must
be able to address both the social and ecological contradictions developing within the
present system and thus ensure the long-term sustainability of the human appropriation of
nature and the long-term stability of the social relations ofproduction.
This, it is argued, will necessitate a radical reorientation of the present political economy
and a transformation of the capitalist mode ofproduction to a future mode ofproduction
determined not by exchange value 'gone mad' but by the social and ecological realities
facing us in the twentieth first century. These realities involve a recognition of the finite
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limits of the biosphere, both in regards to its finite resource base and to the finite
assimilative capacity for waste products. In essence, it involves a recognition of limits to
the human transformation of nature and to the rights of non-human nature, both species
and ecosystems, for coexistence. It recognises the continued biodiversity and ecological
resilience of the biosphere as necessary for both human survival and human reconciliation
with other nature, as part of nature.
These realities also involve an acceptance that the human appropriation of nature, that
economic development, should be concerned, first and foremost, with satisfying basic
human material needs for all the human population. In other words, the appropriation of
nature should be directed at producing human use-values rather than maximising
exchange-values. The benefits of the immense productivity of socialised labour need to
be generalised throughout the proletariat, being the producers of that social wealth, rather
than expropriated by a small elite of owners of the means ofproduction. In short, the
expropriators must themselves be expropriated and the means ofproduction returned to
social ownership and controL Thence, as Marx stated, the private ownership of nature
will become as foreign as the private ownership of one person by another.
We can conclude that in regard to the three propositions the thesis set out to examine all
three can be answered in the affirmative. Firstly, radical planning thought, although often
obscured, does possess a rich history and has had a profound and lasting influence on
modem planning theory and practice since its inception at the close of the nineteenth
century. Although its existence has gone largely unacknowledged by orthodox planning
its presence indicates that historically there has always been a resistance to the
exploitation of capitalist class society and a search for a better, more sustainable mode of
production.
Secondly, radical planning theory has a positive role to play in contemporary (and future)
planning aimed at the transformation of the capitalist mode ofproduction. The social and
ecological contradictions inherent to capitalism, and the inability of reformist approaches
to resolve these contradictions, provides a powerful rationale for adopting a radical
approach to planning. Furthermore, Gramscian transition theory provides a strong
conceptual basis for a theory ofplanning, a methodology of radical planning practice
aimed at the transformation of the capitalist mode ofproduction. This is posited as an
improvement on Friedmann's attempt at providing a theory of transformative planning.
Lastly, this theory can be applied to a concrete practice of radical planning that may
contribute to a progressive challenge to capitalist hegemony. Whether this challenge
escalates into fundamental socio-economic change remains to be seen. History will be the
judge of this. Radical planners can, however, effectively continue the tradition laid down
by those earlier proponents of radical change, and search for alternatives to the
exploitation of human and non-human nature inherent to the capitalist mode of
production. In this way, they can be part of the task of 'men making their own history'
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